Japan and Canada in Comparative Perspective

Economics and Politics;

Regions, Places and People

A Collection of Papers from an International Conference held in Tokyo, May 2015
“Japan and Canada in Comparative Perspective: Economics and Politics; Regions, Places and People”

A Collection of Papers from an International Conference held in Tokyo, May 2015, organized jointly by the Japan Studies Association of Canada (JSAC), the Japanese Association for Canadian Studies (JACS) and the Japan-Canada Interdisciplinary Research Network on Gender, Diversity and Tohoku Reconstruction (JCIRN).

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Editors’ Preface

The twelve papers contained in this collection were first presented at the International Conference on “Culture, Identity and Citizenship in Japan and Canada” held in Tokyo between May 20-23, 2015 at the Embassy of Canada to Japan, and Chuo University Tokyo. The conference was organized jointly by the Japan Studies Association of Canada (JSAC), the Japanese Association for Canadian Studies (JACS) and the Japan-Canada Interdisciplinary Research Network on Gender, Diversity and Tohoku Reconstruction (JCIRN). Other papers delivered at the Conference have been published separately as David W. Edgington, Norio Ota, Nobuyuki Sato and Jackie F. Steele (eds.), Culture, Identity and Citizenship in Japan and Canada, Research Report No. 59, Institute of Social Studies, The University of Tokyo, 2016.

The papers here represent studies from a wide array of social science disciplines, including economics, political science, cultural studies, cultural geography and anthropology. For the most part they all deal with either Japanese or Canadian issues in a comparative perspective, which was a major theme of the Tokyo conference.

For instance, the first section on Economics and Politics in Japan examines aspects of these themes by contrasting Japan with other countries, interestingly in certain cases with Canada. Brian K. MacLean opening paper re-visits Japan’s “lost decade” of the 1990s, and asks the question: “Was poorly conceived Japanese financial policies, especially interest rate policy, responsible at that time for shifting the economy from ‘bubble’ conditions into a sharp recession and slow growth period thereafter?” Using Canadian experience as a comparator of how interest rate policy has been used as a way of managing the economy, he argues that Japanese policy making was fairly mainstream and should not be seen as surprising. Moreover, with hindsight Japan’s approach to addressing its stock market and property “bubbles” in the late 1980s should have utilized what he terms “macro-prudential policies”, rather than dealing with this problem by interest rate hikes alone. Masato Kamikubo addresses the current Constitutional reform debates in Japan, including whether or not to reform the Japanese Upper House of Parliament, the House of Councillors. His study compares Japan’s reform options with the structure of the German and Canadian Upper Houses, and he contends that these international models should also be considered in any Constitutional reform program. The last paper in this section by Wei Liu uses a multi-year international database profiling civil society organizations to look at how these are shaped by the political and social environments in Japan, the USA and China. Identifying that there are sharp differences in the conditions of civil society in these three nations, his analysis reveals interesting patterns in the profiles of Civil Society Organizations (e.g. non-profits), especially in terms of their policy focus as well as capacity and resource issues. Overall, he argues that the particular style of national government in each country—liberal democratic in the case of the USA, democratic but with significant intervention in the case of Japan, and a government overly concerned with economic growth and political stability in the case of China—explains differences found in the data.
The second section of this collection examines particular Regions, Places and People in Japan and Canada. Anthony Rausch considers government programs that try to encourage firms and people to move from the big cities along the *Tokaido* belt of Japan (Tokyo-Nagoya-Osaka) into more rural areas such as Aomori in northern Tohoku region. He maintains that incentive programs to encourage regional revitalization are doomed to failure unless they can incorporate local cultural traditions, especially the way in which regional populations conceive of their local identity. The situation of rural Japan is also taken up by Tom Waldichuck’s investigation of residential developments on the fringe of large cities—often called “peri-urban” places - in both Japan and Canada. The study is based on his own direct observations of Kamloops, a regional city in British Columbia, and Ushiku in Chiba, lying on the outer edge of the large Tokyo metropolitan region. Waldichuck argues that Canadian residents of rural-urban fringe often have an idyllic image of living in a substantial house in a semi-rural setting—a rather “romantic and nostalgic idea” that originated in Europe. By contrast, Japanese people tend to associate residential nostalgia with *furusato* (hometown) villages much further away from the Tokyo region than the immediate urban-rural fring. Indeed, many people reside in Ushiku because it was and still is an affordable place to live in, and a relatively convenient place from which to commute into Tokyo, rather than providing feelings of a rural idyll. Akira Tabayashi and his collaborators similarly focus on rural places in their study of trends leading towards the “commodification” of agricultural areas by urban residents, meaning the tendency to introduce added-value activities such as hobby farms, farmers’ markets, wine tourism and so on. While these developments are apparent in both Japan and Canada he finds that the commodification of rural spaces in British Columbia (BC) is to-date more advanced and diversified than that of Japan, and plays an important role in sustaining the BC rural economy and society. Philip Seaton’s paper explores the options available to municipalities when they seek to create new sites of heritage tourism. A particular program of “place branding” of Japanese rural towns has been through “contents tourism” (*kontentsu tsūrizumu*), which has built on the trend of visitors to visit locations associated with well-known historical characters or stories, usually connected with exhibits in local museums. Seaton finds that heritage sites can play a role in attracting tourists, or more widely help towns through identity creation and in educating school children about their local history.

Catherine Kingfisher reports on an interesting experiment in urban living; specifically, the Kankanmori Collective Housing Community located in the western suburbs of Tokyo. She discusses how the Japanese government has taken steps to incorporate “happiness measures” into its policy-making processes, following other countries. She argues, however, that Japanese culture more easily associates happiness at the collective level rather than with individual happiness. The Kankanmori project appears to allow residents to simultaneously participate in collective living in the same building as well as maintaining some privacy and independence. Millie Creighton narrates the stories of the lives of two Canadians—Raymond Moriyama - a Japanese Canadian who was interned with his family as a youth during the war years; and the other, William Allister, a White Canadian who was taken as a Prisoner of War by the Japanese and spent over three and a half years imprisoned in P.O.W. camps, first in Hong Kong and then in Japan. Her paper also reveals also that venue of our international conference where many of these papers were delivered—the Canadian Embassy in Tokyo, Japan -was designed by Raymond Moriyama.
as a “tree house”. It has also been a venue for William Allister’s art, which has been exhibited in the embassy building.

The final set of papers all deal with native indigenous peoples, either in Japan or Canada. Jeffry Joseph Gayman considers the question of how research into Ainu culture in Hokkaido might help the cause of Ainu people. He reflects on his own proposed study and provides thoughtful insights into the challenges of collaborative and participatory indigenous cultural research in Japan. Shunwa Honda reports on his study of the ideological role of subsistence activities of indigenous Inuit people in Nunavut Territory, Canada, and compares these with the subsistence activities of the “Kalaallit” Inuit of south Greenland. He finds that subsistence activities, such as capturing seal, are not only a means of livelihood in Nunavut Inuit society, but they also take on importance as an ethnic marker in political negotiations with government agencies and contiguous indigenous groups. By comparison, subsistence activities in Greenland play a role in sustaining livelihoods, but are seldom, if ever, employed as a political tool. The final paper by Mikako Yamaguchi examines the Kaska indigenous people of western Canada, their hunting practices and their special relationship with the moose animal wildlife, which form an important source of food. Her study indicates that the Kaska people differentiate between “animals that eat other animals” and “animals that do not eat other animals”, and that their hunting behavior is quite different in each case.

The editors would like to thank all the contributors for preparing their very interesting papers for this collection. We also thank our research assistant Natasha Fox for her hard work in editing these reports for publication. Both the conference and this publication were funded by a generous grant provided by the Japan Foundation.

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SECTION A

ECONOMICS AND POLITICS IN JAPAN
1. Japan’s Lost Decade: A Canadian Perspective

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Abstract
This paper evaluates claims that the poor economic performance of Japan during the “Lost Decade” (of approximately 1992-2002) was the result of glaring errors in macroeconomic policy that policy makers in a high-income developed country should not have made. It accepts that Japan suffered from a serious output gap (that is, a shortfall of aggregate spending) over the period of the Lost Decade, and a serious asset price bubble leading into the Lost Decade, and that better macroeconomic policy decisions, both before and during the Lost Decade, would have resulted in substantially better Japanese economic performance from 1992 to 2002. It argues, however, that the mistakes of Japanese economic policy-makers were rooted in widely accepted economic ideas of the time and in political realities not unlike those faced by many other high-income countries. It illustrates the largely understandable nature of Japanese macroeconomic policy mistakes with examples and comparisons drawn primarily from Canada’s experience over the same time period and later.

Keywords: Japanese economy, Lost Decade, monetary policy, fiscal policy, Canadian economy

1. Introduction
Japan’s “Lost Decade,” the period of recessions and slow growth from the early 1990s to about 2002, has been the subject of a large number of economic studies. Broadly speaking these studies divide into two types: one type of study emphasizes demand-side factors behind the Lost Decade and the other emphasizes supply-side factors.

This paper will focus on the claims of a subset of studies that emphasize demand-side factors behind Japan’s Lost Decade. In particular it will consider the claims of studies—see Kingston (2013), Lincoln (2011), Posen (2010), and Wakatabe (2015)—that argue not only that the poor economic performance of Japan during this period was the result of macroeconomic policy decisions but also that these decisions were glaring errors that policy makers in a high-income developed country should not have made.

The approach of this paper will be as follows. First, it will accept—see also MacLean (2005) and MacLean (2006)—that Japan suffered from a serious output gap over the
period of the Lost Decade, and a serious asset price bubble leading into the Lost Decade. (The concept of an output gap is explained, for example, in Chapter 7 of Frank et al., 2012). Second, it will accept that better macroeconomic policy decisions, both before and during the Lost Decade, would have resulted in substantively better Japanese economic performance from 1992 to 2002. Third, it will argue that the mistakes of Japanese economic policy-makers were largely understandable. That is, the mistakes were rooted in widely accepted economic ideas of the time and in political realities not unlike those faced by many other high-income countries. Fourth, the paper will illustrate the largely understandable nature of Japanese macroeconomic policy mistakes with examples and comparisons drawn primarily from Canada’s experience over the same time period and later.

The main body of the paper is divided into four sections. The first section will look at Japanese macroeconomic policy making during the latter half of the 1980s when Japan experienced its so-called bubble economy period. The second section will look at monetary policy during the period of the Lost Decade. The third section of the main body of the paper will look at fiscal policy during the Lost Decade. The fourth and final section of the paper is the conclusion.

2. Macroeconomic Policy During the Bubble Economy Period

During the latter half of the 1980s Japan experienced an asset price bubble of spectacular magnitude. More precisely, it experienced asset price inflation involving both the stock market and the real estate market over approximately the same time period, with the stock market bubble bursting before the real estate bubble did.

Some critics have blamed Japanese policy-makers for the bubble by attributing the bubble to the low interest rates maintained by the Bank of Japan through much of the latter half of the 1980s. Some go further to blame not just the low interest rates but also Japan’s acceptance of the Plaza Accord (1985) to bring about appreciation of the yen which in turn triggered a slowdown in the Japanese economy that low interest rates were intended to counter.

There are at least four problems with this narrative. First, while the Plaza Accord hastened the appreciation of the yen, the fact is that at the time it was implemented the U.S. dollar was over-valued against a range of currencies. The situation in 1982 was similar to the situation that arose again in 2003. If we look at the Canadian dollar in the post-1984 and the post-2003 periods we also see massive appreciation of the currency against the U.S. dollar.

Second, at the time, and even today, the consensus was that monetary policy—interest rate-setting in this case—should be concerned with controlling the rate of inflation as measured by the growth rate of the consumer price index (CPI). Throughout the period of the bubble economy, Japan’s rate of CPI inflation remained low. The flip side of this is that if policy makers were to have done something, then they should have used not tightening of monetary policy but rather they should have used what has come to be understood as “macro-prudential policy”. That is, instead of raising interest rates the government should
have tightened up on various financial market regulations to discourage speculation in the stock and real estate markets. But macro-prudential policy for targeting asset price bubbles has only moved into the mainstream of macroeconomic discourse in the last decade or less.

We have seen macro-prudential policy used, for example, in Canada to keep a housing bubble in check since about 2007 as the U.S. housing bubble started to burst. Canadian policy markers had begun to loosen rules on mortgage lending in Canada as the United States loosened its own rules during its housing boom. When the U.S. boom turned to crash, the Canadian policymakers reversed course. And this macro-prudential policy has been the main line of attack against the ongoing tendency for a Canadian housing bubble.

Third, and related to the second point, the attitude of policy makers to bubbles was much more relaxed in the 1980s. While some economists and the general public attributed the Great Depression to the Great Crash, following the research of Friedman and Schwartz (1963), the Great Depression has come to be seen in the economics mainstream as the result of the Federal Reserve allowing a collapse of the money supply and not due to the Great Crash. This tendency of the mainstream to downplay asset bubbles was further reinforced by postwar economic history. The U.S. macro-economist Dornbusch (2002, 65) famously opined of the United States that no postwar economic expansion ever died a natural death—every expansion was killed by the U.S. Federal Reserve. What he meant is that postwar recessions were caused by interest rate hikes aimed at reducing the inflation rate. Implicitly, he was saying that the postwar recessions had nothing to do with asset price collapses. And his saying applied not just to the United States. It fit the experience of Canada and many other OECD countries.

And what really led mainstream economists to downplay bubbles was the U.S. experience contemporaneous with Japan’s bubble economy period while Alan Greenspan was Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve. In 1987 the United States experienced a sharp and sudden decline of the stock market. But that stock market crash did not produce a major or even a minor U.S. recession. The Fed cut interest rates and the U.S. economy barely slowed.

There were economists who studied bubbles, and who emphasized the significance of their collapse, and the work of some of these economists, such as Minsky (1986) and Kindleberger (1978), received much greater respect from the mainstream of economics after the collapse of the U.S. housing bubble and the outbreak of the financial crisis of 2007-2008. And it was only in 2013 that an economist who had done work on bubbles received the Nobel Prize in Economics. It was Shiller (2000), who had first attracted public attention by the timely release of his book Irrational Exuberance just as the U.S. dot.com bubble of the late 1990s was on its last legs. During the Japanese bubble, as during the U.S. housing bubble and during bubbles throughout history, there was no shortage of plausible stories explaining why high and rising asset prices were justified.

Fourth, the connection between low interest rates and housing market bubbles is not as automatic as many commentators imagine. For example, as MacGee (2009) discusses, the path of interest rates in the United States and Canada during the period from the early 2000s to 2006 was not much different, but the U.S. experienced a massive housing bubble and Canada did not.
So, yes, the bubble in Japan should have been countered. But it should have been countered with macro-prudential policies, not with interest rate hikes. And the fact that the Japanese policy market did not respond in this way does not point to any extraordinary degree of wrongheadedness or ignorance on their part. Rather, focusing on inflation control and more or less ignoring asset price bubbles was widely regarded at the time as best-practice central banking.

There is one other charge that the critics level against Japanese macroeconomic policymaking or, more precisely, monetary policy, in the bubble economy period. It is that while the Bank of Japan was slow to raise interest rates to counter the bubble, when it did eventually raise interest rates, it over-reacted and by doing so it made the collapse of the bubble worse than it had to be.

The problem with this assertion is that it ignores other reasons for why the Bank of Japan would have raised interest rates when it did. Recall that central bankers see their mandate as controlling inflation. At the time, this meant keeping inflation low. According to the theory to which central bankers gravitated after the abandonment of monetarism, there are two ways that inflation can escalate in normal times. First, the economy can get into an expansionary gap situation. In the product market this means that actual output exceeds potential output. In the labour market, this translates into an actual unemployment rate that is below the natural rate. And Japan’s actual unemployment rate, low by international standards at the worst of times, fell to its lowest rate in years by the late 1980s. Any normal central banker of the era would have taken that as a sign to raise interest rates.

This is what happened in Canada at the time. The unemployment rate, which had been at 11.3% in 1983 as the expansion began, had fallen to 7.5% by 1989. And this 7.5% unemployment rate was considered by the Bank of Canada to be too low, as a threat to the moderate inflation rate of 4%. So the Bank of Canada began to raise interest rates. In fact, the goal was not just to prevent inflation from accelerating but to bring it down.

I mentioned a second way that the inflation rate could accelerate. This is due to what is known as a “negative” inflation shock. And what happened in 1990 or so is that oil prices shot up in connection with the first Gulf War, making for a negative inflation shock. So central banks responded with interest rate hikes, further interest rate hikes in the case of countries that were seen by the central bankers as facing an expansionary gap.

I think that central banks overdid their interest rate hikes. They underestimated the damage that the hikes would do to employment and output. I was even active in calling for the government to avoid re-appointing Bank of Canada Governor John Crow for a second term of office. But the issue is not whether the Bank of Japan overdid it. The point is whether the Bank of Japan did something far out of line with what was considered in the central banking community as best practice. And I doubt that can be said to be the case.

3. Monetary Policy during the Lost Decade

The critics claim that the Bank of Japan was too slow to cut interest rates to zero, that it erred by hiking its key policy rate in 2000, that it was too slow to adopt unconventional
monetary policy, and it should have know better about all three of these decisions. Again, my standpoint is to agree with the critics about causality— that a more rapid reduction of interest rates in first half of the 1990s, holding back on the interest rate hike in 2000, and a more rapid adoption of unconventional monetary policies would have produced better economic outcomes. What I would like to point out is that it is not clear that other central bankers would have done things differently.

3.1. The pace of interest rate cuts in the first half of the 1990s

Let us first consider the pace of the interest rate cuts. The official discount rate, the key policy rate for the Bank of Japan in the first half of the 1990s, was over 6% at its peak in 1992. It was 0.5% in 1995. So the rate was cut by over 6 percentage points in three years. If you have a strong tendency to cut by 0.25 percentage points every time you cut your key policy rate, which is fairly standard for central banks (e.g., it is true for the Bank of Canada), and if you cut eight times a year, which is also fairly standard (e.g., it is true for the Bank of Canada), then it would take a year to cut the key policy rate by two percentage points, two years to cut it by four percentage points, and three years to cut by six percentage points. In other words, if you were to have predicted how long it would take to reach a key policy rate of 0.5 from a starting point of 6.5, with the Bank of Japan cutting rates by the Bank of Canada rule, you would guess three years, the exact number of years it actually took.

Now let us consider how low the Bank of Japan cuts interest rates and how unprecedented it was at the time to cut interest rates to as low as 0.5 percentage points. In April 2009, the Bank of Canada cut its overnight rate to 0.25%, which was termed the effective lower boundary that interest rates could fall to. On its way, the Bank of Canada reduced the rate below 1% for the first time since the Bank's formation during the Great Depression of the 1930s. We experienced many central banks cutting their rates to nearly zero in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, but the fact that near-zero interest rates became commonplace at that juncture in history should not blind us to how unusual near-zero interest rates were before then and how rare, even revolutionary, it was for the Bank of Japan (BOJ) to take interest rates as low as it did.

And even though the economy was demonstrating strength in the mid-1990s the Bank of Japan did not hike rates.

It may be instructive to draw a comparison with the Bank of Canada. It was slow to cut rates in the 1990s. The unemployment rate rose to over 11% in the early 1990s recession. Under Bank of Canada Governor Gordon Theissen there was even a rate hike, which was hard to explain, in the mid-1990s. As late as 1997, the unemployment rate was over 9%. The general trend was for rate cuts, of course, but they were very gradual.

3.2. The interest rate hike of 2000

Next let us consider the Japanese rate hike of 2000. It seems to have triggered another recession. However, there are three things to keep in mind. First, this was not a series of interest rate hikes. It was a single hike of 0.25%. Consumption and investment are not generally hypersensitive to interest rates. It would have been hard to predict that a rate
hike would have had such an impact. (It also seems likely that, especially given that experience of Japan in the global recession of 2008-2009, that global macroeconomic conditions around the time of the BOJ rate hike may have played a quite significant role in the subsequent downturn).

Second, until one has experienced near-zero interest rates over a long period it can be heard to imagine the problems they create. In particular, they create problems for retirement incomes, and this creates pressure for central banks to err on the side of raising interest rates whenever interest rates are very low.

There is also the notion of a natural rate of interest, generally thought to be about 2% or so.

In the case of the Bank of Canada, it kept the overnight rate target, its key policy rate, at 0.25% for one year, from April 2009 to April 2010. But as soon as the financial markets stabilized and the economy began to recover, it raised interest rates in steps to 1%, and would have liked to have kept raising them if conditions had permitted. But the global economic outlook refused to cooperate.

Third, other central banks were raising interest rates in 2000 when the BOJ made its much-criticized rate hike. There was a boom associated with information technology. And other central banks, such as the Bank of Canada, were raising interest rates by a lot.

So, yes, the BOJ interest rate hike of 2000 was a mistake. But when seen in an international context it is a more understandable mistake than it seems from the accounts of the critics.

3.3. The adoption of unconventional monetary policy

What about the charge that the Bank of Japan was slow to adopt unconventional monetary policy?

One point to keep in mind is that the 1990s was a period when mainstream macroeconomists were touting loudly the merits of independent central banks. There was a famous study—see Alesina and Summers (1993)—that correlated central bank independence with inflation rate performance showing, or at least claiming to show, that high central bank independence was related to lower inflation. Among the central banks, the Bank of Japan was viewed as being one of the least independent central banks in the OECD. And, if the Alesina-Summers analysis was correct, this lack of independence created the risk that Japan would eventually be punished with high inflation if the weakly independent status of the BOJ was allowed to continue. Now the process by which the BOJ obtained greater independence was a result of new legislation. It is a complicated one that I tackled back in the 1990s in a joint paper (Bowles and MacLean, 1998) with Paul Bowles of the University of Northern British Columbia. It is useful to keep in mind, however, that the new BOJ law was in line with current research in macroeconomics.

How is the new BOJ law relevant here? Well, central banks are conservative institutions that tend to be concerned with keeping inflation low and little else. Governments, through their treasury branches (in the Japanese case, the Ministry of
Finance; in the Canadian one, the Department of Finance) exercise some degree of control over their central banks. They are inclined to use that control to push the central bank to show some concern for economic growth, low unemployment and the like. So if you wanted to see a central bank implement unconventional monetary policy, you would generally want the central bank to be subject to pressure from the treasury - the Ministry of Finance in the Japanese case. From this standpoint, the timing of the BOJ law was most unfortunate.

Another thing is that the Bank of Japan would have had reason to think that fiscal policy would be effective. As we will see in the next section, a tightening of fiscal policy in 1997 was very effective at inadvertently producing a recession. But, more to the point, a reversal of austerity policy produced a recovery of the economy. And the Japanese debt to GDP ratio was still relatively low (compared to today) before the 2000-2001 recession.

And there were reasons to think that unconventional monetary policy would not be effective. Some of the arguments in favour of what is now known as quantitative easing (QE)—see MacLean (2015)—assumed that if central banks expanded the reserves of the banking system by creating more base money the commercial banks would automatically boost their loans and this would boost private-sector investment spending and hence boost aggregate demand. This does not seem to have been what actually happened with QE in Japan during 2001-2006, with QE in the United States and in Europe since 2009, or with QE in Japan as part of Abenomics after 2012. So the BOJ was right to be skeptical.

One mechanism of unconventional monetary policy that can work to boost aggregate demand is monetizing the government debt. But this is still a semi-forbidden topic in mainstream macroeconomic policy circles, something so scandalous that central banks are loath to acknowledge engaging in it. What it involves is the central bank buying up the debt of the government. As the central bank is part of the government, the government gets to finance a portion of its spending for “free.” In effect, the government gets to print up money, so to speak, to finance a portion of spending. Monetizing the government debt can work as an unconventional monetary policy if it encourages the government to engage in more expansionary fiscal policy than otherwise.

Another way that unconventional monetary policy can work is if it is used to achieve exchange rate depreciation. As with monetizing the debt, this is something that is generally frowned upon in central banking circles—in this case as a type of beggar-thy-neighbour policy. In fact, this is probably the most important way in which QE had worked to date. This could be overlooked in the 2001-2006 period because Japan did not experience a major yen depreciation then. But 2003 and after was a period in which the previously over-valued U.S. dollar depreciated against a range of currencies including the Canadian dollar. The fact that the yen stayed relatively stable against the U.S. dollar and did not appreciate drastically, as did the Euro and the Canadian dollar, was a considerable achievement that worked in favour of Japan’s net exports and Japanese economic growth.

But QE cannot achieve exchange rate depreciation against the U.S. dollar if the United States is dead set against it. Just because the United States tolerated measures to weaken the yen (relative to trend) in 2004, say, does not mean that Japan would have gotten away with deliberate yen depreciation at earlier junctures.
Two other ways unconventional monetary policy can work were actually pioneered by the BOJ, so far as I can tell. One of these is the practice of flattening the yield curve. This requires that the central bank buy not just short-term debt, which has been the general practice of central bankers in high-income countries, but also long-term government debt. So, although short-term rates are at zero and cannot fall significantly, the long-term rates, which may be more important for spending in the economy, may have considerable room to fall.

The other is the practice that has come to be known as forward guidance. In Japan, this took the form of a zero-interest rate commitment, or ZIRC. Under this practice, the central bank not only lowers the key policy rate to zero, but simultaneously commits to maintaining the rate at zero until such time as macroeconomic conditions warrant it. This is another way that interest rates further out of the yield curve can be lowered. For example, if the interest rate is now zero and it is almost certain to be zero two years from now, then the two-year rate of interest will be zero.

3.4. Summing up: monetary policy during the lost decade

To conclude this section, let me summarize. First, the pace of Japanese interest rate cuts to the mid-1990s was in line with general practice at that time. Second, although the interest rate hike in 2000 was a mistake, it is easy to understand why the BOJ would think a single hike of a quarter of a percentage point would not have a big, negative impact on the overall economy. Third, the BOJ was right to be skeptical about some of the arguments in favour of unconventional monetary policy. The most obvious benefits to QE were taboo ones—monetization of the government debt and beggar-thy-neighbour exchange rate depreciation. Other effective components—flattening the yield curve and the ZIRC—had to be developed at the BOJ itself. And the new BOJ law, adapted in line with mainstream macroeconomic research, had the unfortunate effect of shielding the BOJ from pressure from the government to act sooner.

4. Fiscal Policy During the Lost Decade

The critics point to the tightening of fiscal policy in 1997 as a huge mistake. I would agree it was a huge mistake. It is a mistake comparable to Roosevelt’s decision to tighten fiscal policy in 1937, the decision of various European countries to tighten fiscal policy in 2010, and the decision of the current Japanese government to tighten fiscal policy in April 2014 with a hike of the sales tax from 5 to 8 percent.

The issue with the tightening of fiscal policy is that its impact depends on what else happens at the same time. The U.S. President Bill Clinton pursued a fairly tight fiscal policy and was very popular for so doing. He succeeded because the Federal Reserve under Alan Greenspan decided to ignore the mainstream evidence about the natural rate of unemployment in the United States being over 6%—see MacLean and Osberg (1996) for critical perspectives on the concept of the natural rate of unemployment—and kept interest rates low even as the unemployment rate went to 4%. The expansion of employment and output worked through the well-known automatic stabilizers to keep the
U.S. federal government budget in surplus and to offset any consequences for output of tight Clinton administration fiscal policies. In Canada, Liberal Finance Minister Paul Martin had the good fortune to initiate quite draconian spending cuts in the name of government budget deficit cutting against the backdrop of surging net exports as a result of the depreciating Canadian dollar and the U.S. economic boom under Greenspan's unexpected shift in U.S. monetary policy.

In Japan, there were no such “divine winds” that came along to offset the tightening of fiscal policy. On the contrary, there was a string of financial institution failures that reduced lending and hence investment in the economy, and then the dramatic East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98—on which, see MacLean (1999)—and the crisis produced big drops in the incomes of several of Japan's important regional trading partners, and hence in Japanese exports and output.

It could be said that what is most remarkable about Japanese fiscal policy in the 1990s is not so much that the government once moved to tighten fiscal policy but rather than it was willing and able politically to run such large budget deficits for so long.

It is important to recognize that when the bubble burst the government moved fairly quickly to counter it with expansionary fiscal policy. Compare this to the Canadian situation after the 2007-2008 financial crisis that peaked in September 2008. Canada was in a general election with voting taking place in October 2008. Every single major political party was on record saying that there would be no deficits if they were elected. This continued even as it became more and more clear that a global recession was in the cards, and that budgets would automatically go into deficit through the operation of automatic stabilizers. After the election, even as the global recession hit, and output in Canada sank, the minority federal Conservative government refused to act. The opposition Liberal and NDP parties began to push for fiscal stimulus, and by January the government relented. But this was in the face of the government possibly losing power to the opposition parties as well as due to international pressure, as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was pushing countries to run deficits of 2% of GDP in coordination.

One final point to realize is that Japan’s fiscal situation lends itself to exaggeration, and it is plausible to conclude that this would make Japanese policy makers more cautious than otherwise about running government budget deficits and running up the government debt to GDP ratio. One reason that Japan’s government debt to GDP ratio is not as dire as fiscal conservatives would have you believe is that the net debt to GDP ratio is much lower than the gross debt to GDP ratio, and it is the net debt to GDP ratio that is more relevant. The net debt to GDP ratio takes into account that the government has not just debts, but also very considerable financial assets (e.g., over US$1 trillion of foreign exchange reserves). For many countries, the net and gross debt to GDP ratios are not much different, as the government has no significant financial assets; but there is a huge difference between net and gross government debt in the Japanese case.

The other reason that Japan’s government debt situation is prone to exaggeration is that the debt to GDP ratio is a weaker proxy for the burden of the government debt than is the ratio of interest payments on the debt relative to GDP. Interest payments on the government debt depend, of course, not just on the government debt but also on the
average interest rate paid on the debt. You could say that when we use the government debt to GDP ratio to compare the burden of the government debt across countries we are implicitly assuming that the interest rates on debt of the countries being compared are more-or-less the same. Economists with specialized knowledge can say that Japanese policymakers are responding to the wrong indicators of the fiscal situation. But politicians have to respond to the public. And if the public, responding to the media, see a bigger problem than the economists with the specialized fiscal knowledge, it is not a sign that the politicians and bureaucrats are particularly hopeless, but is rather an indication that they are subject to the same pressures and exhibit the same shortcomings that we witness in many jurisdictions around the world.

5. Conclusion

This paper has stated and evaluated a particular set of claims about Japanese macroeconomic policy during and leading into Japan’s Lost Decade. I have accepted the Keynesian framework of the authors of the claims but I have presented evidence that the policy mistakes were less obviously inexcusable than the authors of the claims imply. I have made the particular point of providing relevant evidence from Canada’s experience.

I have focused my attention on three sets of alleged policy mistakes: macroeconomic policy mistakes leading up to the bubble and its crash, monetary policy mistakes during the lost decade, and fiscal policy mistakes during the lost decade.

Regarding policy mistakes during the bubble economy period, I have emphasized that central banks during the bubble economy period and after used interest rates to control inflation, not asset price bubbles. In the 1980s, the received wisdom was that asset price bubbles could be safely ignored. That view has changed, and now the standard view is that bubbles warrant attention but attention in the form of macro-prudential regulation of finance. In response to the view that the BOJ was too aggressive with interest rate hikes, I argue that the hikes had another, or at least an additional, rationale—that is, the Japanese economy was seen as overheating and in need of cooling off, and in need of someone taking away the “punch bowl”.

Regarding monetary policy mistakes during the Lost Decade, I pointed out that the pace of BOJ rate reductions in the first half of the 1990s was not unusually slow, that reducing the policy rate to zero was actually a daring move, that raising the interest rate in 2000 had more dire consequences for the economy than most economists would have predicted, and I provided various neglected reasons for why the BOJ did not resort to unconventional monetary policy until 2001.

Regarding fiscal policy, I noted that the 1997 fiscal tightening has many parallels in other countries and times, that the way the fiscal burden is reported encouraged Japanese policy makers to over-react to government budget deficits, and that their tolerance of budget deficits is actually more surprising than the fact that they were not bolder in their pursuit of expansionary fiscal policy.

In terms of methodology, it has already been mentioned that the paper adopts a Keynesian macroeconomic framework and that it seeks to understand Japanese
macroeconomic policy making by situating it in an international context, in part by using Canadian evidence. Another feature of the methodology has been the application of the principle that decisions, including policy decisions, are to be judged not by their outcomes but rather by the knowledge available to decision-makers at the time the decisions were made. This is more than recognizing, as the saying goes, that hindsight is 20/20. It means bringing to bear knowledge of economic history and the history of economic thought to put decisions in context.

I would like to conclude with two comments about the significance of this paper. The first point is that indirectly this paper has highlighted features of mainstream macroeconomics thinking that influenced Japanese decision making for the worse but which have since fallen out of favour. There was once an overwhelming consensus in favour of low inflation. Now there is more acceptance of moderate inflation, and much greater concern about avoiding deflation. There was once a laissez-faire attitude to asset price bubbles. Now there is widespread acceptance of the need for macro-prudential regulation to keep bubbles in check. There was once a consensus in favour of very independent central banks. Now there is a growing recognition that an overly independent central bank might be overly concerned with inflation and inadequately concerned with deflation.

The second point is that there is a danger of exaggerating the incompetence of policymakers in a period such as Japan’s Lost Decade. It suggests that in jurisdictions with “normal” policy makers, the same mistakes would never be made, and could lead to a dangerous complacency. Indeed, to some degree this lesson has already been learned, for example, central bankers such as Ben Bernanke have discovered that dealing with the collapse of an asset price bubble was not as easy as he imagined it would be.
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2. The Possibility of Reform to Japan’s Upper House Requires Amendments to the Constitution

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Abstract

The objective of this paper is to examine how the Japanese government strategically realises amendment of the Constitution of Japan. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is seeking the reform of the war-renouncing constitution, especially the reform of Article 9. However, it splits Japanese public opinion in two. It is difficult for Abe to overcome the strong opposition to constitutional reform.

The argument of this paper is that the Japanese government should focus on promoting administrative reforms that require constitutional reform. This paper offers the suggestion that “the reform of House of Councillors” would be a good first step toward constitutional reform. Political issues that need constitutional reform are not only remilitarisation but also human rights issues and public administration.

With regard to human rights issues, Komeito claims to add “new human rights” as personal rights, including the right to privacy, and environmental rights to the Constitution, a move called “Kaken”. Komeito, a member of the coalition government, strategically thinks Kaken is more acceptable for Japanese people than the amendment of Article 9, so it is possible to be an opening gun of constitutional reform.

On the other hand, this paper examines the reform of the House of Councillors as a starting point of constitutional reform. Japan adopts a bicameral system in which there are two independent assemblies. The problem of Japan’s National Diet is that Upper House’s power is too strong compared with other democratic nations. For instance, when decisions by the Representatives and Councillors differ, a bill cannot be passed without two-thirds approval in the House of Representatives. Japan’s Upper House was established as the House of Peers in the Empire of Japan. After the Second World War, the House of Peers was replaced by the House of Councillors. Nevertheless, strong power of the House has still remained. In particular, since the 1990s the government has often fallen into difficulties in managing the Diet because of the “Twisted Diet” in which the ruling party secures majority seats in Lower House, while the opposition party obtains majority seats in the Upper House. Therefore, political parties, especially Ishinno-toh (Japan Restoration Party), strongly argue that the House of Councillors should be abolished and a unicameral system should be introduced.
However, the argument of Ishinno-toh, which was originally a regional party, seems strange because its main policy is decentralisation. In the world, almost all federations, such as the USA, Germany, Canada, and so on, adopt a bicameral system, and the Upper Houses in the federation are the house for regional representation. Therefore, it seems to be natural for Ishinno-toh to pursue reform of the Upper House. Concretely, it should claim the Upper House should be the house for representatives of local governments.

This paper will explore the possibilities of Upper House reform in Japan comparing it with the Canadian parliamentary system.

**Keywords:** Amendment of the Constitution of Japan, Article 9, new human rights, the reform of House of Councillor

1. **Introduction**

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe achieved victory in Japan’s general election in December 2014. It was Abe’s fourth straight victory in a national election. The Abe government accomplished a secure majority in both the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors. Prime Minister Abe recognized his government’s policies were supported by the Japanese voters.¹ The Abe government has already passed the “Specified Secrets Protection Bill”² through the National Diet and established a Japanese version of the “National Security Council” (NSC)³ together with the collective security system.⁴ He targeted reforms of the Constitution of Japan, which is called a “war-renouncing constitution”, especially the reform of Article 9 (Abe, 2006). However, this has split Japanese public opinion in two and it may be difficult for Abe to overcome strong opposition to constitutional reform.

In order to decrease Japanese people’s opposition, the Komeito Party, a member of the coalition government, claims that it will add new articles (Kaken) to the Constitution,⁵ such as “environmental rights”, “privacy rights”, “the right to know”, “intellectual property rights”, “criminal victims’ rights”, and so on. The Abe government expects to be able to amend Article 9 of the Constitution because Kaken will result in a decrease of opposition to constitutional reform. On the other hand, the Social Democratic Party and the Communist Party, which have previously protected the Constitution of Japan, oppose Kaken.⁶

The main argument of this paper is that there are many political issues that require constitutional reform, including remilitarisation, human rights issues and public administration. It is suggested that “Reform of the House of Councillors” is a good example of a significant political issue that requires constitutional reform.

This paper is divided into three parts. Firstly, many political system reforms that need constitutional amendments are explored. These include “reform of the bicameral national assembly” (Abolition of the House of Councillors), the problem of “the Diet session”, the introduction of a “directly elected prime minister”, the introduction of doshusei (regional system) and so on. It can be pointed out that both anti-constitution groups (kaiken-ha) and pro-constitution groups (goken-ha) recognize the importance of reform of the political
system. Therefore, an examination of such reforms by the anti-constitution groups will probably result in progress in constitutional reforms.

Secondly, this paper examines reform of the House of Councillors. Politicians, journalists, and academics claim that it is necessary to reform the House of Councillors because Japanese governments have faced difficulties in managing a “Twisted Diet”. This means that the ruling party secures a majority of seats in the Lower House, while opposition parties obtain a majority in the Upper House. Nevertheless, it is difficult to carry out such reform because in order to do so the constitution of Japan must be amended.

Thirdly, this paper compares Japan’s reform with those of the German and Canadian Upper Houses. The Upper House in almost all federations that adopt a bicameral system (e.g. the U.S.A., Germany, Canada and Switzerland) is a kind of “regional representation”, in which the Upper House can reflect the interests of a multiracial society and/or different language groups. It may be possible for Japan to reform its Upper House as a kind of “regional representation”.

2. Political System Reforms Which Need Constitutional Amendments

In Japan, there are a number of political agendas called kaken that require constitutional amendments such as adding “new human rights” to the constitution. Such new human rights include “environmental rights”, “privacy rights”, “the right to know”, “intellectual property rights,” and “crime victims’ rights.” When the constitution of Japan was enacted in 1946, the concept of such human rights did not exist but recently the importance of new human rights has increased (Gendai Kenpou Kyouiku Kenkyukai, 2014). Therefore, it is useful for anti-constitutional groups (kaiken-ha), such as the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), to expand citizen freedoms and rights through the constitution. Such improvements to the constitution may help protect the LDP from harsh criticism of their draft constitutional amendments that overly emphasise “public interest”, “public order”, and “citizen obligations” but downgrade human rights. On the other hand, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Communist Party of Japan (CPJ) are pro-constitutional groups (goken-ha) that reject the idea of any constitutional amendment. They strongly opposed to Kaken even although they have pursued the development of human rights.

Other issues related to political reform which also require constitutional amendments include “reform of the bicameral national assembly” (abolition of the House of Councillors), the problem of the “diet session”, the introduction of a “directly elected prime minister”, the introduction of dohusei (regional system) and so on. Both the kaiken-ha and goken-ha recognize the importance of political system reform. Consequently, LDP and Komeito think the examinations of kaken and political reform could be a natural first step to start deliberations on constitutional reform.
3. Reform of the House of Councillors (Upper House)

This section examines one reform of the political system associated with constitutional amendments, that is, reform of the House of Councillors (Upper House). The House of Councillors has been considered as one of the causes of the stagnation of Japanese politics. One of the serious problems of the House of Councillors is the so-called “Twisted Diet” (Takenaka, 2010). A Twisted Diet means that the ruling party secures a majority of seats in the Lower House while the opposition party obtains a majority in the Upper House. In a Twisted Diet, the ruling party passes bills through the Lower House but these bills are rejected in the Upper House and as a result nothing can be decided in the National Diet.

One problem of Japan’s National Diet is that the Upper House’s power is too strong compared with other democratic nations. For instance, when decisions by the Representatives and Councillors differ, the bill cannot be passed without a two-thirds approval in the House of Representatives.13 Japan’s Upper House was originally established as the House of Peers in the Empire of Japan, but although the House of Peers was replaced by the House of Councillors after the Second World War the strong power of the original House still remains (Naito, 2009, 2-4).

After the Twisted Diet that resulted from the LDP’s crushing defeat in the House of Councillors’ election in July 2007, six Japanese prime ministers (Abe in 2006-7, Fukuda in 2007-8, Aso in 2008-9, Hatoyama in 2009-10, Kan in 2010-11, and Noda in 2011-12) all faced difficulties in passing important bills through the Upper House. As a result, they each had to be replaced after a short period of time (Goto, 2014).

Upper House reform is an old political issue but it is possible that it will re-emerge as a specific political agenda. For example, some political parties, especially Ishinno-toh (Japan Restoration Party), strongly argue that the House of Councillors should be abolished and a unicameral system should be introduced.14 They argue that this is because there is no difference between the houses although this has not been academically verified. Upper House reform has been used as a “political football”. However, this paper claims that such reform should be professionally considered in connection with constitutional reform.

4. The Significance of Adopting a Bicameral System and the Special Characteristics of Japan’s Bicameral System

In Article 43 of the Constitution of Japan, it is stipulated that “both houses shall consist of elected members, representative of all the people. The number of the members of each house shall be fixed by law.”15 This article is exceptional in world terms in that only Japan stipulates that “both houses shall consist of elected members” (Iwasaki, 2013, 1-10). Other countries that have adopted a bicameral system are different. The Lower House tends to represent the middle-class that basically reflects the interests of the majority of society. This is similar in Japan but the structure of each Upper House varies depends on each country’s situation. There are several types: “House of Lords” (UK); “Federation” (USA, Germany, and, Switzerland); and “Publicly Elected” (Italy and Japan) (Nonaka et al., 2001, 75-77).
There are four merits of the bicameral system: 1. Tyranny is unlikely due to a parliamentary majority. 2. Careful deliberation is possible that avoids hasty decision-making. 3. Impulsive actions by the Lower House can be checked. 4. Various public opinions and interests can be represented in a detailed manner. 1, 2 and 3 are widely understood in Japan but 4 may not be. Nevertheless, 4 is very significant because in many countries there is a diversity of culture (ethnic minorities, languages and religions), economy (occupations and income), and politics (ideologies) (Nonaka et al., 2001, 77); and one of the important roles of politics is to adjust to these diversities. The Upper House is a mechanism to reflect the interests of a multiracial society and/or different language groups, which tend to be neglected in the Lower House (Iwasaki, 2013). However, the reason why the significance of 4 is not understood in Japan is that the Constitution of Japan states that both Houses consist of elected people. Also, it is interesting that Japanese people tend to consider that Japan is a “homogeneous society” (Oguma, 1995).

4.1 Case Study (1): The German House of Councillors

The Upper House in almost all federations, such as the U.S.A., Germany, Canada, and Switzerland, is a form of “regional representation” (Wilfried, 2004). An Upper House can reflect the interests of a multiracial society and/or different language groups and so it may be possible for Japan to reform its Upper House as a kind of “regional representation”. The German House of Councillors, which is a good example of a “House for Regional Representation”, will be examined as a case study.

In the German National Diet, there are 598 members in the Federation Lower House and 69 members in the Federation Upper House. The members of the Upper House are governors and ministers in local government. On the other hand, there are no full-time members in the Upper House and their voting behavior is strongly controlled by local governments: the members exercise their voting rights by following the decisions of local government (Maddex, 2001).

The Upper House (the Bundesrat) can reject bills that have been already passed through the Lower House. However, the Upper House has no authority to amend bills but if the bills are not passed through the Bundesrat they are scrapped. In order to enact a bill, the Upper House must pass it (Iwasaki, 2013, 125-133). Therefore, the German Upper House has strong enough authority to reflect the interests of regions, a multiracial society and different language groups.

There are two points that Japan can learn from Germany’s Upper House in order to reform the House of Councillors. Firstly, it is a cheaper form of government. In Germany’s Upper House, regional representatives, such as governors and members of local assemblies, have seats and votes but as there are no full-time members of the Upper House it is not necessary to pay them a salary (Iwasaki, 2013, 192). If this system were introduced in Japan, the Japanese government would be able to cut its expenditure on members of the House of Councillors. Secondly, in the German Federation the roles of central and local government are clearly divided (Iwasaki, 2013, 191). The central government creates laws and local governments implement them. The Japanese system is similar in that local governments implement the law. In Japan, it is very important that local governments
participate in decision-making in the National Diet so it may be beneficial for the Japanese government to study the German Upper House.

4.2 Case Study (2): The Canadian Upper House

Canada was the first country to combine a federal and parliamentary system. Also, Canada was the first country to establish a federation under a constitutional monarchy. The Queen and the Federal Senate and the House of Representatives have legislative power. Laws are approved after voting in the House and Senate, and after the Queen's assent (the Royal Assent). The Governor-General is the Queen's representative in Canada (MacLeod, 2008).

The Canadian government applied the design of the British House of Lords to create their own Upper House. In the Canadian parliament, there are 105 members in the Upper House and 338 members in the Lower House. The Lower House has a single-seat representation system to elect members. On the other hand, Canada's Upper House adopts an "appointive system". There are various requirements in order to qualify as a member of the Upper House: a property requirement; to be at least 30 years of age; to have Canadian nationality; and, to be a resident of the province in which the candidate wants to be elected. The prime minister recommends appropriate candidates to be Governor-General and the Governor-General, on behalf of the Queen appoints members of Upper House. The members have no term of office and the age of retirement is 75. When a member retires, a new member is appointed by the Governor-General (Franco, 2006).

The Upper House has various rights including the right not to pass a bill that has already been passed through the Lower House. There are four ways in which the Upper House can do this: rejection; amendment; pending; and, interruption. The Governor-General assents to bills that have passed through the two Houses. On the other hand, if one House rejects a bill it is sent back to the House to which it was originally submitted. The bill may be scrapped if it is rejected when undergoing amendment in either of the Houses (Iwasaki, 2013, 14-17).

In sum, the Upper House has basically the same authority as the Lower House. However, in Canada it is considered that the Upper House is different from the Lower House. The Upper House is called the House of “deep deliberation”. For instance, the Upper House is able to keep a government bill that has been sent from the House of Representatives in a temporary pending state. It is widely thought that the role of Upper House is to cool the "populism" in the Lower House through deep deliberation. In other words, the Upper House is expected to apply a brake to the Lower House (Brooks, 2007).

5. Further Analysis of the Canadian Upper House

This paper will now examine whether a House of “deep deliberation” functions well or not in Canada. Firstly, the relationship between the prime minister and the Upper House will be investigated. In a parliamentary system, the leader of the biggest party in the Lower House becomes prime minister. The prime minister can select members of the Upper
House and recommend them to the Governor-General. These can include people related to the same political party; experienced veteran members of the Lower House; veteran party staff and secretariat; and business executives who support the ruling party. As long as the ruling party has power it will be able to form a majority in the Upper House. Consequently, the prime minister can have a majority of seats in the Lower House and exert strong influence on the Upper House through the selection process. Among countries that have adopted the parliamentary system, Canada is considered the country where prime minister is in the strongest position (Iwasaki, 2013, 23-25).

Next, the “appointive system” will be examined. In a multi-ethnic society, there are cultural cleavages based on ethnicity, language and religion. Politicians should work not to make them overlap with economic and political cleavages such as profession, income, and ideology. As has been mentioned, the Upper House is a mechanism that can reflect the interests of a multiracial society and different language groups that tend to be neglected in the Lower House. Therefore, the Upper House in Canada is called a “House of sober, second thought” (Iwasaki, 2013, 24). The role of the Upper House is different from the Lower House, to which members are elected, in that it introduces another important element of democracy: “deep deliberation”.

It is useful to study the independence and stability of Canada’s Upper House. Members of the Upper House are appointed by the Governor-General and have no terms of office. Unless they resign, members can continue to have a seat in the Upper House until they are 75 years old. Therefore, they can be completely separate from the pressure of voters and interest groups and can use their expertise and wisdom to present solutions to the problems of Canadian society from a long-term viewpoint.

Canada’s case gives rise to suggestions for the reform of the Japanese system. In Japan, politicians tend to focus on their re-election and can succumb to “populism”. An election is a prerequisite for democracy but politicians tend to focus on popular support in order to be re-elected. This makes it difficult for them to agree in the National Diet on what is best for the state that leads to a “deterioration of politics”. The Canadian experience of a bicameral system gives hints about how to prevent such a deterioration of politics.

As has been mentioned, in bicameral systems across the world, the Lower House consists of elected members and representatives of all the people, while the Upper House consists of diversified members. The Canadian parliamentary system is designed to combine the House of “elected members” (Lower House) and “appointed members” (Upper House) in order to prevent a deterioration of politics by introducing another element of democracy: “deep deliberation”.

6. Conclusion

This paper argues that significant political issues which require constitutional amendments include not only the remilitarisation of Article 9 but also human rights issues and public administration. This paper indicates that “the reform of the House of Councillors” is a good example of an important political issue that requires constitutional
reform. Japanese governments have fallen into difficulties in managing a Twisted Diet and some political parties wish to dismantle the House of Councillors.

This paper uses the Upper Houses in Germany and Canada as case studies. The German case indicates that an Upper House can absorb the interests of a multiracial society and different language groups. The Canadian case shows that the Upper House is an arena of “deep deliberation”. These cases give us suggestions to solve the problem of the deterioration of politics in Japan.

In short, even pro-constitutional groups (goken-ha) that try to protect Article 9 and oppose constitutional reform, cannot avoid examining constitutional amendments. One way to do this is by adding new human rights to the constitution, which, in turn, can lead to reform of the political system.

Notes

2 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, December 8, 2013
3 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, December 3, 2013
4 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, September 20, 2015
6 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, June 12, 2015
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14 Ishinno-to (Japan Restration Party) Homepage
15 The Constitution of Japan, “Article 43”,

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3. State-Molded Civil Society Configuration by Political Institutions—a Comparison of Japan, the U.S.A. and China

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Abstract
Our paper provides a comparative analysis of the characteristics of civil society organizations (CSOs) by describing the relationships between social/political forces and institutions, and changes in institutional configurations in three countries. We argue that these relationships can be clarified by examining comparative data in terms of CSOs’ foundation year, the fields of their activities, their overall policy attention, purpose and sphere of activities, their budgets, number of members, and their number of personnel. Our results suggest certain patterns of differences and similarities in CSOs’ characteristics in the three countries that provide clues to institutional configurations and relationships. By using the Japan Internet Group Survey (JIGS) data in a comparative context we seek to refine our study of the role of CSOs in comparative national environments.

Keywords: Civil Society, Civil Society Organizations, Configurations, Institutions, State

1. Introduction
What is the role of the state in the development of civil society and its influence on the activities of civil society organizations (CSOs)? Is civil society totally distinct from the state as its theoretical definition implies? Rather than a simplistic, oppositional relationship, in practice, the boundaries between civil society and the state are often complex, blurred and

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negotiated. The state always tries to mold, shape and influence civil society and CSOs’ activities to its liking by means of state-recognized institutions (Tsujinaka, 2003, 83). The state also promotes a particular pattern of civil society configuration through its direct and indirect structuring of incentives. Political institutions structure the “rules of the game,” which in part determine who participates, how to play and who flourishes (Pekkanen, 2003, 116). In making this argument this paper joins a trend of efforts to make a more sophisticated understanding of how the organizational dimensions of civil society are influenced by state action and political institutions (Carapico, 1998; Skocpol, 1999; Levy, 1999; Hall, 1999; Chessa, 2004; Pekkanen, 2003, 2004, 2006). We unfold the discussion from the perspective of how the configuration of civil society is shaped and molded by government-structuring incentives and political institutions.

Our discussion is based mainly on the Japan Interest Group Survey (JIGS) research led by Professor Yutaka Tsujinaka, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Tsukuba. The JIGS Survey data provides a comprehensive approach to measuring civil society, paying attention not only to the organizations themselves but also to their individual members. Because of its original intention of a comparative empirical study of transnational civil society structure and governance, the questions in the JIGS surveys are kept roughly the same, with a similar kind of standardizing and sampling methods, overcoming the defect of meaningless comparison and a lack of representativeness. JIGS has carried out a survey of more than 10 countries and the surveys of Japan, China and the United States have been observed more than twice in an approximately 10-years interval, so it can also record the changes of civil society over time. Furthermore, the questionnaire of JIGS is designed not only to obtain a simple typological description of those organizations in different countries but also obtain a general relationship among organizations and other political actors; in other words not only to get to know the basic external activities of organizations but also clarify their internal details and facts, resulting in a consistent record of configuration of civil society.

This work pays more attention to an empirical-analytical interpretation of civil society, cherishing an aim of describing the relationships between social/political forces and institutions, as well as changes in institutional configurations in these three countries. The analysis is conducted mainly using the JIGS database, without any other efforts to view the term civil society from a normative standpoint, also leaving aside the viewpoint of the vital role that civil society played in the transition towards democracy and its consolidation.

2. A Comparison of the Three Countries

Before the comparison of CSOs in the U.S.A., Japan and China, a most important question has to be answered. That is whether civil society does (or can) exist in nondemocratic countries (such as China) and/or non-western countries (such as both Japan and China). The answer depends on how to conceptualize civil society. According to a narrow view, civil society is an inherently western concept, which means it derives from the particular theoretical tradition and practical historical experience of the west and can only exist in that society, so the non-western countries (such as both Japan and China) do not easily accept civil society. According to a more middle view, civil society can only really
exist within countries that have democratic institutions regardless of whether they are western countries or not, so Japan can be included but China has to be excluded. However, the word “civil society” used in this article is more broad a view in that it treats all forms of social organization and practices as different manifestations of civil society, so each country has its own type of civil society (Howard, 2009, 191).

The comparison of civil society organizations in this paper between Japan, the U.S.A., and China itself is full of challenges but also full of promise. The aim is to compare the U.S.A., a traditional western liberal democratic country with a long historical experience of association life and considered the seedbed and model of nonprofit activity (Sokolowski and Salamon, 1999, 261; Salamon, 1997, 282), with Japan, a non-western but electorally democratic country with the concept of civil society imported from outside and a very distinct historical heritage (Tsujinaka 2009a, 252), and China, which is neither western nor electoral democratic country, with the civil society just being in a nascent immature state in a harsh living condition but with rising expectable promises (Chan, 2009, 245). In addition to the difference of political systems and levels of society, there are also other differences, such as culture, political institutions, economic power, modernization process and so on.

At first glance, some similarities can be found between Japan, the U.S.A. and China. However, with a deep and close observation, the differences are more outstanding. For example, from the point of view of political systems, although Japan and the U.S.A. are the same kind of developed capitalism countries, which are very different from China—a developing socialist country—the two countries are also very different and include one with a parliamentary cabinet system and the other having a presidential system. From the perspective of culture, although Japan and China both belong to the east Asia area with a similar cultural background that is very different from the western culture of the U.S.A., Japan changed its culture a lot to become a bridge between east and west from the start of the Meiji Restoration, under the banner of Datsua-nyuo (leave Asia and join Europe). From the perspective of the economy, territory and power, although China and the U.S.A. have a similar broad territory with perhaps a higher probability of development than Japan, Japan is still a developed industrial country with leading technology and initiatives in lots of fields, while China is still a developing country on the road of catch-up having many social and political issues to deal with. From the point of modernization, although Japan and the U.S.A. have entered a very high level that is different from China, Japan shares a similar kind of state-promotion catch-up modernization process with China, although the essence is different. From the viewpoint of civil society, as narrated above, the three countries are also at very different levels.

When it comes to the comparison of the three countries’ civil society, the most important subject is the configurative characteristics. Actually, the configurations of civil society vividly reflect the socio-political reality, political settings and the changes of political policies in the three countries. As Pekkanen (2004, 224, 246) argued, “historical legacies and institutional arrangements have a critical influence on the configuration of civil society.” For example, the foundation year of CSOs displays not only a change of political and social policies, but also the collection of political interest and the start of politicization of civil society. The other items, for example, fields of activity and policy dimensions, purpose and sphere of activities, resources, and so on, all show the
characteristics and status of politicization of civil society from different viewpoints. Through the comparison, this work tries to give a general exploratory description of the institutional configuration of the three civil societies and explore the possible attributions of political settings and political policies that make them so different.

Although the JIGS survey of the three countries has been carried out two times in almost 10-year intervals as mentioned above, to achieve a country-wide data set of the U.S.A. and China still sounds difficult because of the limits of research budgets and political restrictions. So we have to technically select the data of the capital cities to represent the three countries, although theoretically the whole country-wide data would be the most ideal.

According to "2014 Global Cities Index and Emerging Cities Outlook"³, the three national capitals of the U.S.A., Japan and China are all included in the top 10 of the global cities index, with Tokyo holding a more prominent position (top 4) than the other two. But from the perspective of population and area, Washington D.C. is relatively smaller than Tokyo and Beijing. And there are also some kinds of discordance of the three surveys. For example, the population of the Tokyo survey was sampled through a telephone directory. Accordingly, smaller organizations such as NPOs and NHOs who have no official telephone registered in the directory were not included in the survey (Tsujinaka, 1999, 2009b). Although the objective of the first Washington D.C. survey was to compile a sample from the telephone directory, the same as that of Tokyo, the second survey was based on a stratified random sample of NPOs having gross receipts of $25,000 or more that filed their annual financial returns with the IRS (Tsujinaka 2001, 2011). However, the objects of the Beijing survey were social organizations that were registered in governmental departments. Accordingly, the People-Run non-Enterprise Unit organizations, foundations and the unofficial organizations, which did not and could not register in governmental departments as did the grass-root organizations, were not included (Tsujinaka 2008, 2013). When we use the data to analyze and compare CSOs in the three countries, the above bias and distortion should be taken into consideration carefully. Specifically, the Washington D.C. survey was held firstly in 1999 and secondly in 2010. The Tokyo survey was held firstly in 1997 and secondly in 2007. The Beijing survey was held firstly in 2001 and secondly in 2010.

The details of the data sources in each case are as follows (see Table 3.1):

Table 3.1. Details of the JIGS Data Used in this Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sampling Method</th>
<th>Survey Method</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo 1</td>
<td>1997 Random sampling through telephone directory</td>
<td>Questionnaire by mail</td>
<td>1438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo 2</td>
<td>2007 Random sampling through telephone directory</td>
<td>Questionnaire by mail</td>
<td>1803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington D.C. 1</td>
<td>1999 Random sampling through telephone directory</td>
<td>Questionnaire by mail</td>
<td>748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington D.C. 2</td>
<td>2010 Stratified random sample of 501(c) 3 and 501(c) 4 public charities, nonprofits with gross receipts of $25,000 or more that file the annual financial return with the IRS</td>
<td>Website questionnaire or by mail and telephone</td>
<td>571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beijing 1</td>
<td>2001 Stratified sample of social organizations registered in governmental departments</td>
<td>Questionnaire by mail</td>
<td>627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beijing 2</td>
<td>2010 Stratified sample of social organizations registered in governmental departments</td>
<td>On-the-spot questionnaire or by mail</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Japan Interest Group Surveys (JIGS))

3. Description of organizations

3.1. The fluctuation of foundation year of the CSOs

The fluctuation of foundation year of CSOs in each city is shown in Figure 3.1. As discussed below, the pattern reflects a number of policy changes in each of the countries. Indeed, the foundation year of CSOs mirrors vividly a number of social and political policy changes, and the circle of birth, survival, development and decline of these organizations directly coincides with these changes. For instance, a new policy of government can attract more CSOs into various specific fields of social area to promote some particular interest. More broadly, government changes in CSO subsidies, tax exemptions, and so on can basically improve the essential conditions resulting in the development of certain organizations, or it can totally destroy their survival conditions resulting in the disappearance of certain organizations. Consequently, while in theory civil society is often seen as a realm of social life contrasted with and separate from both the government and the market, in reality the map of civil society, their survival conditions and the configuration of organizations are dependent on various policies from the government and the financial supports from the market to a high degree.

We can reach this conclusion from a comparison of the three countries and the pattern of CSO foundation year. First of all, let us start with the U.S.A. The data of Washington D.C. is only available in the first survey in 1999, but it is still enough to observe the linkage between the year of their start and various government policy changes. From Figure 3.1 we can get a general image of increase of these organizations from around 1965 to around the 1990s, and there is a sharp increase in the 1970s and 1980s. However, behind the
fluctuation of the number of organizations there was a simultaneous change of policy. Specifically, in order to meet unprecedented challenges and respond effectively to international crises during the postwar decades, American governments implemented several financial policies to maintain domestic economic and political stability. For example, the universal income taxation was introduced in the 1960s together with innovations in the country’s public finance and economics systems, which gave the federal government a virtually unlimited source of revenue. This transformation of politics of public finance played a key role in fueling the proliferation of nonprofits, not only as providers of government-funded services but also as advocates seeking to influence government policies (Hall, 2006, 51). Also, the period from 1965-1980 saw a period of government-fueled fiscal growth that greatly expanded the operating expenditures of American nonprofit organizations (Salamon, 2012, 21; Grønbjerg and Salamon, 2012, 554; Child and Grønbjerg, 2007, 263). These changed polices could give a rational explanation of the increase of organizations from the 1950s to the 1990s.

Figure 3.1. The Foundation Year of CSOs, 1900-2010

(Source: Japan Interest Group Survey [JIGS])

From the Japanese data (Figure 3.1), there is an apparent increase of organizations from 1945 to the early 1970s, reflecting the tremendous political and policy changes during the post-war years. Between the end of the 1930s and 1945, almost all of prewar associations were either absorbed within the war mobilization efforts or coerced and ultimately realigned into the state corporatist structure. However, after World War II, under the Occupation, with the democratic constitution and a series of new laws enacted,
Japan’s civil society was virtually reborn and saw a flood of new organizations established (Tsujinaka, 2009, 252).

From the Chinese data (Figure 3.1), we can find a much clearer increase of organizations from the 1980s, which echoed the dramatic changes of politics and policies during this time. Before the Reform and Opening up policy of 1978, under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party, society was organized on a principle of vertical rule with restricted horizontal links of individuals and organizations. People were incorporated into hierarchically organized institutional systems, and civic organizations were either banned or incorporated into official organizations. However, from the late 1970s, with the opening up and reform process, there was a gradual withdrawal of the state from the social and economic sector, resulting in a strong development of social organizations (Chan, 2009, 243; Tsujinaka and Kojima, 2014, 23).

### 3.2. The maps of CSOs and their policy attention

Political policies in various countries configure the map of CSOs and shape the direction of their attention. From the Tables 3.2 and 3.3, we can see that in the U.S.A. the most populous field has been the education field and the most populous policy has been educational policy. Although in the first U.S.A. survey the total of health or medical field and social welfare field (6.7+5.2) comprised the third rank, but in the second survey, it became the second populous field. And in terms of specific policies, the total of health care and welfare policy even overpassed educational policy to become the top ranked one. In a word, in the U.S.A., the most populous fields and most specific policy orientations of CSOs are education, health care and welfare fields and policies. However, in Japan the analysis of Tables 3.2 and 3.3 indicate different landscapes. In Japan, the economic and business field is the most populous field and the economic-related industry promotion policy is the most important policy, which is different from the U.S.A. However, although the health care and welfare fields are not as populous as those in the U.S.A., the policy of this field is the second one of the most specific policy, which is similar with their counterparts in the U.S.A. China shares with Japan the same kind of populous field of economic and business and most concerned policy of industry promotion. In China’s case the health care and welfare policy do not receive the same level of attention as that in the U.S.A. and Japan.

| Table 3.2. Fields of Activity of CSOs by Percentage Share (top 6) |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Washington D.C. 1 | Washington D.C. 2 | Tokyo 1 |
| Valid | Valid | Valid |
| Educational | 18.3 | Educational group | 25.3 | Economic | 19.5 |
| Trade or Business or Commercial | 17.5 | Health/welfare group | 14 | Administrative related | 9.7 |
| Academic or Research | 8.3 | Advocacy group | 10.8 | Professional | 9.6 |
| Health or Medical | 6.7 | Arts/cultural/scholarly group | 7.8 | Educational | 8.8 |
| Political or Public Affairs | 6.6 | Professional group | 6.5 | Labor | 7.8 |
| Social Welfare | 5.2 | Civic group | 5.5 | Social welfare | 6.1 |

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Although there is not a completely unanimous coincidence and linkage between the fields of activity and policy dimensions, the two terms almost similarly show the distribution of CSO interest, and the different status of each category (e.g. industry promotion or education) reflects the different background and nature of political policies. That is to say, through the process of modernization and development, different political policies that the government had implemented decisively influenced and configured the profile of CSOs in each city and shaped the direction of their policy concern. For example, in the decades following World War II in the U.S.A., the government carried out a series of federal social, tax, and spending policies, and transformed the general landscape of the
nonproprietary associational, charitable, and philanthropic entities. Steeply progressive taxes on personal income and estates, combined with high corporate tax rates, created powerful incentives for tax avoidance, which were engineered to direct the flow of private resources into various areas that the government was interested in, such as cultural, educational, health, and welfare services (Hall, 2006, 51). Perhaps this can give a reasonable explanation of why the education, health and welfare fields were so populous and why these types of policy fields gained such a high level of focus among CSOs.

In the case of Japan, as a late-comer the Japanese government started a catch-up campaign to enhance the economic and military strength of the country from the time of the Meiji Restoration (1868), in which state played a strong role. Later on, in order to revive from the defeat of World War II, Japanese leaders in the bureaucracy and ruling political party worked hand in hand with corporate executives and actively shaped and mapped the postwar political, economic and social life through numerous state programs (Gordon, 2013, 243-248). Under the postwar framework set by the Allied Occupation forces up to 1951, the postwar era of catch-up campaign was characterized as a kind of developmentalism, which was different from government activities in the pre-war era. This state-promotion pattern of developmentalism impacted CSOs through legislation enacted by the government, and resulted in a flood of business/economic associations (Tsujinaka, 2003, 105). In the high-growth era (the 1960s and early 1970s), the central bureaucracy and the ruling party responded to progressive local governments’ initiatives in terms of social welfare programs by putting them on the national agenda and started the construction of a welfare state in Japan. Then a number of pensions and health insurance programs were expanded and the environmental laws were also strengthened, resulting in the growth of related organizations and a higher concern about health care and welfare policies (Gordon, 2013, 284-285).

In the case of China, the whole process of modernization is also a kind of late-comer’s catch-up, which is similar to its neighbor—Japan, but even later than Japan. So, the characteristics that Japan had experienced can also be found in China. The Communist Party of China strongly controlled the state and society, and initiated and pushed forward the development progress. The Reform and Open policy from the late 1970s started a new catch-up campaign, under which developmentalism was set up in the center of political agendas in both central government and local government. Along with the enormous changes of polices were the blossoming of economic and business related research units, think tanks, institutions, and associations. There was a high level of concern about the polices of these fields, not only by officials of all levels but also by researchers and ordinary people (Wang, 2011,14-17). However, due to the relatively falling behind the times of development, when compared with the U.S.A. and Japan, the focus of policy making changed only a little from the previous development-centered policy to deal with China’s social and environmental problems together with high-speed development. By comparison, Japan had taken the same measures in the 1970s. Although a harmonious society construction program and a welfare-enlarging project have been set on the political agenda in China, it is only just beginning. There is still a question of how seriously the ruling party and government will push them forward at the potential cost of a lower-speed of economic development. That is why in China we cannot find the same Japanese and American
phenomenon of high interest by CSOs in health care and welfare, or the high level of concern of these policies in government circles.

3.3. Purpose of activities and functions

The functions of organizations in the Japan Interest Group Surveys is shown in Table 3.4. Overall, the pattern in the data indicates the influence of various political settings. The purpose of CSO activities shows the general direction and essence of their organizational activities and suggests different functions in their social and political process. From the purpose of their activities, we can tell the difference between various CSOs, such as whether they have a “social autonomous function”, a “political/economic function”, an “advocacy function” or a “social/public service function”. The “social autonomous function” normally indicates that the CSO’s purposes is oriented towards their members’ service provision, such as mutual communication or self-promotion, for example, providing information, education and training opportunities, and recreation activities, and so on. If they have a “political/economical function” then this is nearly always reflected in the purpose of political and economic profits or rights, for example, protecting or advancing their members’ economic interests, assisting members to receive funding from the government, providing members with help in obtaining licenses or receiving contracts, and so on. An “advocacy function” usually indicates the purpose of influencing governmental policies, for example, making appeals or requests to the government, educating the public to achieve public goals, providing nonmembers with policy recommendations, and so on. Finally, a “social/public service function” basically includes public service providing, for example, providing other groups or individuals with information and funds, providing the public with free, subsidized services or for a fee, and so on (Tsujinaka, Kobashi and Huang, 2014,120).

Table 3.4. Functions of Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Washington D.C. 1</th>
<th>Washington D.C. 2</th>
<th>Tokyo 1</th>
<th>Tokyo 2</th>
<th>Beijing 1</th>
<th>Beijing 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social autonomous function</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political and economic function</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy function</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social and public service function</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Japan Interest Group Surveys [JIGS])

From Table 3.4 we can see that Chinese and Japanese organizations perform a similar relatively higher level of the “social autonomous function” rather than other functions and certainly compared with American organizations. In contrast, American organizations have relative balance between different functions, although in the second survey it refers to a lower political/ economic function, probably owing to the different objects of the investigation, of which the second survey is mainly NPOs, rather than general social
organizations. Although, at first glance, the “advocacy function” of Chinese organizations is not so low in comparison with its Japanese and American counterparts (13.4% of total in the first survey and 17.2% of total in the second survey), but if the indirect advocacy activities—cooperating with related government departments’ administrative affairs (10.5% and 13.8%; not separately itemized in Table 3.4)—are taken out of consideration, the “advocacy function” that Chinese organizations recorded in the two surveys would be very low (2.9% and 3.4%). In the case of Japan, there has been a view that the nature of Japanese civil society is full of social capital but it lacks advocacy (Pekkanen 2003, 2006). Although from the first survey, there is no doubt that the advocacy function of Japanese organizations (14.1%) is obviously lower than that of the American ones (22.7%, 23%), but the outcome of the second survey suggests that Japanese organizations even fulfill a higher advocacy function (24.7%) than that of the American ones. The reason for why there is a sharp rise by more than 10% at the time of the second Japanese survey still needs some time to be found out and explained.

In general, the ratio and level of the “advocacy function” demonstrates the influence of various political settings. Thus, in China, the establishment of organizations is still under strict legal and administrative controls, and their activities are also under stringent state surveillance, resulting in the over-reliance on governmental policies and resources and a lack of autonomy. So we can see the “social autonomous function” in China has a relatively high ratio owing to the fact that it is relatively harmless, and so it is more welcome by the government. However, due to so-called political stability and security concerns, the “advocacy function” has been hindered by the government in China, leading to a very low ratio of “advocacy activities”. In the case of Japan, after democratic political reforms in 1945, Japanese organizations may have had better conditions for development. But as discussed above, the state-promotion pattern of catch-up development in Japan determined the way of the allocating social resources. Consequently, those CSOs that fit governmental aims tended to flourish, while others diminished (Pekkanen, 2006, 7). In the case of the U.S.A., through various methods, the government has shaped and mapped the overall patterns of U.S.A. CSO organizations, as in Japan and China. However, attributing to its long experience of liberal democracy, pluralism and individualism, there is an ample room for organizations to also advocate and exert their influence on government policy making.

3.4. Sphere and level of CSO activities

The sphere and level of CSO activities also mirrors the essence of political settings. In addition to the fields of their activities, which are concerned with the specific policies and purpose of their activities, the overall sphere of their activities is one more dimension of civil social organizations, which records what level of geographic and administrative space they select to provide their various services, as well as perform a variety of functions and exert all kinds of influences. The sphere or places of organizations’ activities shows not only their disposition and characteristics, but also the relationship between them and other political actors, and between state and society (Mori and Tsujinaka, 2002, 103). To a degree, the different level of activity sphere even determines the pattern of advocacy activities and their influences towards policy-making agendas.
The sphere of activities of organizations in the Japan Interest Group Surveys was classified into the following five levels: local level (community, city or county); state/prefecture level; large area/province level; nation/federal level; world level. From the Table 3.5 we know that Chinese organizations are mostly active at state/prefecture level and large area/province level, without any other levels. There is also a clear trend that more than 50% of Japanese organizations are active at nation/federal level, with the other levels of activities being almost equally lower. By contrast, the American organizations enjoy relatively the same distribution at all five levels, although the ratio of nation/federals level is slightly more distinct than others.

**Table 3.5. Levels of Activities of CSOs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Washington D.C. 1</th>
<th>Washington D.C. 2</th>
<th>Tokyo 1</th>
<th>Tokyo 2</th>
<th>Beijing 1</th>
<th>Beijing 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>local level (community, city, or county)</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State/Prefecture level</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>68.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large area/Province level</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nation/Federal level</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World level</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Japan Interest Group Surveys [JIGS])

In the case of China, under the strict dual register and supervision regulations, there is nearly no chance of these organizations forming a nation-wide association to hold activities, except for authorized People’s Groups, other GONGOs (Government Organized Non-Government Organizations) or some other national organizations that are admitted, funded and administered by governments, the majority of which are exempted from obligation of registration and keep a very close relationship with government (0% and 0%). Similarly, because the objectives of the JIGS study are mainly with registered organizations, the local level of activities of CSOs in China is also not observed from the data in Table 3.5 (0% and 0%), although the activities of various grassroots organizations in China have become more and more active recently. In addition, the world level of activities of CSOs is also not observed from the data (0% and 0%), although many international organizations in China are either formally involved in Chinese governmental projects or have a cooperative relations with various official Chinese social organizations (Huang, 2014, 92; Zhao, 2014, 290-303).

In the case of Japan, as one of the world’s colossal metropolis congregated with many political and economic chances and resources, Tokyo-based CSOs have more chances to be big organizations with an aspiration of being active on the national stage. On the other hand, the relatively higher portion of nation level of activities in the case of Japanese CSOs also suggests an asymmetrical distribution of power between central and local administrative units. In the phase of catch-up development or even after the success of it, the central bureaucrats played a very important role in social and political progress and
policy-making agendas, in the background of which organizations are more likely embraced by the state with a somewhat corporatist relationship (Mori, 2010,138-140; Ito, 2000, 357). Therefore, we can see more organizations being active at the national level in Japan rather than at other levels.

In the case of the U.S.A., however, the distribution of the scale of CSOs is more dispersed between federal government and local states. In a quantity of CSO fields for example, in the education field the state government still holds a very high degree of autonomous power, so the organizations have more ability to influence government policies apart from the federal government (Ito, 2000, 179). In fact, the local government or state level may be the first or best place for some kinds of organizations to perform to some extent. So, we can see a better balance of activities between the levels in the U.S.A., although the national level is a little higher than others.

4. Resources of Organizations

The levels of budgets, members and staff indicate the level of scale, financial condition, professionalism of CSOs and level of involvement of civil society. The organizations’ performance and survival tend to rely exclusively on their resources. Therefore there is no doubt that their resources are the lifeline of these organizations. Their most basic and fundamental resources are their tangible organizational resources, for example, budgets, members and staff, although intangible resources are also important to their activities (Tsujinaka and Choe, 2002, 288). Among the tangible organizational resources, budgets are more decisive than members and staff because the latter are mainly dependent on the former. According to resources dependency theory, organizations are not self-sufficient entities, but rely on extra-organizational agents for resources, and are therefore subject to the demands and desires of the entities that provide their most important resources (Child and Grønbjerg, 2007, 262). So, the resource relationship is very complex due to the distinctiveness of obtaining resources in each case. Among the various and complex resource relationships, government grants and contracts play a crucial role in the different types of funding streams, for example, donations, sales, fees, special events and so on. So, any change of governmental grants and contracts will completely change the organizations’ survival condition and their activities. And this also becomes a significant measurement for governments to influence and shape the civil society world to their own purposes.

4.1. Budgets

Table 3.6 exhibits clearly that the budgets of Chinese organizations are much lower than that of Japanese and American organizations. Approximately 90% of Chinese organizations had budgets of less than 10 million Japanese Yen. However, even more than 80% of Japanese and American organizations had budgets of more than 10 million Japanese Yen. And even the 10% of Chinese organizations that have budgets of more than 10 million Japanese Yen can’t be equal to their counterparts of Japan and the U.S.A.
Table 3.6. Budgets of Organizations (in 10,000 Japanese Yen)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>WashingtonD.C. 1</th>
<th>WashingtonD.C. 2</th>
<th>Tokyo 1</th>
<th>Tokyo 2</th>
<th>Beijing 1</th>
<th>Beijing 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1~99</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100~299</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300~499</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500~999</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>10.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1,000~2,999</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000~9,999</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000~19,999</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,000~99,999</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000~</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>566(748)</td>
<td>483(571)</td>
<td>1318(1438)</td>
<td>1099(1803)</td>
<td>351(627)</td>
<td>255(306)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Japan Interest Group Surveys [JIGS])

The lower budgets of Chinese organizations reveal that the majority is only of a small scale with a weak financial base. This may show that the social public life has not yet received enough attraction from ordinary people to arrange social financial support to CSOs. Otherwise, it may display a weak cooperation between the government and organizations resulting in a low level of governmental grants and contracts. In addition, the weak budgets perhaps result in a low level of members and staff, and also give a negative influence to their advocacy activities.

While Japanese organizations enjoy the same high level of budgets as their American counterparts, we can also show that the American organizations hold a superiority of budgets in more than 1,000 million Japanese Yen groups. The higher budgets of Japanese and American organizations on the one hand, shows the high level of financial involvement by civilians. On the other hand it also shows a deep mutual cooperation between government and organizations on all kinds of governmental programs to complete social projects and deal with social problems. For example, in the case of the U.S.A., during the 1960s the federal government expanded its funding of scientific research and a wide range of health and social services, providing needed financial nourishment to nonprofit organizations in related sectors under the joint objective of governmental efforts and nonprofits’ operations in the fields such as scientific advancement, anti-poverty, and overcoming ill health (Salamon, 2012, 22). Their stronger financial base may lead to a high ratio of members and staff and a positive influence of their advocacy activities.

4.2. Number of members

In regard to the number of members, there is still a clear gap between Chinese organizations and Japanese and American organizations, though this gap is not as big as that of their budget conditions. Japanese and American organizations also enjoy nearly the same level of members, but the American gigantic organizations, with members of more than 5,000, are much more than that of Japan (see Table 1.7). Nonetheless, we still need to pay attention to the objectives of the second survey of the U.S.A., which are NPOs and which
have budgets and numbers of members obviously lower than those CSOs in the first survey of the U.S.A.

Table 3.7. Number of Members per Organization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Washington D.C. 1</th>
<th>Washington D.C. 2</th>
<th>Tokyo 1</th>
<th>Tokyo 2</th>
<th>Beijing 1</th>
<th>Beijing 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1～49</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50～99</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100～499</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500～999</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000～4,999</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000～19,999</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,000～99,999</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000～</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>479(748)</td>
<td>410(571)</td>
<td>880(1438)</td>
<td>1176(1803)</td>
<td>544(627)</td>
<td>181(306)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Japan Interest Group Surveys [JIGS])

The different level of membership is not only a manifestation of the level of their general financial bases, but also a reflection of a level of the civic involvement of the whole society. In the case of China, civil society is still on its elementary and initial phase of development, and appears very immature, weak, and lacking independence, autonomy and self-determination under the relatively strong regulation and penetration of the state. So, the entire recognition and realization about the role and function of civil society and the responsibility of civilians is still immature. Therefore the engagement in CSOs is distinctly low.

4.3. Number of staff

In terms of staff per organization, we can find out from Table 3.8 that American organizations still have a dominance over Japanese organizations. Also, the gap between Japanese organizations and Chinese organizations is very clear. Especially, there are many more big organizations of the U.S.A. with more than 30 staff than that of Japanese and Chinese. The number of staff in each organization tends to show the scale, professionalism and financial condition of the organizations as well as the ability of their advocacy activities. In the case of Japan, Pekkanen (2004, 225) mentioned the dual structure characteristic of Japan’s civil society, with a plethora of small local groups and a paucity of large professional groups. That is to say, groups with few or no employees (for example the Neighborhood Associations) are especially plentiful. However, groups with many employees (for example large advocacy groups) are especially scarce in Japan. If we compare between the first survey of Japan and the first survey of the U.S.A., there are 14.8% Japanese organizations with staff between 10 and 29. By contrast, the percentage of American organizations is 21%. There are only 3% of Japanese organizations with staff of between 30 to 49; however, the American percentage is 6.8%. There are 2.4% Japanese organizations with staff between 50 to 99; but the number of American ones is 6.7%.
Finally, there are 3.0% of Japanese organizations having staff numbers of more than 100, whereas, the American organizations of this size account for 12.2% of the U.S.A. total. In conclusion, the number of staff employed in the U.S.A organizations is more than two times that of Japanese organizations.

Table 3.8. Number of Staff per Organization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Washington D.C. 1</th>
<th>Washington D.C. 2</th>
<th>Tokyo 1</th>
<th>Tokyo 2</th>
<th>Beijing 1</th>
<th>Beijing 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>4.1</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>11.2</td>
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<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3~4</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5~9</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10~29</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30~49</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50~99</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>100~</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>657(748)</td>
<td>485(571)</td>
<td>1250(1438)</td>
<td>1676(1803)</td>
<td>474(627)</td>
<td>285(306)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Japan Interest Group Surveys [JIGS])

From the comparison of the three countries in the perspective of organizational resources, we can conclude that Chinese organizations are much weaker than Japanese and American organizations in terms of budgets, numbers of members and staff, which may indicate that Chinese civil society is still in a nascent state with a rather harsh living condition because of the dominance of the state. At the same time, the gap of resources between Japanese organizations and American organizations is also obvious, especially from the perspective of staff numbers. This verifies the “four smalls” characteristics of Japanese civil society; that is the small membership, small numbers of professional staff, small budgets and that they operate on a small local area (Pekkanen, 2006, 27). The relatively higher ratio of American organizations in resources also displays the higher level of the recognition of civil society among American civilians and the role of civil society in the modern social and political agenda. The more populous and prosperous nature of civil society, the closer the relationship will be between civil society and government. The more robust, self-determined and independent is civil society, then the more active and positive that civil society will be in the activities of influencing policy-making.

5. Conclusions

From the comparison of the various characteristics of the CSOs in three very different countries, we found out that the disposition and resources of civil organizations vividly reflected the sociopolitical reality in each country, such as the distribution of profits and power in different fields, the state-society relationships, the level of politicization and the potential influences of CSOs. We also found out that the state/government plays a dominant role in the shaping of CSOs world through funds, contracts, subsides, tax exemption policies and so on, resulting in an acceptable arrangement and configuration of
civil society. We also found out that the CSO institution is a major determinant of civil society configurations. The essence of a political system, related laws and regulations determines the establishment, survival and development of CSOs, and changes in these environments can alter their sociopolitical reality.
References


SECTION B

REGIONS, PLACES AND PEOPLE IN JAPAN AND CANADA
4. **Regional Revitalization as Culture, Identity and Citizenship: Promise, Peril and Shared Sacrifice for Shared Investment**

   Anthony Rausch  
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   Hirosaki University  
   Email: asrausch@hirosaki-u.ac.jp  

**Abstract**

This paper considers regional (re)vitalization in Japan with respect to the conference themes of Culture, Identity and Citizenship. After outlining the background for regional revitalization policy as of 2015 and presenting relevant views on culture, identity and citizenship, the content takes up regional revitalization as related specifically to aspects of culture, identity and citizenship. With regard to the intersection of regional revitalization and culture and identity, a number of current projects as reported in the media are presented, with the implications that emerge portraying the promise and peril of various projects. Likewise, looking at the intersection of regional revitalization and citizenship, the content yields questions regarding the notion of shared sacrifice for shared investment as an aspect of contemporary cultural-identity based citizenship. The paper concludes by noting that against such a reality of the promise and perils of regional revitalization, expectations by rural areas of a shared sacrifice for shared investment by urban Japan for the sake of such revitalization is natural, if not obligatory. Stated succinctly, the notion of cultural-identity citizenship obligates all Japanese to a shared sacrifice for shared investment in support of contemporary regional revitalization.

**Keywords:** region, revitalization, sacrifice, investment, economy

1. **Introduction**

   This paper examines *chihō sōsei*, regional vitalization (herein using the term “regional revitalization”), a timely and contemporary issue for present-day Japan, within the 2015 Japanese Studies Association of Canada Annual Conference theme of “Culture, Identity and Citizenship in Japan and Canada.” As will be outlined herein, considerations of regional revitalization in Japan highlight a range of tensions regarding culture, identity and citizenship in contemporary society.
2. Regional Revitalization and Contemporary Japan

Although a timely issue facing Japan at present, the reality of regional revitalization is that resolution of the problematic economic and geographic tensions that have created the need for revitalization emerged over time and will ultimately only be resolved over time. The background to regional revitalization was referred to by Ishiba Shigeru, Minister of the Regional Revitalization Cabinet, in an April 2015 Japan News newspaper article where he noted a number of disturbing fiscal and corporate trends (Abe, 2015). Most important in Ishiba’s mind was Japan’s national debt, which stood at the time at one quadrillion yen, as well as the fact that Japanese corporations with overseas manufacturing facilities showed few signs of returning these to Japan, conditions which Ishiba held heightened the need for “local vitalization” within Japan. Both of these “realities” reflect outcomes of long-term policies on the part of government and long-term planning on the part of the private sector and both will take time to rectify. As for regional revitalization specifically, the Japanese government had declared as early as fall 2014 that a long-term vision for revitalizing rural economies together with measures to address rural population decline were necessary (The Yomiuri Shimbun, 2014c). An immediate goal of the government’s announced plan was to reduce excessive population concentration in the Tokyo metropolitan area through creation of 300,000 jobs in rural areas. This was to be accomplished partly through preferential tax schemes to encourage firms to relocate some facilities to rural areas together with further development of agriculture, forestry and fisheries industries and tourism services in rural areas. Additional details of the long-term plan emerged in a January 2015 Japan News article which outlined that the government would call for a 722.5 billion yen allocation in the fiscal 2015 budget. Through a comprehensive policy strategy based on this fiscal outlay, the government aims to create stable jobs in provincial areas, with 175 billion yen allocated to help people find jobs, 64 billion yen allocated to encourage relocation to rural areas and 110 billion yen to encourage young people to marry and start families (The Yomiuri Shimbun, 2015a). Local response to these announcements was clear: according to the Tōōnippō newspaper of Aomori prefecture, as of the end of 2014, 36 of 40 Aomori prefectural municipalities had “high expectations” for chihō sōsei, with 35 having developed a local “comprehensive strategy” to that end (Tōōnippō, 2014).

3. Culture, Identity and Citizenship in Contemporary Society

The focus by the JSAC 2015 Annual Conference on Culture, Identity and Citizenship in Japan and Canada is timely and appropriate. As Delanty (2002) pointed out, a notable development in recent political discourse has been the increasing confluence of culture, identity and citizenship. Separately, the three terms are used to refer to what are complex, yet dynamic concepts, difficult to define in the abstract as well as isolate within the trends and trajectories of contemporary society. It is, however, in their combinations that the interpretations and implications relevant to the current consideration of regional revitalization emerge. Whereas citizenship historically focused on the civic, political and social rights of citizens defined generally by birth or descent, with citizenship acts seen as envisioning and articulating the public good, serving in public office and holding those in office to high standards, and sacrificing for the polity of which one is a member (Madiraju and Brown, 2014), citizens today are largely passive participants of citizenship, convinced...
that conspicuous consumption, payment of (minimal) taxes and occasional voting are the only citizenship acts required of them. On the other hand, cultural citizenship, as defined by Stevenson’s (2001) cultural sociology, stresses the centrality of culture and identity for an understanding of citizenship, where the challenge of conception and practice is to bring identity as a cultural element into the consciousness and act of citizenship. Based on this view, Delanty’s (2002) definition of the cultural as cultural resources, cultural identities and cultural presuppositions apply both appropriately and combinatorially to the present project. In this view, the intersection of culture and identity imply particular forms of citizenship-engaged agency that are managed both at an individual and a geographically-variable policy level through common experiences, learning processes and expectations, discourses and actions of empowerment that result in a triadic conception of cultural-identity citizenship. “The power to name, create meaning, and construct personal biographies and narratives by gaining control over the flow of information, goods and cultural processes is an important dimension of citizenship as an active process. In this regard what needs to be stressed is the dimension of citizenship as a constructivist process” (Delanty, 2002, 64). In Japan’s contemporary modern trajectory, such emergent cultural identity and the citizenship acts it encourages, manifests itself increasingly at a local level—in the preservation of regional nomenclature, the creation of local meanings and the prioritization of resident narratives, all of which challenge and, in some cases, subvert the monolithic and urban (if not Tokyo-centered) construction of modern Japanese cultural identity and citizenship.

4. Regional Revitalization as Culture and Identity: Promise or Peril?

In addition to the Great Heisei Municipal Mergers (see Rausch 2014, 2012a), the recent history of Japanese rural policy reforms have focused largely on encouraging an increase in agricultural scale so as to improve international competitiveness in the agricultural sector (OECD, 2009), responding to the loss of far-sea fisheries and the “divide and self-regulate” over-exploitation of near-coastal areas by local cooperatives in the fisheries sector (Katsukawa, 2010) and transitioning to an environmentally-oriented “new forestry” approach in the forestry sector (Iwamoto, 2003). However, as espoused by Rausch (2010), such policy reforms do little to capitalize on a fundamental resource of rural areas: their local culture and local identity. Rausch contends that through organizing local cultural resources in a conceptual-operational space format and thereby identifying the full range of possibilities in conceptualizing and operationalizing local cultural commodities, areas can capitalize on the fullest potential for economic growth through their unique local cultural economies. Against this background of policy real and ideal, this section examines emergent regional revitalization policy, identifying elements of culture and identity therein, or lack thereof.

In a series column (1~4) presented by The Japan News of the Yomiuri Shimbun titled “Regionalism Revitalizes Japan,” the first of two projects presented outlined the potential for shifting formally under-used forest resources in Okayama prefecture to a new “cross-laminated timber material” for use in construction, constituting re-establishment of historically-utilized local resources and expertise through application of new technology. The other project outlined in the column focused on developing high technology satellite
offices in Tokushima prefecture. The idea of such satellite office centers is that information technology-based digital work undertaken by Tokyo-based companies can thus be outsourced to such rural sites and done by technology professionals who want to live in a rural setting, constituting a new dimension in the present rural labor economy. Other projects introduced in the four columns included activities related to tourism (Hokkaido) and sake brewing (Nagano), as well as enterprises connected with geographies of historical fabric and fashion (Miyagi), agriculture (Fukushima), commerce (Kobe), and education (Oita). While the range and dimensions of such projects not only reflects an impressive combination, if not integration, of old and new, fixed and mobile, local and extra-local on the one hand, the various projects also integrate elements of a particular local cultural identity into regional revitalization through reviving and energizing local traditional consciousness into contemporary economic ventures on the other. However, in a seeming contradiction to the spirit, if not the details, of the central government’s interest and support in such undertakings, the column also reported that, “common to all the diverse projects is a reluctance to accept government money and a bootstrapping determination to place projects on a self-financing basis” (The Yomiuri Shimbun, n.d.).

Looking at another regional case, but one presented with greater detail and one that reflects a fuller range of background and implications inherent in revitalization strategies being undertaken in rural areas, The Japan News published a three part series on regional revitalization in Aomori prefecture. Focusing on agriculture and fisheries, the three cases presented pointed to the stark contrast of “promise” and “peril” inherent in focusing exclusively on primary industries in revitalization efforts, even when these are inter-woven into the cultural-identity landscape of the area. The first of the three columns pointed out that some Aomori apple farmers were “struggling for survival with a Tsugaru Peach” (The Yomiuri Shimbun, 2014d). The Tsugaru district of Aomori has long been the top producer of apples in Japan and apples are a dominant and powerful identity brand for Aomori. However, with the gradual impact of climate change taking effect, the feasibility of producing high quality apples was becoming questionable in some locations; hence the gradual transition to peaches—a process that will take years to complete, with eventual competitive success uncertain. The second column referred to the Sea of Japan coastal town of Fukaura “making a name for itself through tuna,” as local fisheries had turned from traditional catches of the area to taking migrating tuna on their northward run up the coastline (The Yomiuri Shimbun, 2014e). The fine print of the column, however, noted that the (somewhat smaller) tuna taken by Fukaura fisheries had in the past been destined to be taken later in the season by the more northward Oma village, located on northern coast of the Shimokita peninsula and, like the Tsugaru district and apples, famous nationwide for its giant tuna. While the intended objective of these two columns was to highlight the “promise” of local efforts toward revitalization, through a message of opportunity and flexibility, a starker message of “peril” can also be discerned: center-piece agricultural commodities are viable only as long as climate conditions allow on the one hand, as in the forced switch for Tsugaru farmers from apples to peaches, and can be snatched away by a nearby competitor on the other, even one from your own prefecture and even in the case where doing so degrades the eventual product, as in the case of Fukaura fisheries versus Oma.
The third column of the three pointed toward the “promise” of what is termed the “sixth sector,” businesses in which primary industries combine with secondary sector (processing) industries and third sector (service and retail) activities, in order to realize the fullest economic gain from a local product for the local economy (The Yomiuri Shimbun, 2014f). The column, focusing on a sixth-sector approach to fisheries processing on the west coast of the prefecture, noted that Aomori has seen rapid growth in sixth-sector industrialization initiatives, largely on the basis of central government and prefectural support under a 2011 law whereby such startups can receive interest-free financing for capital investments (this as opposed to the bootstrapping determination to place projects on a self-financing basis with a reluctance to accept government money as highlighted in the “Regionalism Revitalizes Japan” columns above). However, despite the success of such sixth-sector industries, upon further examination, a “peril” can be discerned here as well. According to a USDA Foreign Agricultural Service report, trends point less to the locally-owned and operated farms, fisheries and processors using the start-up subsidies and establishing sixth-sector industries than to national or even international profit-driven agricultural corporations and limited liability and stock-based companies capitalizing on such programs, with participation by such actors rising more than 70% from 2008 to 2013 (USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, 2014).

Such economy of scale realities aside, sixth sector industries do allow for inclusion of local cultural elements through the establishment of “local brands” for local areas. An ongoing reading of any local newspaper in Japan will reveal the level of “local product branding,” the reporting of which constitutes what Rausch (2012b) dubbed local “revitalization journalism,” and which is often accompanied by the creation of a mascot, or yurukyara. Tan (2014) catalogued the number and growth of yurukyara mascots over just one year when she discovered that 863 yurukyara in 2012 had grown to 1242 by 2013. Naturally, Tokyo claims the most yurukyara, with 68, followed by Osaka with 64 and Chiba with 53. Telling for rural revitalization, however, is the case for Aomori, whose various municipalities, associations and industries have produced 22 mascot characters for local goods and tourism promotion. A fall 2014 Japan News article details the development, and expectations, for one such yurukyara. Dubbed “Ichihime,” after the wife of a local prefectural warlord from the Sengoku period, this local moe-kyara, or “moe-character,” is expected to help the fortunes of Inakadate village, the home of Tambo Art, which uses rice paddies as a canvas by planting various types of different colored rice to create giant art works, by attracting tourists to the area year-round (The Yomiuri Shimbun, 2014b). The character was developed by a Tokyo-based company operating a molding factory in the village, and, hopefully, will bring Ichihime fans to the local places that will be linked to the character, as well as generating sales of local goods that will be adorned with her image.

One of the strategies in the project was to differentiate Ichihime from other yurukyara of the area, and thus the moe-kyara concept—cute, young female characters that can generate a strong fan base—was born. Unfortunately, Tan also concluded that the effectiveness of mascots is questionable, as the power of the yurukyara (and presumably moe-kyara) as a factor in tourist destinations is weak at best.
5. Regional Revitalization and Citizenship: A Shared Investment?

While Delanty (2002), as above, outlined a cultural-identity based notion of citizenship, where citizenship was viewed as a constructivist process of creating meaning and establishing narratives, a more grounded dimension of citizenship that often goes unexplored is consideration of the economics of "shared sacrifice for shared investment" as a principle of citizenship. Under this rubric, citizenship implies a sharing of economic sacrifice in order to create economic investment. Of course, such idealistic considerations are subject to budget realities, where any budget promises related to regional revitalization must be considered relative to revenue and other fiscal obligations, and where transfers of money from one sector or geographic area to another must be justified as "shared sacrifice for shared investment."

Thus, beyond any such consciousness or practice of "citizenship," problematic to this dimension is the Japanese national budget itself. The 2015 budget, slated to hit a record high of 97 trillion yen, will have to account for 31.5 trillion yen for social security expenditures on an expected rise in revenues to a 24-year high of 54.5 trillion yen, all while cutting bond issuance to a six-year low of 37 trillion yen. The revenue base is expected to emerge from income taxes (17%), corporate taxes (11%) and consumption taxes (18%) on the one hand, bolstered by government bonds (38%) on the other. Servicing the national debt will account for 24% of the budget, with an additional 32% eaten up by the social security promises referred to above and 16% given over to the local allocation tax grants that will, in theory, provide for the local tax incentives offered to businesses to stimulate relocation. Education, national defense and public works round out the top budget items at 5 to 6 percent each.

One of the primary objectives of the regional revitalization policy plan was an effort to encourage businesses to relocate to rural areas. In that regard, a December 2014 Japan News article outlined how the central government planned to offer corporate tax incentives for companies that relocate head offices or other key facilities from Tokyo and other major urban areas to provincial regions (The Yomiuri Shimbun, 2014c). The scheme aims to provide momentum for the creation of industrial clusters suited to local conditions in specific regions throughout Japan. The December article detailed that to qualify for an incentive, a company will have to apply for programs devised by prefectural and municipal governments, with central government tax revenue allocations to the local government partially offsetting any associated reductions in the local tax revenues. By summer of 2015, revisions and new conditions to the incentives policy had been introduced. As reported in a July Japan News article, the central government will closely examine local measures for effectiveness and offer support as deemed necessary (The Yomiuri Shimbun, 2015b). As the basic policy aims at increasing job opportunities in non-metropolitan communities and invigorating regional economies, the range of transfer specifications was expanded beyond corporate facilities and governmental institutions to include funding for programs establishing continuing care retirement communities together with initiating laws allowing for the transfer of authority on matters such as land-use conversion from the central government to local authorities. With a budget of between 150 and 200 billion yen set for a new type of subsidy to local municipalities, the central government will examine the actual
performance of the local measures in order to prevent the kinds of handouts seen in the past as well as the adverse outcomes that result with bureaucratic sectionalism.

Public works are often seen as a possible way of stimulating not just the economy overall, but specific sectors of an economy and specific regions of the nation as well. However, given Japan’s past use of central government monies for unnecessary infrastructural projects and the political support in outlying areas such funding has yielded, use of public finances for public works has come under harsh scrutiny, if not criticism. This is unfortunate, considering current policy to expand the high-speed ground transportation system, the Shinkansen, nationally to Hokkaido in the north and Kyushu in the south. Even before the release of details regarding regional revitalization, voices speaking against use of state spending to speed up completion of the Shinkansen lines were clear. A fall 2014 *Japan News* opinion article asserted that despite both central and local governments calling for efforts to complete the expansion as one way of revitalizing rural areas, “it is questionable whether the nation as a whole needs to enact risky financial schemes to pay for it” (*The Yomiuri Shimbun*, 2014a).

Such an opinion by a major newspaper highlights the problematic essence of “shared sacrifice for shared investment” in today’s social consciousness of citizenship: it is deemed questionable for the nation as a whole to underwrite sound, but also timely infrastructural projects that could contribute to regional revitalization. Recognition of such divided sentiment is evident elsewhere as well. Mullen (2015), writing about the grim future of Japan’s rural areas in the magazine *Tokyo Weekender*, points out that while entrepreneurs and local activists are crafting innovative local solutions to stimulate lagging rural economies, few see such open-minded and open-ended thinking in the government’s policies. Indeed, many perceive just the opposite; they cite Prime Minister Abe’s decision to have smaller municipalities “pitch” their revitalization ideas in order to secure national subsides as a way of forcing the weakest areas of Japan into mutual competition, where one’s success signals another’s failure. As quoted in the article, Tohoku University political science professor Kawamura Kazunori holds that Abe is sending a strong message to regions that from now on, they cannot depend on the central government but rather must compete for virtually everything. Also quoted in the article is University of Tokyo political scientist professor Uchiyama Yu, contending that Abe’s policies are backfiring in rural areas, as many agree neither with his agenda nor his approach, and that forcing areas to forego their local identity to create short-term universally-appealing strategy plans will not be beneficial for Japan long-term. Tsuji Takuya of Hitotsubashi University also opined on the divisions that are emerging in Japan’s social consciousness. He notes that, on an individual level, city dwellers tend to think that depopulation and population aging are matters solely for the governments of such depopulating and aging areas and have little or nothing to do with urban life, whereas those in rural areas believe that such trends constitute national issues and are therefore deserving of intensive investment as national policy (Tsuji, 2015). Tsuji continues into more thorny areas of policy, alluding to the conflicts that arise between officials who work with an idealized image of regulatory oversight as the path toward municipalities addressing such issues versus those who advocate deregulation as a means for the people of an area to promote a dynamic, bottom-up and highly locale-specific form of local development.
One area where a sense of “shared sacrifice for shared investment” toward regional revitalization and national citizenship would seem to favorably overlap is the furusato tax payment (furusato nōzei) system. Available primarily for individuals but also with allowances for businesses, this system allows for local tax breaks for individuals choosing to have a portion of their tax payments forwarded to a specific municipality of their choosing. The system, envisioned by the central government in 2009 as a way of addressing wealth disparities between urban cities and towns and villages in rural areas on the basis of decisions made by individuals themselves, is not without its critics (Soble, 2015). Viewed from the perspective of the urban municipality that loses tax revenues, Soble cites Doi Takero, a Keio University professor, who points out that the urban areas where the donors live end up bearing the costs of the program as the tax write-offs subtract from the cities’ revenue. In fiscal 2014, a total of 14 billion yen was diverted from local municipal tax revenues as donations to other municipalities, and with the government doubling the upper limit on tax deductions to 20 percent of the donor’s municipal tax bill, the figure is expected to balloon in the future. Another questionable aspect of how the program has come to operate is that the rural municipalities receiving the tax donations now compete for donors by offering “thank-you gifts” such as local produce, beef or seafood. Some municipalities have taken the scheme as far as offering tablet computers or, in the case of Toyota city, home of Toyota Motors, free use of an eco-car. The numbers of donors, the amount of revenue diverted and the value of the gifts can be staggering. The village of Hirado has courted 36,000 donors, more than the number of residents, for a total of 1.46 billion yen, accounting for seven percent of its annual budget. The amount that local governments are spending on such “thank-you gifts” can be problematic for municipalities with small budgets. Some towns are allocating as much as 70 to 80 percent of the value of donations back into the gifts, meaning that rich donors can gain a bonanza of gifts, while the two competing municipalities—one urban and the other rural—bear the fiscal burdens of the program. That said, defenders of the system contend that there are specific pluses to the program: donors can both designate funds for specific purposes in the target municipality—child-care subsidies for local residents and computers for local schools are often popular selections—and select the gifts they find most attractive. In the latter aspect, some town and local business leaders contend that the competition this creates for local products encourages local innovation, strengthens local brand profiles, and brings investment to the area.

6. Conclusion

As outlined in the opening, the focus herein is in the intersection of regional revitalization, an important and timely issue for Japan, and how approaches to regional revitalization reflect practices and realities regarding culture, identity and citizenship in contemporary Japan. The primary focus of regional revitalization efforts is in the creation of stable jobs in provincial areas through re-development of agricultural, forestry and fisheries industries along with relocation of corporate and government facilities to rural areas and establishment of new business clusters. The specific activities outlined herein that show “promise” focused on re-establishing industries centered on existing local natural resources, developing new regional business centers amenable to specific
industries, and re-branding existing local agricultural and fisheries resources under various sixth sector management schemes. In addition, policy plans allowing for tax incentives for corporate relocation to rural areas and designation of municipal tax payments to specific extra-local municipalities were also outlined. However, these same policies and approaches were also shown to include “peril” in various forms as well. These were shown to be financial, as when local profits are potentially lost to a host area through corporate stock practices or local revenues are lost to municipalities through “tax diversions” and “thank-you gifts” in the furusato nōzei system, as well as “market competitive,” as when one area undercuts another and unforeseen factors such as climate change impact the continued potential of industries generations in the making.

Thus, with an aim toward realizable, meaningful and sustainable revitalization of regional areas, we might ask if culture, in the form of regional or local culture, and identity, in the form of regional and local identity, are paths of “promise?” As Rausch (2010) opined, given the trend toward ubiquity of most products as contemporary market-amenable commodities and most places as widely attractive and easily appreciated tourist sites, one element of the future economic base for any locale will in part be based on its capability and success in capitalizing on its cultural and identity characteristics. If all “local products” come to look, feel, and taste the same and all “local places” offer generally similar experiences, those that will command a sustainable presence will be those that have maintained and enhanced a specific and unique cultural identity that emerged from and still connects to a set of local cultural and identity resources.

Yet despite this view towards the survival of local economies and the potential this offers to local areas, it appears that regional revitalization approaches have adopted less a turn toward a local cultural economy based on local cultural commodities than a focus on creation of sixth sector industries, ones where traditional, predominantly extractive local industries are re-established and re-branded. Undercutting this strategy, however, is the fact that local economies based solely on primary industries run stark risks as, as shown, what were once solidly locale-based traditional commodities, agricultural and aquatic, can be subject both to changes broad and irreversible, as in the cumulative effects of climate change, and, in particular instances, the strategies and actions of other locales. The reality of this approach is one of winners and losers, whether one product over another, one area over another, or one group of interested parties (non-local stock-holders and corporate entities) over another (local residents as producers and owners). In terms of Aomori prefecture’s namesake commodities, the future seems less about activating Tsugaru nuri lacquerware as a potentially national craft commodity and capitalizing on Tsugaru shamisen as a potentially global cultural-music performance than reorganizing local agriculture in the face of a changing climate based on the success of other regional agricultural commodities, an approach that, at present, seems to favor peaches over apples. For coastal Aomori, the future seems to be less about establishing an Aomori coastal brand based on sustainable components of its coastal areas and marine habitat than accepting a market-driven race that compromises one nationally-known prefectural village, famous for a particular product, for the sake of another. For “sixth-sector industrial” Aomori, a future may emerge that is less a function of a nationally-organized and valorized program of subsidies that will ensure that the profits born of local products stay in the area of their
origin, than one of a deregulated approach whereby economic interests outside the area can “invest” their way into local profits, a reality where, once again, local resources and local labor are exploited for profits taken elsewhere.

Such a dualistic paradigm of “winners and losers” seems to fit both urbanites’ view of regional revitalization, as well as the current policy approach of the ruling government. Residents of Japan’s urban centers seem to view rural problems as the inevitable and irreversibly specific problems of rurality, something distinct and removed from their city life, and the Abe Cabinet appears to favor “competition” and “effectiveness” as the primary means for determining regional revitalization subsidy recipients. Thus, regarding a relationship between regional revitalization and citizenship, the question is less one of defining citizenship than identifying which “citizen” actors to focus on and then defining the desired, appropriate or necessary actions of each. If one views citizenship within the purview of the individual citizen, then perhaps the best we can hope for are tax transfers to locations one has an interest in through the furusato tax payment scheme along with encouraging urban residents to travel to and spend money in troubled rural areas that are in need of revitalization. If one views citizenship as an act of the national corporation, then, as related to regional revitalization, relocating offices and facilities to peripheral areas for the “good of the country” becomes a corporate act of citizenship, but an act in which the true burden is borne by the individual employee and his or her family, problematic based on whether the individual and family view such a forced move positively or not. If one turns citizenship back on itself, and asks what constitutes acts of citizenship for a government itself, the question devolves into the ideologies and equations of governance: how does a government do best for all its citizens? By operating from a principle of strict equality for all areas and all residents, whether through uniformly-applied regulation and equative subsidy or conversely deregulation and a “survival of the fittest” mentality? Or, rather, by sorting and sifting through the various arguments for or against a particular allocation of attention and funds for a particular place, company, cooperative or citizen and then asking for a national “shared sacrifice for shared investment” by all?

Concluding with the conference theme in mind, the ideal confluence of culture, identity and citizenship in the regional revitalization of contemporary Japan thus appears to be less in an ideal of local and regional economies prioritizing local culture, local identity and local cultural commodities so as to create local culture economies than in the problematic reality that the cultural identity of all places, but particularly regional places, requires a modern sense of “cultural-identity citizenship.” This is citizenship that accepts and encourages local citizenship as a constructivist process, in the local creation of meaning and the promotion of local narratives on the one hand, and which implies and agrees to “shared sacrifice for shared investment” in support of the very multi-dimensional and multi-geographic cultural identity that constitutes the complexity of modern Japan. If the regional towns and villages that support the richness of local cultural identity that defines Japan are allowed to whither, then Japan as a vibrant country of both urban and rural dimensions—city and country, skyscraper and forest, factory and farm, museum and festival—ceases to exist. The rural has long provided for the urban—with its youth, its agricultural produce, its natural resources, its access to clear air, clean water and abundant nature that make it a desirable place to return, whether in reality or merely through nostalgia. This is the citizenship
contribution of rural Japan to the cultural identity of urban Japan. The urban must now ensure the contemporary survival of the rural—through meaningful, sustainable and non-exploitative support of regional economies. This is urban Japan’s obligation to an overall Japanese cultural-identity citizenship.
References


5. The Rural Idyll, Globalization and Cultural Differences Between Japanese and Canadian Residential Landscapes on the Fringe of Cities

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Abstract
There are a variety of residential styles outside of cities owing in part to the interaction with traditional rural settlement form. In Canada, the idyllic large non-farm estate—originating in Europe—is one type of housing people identify with in the rural-urban fringe. Yet Japanese people are nostalgic about more distant rural landscapes of their furusato or hometowns. But the preference for, and identity with, housing landscapes is changing on the edge of both Canadian and Japanese cities due to globalization and the importance of nature. The purpose of this paper is to examine the cultural differences between Canadian and Japanese residential landscapes in the countryside around cities. I review the literature and supplement it with landscape observations. The preliminary results are that, although rural landscapes outside of Japanese cities are increasingly being valued for their food production and ecological qualities, these areas are still valued as cheap places to live. In Canada there is an emphasis on environmental preservation, but the idyllic rural estate home is still highly valued. The principal conclusion is that material landscape differences between Japan and Canada persist owing in part to different interpretations of the rural idyll.

Keywords: Rural-urban fringe, rural idyll, residential landscapes, culture, globalization

1. Introduction: Culture in the Context of Japanese and Canadian Rural-urban Fringe Residential Landscapes
The edges of cities are interesting places to study culture because of the mixing of rural and urban landscape elements with the gradual change from built-over to rural landscapes as one leaves the city. These are landscapes in transition. This paper is a cross-cultural study of Japanese and Canadian residential landscapes in the rural-urban fringe. Culture refers to "...people’s way of life, their behavior, and their shared understanding about themselves and the world. Culture serves as a guide for how we act and interpret the world.
around us” (Kuby, Harner, and Gober, 2007, 34). Both Martinez (1998) and Norton (2004) talk about material and non-material forms of culture. This paper examines differences in landscape elements or material culture, such as housing type or the makeup of the surrounding farm landscape. The paper also examines non-material culture, such as the people who live in the rural-urban fringe, e.g., farmers and non-farmers, and their attitudes toward landscapes; the people who make decisions about the management of the fringe, e.g., planners, and government bureaucrats and their attitudes. Planning regulations are also considered non-material culture, which can lead to landscape differences, which is part of material culture, or as Cadieux et al. (2013) label it “material landscape.”

In terms of non-material culture, many Canadians identify with the rural idyll—this positive view toward rural areas that can be traced back to Greek and Roman civilization (Short, 2006). During these ancient times wealthy nobility would live in luxurious villas in the countryside. In modern times estate homes have popped up in the Canadian rural-urban fringe that emulate architecture from 19th century Europe and especially England. These homes have become attainable by middle class (Bunce, 1994) Canadians. Conversely, many Canadians ignore the rural idyll and move to new residential developments in rural areas because homes there are affordable (e.g., Gyarmati, 2015). The Japanese tend to have a more idyllic attitude toward more remote rural areas—sometimes this is where people have their hometowns. At least once a year, many Japanese migrate back to their rural hometowns—other people travel as tourists to rural areas.

There exist many material landscape differences between Japan and Canada in residential areas of the rural-urban fringe. Japan’s rural-urban fringe landscape is generally superimposed on a high-density rice and dry crop farming pattern, whereas the Canadian rural-urban fringe is superimposed on a larger scale agricultural and forest landscape. One cultural distinction of the Japanese material landscape is that it has always had a mixture of urban and rural land uses (Yokohari et al., 2000, cited in Mok et al. 2013). Historically, Japan had agricultural areas in large cities, such as Nara and Kyoto as far back as the 8th century. According to Yokohari et al. (2010), about 40 percent of land in Edo was used for agriculture. Interestingly, much of this land was considered gardens that people could enjoy. Historically, Canadian cities did not mix farmland within the urban core.

Finally, one must consider the socio-economic context of residential landscape change going on in the rural-urban fringe. Rapid economic growth occurred from the late 1950s onward in Japan, and urban residential areas expanded into rural areas leading to the development of the rural-urban fringe (Ichikawa et al., 2006; Kurita et al. 2009; Yokohari et al. 2010, cited in Mok et al. 2013). A similar phenomenon happened with the growth of suburbs in Canada (Smith, 2006). These were high density, single detached houses on small lots. Yokohari and Bolthouse (2011, 421) refer to the term “high growth modernity” when referring to Japan’s rapid economic and population growth up until the 1970s when new housing and parks were popping up everywhere. But in Japan there were no estate homes on big lots as in parts of the fringe in Canada, and there was no rural idyll being promoted as is the case in these low-density exurban (see Bunce, 1994) developments. Okamoto (1997) refers to the growth of large cities such as Tokyo and people migrating to the distant suburbs where housing was cheaper. This migration was exacerbated by the commercial real estate bubble in Tokyo of the late 1980s, which “bumped up” residential
land prices further, meaning that people had to move to even more distant locations. Commuting times were, and still are, so long that commuters had little time to spend at home with their families. Many people were, and still are, living in the rural-urban fringe because it was, and still is, an affordable place to live in and commute from in both Canada and Japan. The rural idyll was, and is not, a motivating factor for living in the Japanese rural-urban fringe.

Globalization has changed the appearance of both urban and rural residential landscapes, so there is a sameness in terms of architecture, neighbourhood design and road layout wherever one goes. This started in earnest after World War II in Japan with the adoption of land-use planning procedures from abroad, such as the garden city concept from England. More recently, Canadian housing designs have been used in residential developments. Meanwhile, on the other side of the Pacific in the Kamloops area of British Columbia, a locally based construction company owned by people from Japan is building homes in rural areas with Japanese characteristics. Also, the concern for safe and healthy food in Japan has led to a proliferation of garden plots in the rural-urban fringe, much like the "Kleingarten" allotments in Europe. In both the Canadian and Japanese rural-urban fringe, there has been a greater desire to preserve natural landscapes.

The purpose of this paper is to describe non-material and material cultural differences between the residential landscapes in the rural-urban fringe of Japanese and Canadian cities. Some of these differences are related to variations in the idyllic view toward the countryside (Woods, 2011). I argue that this rural idyll does not exist in the rural-urban fringe of Japan as it does in Canada where residential areas often are organized to present a bucolic image, exemplified by large lots and rural estates. I will first define the rural-urban fringe. Second, I will discuss non-material cultural differences between the Japanese and Canadian rural-urban fringe. Third, I will discuss material cultural differences at the macro, meso and micro residential landscape scales (Jones, 1988). Fourth, I will discuss the effects of globalization on the residential landscape of both the Japanese and Canadian fringes. Finally, I will summarize then conclude.

2. Defining the residential rural-urban fringe in Canada and Japan

Before describing differences between the Japanese and Canadian rural-urban fringes, one must define the rural-urban fringe in theoretical terms. *The city's countryside* by Bryant et al. (1982) describes the rural-urban fringe as having an inner and outer zone surrounding a city (Figure 5.1 Model of the rural-urban fringe). Beyond the outer fringe zone is the rural hinterland, and beyond that is the urban shadow. This model is based on a flat farm landscape in Canada or the US. It is a simplified static view of a very complex and dynamic landscape. A newer view of the rural-urban fringe focuses on the people who live and work there—actors—and their influence on change (Bryant and Mitchell, 2006, 237). Still, the original model of the city's countryside gives a good introduction to the spatial organization of the fringe around cities. This paper begins its focus primarily on the inner rural-urban fringe, which is the region adjacent to the built up city. I will compare this area in general terms between Japan and Canada but I will give more specific examples from the periphery of a small city called Ushiku, in the rural-urban fringe of Tokyo (Figures 5.2 and
5.3), and Kamloops, located about 350 kms northeast of the centre of Vancouver. Both cities have populations of about 85,000.

**Figure 5.1. Model of the rural-urban fringe**

(Source: Adapted from Bryant et al., 1982, as adapted in Bunting and Fillion, 1991, 220)
Figure 5.2. The Rural-urban Fringe of Tokyo and the Location of Ushiku

(Note the influence of the rail lines on the built landscape)

(Source: Drawn by Dr. R. Nelson, modified from K. Miyasaka (cartographer) and Waldichuk and Whitney 1997, 34)
3. Analyzing the Cultural Landscape

One can analyze the cultural landscape through a model devised by Jones (1988, 203). In this model, he uses a triangle to explain the landscape in terms of scale: micro, meso, and macro scales (the three points on the triangle) (Figure 5.4). At the micro scale there are individual actors, (bottom-left point), e.g., homeowners, who change their household landscapes based on their intentions. At the meso-scale one acknowledges the functional landscape and the mechanisms that are responsible, specifically individual actors involved in the production process (bottom right point). Finally, at the macro-landscape scale, we see the structural landscape, which is an outcome of ideology and production (top point of the triangle). With this model one can see the context of residential landscape change in the rural-urban fringe in terms of structural change at the macro level, the impact of production on the meso landscape, and the impact of individual behaviour on the micro
landscape. I will analyze differences in the Japanese and Canadian rural-urban fringe residential landscape using Jones’ model.

**Figure 5.4. The Jones (1988) Model of Theorizing the Cultural Landscape**

![Diagram of Jones' model](image)

(Source: Jones, 1988, 203)

4. **Non-material cultural differences & their influence on the material landscape: the rural idyll, nostalgia, and agrarianism**

4.1. **Canada, USA, and Europe**

The rural idyll is a powerful example of non-material culture. It is associated with words such as picturesque, bucolic and pastoral (Bunce, 2003, 14). Bunce also says that farming, community and recreation also are part of the definition (Ibid., 14). The rural idyll varies in form from place to place, and has a major effect on who lives in the rural fringe of cities and what the built or material landscapes look like there.

The modern capitalist version of the rural idyll developed during the second half of the 1800s and the early 1900s (Short, 2006). Bunce (1994) talks about the idealization of the countryside, which developed in the 19th century and was a result of the urban and industrial revolution (see also Bell, 2006; Short, 2006; and Woods, 2011). Short (2006) mentions that urban squalor also resulted in escaping to rural areas; this escape to rural areas continued into the 20th century (Bunce, 1994, 57-58). Short (2006) continues that this rural idyll came about in opposition to modernity. The rural idyll developed due to the rise of the middle class (Bell, 2006), and it desired to set itself apart from the urban
working class, by imitating the lifestyle of country gentry by building country homes and “Arcadian” suburbs (Ibid., 206). In English speaking countries this rural idyll was strongly influenced by the landscape of pre-industrial England (Woods, 2011). Thus, the idyll had an impact on material culture; for example, large country homes or the design of suburbs.

In a more modern-day context, Bunce (1981) talks about the influences of positive rural sentiment on city dwellers to move to the countryside. Bell (2006, 158) similarly talks about new rural settlements in England for non-farm newcomers that resemble traditional rural village neighbourhoods, which are often gated, and are called “fortress villages”. These villages, which Bell identifies as new traditionalism, provide an exclusive type of rural idyll in terms of executive homes for a middle-class urban population, where traditional middle-class values are preserved and protected against urban consumer capitalism (Murdoch and Marsden, 1994, 220, cited in Bell, 2006, 153). These residential landscapes are all examples of material culture or landscape.

The rural idyll is closely connected to the idea of nostalgia—another example of non-material culture. Short (2006, 137) mentions that the rural idyll leads to a feeling of nostalgia, which becomes stronger during difficult times (also Bunce, 1994, 208). Nostalgia has been defined by Lowenthal (1985, 8) as “memory with the pain taken out” (cited in Mitchell, 1998, 274). Nostalgia is also associated with a sense of loss of home or homesickness (Harrison, 1982, cited in Bunce, 2003, 15). Gerald Walker has talked about nostalgia in terms of reminiscing about grandparents or great-grandparents who farmed (personal comm., 1993-94). The feeling of nostalgia for a simpler past as in the pre-industrial period has been common in North America since about 1970 (Mitchell, 1998). Bell (2006) refers to nostalgia when describing new rural estate homes in England, saying that these homes and the lifestyle they promote are “a nostalgic defense against the body blows of post-industrial consumer capitalism” (Leslie, 1993 and Probyn, 1990, cited in Bell, 2006, 153). These feelings of nostalgia have paralleled the post-modern period (Mitchell, 1998, 274). Nostalgia can thus probably influence one to move or visit to the rural-urban fringe and can affect what kind of residential area and housing one chooses.

Agrarianism—or the positive attitude toward agriculture—is another example of non-material culture and is also talked about in terms of the rural idyll in Canada and Europe. For example, Bunce (1994, 207) refers to the philosophy of agrarianism combined with romanticism to give a positive attitude towards the countryside. He mentions that the rural ideal in North America is less about aesthetics as it is in the UK, and more about old lifestyles and the evolution of agriculture (Bunce, 1994, 36). In sum, the rural idyll, including nostalgia and agrarianism have had an impact on the development of the material landscape in the rural-urban fringe of Canada.

4.2. Japan

In Japan, McMorran (2014, 1) discusses the rural idyll and how it is emulated through fuukeizukuri or “landscape design” of a hot springs resort. He does not define the rural idyll but does refer to the Western literature (e.g., Mitchell, 1998; Mitchell et al., 2001 and others), so he is relying on the North American and British interpretation of the term. Francks (2006, 279) also refers to the rural idyll in relation to Japan, stating that the
Japanese people do not "aspire to the rural idyll of life in the real countryside" compared to people in Britain.

In Japan the meaning of nostalgia in the context of the rural-urban fringe is different from that in Canada: it refers to a longing for one's hometown or furusato (Clammer, 1997; McMorran, 2014). Nostalgia also leads to a desire to visit rural areas beyond the rural areas next to large cities. Furusato is an idyllic landscape and lifestyle—not harsh wilderness (Rea, 2000) (Figure 5.5). The concept of furusato motivates one to return to one's rural hometown. McMorran (2014) mentions that in the mid-1980s post-war nostalgia for the Japanese countryside was widespread. Thus, the Japanese living in cities identify with their furusato or old town. Francks (2006, 1) mentions that the nostalgia that the rural furusato or native place evokes “remains a powerful weapon in the armoury of Japan’s advertising industry,” meaning that nostalgia is used to promote tourism. In sum, nostalgia is not talked about in terms of deciding to move to the rural-urban fringe outside the built up city, nor is it talked about in terms of residential design—it is talked about in terms of visiting more remote rural areas.

Figure 5.5. Image of “Furusato”

(Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Tono-furusato-mura16s3872.jpg)

Agrarianism as a non-material cultural idea or group of ideas exists in Japan as it does in Canada. In Japanese it is called nohon shugi, which more literally means “agriculture is-the-base-ism” (Ogura, 1982, 1) and is similar to American agricultural fundamentalism, which purported that agriculture is the foundation of the American economy. This thought has existed since the Edo period (1603-1867), and during the Meiji period (1868-1912) the term was commonly used in agricultural policies and studies. Some Confucian scholars
warned about the promotion of manufacturing and the merchant class, which would have an impact on the farming class and thus agriculture (Ogura, 1982, 2).

Penelope Francks (1992) mentions that ideas of agrarianism as well as romanticism were used to oppose industrialization, although she does not elaborate. The rural idyll (which embodies agrarianism) has been used politically to preserve the traditional Japanese rural landscape and what it produces (Francks, 2006). The fact that the Emperor plants rice at the imperial palace every year strengthens the connection between Japanese culture and agriculture, particularly rice, and supports the idea of Japanese nationalism. Francks says that at a political level farm interest groups have been able to garner public support for agricultural trade protection owing to the often emotional support for traditional rural landscapes and what they produce. This sentiment of supporting the agricultural landscape and what it produces can have an impact on the material landscape.

In summary, the rural idyll is a good example of non-material culture that can result in changes to the material landscape in the rural-urban fringe. For example, it is associated with a desire for estate homes in Canada. Nostalgia in Japan refers to one’s furusato or hometown, which one can identify with on an individual or national basis. Nostalgia also motivates urbanites to get away for a visit to the countryside. But it does not result in residential change in the rural-urban fringe of Japan. The ideas of agrarianism are stronger in Japan. There is a strong belief in farming (Ogura, 1982). Thus, overall, while the rural idyll in Canada may lead to residential landscape change in the rural-urban fringe with more people moving into the fringe and desiring, for example, estate homes, it will not in Japan. However, more people in the Japanese fringe may take up small-scale agriculture or vegetable gardening, and they may be motivated to travel to more remote rural areas or to their rural hometowns.

5. Material cultural differences: Residential landscape differences between the Canadian and Japanese rural-urban fringes

The current landscape in both the Japanese and Canadian fringes is a product of non-material culture, e.g., the rural idyll, including nostalgia and agrarianism or rapid modernization in the context of modernity as described above. At the macro-scale level of analysis (Jones, 1988) of the fringe in Canada we see large-scale heterogeneity with dispersed farm houses and low density large non-farm country estates (Figure 5.6), a pattern which is commonly referred to as exurbia (Bunce, 1994) and is a reflection of the rural idyll. Closer to the city, one might also see high density single-detached housing developments, which is not a product of the rural idyll, but rather affordable single-detached housing.
In Japan, on the other hand, at the macro scale one can see bed-towns, new towns, *danchi*, garden cities, farmland and fragmented urban development. These are all products of planning during the rapid period of economic growth, related to modernity—these are not reflections of the rural idyll. These rural-urban fringe settlements reflect the desire to build as much housing as possible during the period of high economic growth.

The “bed-towns” are commuter settlements in the rural-urban fringe of large cities such as Tokyo. Some of these bed-towns have been transformed from former rural towns such as Ushiku, or they can be planned new towns, e.g., Tama in western Tokyo (Edgington, 2003; Yokohari, Amemiya, and Amati, 2006). Some of these communities are leap-frog settlements on rural land where costs are lower and where there are fewer regulations (Sorensen, 2000, cited in Galloway, 2007, 96). At the meso scale within the new towns and bed-towns there are residential tract developments of mostly single detached housing, also known as *danchi* (*danchi* refers to a grouping on land). Sorensen (2001) says that housing in these new towns is popular but expensive (Figure 5.7). Within these new towns there are blocks of large high-rise condominium buildings that are also called *danchi* (Figure 5.8) (Edgington, 2003; see also Botting, 2003).
As mentioned above, many of these residential tract developments are a result of land readjustment procedures, when landowners pool their farm and forest land and collectively create a new residential subdivision (see Sorensen, 1999). Land readjustment can also involve collectively redeveloping an existing urban or industrial area too.

At the meso scale the residential areas in these tract developments are usually on a grid with wide roads and sidewalks for pedestrians and usually cyclists. The *danchi* can include apartment buildings and shops along the main street. I have seen a Christian church and a Buddhist temple in one *danchi* in Ushiku City. The houses are usually uniform in appearance, have two storeys with three bedrooms, and are usually mass-produced. These suburban houses are no bigger than houses in the city core, e.g., Tokyo (Hebbert and Nakai, 1988). Houses can be bought out of catalogues, and one can go to a demonstration housing display lot to look at homes before buying—similar to visiting a car lot or showroom. Homes can be custom built or mass-produced (Patchell, 2002). Some of these houses even have Canadian designs (Canada Home, 2014). One can relate this mass production of uniform housing design to being part of post-World War II housing production that McCarthy (2008) describes in the US and other countries.
In addition to new towns and danchi, there is the planned garden city that can be analyzed at the meso and micro scales. The garden city design originated in England and is related to the rural idyll. Most of this review is based on Ishida (2007, 116-117, 127). The Den’en Toshi project in the suburbs of Tokyo started in 1953 when these suburbs were really part of the rural-urban fringe of Tokyo. Translated into English “Den’en Toshi” means garden city, and the concept was borrowed from Ebenezer Howard’s Garden City movement from the early 1920s in England. These were a series of suburbs along the Tokyu Den’en Toshi commuter rail line in western Tokyo near the Tama River. Den’en Toshi was planned to have 310,000 residents, but by 1987 the population was over 400,000. The rice paddies have been preserved because the land is designated as an urbanization control zone (UCZ) where no development is allowed, whereas the land set aside for development, through land-readjustment, has been designated as an urbanization promotion zone (UPZ). Still, there were problems with this garden city in the 1960s in terms of facilities, such as lack of sewers. There were also local groups forming to help preserve the local natural environment, and there were attempts at creating green space corridors. Moreover, there was a plan proposed in 1966 to link park and green space areas with tree-lined boulevards called the Pear City Plan, but there was not enough land set aside for wide boulevards, and the plan never came to fruition (Ishida, 2007, 127). Although the above proposed plan is related the area’s farm heritage, which can be related to the rural idyll (Bunce, 1994), Ishida does not explicitly mention the rural idyll in his depiction of Den’en Toshi. Versions of garden cities were also proposed in Osaka (Hanes, 2002). The garden city is the only planned rural-urban fringe settlement that is related to the rural idyll—as perceived in
England! The new towns and danchi that were built in the rural-urban fringe did not capitalize on the farm or forest landscapes in which they were situated.

The other landscapes to consider are the unplanned mixed rural-urban landscapes—often referred to in Japanese as konjuka settlements (e.g. Waldichuk and Whitney, 1997). Here residential developments are not landscape expressions of the rural idyll. Compared to Canada one sees a denser heterogeneity of land uses such as multi-family residential, forest, farmland, and factories (Figure 5.9).

**Figure 5.9. Rural-urban Fringe in Western Tokyo—Denser Heterogeneity of Land Uses, Higher Density**

(Source: T. Waldichuk photo)

At the more detailed meso-scale in Canada we see dispersed farm households, dispersed non-farm households, golf courses, conflicting land uses, commercial vegetable farming, and tract housing, schools, and religious institutions, such as churches and mosques (Figures 5.10 and 5.11).
Figure 5.10. Dispersed Non-farm Households

(Source: T. Waldichuk photo)
At the meso-scale in Japan these unplanned residential landscapes often consist of mini housing developments with 10 or so homes (see Sorensen, 2001), clustered farm houses, surrounded by farmland, and fallow or abandoned farm fields, and Shinto shrines and Buddhist temples. Most of the Shinto Shrines and Buddhist temples and graveyards have existed long before urbanites moved into the area. These religious landscapes tend not to change as the surrounding farm and forest land is consumed by new housing. Also, shrines and temples often add green space to new housing developments because they are usually surrounded by forest. Streets are narrow and curved with no sidewalks. Residential lot sizes and houses are smaller on the fringe in Japan compared to that with Canada.

The largest lots belong to the farmers, who have a large main house and then some out buildings on the same property. The farmers usually own farmland detached from their farm-houses, which can be, for example, half a kilometre away. The nearby households are usually those of relatives (known as branch families or bunke in Japanese) (see Figure 5.12). Over time, on the dry fields close to their farmhouses the farmers build apartments, rental houses or parking lots. Japanese farmers are attached to their land, and thus, tend to develop it rather than sell it (Dawson, 1984).

Apartment buildings are usually two stories, and single-detached rental houses are one floor, often two room cottages. People from large cities such as Tokyo try to acquire a plot in the rural-urban fringe and then build a home on it (Hebbert and Nakai, 1988). Thus, one can see farmhouses, often in clusters as mentioned above, apartment buildings among vegetable fields and newer owner-occupied residential housing (see Allison, 1979).
One can see a sprawl-like settlement pattern in these unplanned *konjuka* areas. Housing and land use, in general, can appear scattered but this is not perceived to be a problem. Hebbert (1994, 77) states that “...the strong cultural biases against scattered development are inapplicable in Japan...” (cited in Sorensen 2000, 239). Often there are no sewers. Infrastructure such as sewers, widened streets, and sidewalks is generally put in after the houses are built (Sorensen, 2001; Mori, 1998). The unorganized landscape leads to problems of efficiency and the provision of basic services (Galloway, 2007).

**Figure 5.12. A Clustered Farm Hamlet with Branch Houses for Offspring on the Periphery of Ushiku City**

![Figure 5.12](Source: Ushiku City air photo)

Aesthetically, at the macro and meso level, these landscapes are often “...crisscrossed by high voltage transmission lines,” (Sorensen, 2000, 219) (Figure 5). Galloway (2007), in his description of Japanese suburbs (basically the inner rural-urban fringe), compares them to sprawling patterns found in North America, e.g., big box stores and strip malls among fields of unattached houses (Galloway, 2007, 96). There is no apparent order in the landscape, which illustrates a fragmented rural to urban land conversion (Wiltshire and Azuma, 2000). Thus, a visitor from Canada may find these landscapes unappealing. It can take a number of years for the rural landscape to become built over and totally urban. But Sorensen (2000) claims that this long period of urban development in the Japanese fringe results in a variety of houses often uniquely built, which is pleasant. Allison (1979, 160) similarly states in his description of the suburbanization of western Tokyo (basically the inner rural-urban fringe at the time) that a “rustic feeling” still exists.
What are some of the reasons for this fragmented, sprawl-like rural-urban fringe landscape? First, even though most of these areas are within urbanization control zones, there are loopholes, so that urban development still occurs. Sorensen (2001) also states that the fragmented nature of the Japanese fringe is partly due to the presence of small rice farms and post-World War II land reform. The Canadian rural-urban fringe generally consists of a larger-scale dry crop landscape. Sorensen (2001) states that people walked on footpaths between fields—which still happens—thus, leading to a denser landscape. He also states that when North American farmland was surveyed roads and land for public facilities such as churches was included and that even in Europe there was more public land before urban development took place. Also, after World War II, owing to land reform, the number of smaller plots that were held individually increased (Sorensen, 2001). In sum, the non-material culture in the form of planning regulations and procedures has resulted in a higher density, more fragmented landscape in Japan. Also, the pre-existing farm landscape, i.e., small-scale rice versus large-scale vegetable and grain in Canada, has had an impact on the contemporary rural-urban fringe landscapes in both Japan and Canada.

In conclusion, at the macro and meso scales of analysis, one can see planned suburbs in the rural-urban fringes of both countries. But in Japan we see planned new towns consisting of high density condominium and apartment complexes as well as higher density single-detached housing (Galloway, 2007); danchi tract housing developments are also common. The garden city or Den’en Toshi is an imported planning concept based on the rural idyll found in England. These landscapes are a result of the high economic growth period—part of modernity. One also sees low density housing being built in Canada, sometimes the size of estate homes. This is the exurbia that is a product of the rural idyll. The traditional clustered farm hamlets in Japan contrast with the dispersed farms in Canada. There is sprawl on surrounding farmland in both countries, but there are no estate lots in Japan. At the macro scale of analysis we see a higher density of land uses and a greater heterogeneity of land uses in the Japanese rural-urban fringe due to smaller-scale and the spatial organization of Japanese farms and the traditional form of farmland succession, resulting in small farm plots and a more fragmented residential landscape. The rural idyll in Japan, including nostalgia and agrarianism has little impact on these inner rural-urban fringe landscapes.

5. Globalization in the Japanese and Canadian rural-urban fringe

Woods (2007, 487) defines globalization as “…a dynamic and multifaceted process of integration and interaction that enrolls localities into networks of inter-connectivity organized at the global scale, and facilitating the global circulation of people, commodities, ideas and representations.” It is this global circulation that is important in the rural-urban fringe, especially in terms of the organization of landscapes at the macro, meso and micro levels as mentioned by Jones (1988). This section will examine the effects of globalization on residential landscapes in the rural-urban fringes of both Canada and Japan.

The globalization of land-use planning has had an impact on the Japanese rural-urban fringe since the end of World War II. Examples are the introduction of the garden city
movement from England, e.g., *Den’en Toshi*, and the attempted implementation of a greenbelt around Tokyo (Yokohari et al., 2010). Also, the use of land readjustment for urban development was introduced from abroad (Sorensen, 2000). There are many other land-use planning concepts that have been introduced, such as public participation (See Sorensen and Funck, 2007). These are examples of non-material culture.

If globalization means that different cultures are accepting similar ideas, then does a universal rural idyll exit? Bunce (2003) ponders this issue. But he argues that the rural idyll is different between England and North America in that the English rural idyll treats the countryside as a national treasure, whereas in much larger North America the rural idyll is not connected to nationalism. Still, a changing rural idyll due to globalization may have an impact on rural-urban areas. Bell (2006) states that globalization involves the placeless and that the rural idyll is like an imagined homeland that, according to some political views, is being threatened by globalization. Thus, some may advocate that these areas be protected and preserved. Bell then talks about the effect of US pop culture, such as rural based TV shows, and media on perceived notions of the rural idyll in England. He also mentions how tourism activities in increasingly diverse rural areas lead to different conceptions of rural idylls (Butler, 1998, cited in Bell, 2006). For example, in the rural Lake District of England the Japanese enjoy looking at the landscapes of Beatrix Potter (Craik, 1997, cited in Bell 2006, 156). Thus, globalization can have an impact on the rural idyll, and how rural areas are viewed and maintained, leading to changes to the material landscape.

In Japan Takahashi (2001) states that rural areas are now valued for nature, recreation, and education. Asano (2007) talks about the change in attitude toward preserving rural and natural landscapes in Japan. Up until the 1960s, there was a focus on protecting wilderness and natural places that were rare and scientifically important. Then, the focus was on ecological values and thus ecological landscapes. Recently though, there has been an emphasis on the cultural value of nature and accessible natural areas are being considered for conservation (Ishikawa, 2001, cited in Asano, 2007, 192). Community groups that are made up of mostly of urbanite retirees have been managing once overgrown woodlands in the rural-urban fringe (Takeuchi, 2003, cited in Yokohari and Bolthouse, 2011). Thus, the value and use of the landscapes around residential areas in the rural-urban fringe is changing.

The concern for the natural environment is growing in both the Japanese and Canadian (e.g., see Taylor, 2010 and Cadieux et al., 2013) fringes but the desire for individuals to grow food is still stronger in Japan. Although this trend may be influenced by the positive view toward farming that is espoused by agrarianism (Ogura, 1982), much of this desire to grow one’s own food in Japan may be due to the concern over food quality, e.g., the importation of tainted food products; it may also be due to the perceived inaccessibility of food, leading to a counter movement of farming in the city (Yokohari et al., 2010, cited in Yokohari and Bolthouse, 2011; Jussaume et al., 2000). Yokohari and Bolthouse (2011) promote the establishment or re-establishment of agriculture in urban areas and mention that urban agriculture is expanding beyond small garden plots with some urbanites now becoming involved in the operations of aging farm households. These small-scale farms are called *kleingarten* (which means small garden in German) (see Figure 5.13). Since about 1990 laws have been changed to allow farmland to be leased out to for use by urbanites,
from small garden plots to ones as large as 100 square metres (Japan for sustainability newsletter, No.136, Dec. 2013; Kieninger et al., 2011, cited in Mok et al., 2013; Wiltshire and Azuma, 2000). Some urbanites also travel further into the countryside for one or two days to stay and work at the larger kleingartens (Japan For Sustainability Newsletter, No.136, Dec. 2013), and one was even advertised on a TripAdvisor website (see Figure 5.14). Thus, this growing interest in small-scale farming by urbanites is having an impact on the fragmented rural-urban fringe residential konjuka areas discussed above.

At the macro scale, there are also eco-villages being proposed in Japan by Takeuchi et al. (1998). “Eco-village” is a key phrase for establishing sustainable human settlements internationally (Atkisson et al., 1991; Ansted and Franta, 1994; Dichristian, 1996; as cited in Takeuchi et al., 1998, 178). Takeuchi et al. (1998) advocate moving people to rural areas from large cities and encourage people to settle in agricultural and mountainous areas. They devised an eco-village model for the fringe (called an “urban front area”) that has 10,000 urbanites and 60 villagers with an area of 100 ha. The allotment garden in the eco-village is good for communication between the urbanites and the farmers when growing vegetables and flowers.

At the meso-scale, neigbourhood and housing design is also becoming global in terms of design. McCarthy (2008, 129) states “We see the countryside is increasingly a global commodity, one produced to standardized and exacting specifications at a growing number of locations.” “We learn that the same architects (and designers, builders, and other manufacturers) are plying their trades in a growing number of far-flung rural locations.” This is particularly relevant in terms of neighbourhood and housing design (e.g., Patchell, 2002). At the micro scale, there are Canadian housing designs that have been adopted in the Japanese fringe (e.g., Figure 5.15, Canada Home, 2014).

Conversely at the micro-scale in the Kamloops area of British Columbia a company called Daizen Joinery has been building custom homes by adapting Japanese wood-working designs (Figure 5.16, which is the homepage of Japanese company producing custom-built homes near Kamloops, March 2015, Daizen.com).
Figure 5.13. An Example of a Japanese kleingarten from Kasama City, Ibaraki Prefecture

Figure 5.14. Trip Advisor Internet Page for a kleingarten

(Source: www.tripadvisor.ca)
Figure 5.15. Canada Home


Figure 5.16. Daizen Joinery

Homepage of Japanese company producing custom-built homes near Kamloops, March 2015.

(Source: daizen.com)
In sum, globalization has and is continuing to change the residential landscape in both the Japanese and Canadian rural-urban fringes. The past adoption of foreign land-use planning concepts in Japan, such as new towns and garden cities are clear examples. At the macro level, rural areas in both Canada and Japan are valued more now for nature, and this can have an impact on residential design. Gardening and small-scale agriculture has increased more in the residential rural-urban fringe of Japan. At the macro scales, there is a proposal for eco-villages in Japan, including those located in the rural-urban fringe. There are also Canadian housing designs being adapted to Japanese residential areas (Canada Home, 2014), and there are Japanese designed homes being built in the rural-urban fringe of Kamloops (e.g., Daizen.com, n.d.). But country estate lots still exist only in the rural-urban fringe of Canada—a material landscape outcome of the ever-lasting yet changing rural idyll (see Figure 5.17).

Figure 5.17. Soon to be Estate Homes Outside of Kamloops

(Source: T. Waldichuk Photo)

6. Summary and Conclusion

The rural-urban fringe is a dynamic zone of land-use change. Its appearance is different in Canada compared to Japan owing in part to culture. One can analyze these differences in terms of non-material and material culture, with non-material culture, such as attitudes toward landscape, leading to differences in material culture or material landscape change. These differences can be analyzed at macro, meso and micro levels.
In Canada attitudes toward rural and urban landscapes are affected by the rural idyll—positive views toward rural areas, which include the related ideas of nostalgia for rural areas and agrarianism—favourable attitudes toward farming. The rural idyll in Canada comes from England and the rest of Europe. It has led to a material landscape of estate homes on large lots populated by middle-class people, symbolizing in part a landscape of leisure. In Japan, the rural idyll focuses on nostalgia for one’s furusato or hometown in rural areas. Even if one is born in a large city, one associates furusato with rural landscapes—it has become a national myth. These rural areas are well beyond the city, and thus, the “rural” in the rural-urban fringe is not held in the same high esteem, so no estate homes appear there.

The fundamental material differences between Japanese and Canadian rural-urban fringe landscapes, however, are based on differences in the traditional agricultural landscapes of both countries and the survey systems used. Specifically, the small-scale rice and dry field cultivation system used in Japan differs from the much larger scale vegetable and grain farming system used in Canada. Moreover, different Japanese and Canadian planning regulations, which are part of non-material culture, lead to many landscape differences, particularly sprawl.

Since the end of World War II at the macro scale there have been large-scale residential developments in the Canadian fringe, which is part of the suburbanization process within the context of modernity. These are higher density, cheaper houses than estate homes. In the Japanese fringe, at the macro level, there have been planned new towns, and high density track developments with a similar objective of providing affordable housing. The context of this residential development is the post-World War II high economic growth period. Still, there are no estate homes in the rural-urban fringe of Japan—there is no demand as in Canada. A different interpretation of the rural idyll in Japan is partly responsible for this.

Globalization has had an impact on the residential landscape in the Japanese and Canadian rural-urban fringes. In Japan at the macro level the garden city concept from England was introduced to the fringe of Tokyo in the early 1950s. New towns were introduced consisting of high-density single detached housing reflective of modernism. More recently there are some new housing designs, such as those from Canada. But the bigger change is that more people are involved in growing food in the rural-urban fringe—there has been a proliferation of kleingarten-style allotment gardens. The reasons for this increased interest in food production are imported food safety concerns and food accessibility. These urbanite farmers’ attitudes may also be influenced by agrarianism—positive views toward agriculture—which is related to the rural idyll. These same residents are also interested in managing local forest landscapes. In the Canadian residential fringe there are also more varieties of housing available; for example, higher quality custom-built housing from Japan. However, one still sees the estate home. There is also an interest in preserving the natural landscape. Thus, there are a greater variety of residential landscapes in the rural-urban fringes of both countries—these exemplify post-modern landscapes.
References


6. Commodification of Rural Spaces in British Columbia, Canada

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Abstract

Rural areas in developed countries have traditionally been considered spaces for agricultural production. However, in recent years, they have been regarded as suitable for other functions, such as leisure and recreation, environmental conservation, culture, and education. Whereas the role of food production has decreased in rural areas, the role of other forms of “consumption” has increased. This process may be understood as the “commodification of rural spaces.” This paper provides an overview of the commodification of rural spaces in Japan and then reflects on the manner in which the commodification of rural spaces is progressing in British Columbia, Canada. Four case studies are discussed in this paper. The Lower Mainland region is characterized by diversified rural commodities such as hobby farms, farmers’ markets, farm product shops, “Circle Farm Tours”, pick-your-own farms, horseback riding and estate homes. Wine tourism in the Okanagan region, and a slow food movement in the Vancouver Island region that concentrates on consuming locally produced food from Vancouver Island are also very important. Ranch tourism and the sales of branded dairy products characterize the commodification in the Thompson-Cariboo region. The commodification of rural spaces in British Columbia, which is much more advance and diversified than that of Japan, plays an important role in sustaining the rural economy and society.
Key words: Rural spaces, commodification, agri-tourism, Japan, British Columbia

1. Introduction

At present, multiple functions are carried out in rural areas in developed countries, and the diverse non-agricultural functions have had an impact on the landscape, as well as functional impacts. Although all rural areas are regarded as areas for farm production, more recently such functions as recreation and tourism, residential accommodation for urban workers, repositories of cultural and educational values and environmental conservation have been added. Food production continues to be the most important function of rural areas in developed countries, including Japan. However, the trend for rural resources to be utilized and consumed in different ways has increased sharply since the 1990s. Such phenomena can be regarded as the “commodification of rural spaces” (Cloke, 1992; Halfacree, 1993).

Cloke (1993, 55) observed that the “commodification of rural spaces was advanced by the rural policy of the Thatcher era in the United Kingdom.” More specifically, markets were created for various “products,” including residential zones, rural communities, rural village lifestyle and landscape, newly commodified food, and industrial goods produced in rural villages. According to Woods (2005, 174), the result of the commodification of rural spaces is that “the countryside has become a commodity, to be bought and sold through the consumptive practices of tourism, property investment by in-migrants, the marketing of rural crafts and products, and the use of rural images to sell other products.”

Since commodification strongly influences current rural spaces, it is important to clarify in what way commodification has been promoted, and how it characterizes present rural spaces, in order to understand the characteristics of rural areas in advanced countries. We have studied the characteristics of the commodification of rural spaces in Japan for the last decade (Tabayashi, 2013; 2015). If research from British Columbia, Canada is added, our geographical perspective on present rural areas will be significantly widened and developed. This is because British Columbia’s many natural attractions (including scenic ocean landscapes, wildlife, and the rugged Cordilleran landscape), diversified and productive farming activities, and many cultural resources (including First Nations sites, heritage sites and sports events) attract visitors (Wood, 2001). In addition, there is a long tradition of urban residents living in estate homes in suburban areas and second homes in remote areas.

This paper first provides an overview of the commodification of rural spaces in Japan, and then reflects on the manner in which the commodification of rural spaces is
progressing in British Columbia, Canada. The paper then examines current types of commodification and the roles they play in sustaining the rural economy and society.\(^1\)

2. The Commodification of Rural Spaces in Japan

First, let us observe current diversified activities in Japan’s rural areas. The main agricultural industry in Japan is rice harvesting. Wheat and other grain crops, potatoes, beans and peas, also have important histories. In addition, new farm products have appeared, including foxtail millet, young barley leaves for chlorophyll juice and mulberry leaves for tea, which are cultivated as health foods.

In the past, agricultural cooperatives or wholesale markets supplied most farm products to retail outlets. In recent years, there has been a growing trend for consumers and producers to be linked directly, without intermediaries. Farm produce stands and shops, where urban residents can enjoy buying fresh and inexpensive vegetables and fruits, are increasing. Allotment gardens have been established for urban residents to enjoy small-scale farming, and grow vegetables and flowers for their personal use. Local government mediates these plots between farm households and urban residents.

At tourist farms, visitors pick fresh fruit or strawberries; they are attracted to the rural atmosphere and the combination of natural scenery and cultivated landscapes featuring various farm products (Iguchi et al., 2008). Farmhouse restaurants that serve dishes using local products are popular in several regions. New tourist activities such as the opportunity to ride horses and interact with animals, have emerged on many ranches that once produced only milk and other dairy products, in addition to outlets to purchase dairy products, ham and sausage (Tabayashi et al., 2008).

The concept of second homes, built for people to escape from urban areas and spend time in the countryside, has long existed. However, there has been an increasing number of people who choose to reside in rural areas and work there or commute. Urban residents hike or cycle to outlying rural areas, hilly areas, or village forests and enjoy rural landscapes. For example, many people visit a traditional settlement of thatched-roofed houses in Ouchi-juku in Shimogo Town, Fukushima Prefecture. Landscapes with terraced fields also attract urban residents, who sometimes join in conservation activities and participate in farm operations.

2.1. Types of rural commodities in Japan

The commodification of rural spaces in Japan has progressed in a number of ways. Rural commodities in Japan can be classified into four types, according to Perkins (2006).

\(^1\) The description of the commodification of rural spaces in Japan in this paper is taken largely from papers that have already been published (Tabayashi, 2010; 2013; 2014).
The first is the commercial supply of ordinary farm products, such as rice, vegetables, fruit, and various livestock products. The second is the supply of new farm products related to the health and well-being of consumers. These include health foods, as well as beauty products derived from rice, vegetables, fruit, tea, milk and meat. In recent years, the demand for organically cultivated farm products and chemical-free food has increased, along with products with traceable origins. The third type of commodification concerns rural residences for urban workers, which have rapidly increased. Recently, the number of people working in cities and residing in rural areas has increased. The number of people who have retired from jobs in cities and begun farming or enjoying country life has also increased. This includes urban residents who have purchased second homes in the country to relax during weekends and holidays. The fourth type of commodification of rural spaces involves recreation and tourism, facilitated by walking paths and hiking routes, farm produce stands, orchards for fruit picking, allotment gardens, farm stays for experiencing agriculture, farmhouse restaurants, kleingarten, guest houses, magnificent natural landscapes and hot springs, large-scale ski resorts, swimming beaches, pastures for horse-riding and agricultural museums (Butler, 1998).

Our research suggests that there is a fifth type: activities to improve the quality of life by conserving the landscape and environment, and understanding the culture and society of rural areas. Urban residents, rural residents emigrating from cities and the longtime residents of rural areas are involved in these activities. Residents in rural areas find meaning in nature, landscape, lifestyle, traditional events and the culture of the regions around them. Residents become proud of their regions, which reinforces their emotional attachment and sense of identification. Urban residents look for healing in the landscape, environment, culture and society, and gain a feeling of satisfaction.

Of the above-mentioned types of commodification of rural spaces, the supply of ordinary farm products and new farm products, as noted by Perkins (2006), overlap one another, and it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between them. They are therefore grouped into one category, along with marine products. This results in four types of commodification: (1) the supply of agricultural and aquatic products; (2) the consumption of rural spaces for recreation and tourism; (3) residency in rural areas; and (4) activities to improve the quality of life by conserving and managing landscapes and the natural environment, and understanding traditional rural culture and society (Tabayashi, 2013).

2.2. Regional differences in the commodification of rural spaces in Japan

From 2007 to 2010, 15 rural and agricultural geographers, including the present author, conducted a joint research project about the commodification of rural spaces in
Japan, and the individual regional pictures created by the 15 researchers have been integrated.

There are a number of regional differences across Japan in the commodification of rural spaces. The areas in and around major metropolises such as Tokyo, Yokohama, Osaka, Kyoto, Kobe, Nagoya, Sapporo, Sendai and Fukuoka can be categorized as the improvement to the quality of life through landscape and environment conservation and management, and the development of an understanding of traditional rural culture and society. In these places surrounding the metropolitan areas, examples of the commodification of rural spaces, such as residences in rural areas and recreation and tourism activities, can be seen. In addition, there are many second homes in these areas, which are also residences in rural spaces. Primary plains and coastal areas are characterized by the supply of agricultural and aquatic products. Although the commodification of rural spaces has not in fact progressed in broad mountainous areas with sparse populations, these areas can perhaps be characterized as improving people’s quality of life through the maintenance of rural landscapes and environments, and recreation and tourism.

As seen above, differences in natural conditions such as topography and climate initially determine the nature of rural spaces in Japan. In addition, proximity to metropolitan areas is significant, and a type of zonal structure centering on metropolitan areas is apparent. Rural spaces are also impacted by existing tourist sites.

The commodification of rural spaces can be found in each region in Japan. However, urban residents have mainly initiated it. For residents born in urban areas, rural areas are unconventional, fresh, and attractive places. For those residents, rural areas are great products to be consumed (Yamamoto, 2013). Since residents who were born and raised in urban areas have no accessible rural hometowns, they look for that home in rural spaces that they do not know. Natural, agricultural, forest and fishery sites are inherited intact by rural families, relatives and regional societies. Urban residents can experience these rural characteristics and identify different regional identities based on other regional characteristics (Shinohara, 2013). On the other hand, local residents of rural spaces have rediscovered and become proud of nature, their environment, society, and the life surrounding them in response to the inspiration of urban residents. This is an indication of rural residents’ sense of attachment to their region and their enthusiasm for regional sustainability (Nishino, 2013).

3. Commodified Rural Spaces in British Columbia

3. 1. Agricultural regions in British Columbia

British Columbia is the third largest province in Canada, with an area of 9,450,000 km², which is two and a half times larger than Japan. It is a vast region of great beauty, physical diversity and human variety. From the Pacific islands to the Coast Mountains, interior plateau, and snowcapped summits of the Rocky Mountains, it presents a spectacular succession of panoramas (Wood, 2001). According to Statistics Canada, the population of British Columbia in 2014 stood at 4,631,300, an increase of 11.3 percent over 2001 figures. It is the third largest provincial population in Canada, and is 13.0 percent of the total Canadian population. It is the only province to have continuous increase in population since Confederation (Bone, 2011).

Due to its mountainous landscape and severe climate, there is very little good agricultural land in British Columbia. An agricultural land distribution map documents the pockets of primary farmland, agricultural land reserves, along with the larger rangelands areas, and the few areas of potential farmland in the north. Approximately three percent of the land base is farmland and another 30 percent of the land has some agricultural capacity (McGillivray, 2011). British Columbia is divided into six agricultural regions as follows: Lower Mainland, Vancouver Island, Okanagan, Thompson-Cariboo, Kootenay, and Peace River (Figure 6.1). The following are brief descriptions of these agricultural regions, based primarily on McGillivray (2011).

The Lower Mainland region produces over 70 percent of British Columbia's dairy products, berries, vegetables, poultry, eggs, pork, greenhouse vegetables, mushrooms, floriculture and nursery products. Mild weather, plenty of frost-free days, good soil, a large population, proximity to the United States and excellent transportation infrastructure have resulted in thriving farming activities generating over half of the province's agricultural revenues. Tourism is directly related to agriculture in the form of farm tours and bed and breakfast accommodation.

In the Vancouver Island region, with a population nearing three-quarters of a million, there is a substantial market, as well as sufficient agricultural land, for dairying, sheep and cattle ranching, growing vegetables, fruit, and a variety of specialty crops such as kiwi fruit and organic vegetables, and raising livestock such as ostrich and fallow deer. The greenhouse production of flowers and vegetables has become important, as has growing grapes for an increasing farm-gate wine industry.

The Okanagan region is famous for its orchards. It produces apples, pears, and soft fruit such as peaches, apricots, and cherries. It also produces dairy products and vegetables, and wine grapes. The success of the wine industry is based on new varieties of vines and a new marketing system, the Vintner's Quality Association labeling system, which guarantees quality wine from 100 percent British Columbia grapes. These wines have helped to build the reputation of the Okanagan region and tied it firmly to the tourism industry.
The Thompson-Cariboo region includes much of the grassland and open forests of the interior plateau, which are ideal for grazing cattle. Today, the region is still devoted to ranching, but its farms have diversified into dairy and lamb production, along with potatoes, cabbages, turnips, cauliflower and carrots.

Agriculture is carried out mainly on the lowlands of the Columbia and Kootenay rivers in the Kootenay region. Livestock and forage crops are the main commodities, but the region’s moderate climate allows for apple growing, poultry, honey and many vegetable crops. With relatively few people in the region and relatively high transportation costs, commercial agriculture for export faces a number of economic constraints.

The Peace River region is prairie country, and its agriculture is dominated by grain. It produces about 80 percent of the province’s grain crops, including canola. Cattle ranches are also a significant part of the region’s agriculture. Grain farmers in this region face high transportation costs, low world market prices, and the vagaries of the weather.
The population of British Columbia is concentrated in the south and southwestern parts of the province. Nearly 70 percent of its residents live in the Lower Mainland region where Vancouver, Abbotsford, Chilliwack, and other small cities are concentrated. Beyond this population core, a secondary population cluster is found on Vancouver Island, where Victoria forms the second-largest urban population, and there is a series of towns and cities. In the interior, Kelowna, Vernon, and Penticton constitute the major urban centres in the Okanagan Valley, whereas nearby Kamloops is in the Thompson Valley (Bone, 2011). Since the major consumers of rural spaces are urban residents, the commodification of rural spaces has advanced in the areas accessible to urban centres. Therefore, this study focuses on the Lower Mainland, Vancouver Island, Okanagan and Thompson-Cariboo regions.

3.2. Types of rural commodities in British Columbia

In line with the results of our studies in Japan, we classified rural commodities in British Columbia into the following four types. The first is the supply of agricultural and aquatic products, including suburban agriculture, farm produce stands and shops, local food, slow food movements, organic agricultural products, branded agricultural products, processed agricultural products and fishermen’s wharves.

The second is rural consumption for recreation and tourism. There are various activities such as walking, jogging, hiking, horseback riding, visiting pick-your-own farms, hobby farming, wine tourism, Circle Farm Tours, cycling, mountain biking, farm stays, camping, zip-lines, canoeing, fishing, sailing, boating, whale watching, surf-riding, cruising, skiing, riding snowmobiles, dogsledding, hunting, mountain-climbing, enjoying magnificent scenery and experiencing the wilderness.

The third type is residency in rural areas. Estate homes, second homes, long-term stays on tourist ranches, and retirement residences are included in this category.

The last type is activities to improve the quality of life by conserving and managing landscapes and the natural environment, and by understanding traditional rural society and culture. Conservation and management of historical sites, First Nations’ heritage tourism, rural settlement conservation, and environmental movements can all be observed in British Columbia.

4. Regional Differences in British Columbia in Terms of the Commodification of Rural Spaces

4.1. Case study of the Lower Mainland region

The Lower Mainland region is the plain that extends along the lower Fraser River, from downtown Vancouver to 120 km east of the city. Approximately 70 percent of the population of British Columbia is concentrated in this highly productive agricultural area. Due to a tremendous demand from urban residents, various types of commodification of rural spaces have expanded. One typical activity is farmers’ markets. They are open on
Saturday or Sunday mornings, or Wednesday afternoons, in the downtown areas of many towns and cities in the Lower Mainland region, and are comprised of 50 to 150 vendors selling vegetables, fruit, meat, dairy products, cakes and pies, clothes and crafts. “Fresh,” “healthy,” and “local” are important key words for the markets. The website of the BC Association of Farmers’ Markets says, “The farmer’s market is a place to appreciate the changing seasons, bump into neighbors, listen to music, eat strawberries within hours of picking, and introduce your children to the farmers who grew those cherry tomatoes they love.” According to the association, there were 108 farmers’ markets in British Columbia in 2015, of which 37 were concentrated in the Lower Mainland and Vancouver Island regions.

There are also many farm produce shops or stands, in which locally produced farm products are sold. People can also enjoy shopping at local farms for fresh, tasty, and nutritious food, and pick their own berries and fruit. Eighty-seven farms have organized themselves into the Fraser Valley Farm Direct Marketing Association.

Circle Farm Tours had their origin in the idea that the public could be reacquainted with agriculture through visiting farms, whether out of curiosity, or because they were attracted by the fresh produce for sale, or perhaps they were simply wanting a lovely country outing. The Circle Farm Tour is a roadmap to agricultural attractions in the Fraser Valley. The tour is self-guided, allowing visitors to explore the Valley at their own pace and experience agricultural attractions in a fun and interactive way (Hayden, 2015). There are five Circle Farm Tours at Agassiz/Harrison Mills, Maple Ridge/Pitt Meadows, Langley, Abbotsford, and Chilliwack. In 2003, Agassiz/Harrison Mills in the District of Kent created the concept, and it has developed into a partnership among six communities in the Fraser Valley—Abbotsford, Chilliwack, Kent, Mission, Langley and Maple Ridge/Pitt Meadows—to encourage the development of a strong agri-tourism sector (Hayden, 2015). For example, the Circle Farm Tour in Abbotsford encourages visits to Granny & Grump’s Antiques, Birchwood Dairy Farm, Bakerview Eco-dairy, Fraser Valley Trout Hatchery, Maan Farms Market & Estate Winery, Neufeld Farms, Campbell’s Gold Honey Farm & Meadery, Tanglebank Gardens & Brambles Bistro, Onnik’s Blueberry Farm, Singletree Winery, Mt. Lehman Winery, Goat’s Pride Dairy, Lepp Farm Market, and Restaurant 62. In addition to these destinations, others, such as a pioneer village, museums, a fur trading post, garden centres, and a pottery studio are included in other Circle Farm Tours.

Urban residents are increasingly choosing to live in the country, which has led to the development of scattered homes that are the owners’ primary residence. A number of people have hobby farms on which they raise horses and enjoy horseback riding.

4.2. Case study of the Vancouver Island region

In the Vancouver Island region, the research focused especially on the Cowichan sub-region, where the commodification of rural spaces is characterized by the development of wine tourism and the establishment of a “slow city” based on the consumption of local food. Many visitors and tourists come to this region because of its excellent accessibility to Victoria and Vancouver. In addition, due to its mild winter climate this region is considered ideal for retirement living in Canada. Small-scale farming is pursued in the narrow
farmland area between the Island’s mountains and east coast areas. Tourism based on First Nations’ culture has also thrived.

Various types of local food production are conducted in this region: livestock and dairy farming in mountainous areas, grape production on the slopes, and vegetable production and fishing in the coastal areas. There are approximately 20 wineries, using local grapes, with wine shops, tasting sessions, and wine factory tours.

The rural space for production has changed rapidly into a space for the consumption of locally produced food such as cheeses, wines, organic vegetables and fish. Such local food is served at restaurants attached to wineries. A network of local food producers and their organizations is developing various new food brands. Cowichan Bay is one of the two designated slow cities in Canada, along with Naramata in the Okanagan Valley.

4.3. Case study of the Okanagan region

The Okanagan region extends in and around the Okanagan Valley, lying along a 250 km north-south axis, and contains a series of long and narrow lakes. It has a mild, dry climate. Its commodification of rural space is characterized by wine tourism.

European people first settled in this region in 1859, and the area’s economy was based on extensive agriculture, such as cattle ranching and grain growing. The trans-Canada railway arrived in the mid-1880s and the construction of a branch line was completed in 1892. Intensive farming was introduced in the early 20th century, when commercial fruit farming began. Grazing lands, hay flats, and grain fields became 2-16 ha orchard lots, supplied with irrigation (Senese et al., 2012). In the late 1920s, commercial-scale grape growing began. The grape acreage continued to increase steadily over the next 50 years, but grape growers were damaged by the Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the United State in the 1980s. Approximately 50 percent of Okanagan grape growers went out of business in the years following the agreement (McGillivray, 2011). Fortunately, the provincial government introduced new regulations for producing wine from locally grown grapes, and both vineyard acreages and wineries have increased since the end of the 1980s. Since the latter half of the 20th century, amenity industries, including retirement communities, vacation homes, and wine tourism have been developing in the Okanagan region.

A high quality wine industry based on tourism has developed since the 1980s, due to (1) the mild, dry climate; (2) the introduction of capital, techniques, and entrepreneurs from other regions; (3) government protection; and (4) cooperation with local food activities. There are approximately 140 wineries, some of which have restaurants. In addition, there are many resort hotels, wine festivals, a wine museum, wine shops, and visitor centres.

There is a strong relationship between wine and tourism industries in the Okanagan region. Wine tourism facilitates the consumption-production overlap through tours, tasting rooms, and cellar door sales. An increase in small-scale local consumption has become central to both quality wine production and quality tourism production (Senese et al., 2012). One of the examples of the wineries in the Okanagan Valley is Quail’s Gate
Winery on Okanagan Lake, a place known for its scenic beauty. Tourists can enjoy wine tours, tastings, shopping, and lunch and dinner in the restaurant. Another example is the Mission Hill Winery, which has a large green space with uniquely decorative architecture, a huge collection of sculptures, wine tours, tastings, shops and a first-class restaurant facing Okanagan Lake.

4.4. Case study of the Thompson-Cariboo region

The Thompson-Cariboo region has traditionally been cattle country and remains so, primarily with cow and calf operations (McGillivray, 2011). However, the extensive ranch area has changed dramatically; specific changes reflect the differentiation from competitors, specialization and intensification. One example is the change from extensive cattle grazing to intensive dairy farming. Blackwell Dairy Farm near Kamloops focuses on organic milk production and supplying a value-added fresh milk brand and dairy product through its own distribution system. In addition, the farm receives visitors for farm tours to show the milking process.

Another example is a newly established winery that grows its own grapes. A large ranch has been changed into vineyard to take advantage of long daylight hours, low precipitation, and mild weather during summer. In addition to supplying its wine to local markets, it is selling directly to visitors from Vancouver and other cities. In the Thompson-Cariboo region along the lowlands near the Fraser and Thompson rivers, the number of vegetable farmers growing onions, cabbages, turnips, cauliflower, potatoes and carrots is increasing. These farmers grow produce using local brands under contract to supermarkets and farmers’ markets in Vancouver and other cities in British Columbia.

A further example is the change from traditional ranches to tourist farms and ranches. Urban residents stay long-term in a cottage built on a ranch and experience ranch life and other rural tourism. There are also many country cottages where urban residents can retreat and rejuvenate.

The Thompson-Cariboo region and the north and west regions of British Columbia are blessed with abundant natural resources. Recreational and tourism activities, which take advantage of the natural environments and landscapes found in the national and provincial parks, are particularly thriving in these regions.

5. Conclusion: Characteristics of the Commodification of Rural Spaces in British Columbia

The commodification of rural spaces, in other words, utilizes the regional resources found in rural spaces. These resources are familiar to regional residents, and involve local landscapes, natural environments, industries, products, lifestyles, annual events, culture and histories. The diversified commodification of rural spaces can be observed in British Columbia.

Diversified rural commodities such as hobby farms, farm product markets, Circle Farm Tours, pick-your-own farms, horseback riding and country residences characterize the
Lower Mainland region. Many residents of Vancouver and other cities visit to consume rural spaces during the weekend. A number of people live in the countryside to enjoy rural life and hobby farming. The slow food movement that concentrates on locally produced food is typical of the rural consumption in the Cowichan Bay region of Vancouver Island. City residents, primarily from Vancouver, Victoria and other nearby cities visit on weekends to consume rurality. Wine tourism is important in the Okanagan region, and ranch tourism and the sales of branded dairy products characterize the commodification in the Thompson-Cariboo region. Since both regions are far from the large population centres in British Columbia, most visitors stay for a relatively long term.

There are regional differences in types of commodification, as defined by physical conditions, accessibility to metropolitan centres, and local agricultural activities. In short, the commodification of rural spaces in British Columbia, which is much more advance and diversified than that of Japan, plays an important role in sustaining the rural economy and society.

The various phenomena occurring in rural areas of developed countries, including Japan and Canada, can be understood to a substantial degree, using the concept of the commodification of rural spaces. One effective measure to develop regional economies is to commodify rural spaces. Furthermore, promoting the commodification of rural spaces could possibly lead to the development of healthy societies. Therefore, generalizations and concepts must be continually developed, and more empirical research is needed in the future.
References


7. Building Heritage Tourism and the Semiotics of Exhibition: Constructing Places and Spaces Related to Historical Dramas in Japan

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Abstract

Historical dramas in Japan, particularly NHK's annual Taiga Drama, have a long history of inducing tourism to heritage sites related to the drama. In response to the knowledge that a drama will be set in their locality, municipalities have adopted a number of approaches for profiting from anticipated tourism booms. This article analyzes the options available to municipalities when they seek to create new sites of heritage tourism. Nine types of site are identified, which are the combinations of two sets of variable: temporal (permanent, semi-permanent and temporary) and display type (purpose-built buildings, exhibitions and display objects). Drawing on examples from various dramas (the Taiga Dramas Saka no ue no kumo, Tobu ga gotoku, Shinsengumi!, Ryōmaden, Yae no sakura and Gunshi Kanbee and the Morning Drama Massan) this article presents representative examples of each type of display and explores the rationale for employing that kind of display. The analysis reveals that municipalities are not simply concerned with financial profit, but may also prioritize local identity creation. Furthermore, the display type may depend not so much on the nature or popularity of the historical contents, but more on the broader tourism infrastructure within a municipality, which affects the ability of the municipality to accommodate an influx of tourists.

Keywords: Heritage tourism, contents tourism, Japan, television dramas, destination branding

1. Introduction

The phenomenon of film-induced tourism has a history going back many decades, although it was only in the 1990s that tourism scholars began investigations into the phenomenon (Beeton, 2015, 21). There is now a considerable literature presenting many well-known case studies from around the world of tourism and travel stimulated by the moving image (see Connell, 2012). In Japan, too, popular culture has a long history of inducing tourism, although the term coined by Japanese scholars is “contents tourism”
(kontentsu tsūrizumu), which is defined as “travel behaviour motivated fully or partially by narratives, characters, locations and other creative elements of popular culture forms, including film, television dramas, manga, anime, novels and computer games” (IJCT, 2015). In Japan, the term contents tourism is often associated with manga- and anime-induced tourism, although the concept has wide applicability to various forms of media-induced tourism and is now making its way into the international literature (Beeton, Yamamura, and Seaton, 2013; Seaton and Yamamura, 2015).

Media-induced tourism and contents tourism comprise a broad and diverse range of activities. They include visiting filming locations, sites related to artists/creators, studio tours, theme parks such as Disneyland and sites relating to historical events depicted in works of popular culture (see Beeton, 2015, 32-34). In many cases, travellers on the trail of places and spaces related to their favourite works of popular culture enjoy seeking out locations that, on the surface at least, remain free of commercial exploitation or tourification. Relatively few works of popular culture generate enough tourism to make tourification commercially viable (although Lord of the Rings, The Sound of Music and Sherlock Holmes are examples of works precipitating successful tourification), and in any case, for many fans the adventure of seeking out unmarked locations is an integral part of the enjoyment (Okamoto, 2015, 22). On other occasions, there is a pre-existing tourism industry related to the work of popular culture. This is particularly the case if the work is non- or semi-fictional and the locations are heritage sites. The film Braveheart, for example, triggered additional tourism to existing sites relating to William Wallace in Scotland (Edensor, 2005), and in Japan heritage tourism triggered by historical contents is a well-established phenomenon (Seaton, 2015; Sugawa-Shimada, 2015). However, for some works of popular culture the significant levels of tourism—either expected or actually generated—provide the rationale for a local tourism industry to engage in the construction of new tourism assets to satisfy and attract travelling fans.

This article discusses the options municipalities have when they consider constructing a purpose-built site of contents tourism to magnify and profit from an anticipated contents tourism boom. The article discusses both NHK’s Taiga Dramas, which have long produced significant tourism booms and have been studied extensively for their economic impacts in Japan, and the 2014-5 morning drama Massan, which was a semi-fictionalized account of the life of Taketsuru Masataka (the “father of Japanese whisky”) and his Scottish wife Rita. While exploiting the popularity of historical contents and reaping the economic benefits of an influx of tourists to heritage sites might make simple business sense for a local community, this article reveals that the creation of exhibition spaces and places related to historical contents in Japan generates a much broader range of issues. It sheds light on the processes of building a heritage tourism industry and destination branding, as well as illuminating local strategies for strengthening or renegotiating local identity.

2. Typographies of drama-related heritage sites

The greatest problem facing tourism planners considering the construction of a site of contents tourism related to a specific work of popular culture is being able to predict
whether that work will generate enough tourism to justify the investment. Such predictions are notoriously difficult and fraught with financial risks. However, one of the safest bets when constructing a site of contents tourism in anticipation of a tourism boom is to create a site related to the annual Taiga Drama and Morning Drama on NHK. Both of these drama series have long histories and traditions of inducing tourism, so as soon as the location for the next drama is announced the municipality where the drama will be set puts into action a plan to benefit from the expected rise in tourist numbers. Furthermore, municipalities wanting to take advantage of, or even initiate, a historical contents tourism boom typically have a pre-existing set of heritage tourism assets in place because only those historical figures already memorialized in monuments, museums, local lore and the history books typically warrant a starring role in a flagship NHK drama.

After the decision to create a place or space of tourism has been taken, municipalities have nine main options, which are the nine possible combinations of two sets of variables. First, places and spaces may be categorized into permanent, semi-permanent and temporary. Permanent means there is no planned closure date, semi-permanent means it is expected the exhibits will be removed at an unspecified point in the future, and temporary means the exhibits will be removed as soon as the drama-induced boom is over. Second, the nature of the place or space may be categorized into purpose-built museum, exhibition and display items. A purpose-built museum is an entire building constructed for the explicit purpose of generating or taking advantage of drama tourism. An exhibition is when the interior of an existing building is partially or wholly given over to an exhibition about the drama. Finally, display items are when individual artifacts or display objects are added to an existing display. The nine possible combinations (and a representative example to be discussed in subsequent sections) are indicated in Table 7.1.

Table 7.1. Nine Types of Exhibition Space and Place

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Purpose-built museum</th>
<th>Exhibition</th>
<th>Display items</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Permanent</td>
<td>Saka no ue no kumo</td>
<td>Tobu ga gotoku</td>
<td>Shinsengumi!</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Matsuyama</td>
<td>Kagoshima</td>
<td>Kochi</td>
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<td>Semi-permanent</td>
<td>Ryōmaden</td>
<td>Massan</td>
<td>Massan</td>
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<td>Kochi</td>
<td>Yoichi</td>
<td>Yoichi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Temporary</td>
<td>Gunshi Kanbei</td>
<td>Yae no sakura</td>
<td>Gunshi Kanbei</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Himeji</td>
<td>Aizu Wakamatsu</td>
<td>Himeji</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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2.1. Permanent, purpose-built museum

Figure 7.1. The Saka no ue no kumo Museum, Matsuyama

(Source: Website: http://www.sakanouenokumomuseum.jp)

The Saka no ue no kumo Museum in Matsuyama, Ehime prefecture, is a purpose-built museum depicting the world of Meiji period Matsuyama. *Saka no ue no kumo (Clouds Above the Hill)* is Shiba Ryōtarō’s epic novel of the Russo-Japanese War, which was serialized in the *Sankei Shinbun* newspaper from 1968 to 1972 and then broadcast as an NHK special Taiga Drama in 2009, 2010 and 2011 (see Figures 7.1). The museum was designed by world-famous architect Andō Tadao and is worthy of visitation in its own right as a building. The museum’s English-language pamphlet contains a message from Andō and describes the aerial walkway in Figure 21 as a “unique staircase without middle pillars.” The exhibits themselves introduce the main characters of Shiba’s drama and life in Meiji period Matsuyama, particularly the education system.
2.2. Permanent exhibition within a museum

Figure 7.2. Museum of the Meiji Restoration, Kagoshima

An example of a permanent drama exhibition within a museum can be found in the Museum of the Meiji Restoration (Ishin furusato kan) in Kagoshima (see Figure 7.2). The museum provides a general history of the role of Satsuma in the Meiji Restoration of 1868, but there are exhibits about NHK's dramas alongside the more general historical exhibits. There is a permanent exhibit relating to the Shiba Ryōtarō novel Tobu ga gotoku (As If In Flight) about the life of Saigō Takamori (1828-1877) and the 1990 Taiga Drama that was based on it. Saigō remains one of Japan’s most popular historical figures and he dominates the heritage tourism sites in Kagoshima. In this museum, there is also a film set for one of the rooms that featured in the 2008 Taiga Drama Atsuhime (Princess Atsu), about the woman who married Shogun Tokugawa Iesada in 1856. Both of these dramas precipitated considerable tourism booms in Kagoshima that register clearly even in aggregate data about the Kagoshima tourism industry as a whole (Seaton, 2014).

2.3. Permanent display item

In a corner of the Ryoma’s Birthplace Memorial Museum (Ryōma no umareta machi kinenkan) in Kochi, which is built near where legendary Bakumatsu period (1853-1868) visionary Sakamoto Ryōma (1835-67) was born, there is a small display featuring one of Ryōma’s many appearances in television dramas (Figure 7.3). Ryōma has become central to the entire tourism industry in Kochi, but in this museum there are very few references to his numerous appearances in historical novels, dramas and other forms of popular culture. However, in one corner the costume worn by actor Eguchi Yōsuke when he played Ryōma during the 2004 Taiga Drama Shinsengumi! is displayed. As the drama was over a decade...
before my visit to this museum, the costume can be categorized as a permanent display
item.

Figure 7.3. Ryoma’s Birthplace Memorial Museum, Kochi

(Source: Website: http://ryoma-hometown.com)

2.4. Semi-permanent, purpose-built museum

Figure 7.4 shows the Ryōmaden Bakumatsu Heroes Pavilion (Ryōmaden bakumatsu
shishi shachū) in front of Kochi Station. This building can be categorized as a semi
permanent, purpose-built building. The structure was built to house the Ryōma deai haku
(Meeting Ryōma Exhibition) in 2009 and was open throughout the broadcast of Ryōmaden
(The Legend of Sakamoto Ryōma) in 2010. However, Ryōma has assumed such an important
role within Kochi’s overall tourism strategy that the building has remained. When I visited
in 2014, it had been renamed, but it still contained the set of Ryōma’s house that was used
in NHK’s drama as well as a more general tourist information centre and gift shop. It seems
likely the building will remain as long as it is deemed to be profitable, but it was not
constructed with the intention of it being a permanent building.

2.5. Semi-permanent exhibits and display items

The next two examples, a semi-permanent exhibition and semi-permanent display
item, come from Yoichi in Hokkaido, which was the location for the second half of the
Morning Drama Massan (broadcast September 2014 to March 2015) (see Figure 7.5). This
drama was based on the life of whisky-maker Taketsuru Masataka and his Scottish wife

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Rita. The town created the Yoichi Information Centre (Yoichi jōhōkan) (Figure 7.5) in a disused shop just a hundred metres away from the entrance to the Nikka Whisky Factory. While the factory museum focuses on the technical and historical aspects of whisky production in Yoichi, the Information Centre focuses on the real-life Masataka and Rita. For example, Rita became well known locally for her Scottish recipes and love of cooking, and this features prominently in the Information Centre.

**Figure 7.4. Ryōmaden Bakumatsu Heroes Pavilion, Kochi**

![Ryōmaden Bakumatsu Heroes Pavilion, Kochi](http://www.attaka.or.jp/tabihiroba/bakumatsu-shishi.php)

(Source: Website: http://www.attaka.or.jp/tabihiroba/bakumatsu-shishi.php)

**Figure 7.5. Yoichi Information Centre and Nikka Whisky Factory, Yoichi**

![Yoichi Information Centre and Nikka Whisky Factory, Yoichi](http://www.nikka.com/eng/distilleries/yoichi/index.html)

There is very little about the drama *Massan* in the Nikka Whisky Factory itself, although as can be seen in Figure 7.5, among the bottles of whisky on display there is a calligraphy board signed by the stars of the drama, Tamayama Tetsuji and Charlotte Kate Fox. It is not clear how long the Information Centre and autographed calligraphy board will remain, but because they have stayed on after the completion of the drama in March they may provisionally be categorized as semi-permanent.

### 2.6. Temporary, purpose-built museum

#### Figure 7.6. Himeji Kuroda Kanbee Taiga Drama Pavilion, Himeji

![Image of Himeji Kuroda Kanbee Taiga Drama Pavilion](http://himeji-kanbee.jp)

(Source: Website: http://himeji-kanbee.jp)

Figure 7.6 shows the Himeji Kuroda Kanbee Taiga Drama Pavilion (*Himeji no Kuroda Kanbee taiga dorama kan*), which was open throughout the broadcast of the drama *Gunshi Kanbee* (Strategist Kanbee) in 2014. The drama was about the life of Kuroda Kanbee (1546-1604), a master tactician during the warring states period, who was born and grew up in Himeji. It has been standard practice in recent years for there to be an NHK exhibition related to the Taiga Drama in the key location for the drama that year. The exhibits have panels giving profiles of the actors/actresses or location reports, there are props or sets on display, and televisions screens play messages to fans from the cast or documentaries about the making of the drama. There is also a gift shop selling drama-related goods and souvenirs. This type of pavilion can be categorized as a temporary, purpose-built building.
It was effectively a large shed on a lawn in front of Himeji Castle and was removed after *Gunshi Kanbee* finished.

### 2.7. Temporary Exhibition

**Figure 7.7. Taiga Drama Exhibition, Aizu-Wakamatsu**

(Source: Website: http://yae-sakura.jp)

The year before *Gunshi Kanbee*, the main location for the Taiga Drama was Aizu-Wakamatsu in Fukushima prefecture. The drama in 2013 was about Nijima Yae (1845-1932) who took part in the defense of Aizu-Wakamatsu Castle during the Boshin War (1868-9) before marrying the founder of Doshisha University and having a distinguished career as a nurse. Figure 7.7 shows the Taiga Drama Exhibition in Aizu-Wakamatsu in 2013. It was a temporary exhibition because rather than constructing a purpose-built building, Aizu-Wakamatsu converted one of its public buildings for the year to house NHK’s exhibits about the drama, *Yae no sakura* (Yae’s Cherry Blossoms).

### 2.8. Temporary Display Items

The final category is temporary displays. Engyoji Temple in Himeji is famous as a location for the Tom Cruise film *The Last Samurai*. Engyoji Temple was also used as a location for *Gunshi Kanbee*. While the temple is happy to let its facilities be used for filming, it takes a low-key approach to attracting drama tourism. There is very little on its website to publicize filming locations, and all the exhibits about *Gunshi Kanbee* when I visited in
2014 were not only temporary but easily movable. The photos of the filming of *Gunshi Kanbee* in Figure 7.8, for example, were on stands placed in front of a permanent exhibit about the temple’s history and architecture. They could be removed by hand at any time. The temple states clearly on its website that it is primarily a religious place and allows no permanent changes to its appearance for the sake of filming or indeed attracting a few more film/drama tourists.

**Figure 7.8. Photos of Shooting Gunshi Kanbee, Engyoji Temple, Himeji**

(Source: Website: http://www.shosha.or.jp)

### 3. Contents Tourism and Local Tourism Strategies

I have presented nine major forms of exhibit/display related to televisions dramas. In this final section, the discussion moves to what these typographies of places and spaces (as opposed to the contents of the exhibits themselves) tell us about local tourism, identity and the uses of heritage. When considering which of the nine options outlined above to take, the response of tourism planners revolves around four key issues.

#### 3.1. Heritage creation vs. tourism promotion

Heritage creation is when a municipality uses a drama as an opportunity to establish a new set of tourist sites and narratives within its tourism profile. For example, the city of Matsuyama in Ehime has used the drama *Saka no ue no kumo (Clouds Above the Hill)* as a way of promoting the city. It built a new museum which opened in 2007 (Figure 7.1) and there are signs around town stating that Matsuyama is *Saka no ue no kumo* city.

The process of producing the drama and opening a state-of-the-art museum related to it took many years. Shiba had refused to let his novel (originally published in 1,296 installments in the *Sankei Shinbun* newspaper, 1968-72) be dramatized out of fear that it would be misconstrued as pro-war. Following Shiba’s death in 1996, NHK obtained
permission from his estate to produce a drama. In 1999, Matsuyama city, under the leadership of Mayor Nakamura Tokihiro, began the development of tourist sites relating to *Clouds Above the Hill* with a decision to create a purpose-built museum about the drama and to support the reconstruction of the Akiyama brothers’ house (Hirano, Saaler and Säble, 2008, 259). The Akiyama brothers, Yoshifuru and Saneyuki, were the main characters in the drama along with poet Masaoka Shiki. Both brothers served with distinction in the Russo-Japanese War, Yoshifuru in the cavalry and Saneyuki in the navy. The two museums, along with various other sites related to the Meiji period novelist Natsume Soseki, are emblematic of an explicit municipal plan to turn Matsuyama into a key destination for those interested in the Meiji period (1868-1912).

In other cases, the municipality aims for tourism promotion, namely using a historical drama to trigger additional tourism to existing sites. The historical figures featured in NHK’s dramas are generally very well known and have been treated as local heroes or heroines for decades before the drama was broadcast. Many localities have already developed tourist assets, including museums, statues, monuments and placards to indicate important sites. This pattern is exemplified by Kochi, which had a significant tourism industry related to Sakamoto Ryōma well before the 2010 drama *Ryōmaden* was announced. In Kochi, again Shiba Ryōtarō was a key figure. His novel *Ryōma ga yuku* (serialized in the *Sankei Shinbun* newspaper from 1962 to 1966), which was made into the 1968 Taiga Drama of the same title, laid the foundations for the modern Ryōma tourism industry in Kochi by rehabilitating the Ryōma legend after Ryōma’s reputation had been tarnished by its association with militarism in the 1930s and 1940s. The majority of Ryōma sites were constructed in the 1990s and early 2000s (Seaton, 2015b). These sites had been in place for a decade or more prior to the drama being aired in 2010. Kochi, therefore, was well placed to cash in on what was probably (according the Bank of Japan estimates) the biggest tourism boom ever induced by a historical drama, the *Ryōmaden* boom of 2010 (Seaton, 2015a).

The Sakamoto Ryōma case study demonstrates that heritage creation and tourism promotion are not distinct phenomena but stages along the same continuum. If there are repeated representations of the same history in various cultural forms across a long time period, the locality will engage first in heritage site creation and later, once a portfolio of tourism assets has been created, in tourism promotion. Reiterations of this process continue until the tourism sector related to the historical contents reaches saturation point. Thereafter, the returns on major investments in new permanent sites diminish, and attention switches to the renewal and upgrading of sites or the introduction of new exhibitions and displays items to encourage repeat visitors.

### 3.2 Leading role vs. supporting role

The next distinction is whether the drama tourism site is the flagship site in the local tourism industry, or simply plays a supporting role. Matsuyama and Kochi are good examples of drama tourism playing a leading role. In such places, permanent facilities are required, hence the permanent museums to *Clouds Above the Hill* and Sakamoto Ryōma. However, when the drama plays only a supporting role, temporary places and spaces are
more likely. Gunshi Kanbee was important in stimulating tourism to Himeji, but that city’s main attraction will always be its magnificent castle. As if to demonstrate this, of the two main exhibitions in Himeji about Gunshi Kanbee, the smaller one actually in Himeji Castle (Figure 7.9) had 890,455 visitors compared to 611,576 visitors to the Taiga Drama pavilion (Himeji City Website, 2015). Clearly many visitors to the exhibits in the castle were there primarily for the castle (even though it was undergoing major renovations at the time and shrouded in tarpaulin) and engaged in what we might prefer to call “opportunistic drama tourism” in contrast to the more “intentional drama tourism” of those visiting the Pavilion (Figure 7.9).

Figure 7.9. The Gunshi Kanbee Exhibits within Himeji Castle (2014)

And in Fukuoka, where Kanbee spent his final days as a feudal lord in recognition of his services first to Toyotomi Hideyoshi and then to Tokugawa Ieyasu, the prefectural museum put on a temporary exhibition in 2014. With Kanbee tourism focused on Himeji, Fukuoka did not attempt to build a permanent, new place or space. However, in both Himeji and Fukuoka, Gunshi Kanbee tourism was similar in that despite all the attention focused on the locality by the drama, drama tourism still played a supporting role in supplementing visitation to the locality’s primary tourism attractions. This supporting role was reflected in the more temporary nature of the places and spaces created for drama-induced tourists to enjoy.
3.3. Non-monetary value vs. monetary value

The next distinction relates to whether the value of places and spaces are monetary, non-monetary, or a mixture of both. While some heritage tourist sites operate on a simple for-profit basis (revenues from entrance fees and on-site commercial activities exceed running costs), many other sites are deemed to have value beyond their ability to generate a financial profit and as a result receive subsidies from public (local and/or national government), private (individual and/or organizational benefactors) or international (for example, UNESCO) organizations.

“Value beyond their ability to generate a financial profit” refers to three issues. First, regardless of whether the tourist sites themselves run at a profit or loss, heritage sites help generate financial returns for other businesses in the communities in which they are located. The profits generated by visitor expenditure on food, accommodation, activities and souvenirs can generate local tax revenues sufficient to justify using some of those revenues as public subsidies to the local heritage sites.

Second, some heritage sites are effectively built for public relations purposes or attracting visitors to the vicinity of commercial enterprises. In such cases, financial support for the site is considered as part of an advertising budget. The most obvious examples here are corporate museums, which tell the history of a business while also promoting its ongoing business activities. Such sites may also be a way of attracting visitors, who then spend money on consumer items rather than tourism experiences. The Nikka Whisky Factory (location of NHK’s morning drama Massan) is a good example of this model. One can walk around the distillery and visit a free museum with displays about whisky-making and the history of the company. However, in the museum and main visitor centre there are sites for whisky-tasting. There are also restaurants and a shop selling the company’s products and other souvenirs.

Third, heritage sites can play an important role in local identity creation or as sites of education. Museums, monuments and other places and spaces remain the most effective way of literally building a narrative into the heritage of a community. Very often the primary audience is schoolchildren. Having a local, public museum for children to visit as part of their school education is a common practice for municipalities in Japan. A clear example of this third type is the Home of the Shinsengumi Museum in Hino City, Tokyo. This purpose-built, permanent museum about the Shinsengumi (a group of Tokugawa loyalist samurai who earned a fearsome reputation for their attacks on pro-Restoration samurai in 1860s Kyoto) opened in 2005, the year after NHK’s drama Shinsengumi!. It was unable to cash in on the popularity of the drama Shinsengumi! in 2004, and since opening its visitor numbers (around 10,000 people a year) do not suggest any level of financial profitability (Seaton, 2015, 96-97). But, as its name suggests, the museum makes an explicit claim for Hino to be considered the authentic Shinsengumi site. A number of the key members of the Shinsengumi were from the Hino area and the relatives/descendants of a number of members (including the “poster boy” of the Shinsengumi, Hijikata Toshizō), still live in the area. The museum, therefore, plays an important role in local identity creation and passing down local history free from the broader national (and often much more critical) narrative of a group of fearsome samurai who fought to preserve the dying Tokugawa shogunate.
In these various examples, the simple trend appears to be that the more significant the non-monetary value of heritage sites, the more likely it is that the site created will be permanent and be sustained by significant financial backing from one or more key sponsors. By contrast, the sites that are semi-permanent or temporary have their lifespan determined more by their profitability than by their non-monetary contributions.

3.4. Ample vs. limited tourism infrastructure

The final issue affecting the type of place and space constructed is the broader nature of the destination, in particular the state of existing tourism infrastructure and therefore the financial potential of drama-induced tourism. The examples of Hino city and Yoichi were given in the previous section as examples of heritage sites with significant non-monetary value. These two examples have another similarity: they are both tourist destinations with poor infrastructure for profiting from large influxes of tourists. The issue is the same—a lack of hotel accommodation—but for very different reasons. In the case of Hino, the city is a residential area in the sprawling Tokyo-Yokohama megalopolis. There is the usual array of small business hotels, but for tourists, there are few reasons to visit Hino apart from Shinsengumi-related sites, and even fewer reasons to base oneself in a hotel there. Most people visiting Hino to see Shinsengumi sites can do it as a day trip from another part of the Tokyo area. The same accommodation issue affects Yoichi, except in this case a small rural town with an economy based in agriculture does not have or need a large number of hotel beds. Most tourists visiting Yoichi during the Massan boom in 2014-5, therefore, based themselves in Sapporo or Otaru and did day trips to Yoichi.

Recognizing this limitation in their tourism potential, both Hino and Yoichi have focused on non-monetary benefits. The Hino case has already been described. Yoichi was acutely aware of how much money it could afford to invest in promoting Massan-related tourism given the limited expectations of financial return. Instead, Yoichi adopted a different strategy: to use the drama as a way of promoting local produce. In real life, as in the drama, apple juice features prominently in the Massan story as the product that kept the Nikka Whisky Distillery in business during the years between the establishment of the distillery and the first shipments of whisky a number of years later. In the Yoichi Information Building (Figure 7.5), in addition to the exhibits about the real Taketsuru and Rita, there is information about local produce such as apples and Yoichi wine. Interviews with local tourism officials in Yoichi have also revealed that as a result of Massan there has also been an extensive exercise in local identity creation through rediscovering local heritage. Nikka Whisky has long featured prominently in the history and economy of the town, so the Taketsuru/Rita story was well known, but in the wake of the drama, activities included local classes for cooking some of Rita’s favourite recipes and schools using the drama as a focal point for history lessons.

By contrast, other municipalities have the infrastructure to capitalize on an influx in tourists. Cities like Matsuyama, Himeji, Kochi and Aizu-Wakamatsu are large enough and have enough hotel capacity to accommodate a tourism boom induced by a drama. Such places can afford to invest in measures to attract even more visitors in the knowledge that
extra money spent on attracting visitors should result in far greater per capita spending by tourists because they stay overnight rather than simply doing day-trips from elsewhere.

4. Conclusions

It is well known that sites featured in NHK’s Morning and Taiga Dramas will see a large increase in visitors in the period immediately before, during and after the drama is broadcast. Taiga Dramas air for one year and Morning Dramas typically for six months, so municipalities have a limited but still significant window of opportunity in which to profit from the tourism boom. As this article has described, municipalities have a number of options available to them. I have categorized the various types of places and spaces created by local municipalities as permanent, semi-permanent or temporary, and as purpose-built buildings, exhibitions and display items. The ways in which municipalities choose to develop heritage sites depends on a complex series of variables relating not only to the inherent qualities of the contents, but also on the pre-existing tourism assets, regional branding strategies and tourism infrastructure of the municipalities.

Through a process of trial and error, and also through considerable research into the financial impacts of drama-induced tourism over many years, Japan’s municipalities are now generally quite adept at gauging the economic potential of tourism to heritage sites induced by historical dramas. In this article I have spent very little time focusing on the contents of the dramas or exhibitions themselves. Instead, I have focused on the architecture and nature of the places and spaces of historical drama tourism. The characteristics of the sites themselves, it can be concluded, are a valuable barometer of municipalities’ evaluations of the perceived and actual value, in both monetary and non-monetary terms, of drama-induced tourism.
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8. Challenging the Happiness Imperative: Preliminary Notes on Kankanmori Collective Housing Community

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Abstract
In recent decades, an increasing interest in happiness and wellbeing has come to permeate scholarly, governmental and public imaginaries and practices. Driven in part by the emergent sub-disciplines of positive psychology and happiness economics, these new engagements with happiness are marked by a radically individualistic perspective. Collective housing communities represent a challenge to this dominant, EuroAmerican orientation by locating wellbeing, at least in part, in the social. In this paper, I draw on preliminary research in Kankanmori, a collective housing community in Tokyo, in order to place into relief the cultural assumptions and forms of power at the foundations of dominant EuroAmerican approaches, and to highlight alternative models of wellbeing that provide potential, practical responses to problems of social isolation and alienation.

Keywords: Happiness and wellbeing, culture, governance

1. Introduction
It’s more fun to live with more people. –Kankanmori resident, 2014

In recent years, Japan has joined a number of countries in placing happiness and wellbeing\(^1\) on the public and governmental agenda. Although happiness has not been at the forefront of Japanese culture historically, “at present,” Florian Coulmas argues, “the promise of and call for happiness is widespread in Japan” (2008, 3). This contemporary

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\(^1\) Although the genealogy of both happiness and wellbeing warrants investigation, I adopt them uncritically in this paper since they are the most commonly used terms in the literature. In addition, and again as in much of the literature, I use them interchangeably, although wellbeing is perhaps the broader of the two.
“quest for happiness,” as Coulmas puts it, manifests itself in mounting numbers of popular publications on the topic, the increasing circulation of discourses of wellbeing in the press and in politics, and in an escalating pattern of coupling happiness with consumption in advertising. The government of Japan has also expressed official interest: in 2010 it established a Commission on Measuring Wellbeing, and between 2010 and 2012, it focused its National Survey on Lifestyle Preferences, administered yearly since 1984, explicitly on happiness and its determinants (see Tiefenbach and Kohlbacher, 2013a & b; Uchida, Ogihara and Fukushima, 2015).

As Coulmas indicates, the emerging concern with happiness in Japan reflects the global circulation and purchase of aspects of what he refers to as the “western tradition” (Coulmas, 2008), comprising what I characterize as the EuroAmerican model of happiness. My goal in this paper is to explore this emergence—which embodies a uniquely 20th - 21st century iteration of a concern that has deep historical roots in a number of philosophical and religious traditions—from two angles of approach. First, I sketch, in general terms, both the cultural foundations of the EuroAmerican model and its connection to particular forms of power relations; specifically, those related to neoliberalism. My intention here is to trouble the often-uncritical universalization of EuroAmerican forms of personal, social and governmental organization that marks much of the happiness literature. I then extend the analysis by means of a concrete reference point—Kankanmori, a collective housing community in Tokyo—in order to further place into relief the biases of the EuroAmerican model. In exemplifying a hybrid approach that valorizes neither the individual nor the collective to the exclusion of the other, Kankanmori, the first urban collective housing community established in Japan, also provides both an alternative model of happiness and wellbeing in general, and a potential practical response to problems of social isolation and alienation in particular. Attention to Kankanmori, and to other places it like it, can therefore contribute to an expansion of conceptual and policy-related discussions of happiness and wellbeing, whether in Japan or elsewhere.

2. Situating the EuroAmerican happiness imperative

The emergence of the contemporary obsession with happiness can be dated to 1973, when Bhutan developed a Gross National Happiness Indicator to challenge the hegemony of Gross National Product as an appropriate measure of well being and prosperity. Supported by the United Nations, which has instituted an International Day of Happiness and now releases an annual World Happiness Report, happiness and wellbeing have taken on increasing prominence of place in governmental orientations and practices across the globe. The U.S., Britain, France and Australia all publish reports on wellbeing (Davies, 2015), and France and Britain have also taken steps to incorporate happiness measures directly into their policy-making processes (Dolan, Peasgood and White, 2006; Stiglitz, Sen

2 Portions of this section draw on Kingfisher 2013a.
The efforts of the Japanese government, mentioned above, are part and parcel of this trend.

Although increasingly global in its governmental and popular reach (see, e.g., Lu and Gilmore, 2004; Zevnik, 2014), the discourse of happiness and wellbeing remains in many respects firmly rooted in EuroAmerican cultural orientations. Two pillars of positive psychology—a quintessentially American enterprise, and one of the keystones, along with happiness economics, of the EuroAmerican mode—comprise the foundation of this discourse. The first is a construction of happiness as having to do with emotional satisfaction and positive affect—as marked by the presence of good feelings and the absence of bad feelings, or of any kind of emotion constructed as “negative.” Both reflect positive psychology’s basic claim that psychology as a discipline has suffered from an over-emphasis on what is wrong (mental illness, distress, crisis), rather than on what is right (strengths, capacities), and on the corresponding claim that we need to focus on enhancing the positive as opposed to fighting the negative (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990, 1997; Linley et al., 2006; Gable and Haidt, 2005; Seligman, 2002, 2006; Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi, 2000; see also Christopher and Hickinbottom, 2008). In an odd sort of slippage, this has translated into a construction of what are tagged as “negative” emotions—anger, guilt, self-doubt, anxiety, dependence—as inherently detrimental. Here, the range of possible human emotions is divided and placed into a binary system of good/bad.

The second pillar of positive psychology is an emphasis on interiority (Christopher and Hickinbottom, 2008; Taylor, 1989)—on an inner life that is in many ways autonomous from the external world. This emphasis provides the foundation for positive psychology’s key method for enhancing wellbeing; namely, work on the self, via therapy, meditation, and various disciplines of positive thinking, all with the goal of producing a positive attitude. This serves to institutionalize another set of binaries—inside/outside, personal/social—in which the inside and the personal are over-valorized at the expense of the outside or the social. Thus while advocacy of community involvement and voluntarism have been popping up more frequently in recent years, for the most part it is still the case that collective enterprises—and, perhaps, even relationships with others in general—are positioned less as activities worthy in and of themselves, and more as mechanisms by means of which individuals can augment their own personal sense of wellbeing.

These emphases on interiority and positive affect/satisfaction do not reflect universal human drives or desires, but are, rather, historically and culturally unique. The taken for granted focus on inner life that marks positive psychology—and, indeed, much of EuroAmerican culture—emerged in EuroAmerican cultural contexts in full form only

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3 In countries whose governments do not address happiness and wellbeing directly, other bodies are filling in the gaps. In Canada, for example, the Canadian Research Advisory Group at the University of Waterloo, comprised of former government officials as well as academics, is working to encourage government recognition of the policy relevance of wellbeing.
around the time of the Enlightenment (McMahon, 2006, 2010; see also Ahmed, 2010; Davies, 2015; Kingwell, 1998). Given these shallow roots, any attempt to highlight the importance of interiority—or, rather, to assume it—as a historical universal is rendered highly problematic. When a cross-cultural perspective is added, the narrow specificity of the EuroAmerican model becomes even more apparent. Different cultural systems can place different relative weightings on orientations towards others versus orientations towards an inner self (see Kingfisher, 2002 for a review). Nor are emotional satisfaction and positive affect overvalued everywhere: emotions like a sense of dependence, subservience, or dissatisfaction, for example, are considered crucial in some contexts (Christopher and Hickinbottom, 2008; Joshanloo and Weijers, 2014).

Positive psychology’s foregrounding of interiority and positive affect represents a manifestation of the general claim of its home discipline that “happiness is best understood as a personal concept” (Joshanloo and Weijers, 2014, 718). This claim, in turn, both reflects and serves to naturalize a distinctively contemporary construction of liberal individualism (Ahmed, 2010; Zevnik, 2014; see also van Uchelen, 2000)—a construction that embodies more than just supposedly neutral cultural values, but that also indexes—and produces—the power relations associated with a particular historical and cultural formation: neoliberalism. Neoliberalism, as we know, claims that if markets are freed from state intervention and if individuals are accordingly liberated to be their naturally autonomous and entrepreneurial selves, the result will be a healthy economy and a collection—if not a social collectivity—of happy, self-fulfilled individuals (see, e.g., Bourdieu, 1998; Kingfisher, 2013 a & b; McDonald and O’Callaghan, 2008; Peck, 2013; Rose, 1996). When analyses of neoliberalism and of the contemporary obsession with happiness are paired, two significant points of convergence are placed into relief. First, it just so happens that the type of person most valorized by neoliberalism—self-examining and—self-governing, “active” and autonomous—is the type of person most valorized in positive psychology (Miller, 2008, Ehrenreich, 2009, 2010; McDonald and O’Callaghan, 2008). Take, for example, the following statement: “No longer do dominant theories view the individual as a passive vessel responding to stimuli; rather, individuals are now seen as decision makers, with choices, preferences, and the possibility of becoming masterful [and] efficacious.” Mirroring claims made by pundits of the “active society” (Walters, 1997), including key architects of structural adjustment and austerity programs, this statement was in fact written by the founders of positive psychology (Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi, 2000, 8). Thus positive psychology can be used to support the gutting of social programs in the name of so-called empowerment, and thus wellbeing. To give just one example, Paul Dolan and Mathew White (2008, 77), two happiness economists, claim that government use of measures of subjective well being to determine whom to target with programs designed to increase resilience will have the beneficial side-effect of allowing for cuts to welfare programs. Richard Layard, a leading figure in happiness economics, concurs, claiming that state sponsorship of individualized therapeutic modalities (in particular, Cognitive Behavioural Therapy, or CBT) will lead to reductions in government expenditures on financial assistance programs (Layard et al., 2007; cited in Davies, 2015, 111). In short, it is “as if positive psychology were a…manifestation of the technical and instrumental rationality” of neoliberalism (Fernández-Ríos and Cornes, 2009, 10); and government attention to happiness measures and the mainstream scholarship on wellbeing more
generally may accordingly reflect an interest in efficiency—a keystone of neoliberal economics—as much as any kind of benevolent interest in happiness and wellbeing per se.

Second, except when it is intervening in peoples’ lives in the most illiberal ways, the goal of neoliberalism is to encourage self-governance in place of state government. In this framework, responsibility for happiness, just like responsibility for poverty and risk more generally, is devolved to the level of the individual, as is made clear by positive psychology’s emphasis on work on the self. Neoliberal governance, then, entails more than the policing and regulation of welfare recipients, the homeless, the “others” to the market, and the inmates of carceral society; the work that gets done in the so-called center, in the taken-for-granted, mundane everyday lives of proper middle and upper-class subjects, is equally crucial to its operations. Thus we are all enjoined to work on ourselves in order to become happier and more fulfilled—and thus better workers and entrepreneurs; and there is a plethora of technologies of self devoted to this enterprise, ranging from the state-sponsored to the individually purchased, from anti-depressants, to therapy, to yoga and meditation regimes, all designed to enable us to craft ourselves into the kinds of persons most valued in our society.

Traveling through popular culture as well as in policy circles, positive psychology is at the heart of a confluence of academic, policy-related and popular orientations that has, in turn, provided the conditions of possibility for the emergence of a happiness imperative: a positioning of happiness as a social obligation, a form of propriety that requires an intense work on the self and that marks the unhappy as failed persons. In being held (and holding ourselves) responsible for our own happiness—both a prerequisite for social citizenship and a consumer product—our analysis of our lives is channeled away from political economy and structures of inequality and towards a particular form of destructured, non-or post-social personhood. “Rather than assuming that happiness is simply found in ‘happy persons,’” then, we could think more carefully about “how claims to happiness make certain forms of personhood valuable” (Ahmed, 2010, 11). In working to transform ourselves into such valuable persons, we can become so engrossed in monitoring ourselves for evidence of negativity and working to cultivate positivity that we fail to attend to what is happening outside of ourselves, and remove ourselves from collective engagement—thereby contributing to the decollectivization that Bourdieu (1998) claimed is one of the biggest dangers of neoliberalism. Dominant EuroAmerican approaches to happiness thus serve simultaneously to disassemble the social and buttress the market. It is perhaps appropriate, then, to refer to the contemporary culture of happiness as a “regime of happiness” (Zevnik, 2014, ix) inextricably tied to governmental attempts to create proper depoliticized, consuming subjects—a kind of happiness/market/governance complex.

3. The Challenge of Collectivity: Urban Collective Housing Communities

Although disbanded by the Abe administration in 2013, the framework of the Japanese Commission on Measuring Happiness provides at least one useful foil to the dominant EuroAmerican model. As outlined by Uchida, Ogihara and Fukushima (2015, 826), the Commission included among its five key orientations recognition that, “To ensure that we achieve a sustainable society, we should examine wellbeing not only at the individual level
but also at a collective level. In addition, we should focus on inequity within societies.” In locating wellbeing in the social as well as in the individual, and in highlighting, in addition, issues of social structure and political economy, the Commission’s orientation to can serve as a corrective to the ethnocentrism of mainstream happiness studies. Significantly, Yukiko Uchida, who served on the Commission, is a cultural psychologist. The “cultural” in cultural psychology indexes its attention to “the critical role of culture in explaining psychological functions and behaviors,” in contrast to traditional (EuroAmerican) psychology, which tends to “define psychological phenomena as universal entities” (Ibid., 823). Uchida and her colleagues accordingly argue for the need to attend to the “cultural construal of happiness.” In their comparisons of EuroAmerican and East Asian, and, in particular, Japanese, construals of wellbeing, they outline, among other patterns, a generalized difference between a foundational orientation to personal achievement and personality attributes in the former, and an emphasis on intersubjectivity and a self-other balance in the latter (Uchida and Kitayama, 2009; Uchida and Ogihara, 2012; Uchida, Ogihara and Fukushima, 2015). This is a significant difference that undermines the supposed universality of EuroAmerican individualism, and that points to the need to broaden our scope of attention.

In keeping with this call to explore the collective as well as the individual aspects of happiness and wellbeing, I devote the remainder of this paper to a discussion of Kankanmori, an urban collective housing community in Tokyo. My research in Kankanmori is part of a comparative project focused on tracing how models of collectivity are translated and assembled in cultural contexts that have traditionally valorized individualism, on the one hand; and in those that have historically valorized collectivism, on the other. The project is in the very early stages of development; thus the analysis I provide, based on only two short stays at Kankanmori to date, is preliminary, meant to raise questions and broaden discussion rather than provide conclusions.

4. Framework and Method

Urban collective housing communities provide one example of what we now refer to as “intentional” communities, which include ecovillages, spiritual communities, cooperatives, disability communities, and, increasingly, retirement communities. The social and economic orientations of intentional communities range from “total communities,” where there is no private property or space, and in which all activity takes place within the geographic boundaries of the community, to hybrid communities that make space for both individual and collective activities and identities.

Although not new, recent years have witnessed a re-emergence of interest in intentional communities. Thus the Fellowship for Intentional Community web site (www.ic.org), which hosts the largest international database on intentional communities, lists as many communities that are “in formation” as those that are already existing. Within

4 My second research site is Quayside Village, in Vancouver.
this re-emergence, I have chosen to focus on urban, hybrid communities, for two reasons. First, they are understudied, relative to, for example, ecovillages and spiritual communities. Second, and in contrast with the latter, they are neither geographically isolated nor exclusively collectivist. In being more spatially integrated with the wider society, and in making space for the individual as well as the collective, they thus provide a more viable critique and alternative than isolationist intentional communities to the hyper-individualized models of life that seem to be most common in contemporary, predominantly urban post-industrial contexts.

My theoretical and methodological orientation draws on the concepts of translation and assemblage, which encourage exploration of how ideas and practices emerge in particular forms, in particular places, and among particular actors as artifacts of active cutting-and-pasting, or bricolage (Deleuze and Guattari 1987; Freeman, 2009; Kingfisher, 2013; Lendvai and Bainton, 2013; Shore and Wright, 2011). In other words, approaches to governance; the constitution of the individual, the collective, and their relationship; and experiences of collective living, for example, are theorized as constructed in the process of their translation from and articulation with locally and globally circulating historical and/or cultural discourses.5 These emergent forms, or assemblages, thus reflect the particular material and discursive resources, histories, agendas, and cultural contexts of agents’ productions, resulting in unique formations that are nevertheless tied to larger patterns. This kind of theoretical orientation calls for ethnographic engagement, or participant observation, as opposed to the kinds of measuring devices, deployed by happiness economists, which often uncritically universalize EuroAmerican cultural orientations. Accordingly, my key method has been to reside in Kankanmori6 in order to observe and participate in everyday events (e.g., shopping for, preparing, sharing, and cleaning up after common meals), and in naturally occurring as well as orchestrated7 conversations with residents.

5 As I discuss below, I am referring here to models of collectivity that travel from, e.g., Europe or the United States, to Japan, as well as to Japanese imaginaries of historical forms of social organization.

6 It is worth reiterating that, at this point, I have had only two short stays at Kankanmori. My future intention is to reside in Kankanmori for six months to a year.

7 By “orchestrated conversations” I mean interviews. Given my rudimentary Japanese language skills, I used an interpreter during my first stay at Kankanmori. As my Japanese improves, I will rely less on such orchestrated conversations and more on naturally occurring, everyday conversations in which interlocutors engage with each other for reasons other than the presence of a researcher.
5. Kankanmori

After two years of planning, including some 30-odd workshops and meetings with architects to design spaces that encourage particular forms of sociality, Kankanmori, located in Nippori, just outside of the Yamanote line that circles Tokyo’s central core, opened in 2003. There are currently 34 adults and 14 children living in the community. Occupying two floors of a 12-story building in the fabric-town section of Nippori, Kankanmori has 28 apartments, ranging from share-house (or roommate) apartments to those designed for families of four or five. At the center of the building is a large common area, at the heart of which is a commercial size kitchen and space for eating, meeting, and children’s play. A full 13% of Kankanmori’s space is common space. This was a deliberate decision, reflecting a desire to encourage residents to extend their “private” space beyond the confines of their individual apartments – a mechanism, in other words, for establishing community. (This mechanism has been by and large successful: residents regularly use the common spaces to work on their computers, read, cook for their personal consumption, and entertain friends and relatives.) In addition to 10-12 common meals per month, residents in Kankanmori engage in a number of cooperative activities, including gardening, bulk buying, and hosting a series of social events, some for residents only, and others open to the wider community. Kankanmori is self-governing, with decision-making based on consensus rather than voting. To aid in the planning and decision-making processes, there are some 20 committees and subcommittees in which residents participate. Committees report to the community as a whole at monthly meetings and at the AGM.

In the view of many residents (as well as in the descriptions and analyses of many scholars; e.g., Allison, 2013; Coulmas, 2008; Kawano, Roberts and Long, 2014), until the mid-20th century, Japanese social organization was closer to the collectivist than the individualist end of the continuum. Thus *ikigai*—what makes life worth living—focused on embeddedness in a community (see Mathews, 1996), the two types most frequently noted being extended families, on the one hand, and companies—in which employees tended to stay throughout their entire work lives—on the other. Kankanmori is positioned by a number of its residents as an explicit political and policy-relevant intervention designed to address the issues generated by the erosion of these patterns—including childcare shortages, domestic violence, and social fragmentation—as well as issues associated with a rapidly aging population. Residents also saw collective housing as an antidote to a post-war redefinition of the good life in which commitments to work and extended family began to take on increasingly negative valence in relation to valorizations of privacy, individualism, and consumerism—a shift that Kankanmori residents were dissatisfied with, having found themselves, prior to moving in to the community, feeling cut-off and alienated in their high-rise Tokyo apartments.

Joining Kankanmori served to ameliorate this unhappy situation, and community members spoke with me at length about the positive aspects of collective living. They placed particular value on common spaces—not only the kitchen and eating areas, but also the common play areas for children and the garden and patio spaces. Many said that they especially enjoyed preparing and sharing common meals and participating in special community events: they liked always having someone they could eat, drink, and converse with. Parents highlighted in addition the benefits of having other parents to go to for advice.
on parenting, the convenience of having other adults available to pick up the slack in an emergency, and the relief of having peers for their children to play with in a safe environment. Finally, and most generally, all the residents I spoke with voiced their appreciation of being in a situation that allowed them to simultaneously participate in collective living and maintain some privacy and independence.

On the one hand, Kankanmori residents were interested in recapturing an idealized past of connection and mutual dependence. Reference was made in this regard to nagaya, a particular style of one-story, row-house collective living prevalent prior to the Meiji restoration that is being re-envisioned by contemporary Japanese architects (Schultz, 2014). On the other hand, Kankanmori is not simply about nostalgia for an imagined past of collectivist harmony. Thus members referred to new forms of social relationship that they felt represented significant departures from historical forms of collectivity in Japan that were, in their view, fairly rigidly homogeneous (in terms of, for instance, occupation and geographic origin). In contrast, they argued, Kankanmori residents encountered others very different from themselves in background and lifestyle—something they felt was one of the most inventive aspects of their approach to collective living. They placed great value on sharing community with people in a range of professions, who hold various ideas and philosophies, engage in different kinds of activities, and come from different places. Residents—young and old—also highly valued living in a cross-generational community. Indeed, the cross-generational aspect of Kankanmori was so important that, at one point, when they found themselves without children (due to, e.g., members’ job transfers), they advertised a discount to families with children. Diversity is thus a keystone of the community. One resident summed up this orientation best when she said that Kankanmori residents are neither friends nor family, but something different, something new. As another resident expressed it, Kankanmori is about creating new bonds that are not based on blood.

It is worth noting in this regard that Kankanmori models itself not only on nagaya, but also—both more explicitly and more frequently noted by residents—on the Swedish approach to collective housing introduced to Japan in the late 1980s by Ikuko Koyabe, a recently deceased architect now widely known as the “mother of collective housing in Japan.” During a conversation we had in 2014, Koyabe described how, in her view, the Japanese culture of collectivity was lost during the post-war era. In the contemporary context, she said, collectivity was no longer organic, but, rather, had to be created, and tailored to contemporary economic and social arrangements. As part of this effort, she conducted research on Swedish collective housing; and, in keeping with her conviction that collective communities have to be established by participants rather than legislated by experts or government officials, she accompanied 10 potential Kankanmori residents to Sweden in 2002 so that they could explore its approaches collectivity and then decide for

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8 Kankanmori residents hail not only from Tokyo and neighboring prefectures, but also from more far-flung places in Japan, including Hokkaido and Kyushu, as well as from Europe.
themselves how they might want to organize social and spatial relations in Kankanmori. As she wrote when Kankanmori opened, “instead of just taking the ideas of Northern European countries we wanted to adjust their ideas to our lifestyle. We wanted to introduce something new” (2014, 12).

In addition to—or as part of—this “something new,” a number of residents’ stories indexed a relationship between moving into a collective community and re-evaluations of life-as-a-whole that entailed critiques of the happiness imperative—which, they told me, informed the lives of many of their friends and co-workers, whose responses to collective housing ranged from astonishment to a kind of horror. Some residents changed jobs and reassessed friendships, while others altered the relative weighting of various activities in their lives. These reconfigurations reflected, in their view, ongoing efforts to create a mutually beneficial harmonization of the person and the community, neither of which would cannibalize the other. This was not, then, about a rejection of the individual, who, in stereotypes of traditional Japanese culture, is completely subsumed by the collective. On the contrary, although residents’ “private” space expanded out into common areas, as noted above, common space generally did not extend into residents’ apartments; there was some protection, then, of individual space and autonomy. In addition, I was told, the goal is not to participate in community in order to boost one’s personal level of happiness, but, rather, to build a healthy community with a capital “C”—that is, the community that, as one resident put it, is a “basic characteristic of humanity.” As Koyabe expressed it, while collective communities need to start at the level of the individual—since they are, after all, comprised of individuals—and although the production of individual wellbeing is clearly important, individual desires are only ever accomplished via engagement with a community, via learning how to live with difference and how to communicate. In thus positing the individual and the collective as inextricably tied, Kankanmori may provide an opportunity to explore the spaces in between, offering a release from the either/or binaries that plague happiness studies (and perhaps social theory more generally as well). Kankanmori, then, is a truly hybrid site: not only in terms of the “Japanese” and the “Swedish” (which of course cannot be taken as a unified entities), but also in terms of what we take to be the “individual” and the “collective.”

6. Conclusion

The concern with happiness and well-being has come to permeate popular, scholarly, and governmental imaginaries and practices in a range of settings. Mainstream happiness studies, however, has been marked (marred?) by a lack of reflexivity—a lack of awareness and articulation of its EuroAmerican cultural foundations, on the one hand, and of its connections with neoliberalism, on the other. What is called for, then, is an approach that

9 Kankanmori is planning to send another 10 members (including at least one person who was on the first trip) back to Sweden in the summer of 2016, in order further to compare notes.
makes explicit the relationship between models of wellbeing and forms of governance (e.g., Ahmed, 2010; Ehrenreich, 2009, 2010; Ferguson, 2007; Kingfisher, 2013; McDonald and O’Callaghan, 2008; Zevnik, 2014), and that situates models of happiness and wellbeing in historical and cultural context by means comparative, ethnographic work (Christopher and Hickinbottom, 2008; Jiminez, 2008; Johnston et al., 2012; Kingfisher, 2013a; Mathews and Izquierdo, 2009; Thin, 2012. See also Coulmas, 2008; Kitayama and Markus, 2000; McMahon, 2006, 2010; Uchida and Kitayama, 2009; Uchida and Oghara, 2012; Uchida, Oghara and Fukushima, 2015). This paper reflects a preliminary attempt to combine these two strands of critique and analysis—the governmental and the cultural.

In Japan, interest in happiness and wellbeing has emerged in the context of an economic downturn (Allison, 2013; Coulmas, 2008), and alongside increasing anxiety about a range of social issues: most notably a rapidly aging population and the phenomena of NEET (Not Engaged in Employment, Education or Training) and hikikomori (social isolation) among youth; but also an array of other problems related to immigration and minorities, gender, interpersonal violence, suicide, and mental health more generally (Allison, 2013; Aspinall, 2014; Cleveland, 2014; Goodman, 2012; Horiguchi, 2012, 2014; Kitanaka 2012; Kwano, Roberts, and Long, 2014; Leheny, 2014; Seldon 2014; Siddle 2013; Sugimoto 2014; Toivonen 2012; Toivonen and Iimoto, 2012; Uchida and Norasakkunkit, 2005; Norasakkunkit, Uchida and Toivonen, 2012). Significantly, Riefenbach and Kohlbacher (2013 a & b), in analyzing the government’s National Survey on Lifestyle Preferences between 2010 and 2012, discovered that a key determinant of happiness and wellbeing in Japan is loneliness. This is one of the issues indexed by Kankanmori residents as relevant to their decision to move into the community: the desire for connectivity, for interdependence. Together, the well-documented, widespread problems of social isolation and alienation in Japan, coupled with the need for connection expressed by the residents of Kankanmori, indicate that approaches to happiness and wellbeing that focus on the individual may be too narrowly construed.

My intention, however, is not to romanticize collectivity—which also entails forms of governance, and which no doubt can be experienced as oppressive as well as liberatory. Kankanmori residents are acutely aware, for instance, of the difficulties involved in balancing their commitments outside of Kankanmori with their participation in the community, and, within the community itself, in navigating the relationship between what they mark as the social and what they mark as the private. A number of residents felt pressure to contribute more than they desired or felt capable of, or experienced guilt when they decided to give more time and space to their personal lives than to community endeavors. In this sense, they recognized that community is an unfolding and emergent practice that waxes and wanes, and that is comprised of pressure as well as of the fulfilling.10

10 I intend to explore these patterns and nuances in more detail as the project develops.
My goal, rather, has been, first of all, to place into relief the individualism and individualizing forms of governance generated by dominant EuroAmerican models of happiness and wellbeing. A preliminary ethnography of Kankanmori, coupled with the general critique of the EuroAmerican model I presented in the first part of the paper, serves to accomplish this—and also to point to alternative ways of thinking about and practicing happiness and wellbeing. Again, Ikuko Koyabe: “instead of getting more material goods and services for an individual family we thought we should open up our lives. We might be able to make a place to relax but at the same time keep our privacy if we shared time, information or place” (2014, 11). This challenges models of consumerism as fulfillment, as well as approaches that posit the individual and the collective as inherently oppositional, rather then mutually constitutive and thus inextricably tied. Given the speed with which EuroAmerican approaches have gained currency in a range of popular and policy-making contexts, the refusals and alternative approaches of Kankanmori, and of places like it, offer a rejuvenating—and expansive—breath of fresh air.

11 The importance of exploring the spaces in between – in between the individual and the collective, and, in the case of Kankanmori, between Japanese and Swedish models – can also be fruitfully extended to the spaces, or differences, between urban collective housing communities in different sites. One small example from Quayside Village in Vancouver, serves to illustrate the importance of dwelling in the space in between the similarities across sites that have to do with the global circulation of models of collective housing, on the one hand, and the differences that reflect how models are translated and assembled in unique cultural and local contexts, on the other. Quayside residents visit each other’s “private” spaces regularly – for dinner, coffee, or to borrow things – the latter sometimes when residents are not home. Once, when I was helping prepare a common meal and ran out of a particular ingredient, I was to told to go into the apartment of a resident who was not home at the time in order to fetch it. This would not happen in Kankanmori, where people rarely visit each other’s apartments, but instead tend to restrict their interactions with each other to common spaces. This is a little difference, but it could be a little difference that really matters in terms of experiences of collectivity, and that may be tied to some general cultural differences between Japan and Canada in terms of how people negotiate space and social relations. It is important, in other words, to explore such communities as both general and unique examples of collective living.
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9. **Welcome to the Tree House!: The Architecture of Raymond Moriyama and His Life Comparison as an Interned Japanese Canadian with Artist William Allister as a POW in Japan**

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**Abstract**

This presentation explores architecture and art as forms of creative cultural expression while it also engages in the comparison of the lives of Raymond Moriyama, a Japanese Canadian who was interned in Canada as a youth during WWII, and William Allister a Canadian who was taken prisoner by the Japanese military and spent several years in POW camps in Japan. The comparison has been both embraced and criticized. Some have seen the comparison of the two men’s lives and experiences in WWII as an important call for transcendence over unjust and difficult experiences, while others have seen it as an inappropriate equation of Japan imprisoning citizens from a foreign country vs. Canada imprisoning its own citizens because of their ethnic descent. Both men overcame their circumstances and went on to pursue creative careers, one as an architect and the other as an artist. Raymond Moriyama became one of Canada’s most prominent architects designing such buildings as the Bata Shoe Museum in Toronto, and the Canadian Embassy in Tokyo, suggesting it to be a representation of a Tree House. Decades after WWII William Allister would return to Japan to come to terms with what happened to him, and go on to produce art with Japanese theme images. The two men met and shared life experiences as a way of helping to overcome the bitterness of their experiences. The culmination of their mutual engagement, was a bringing together of the two men’s creative products through an exhibit of William Allister’s art, in the Canadian Embassy in Tokyo designed by Raymond Moriyama. The paper also discusses how the architectural construction of this embassy was supposed to represent a Tree House and the suggested symbolism of this in recapturing a sense of humanity, and identities of citizenship.

**Keywords:** Japan, Nikkei, Japanese Canadian internment, World War II, POWs of WWII, architecture, art, creativity, resilience, Canadian Embassy in Tokyo
1. Introduction

I chose the topic of my paper for the 2015 Japan Studies Association of Canada (JSAC) meetings held at the Canadian Embassy in Tokyo, Japan, with two relevant considerations in mind. The year, 2015, marks the 70th anniversary of the ending of World War II, and the first time in the history of the Japan Studies Association of Canada that its meetings were held outside of Canada, instead held at the Canadian Embassy in Tokyo. My paper focuses on issues relevant to World War II and its aftermath, through the stories of the lives of two Canadians, one a Japanese Canadian who was interned with his family as a youth during the war years, and the other of a White Canadian who was taken as a Prisoner of War by the Japanese and spent over three and a half years imprisoned by the Japanese in P.O.W. camps, first in Hong Kong and then in Japan. My paper also seeks to address the very venue of these JSAC meetings, as I wish to discuss the building we are in—the Canadian Embassy in Tokyo, Japan—and also the architecture of it as a human creative product (along with art as a human creative product) in reference to the building, construction, and re-capturing of identity, both individual and collective, along with the re-envisioning of citizenship, both within countries (in this case Canada specifically) and in terms of being global citizens or as it can possibly be expressed in Japanese, Chikyujin (citizens of the earth) (see Creighton, 2007; 2008 for a discussion of Chikyujin).

In pursuit of the above, I will focus on the creative products of two people, Japanese Canadian architect Raymond Moriyama and (White) Canadian (I indicate ‘White’ since an ethnic category is being identified for the other primary person of focus) William Allister, their personal interactions with each other and a movie made comparing and connecting their lives. In particular I will focus on how the architectural goals of Raymond Moriyama are reflected in this building in which most of the 2015 JSAC meetings took place, The Canadian Embassy in Japan—a building which hence links both countries, Canada and Japan. Moriyama was interned as a youth in his home and native country, Canada, in one of the internment camps to which Japanese Canadians were relocated. William Allister also experienced incarceration as a young man; he was taken prisoner during WWII by Japan and spent more than three and a half years (44 months) as a POW held by Japan, first in Hong Kong and then the majority of that time in Japan. For both men their creative products and pursuits were both an expression of their own version of human creativity, and also a means of dealing with, addressing and overcoming their formative experiences of incarceration.

2. Architecture, the Tree House and Raymond Moriyama

Returning to the architectural discussion I will explain the reference to the Tree House. Perhaps many conference attendees, along with many other people who first visit this embassy, found it a bit odd or unusual when first entering the building to take four flights of escalators upwards while still outside the building in order to enter on one of the higher floors rather than walk into the building directly on the ground floor. I know I found it quizzical long ago when I first came to this embassy. At that time, and in particular as a long-term researcher of department stores and other consumer complexes, I thought I had a clear sense of where escalators belonged. Escalators belonged on the inside of buildings, complexes or structures (a strong inside/outside distinction generally applies to
escalators). However, in the case of this Embassy one takes the escalators upwards, until one is at the level of the tree-tops, of the trees which line the building which are actually growing in the park area that adjoins the Embassy, and then one enters. This is because Moriyama’s intention for this Embassy was that it be a Tree House. Hence for the 2015 meetings, JSAC members have all gathered in a Tree House. A Tree House evokes a spirit of youth—many of us had, entered, or played in tree houses when young—and idealism perhaps. Moriyama thought of a tree house as a “magical place” (expressed in Campbell’s film, *The Art of Compassion*, 1995) hence an apt place for the unfolding of human sociability, planning and exchange. This embassy as one metaphorically and structurally representing a Tree House is unique—I cannot think of another embassy or consulate (or any other prominent modern building) imaged as a Tree House. More common metaphors for embassies and consulates are either sites of grandeur or a metaphorical Fortress—structures that attempt foremost to project a sense of importance, power and security. I am a dual citizen (of Canada and the USA) and once worked at the American Embassy in Tokyo for which this concept of “Fortress” seems an apt metaphor and which contrasts to this Canadian Embassy as a “Tree House”.

Anthropologists who have studied building and architectural form in relationship to human social life, construction of identity and moral personhood (for example, Morgan, 1965; Levi-Strauss, 1963; 1987; Carsten and Huges-Jones, 1995) suggest that continuity in collective identity in part is suggested in architectural forms through *iteration* and *re-iteration*. The Canadian Embassy as a Tree House designed by Moriyama, already involves a re-iteration to the first Tree House Moriyama built. The Canadian Embassy in Tokyo, Japan is not Moriyama’s first tree house. He built his first tree house in Canada, in the interior of British Columbia. Canada had not commissioned nor compensated him for building that one, and he built it during the constraints of being interned by Canada. However, it is perhaps from that first tree house that this Canadian Embassy as a Tree House stems. Moriyama built his first tree house in the interior of BC as a youth—undergoing a great deal of bitterness—incarcerated by his own country in the internment camps set up there for Japanese Canadians during the WWII years, after his family’s initial incarceration in cattle stalls at the fairgrounds of the PNE (Pacific Northwest Exhibition). One element of Moriyama’s bitterness was his mother’s miscarriage while housed in the PNE stalls, the conditions of which along with the stress of internment Moriyama attributes to being the cause of the loss of what as a child he thought could have been his “younger brother” (Peter Campbell, Director, *The Art of Compassion*, 1995).

Even as an interned youth, Moriyama was already acutely interested in spatial concepts and was given lumber from neighbouring (White) Canadian farmers in the community near where he was interned, which he used to build his first tree house. Incidences such as these are notable in suggesting some hope in the ability of the human spirit to transcend pettiness even in times of stress. It does not negate the injustices done to Japanese Canadians nor is it mentioned to suggest that, but it does indicate that (some) average people could nonetheless deal with others during such times in a more meaningful and humane way. A similar example is provided in one of Linda Ohama’s films (*The Last Harvest*, 1992), which shows how members of the local White community near where Japanese Canadians were interned help resolve the issue of whether the interned Japanese
Canadian children should become educated while being interned, and if so, how—something the government had not worked out nor assured in that situation. The locals decided that since the Japanese Canadian internees who were children, were children and since children should be educated, and since there was one local school for the community’s children, the Japanese Canadian children interned in a nearby location should be allowed to attend it. In building that first tree house Moriyama thought of a tree house as a magical place where his spirit could rise above the facts of his incarceration, at least while creating and being in it, and above the sense of bitterness of being incarcerated by his own country. In designing the Canadian Embassy in Japan, as a Tree House, Moriyama was not only invoking this sense of magic and of creating a potentially magical place, he was also “returning” to the Tree House as such a place.

3. From Architecture to Art and William Allister

William Allister, who is now deceased but someone with whom I interacted and discussed these issues extensively in the past, was of course, also once a youth. As a young man he enlisted with a group of friends—all eager to go off and fight exciting battles and be in a war for Canada. After enlisting in WWII, they were stationed in Hong Kong—seen as an “easy” assignment where there was no action. Allister wrote of his youthful frustration at this, and how he along with the others were irritated and annoyed at this “wimpy” posting where nothing really happened. They had signed up for war, and that was what they wanted. They wanted to be in a “real war” for which they had signed up and in which they were eager to take part. Allister would later have a sort of “conversion” experience and change his mind about all this (too late), and spend much of the decades of his life after surviving his WWII experiences trying to express through his art, and educate through his talks (one of which he gave to one of my classes) the idiocy of wars, and how we should realize we do not want them, nor want to be in them, and our pressing human moral obligation to try to prevent them. But as a young man, who had not yet experientially learned this, he was eager for that action and involvement—and he and the others did get their wish after all.

Hong Kong fell to the Japanese on December 25, 1941. The day had pivotal symbolic significance for many Canadians as Christmas Day, which added to the bitterness many Canadians felt about this event. The Japanese had invaded Hong Kong—as a British (and Canadian) post on the same day it attacked Pearl Harbor as part of the United States, in what seemed an all out attack on Western powers in terms of attacking both places on the same day based on Japan time. (Even if Hong Kong is geographically in Asia it was seen as a British stronghold). As indicated the day was December 8, 1941, and I said it was the same day Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, not the following day as is often stated, and I believe erroneously or misconceptually reported. (For example, See, in her 2009 novel Shanghai Girls says that Japan attacked Hong Kong just one day after attacking Pearl Harbor.) Such statements do not recognize time changes nor the international date-line issue. The date difference is not a temporal one but a perspective from where one is recording the date, given the international date-line and time changes. Thus, from the Asian and Japanese perspectives and designations both occurred on December 8 (as that was the date for both in Japan since Japan is a day ahead of North America).
The battle for Hong Kong was intense and Allister and the others were in it. (It may have indeed been a classic case of the dictum that one needs to be careful what one wishes for because one’s wish might come true.) When Hong Kong fell on that highly symbolic Christmas Day, over 10,000 Canadians were taken Prisoners of War (POWs) by the Japanese. For those that lived, the next few years of their lives would not be good ones, although for many they would be memorable ones that shaped the rest of their lives. The majority of those 10,000 Canadians taken POWs would not live through the severity of the POW conditions. They would die of starvation, they would die of sickness, they would die of overwork from forced labour, they would die from beatings and torture, they would die from a combination of these. They were first sequestered in Hong Kong and then taken to Japan. Conditions were harsh, food was scarce, torture was common, as was harsh forced labour. Allister wrote of his experiences as a POW that one of his greatest shocks came well into his incarceration period as a POW, and not from his captors but from his family. Due to the war, conditions, the stopping of communications, censorship, and so on, the POWs did not receive any mail or communication from those “outside” for a long time. Then well into his imprisonment as a POW in Japan, a letter to him from his family arrived despite all this. He wrote that he was in shocked disbelief (and still talked about this to me decades later) when he opened that letter and the first line he read by his own family indicated that they were overjoyed hear he had been taken a POW. Their meaning, of course, was that they were joyful at knowing he was still alive despite having heard no longer of his whereabouts or survival for some time. He, however, as someone in the awful circumstances of being a POW was astounded at the comment that anyone could be happy to hear he was a POW. As Allistair (1989) wrote about it:

I opened the letter with trembling fingers and stared uncomprehendingly at the first sentence: We were overjoyed to know you are a prisoner of war. Overjoyed! There I sat in shit up to the eyeballs, half dead, crawling with lice, exhausted, starved, disease ridden, jolted by electric feet, a bloody walking skeleton and they were overjoyed? Had they all gone balmy? It took a while to see it their way.

The Canadian POWs taken at Hong Kong—if they survived—were often left with much bitterness, as were other Canadians (and Canada) over these POWs in particular. (There have been suggestions that there was greater bitterness among people in Australia, Britain and Canada as countries from which many POWs were taken, who experienced the horrendous conditions of being POWs, and also as countries that did not have the offsetting positive experiences of post-war occupation interactions in Japan with Japanese, compared to Americans among which there were less POWs taken, and who often had offsetting positive experiences with average Japanese in the post-war period because of the American occupation.) Allister would spend years through his writing and his art to try to overcome this bitterness. For others this was not their approach. This can be perceived in just the title of a book co-authored by Jack Edwards (with Jimmy Walter, 1991), another one of the survivors that Allister knew (and whom I met with in Hong Kong); Banzai, You Bastards! (not a title that suggests promoting overcoming and transcending bitterness and hatred)—a strong contrast to Allister’s own approach. As Allister once expressed his view, it was that “even if someone does me dirt” I should not hate him or her but try to understand what made the person that way.
Allister dealt with these themes in his book regarding his capture and POW experiences, *Where Life and Death Hold Hands* (1989). For example in the book he recounts the story of the Kamloops Kid—whom I think was found guilty during the war trials and executed after the war—who was a Japanese Canadian who had gone back to Japan, and was on the Japanese side and one of the captors, and according to the POWs one of the worst. Rather than hate him, Allister attempted to try to understand what had caused him to be so brutal and how experiences of discrimination or abuse due to his status in Canada may have been part of the background to that. At some point Allister’s attempts to overcome his bitterness were reflected in his art, in which he actively engaged Japanese imagery, often using classical or traditional Japanese images, or bringing together Japanese and Western imagery in his paintings.

Allister then decided that to overcome lingering animosity towards Japan, he needed to address the issue head-on by returning to Japan, which he had not done since his POW years, and to the actual sites of his imprisonment, thereby as he puts it in his writing, addressing a need to “return to the scene of the crime.” Decades after the war ended, in the 1980s, he thus took a trip to Japan with his wife Mona. He went on to write a prize-winning essay about this visit that appeared in *Reader’s Digest.* By that time, 40 years after WWII, of course the POW camps were long gone, and where Allister had been located had become the Kawasaki ship building yards. He thus wrote to Kawasaki as a company to let him come and go to the sites where he had been imprisoned as a POW. There was nothing to compel Kawasaki representatives at the shipyards to do this, however, they granted his request. Allistair was even escorted to various sites by the son of a former prison guard.

Although such pronouncements are difficult in an absolute sense, in terms of physical hardships and adversity I would say Allister suffered more than Moriyama. This is not to negate that the Japanese Canadian internment did involve physical hardship, at times in extreme form, and adversity that is often overlooked, denied or erased in the minds of other Canadians. Nonetheless, by the time the 1989 movie comparing the lives of the two men, *The Art of Compassion,* was made, a movie that would bring the two men into frequent and repeated contact to discuss their lives and experiences together, and allow them to get to know each other well, Allister who had faced the harsher physical conditions seemed to have gone further towards addressing and eliminating his bitterness more completely. For Moriyama, the core of any remaining bitterness is expressed in the film in a conversation between the two men. Moriyama tells Allister that in some sense he (Allister) was better off because at least for him (Allister), he was imprisoned by the enemy with which his country was at war, whereas for Moriyama what he (Moriyama) had to deal with was that it was his own country that did this to him. So at the heart of his bitterness seemed to be more this psychological aspect of the denial of his identity and citizenship as a Canadian.

There was also bitterness at times expressed in the Japanese Canadian community that such a film comparing the two men’s lives was even made. I do not agree that the comparison should not have been made, but try to understand and relate the sentiments behind this. This was being done, after all, not long after the long struggle to get official recognition that the Japanese Canadian along with Japanese American internment had been wrong, and Redress had finally been won. One of the difficulties in the struggle had been dealing with the false equation of Japanese imprisoning Canadians as POWs with Canada
imprisoning what mainstream Canadians often referred to as Japanese, but who were Japanese Canadians. Statements by those opposing recognizing the wrongs of the internment, apologizing, or granting Redress on the part of Canada were often premised in the idea that Canada should not apologize (or pay money to) “the Japanese” (actually Japanese Canadians) they interned, because Japan had never apologized or paid money to the Canadians they had imprisoned as POWs. The problem inherent in this, is the false collapsing of two completely different categories (a country imprisoning foreign prisoners of war, and a country imprisoning its own citizens and legal residents) which Japanese Canadians, particularly those interned, got clearly, but some other Canadians often did not. These circumstances should not have been equated or taken as parallel; one was the imprisonment of those taken as enemies from a foreign country with which the country was at war, and the other was the imprisonment of citizens of a country by their own country, thus something very different.

Creative works figured highly in the discussion of both men’s abilities to recover, and go on to productive and creative activities and accomplishments; their lives thus truly constituting a two-fold story of the ability of the human spirit to rise and soar despite extreme setbacks. The culmination and bringing together the telling of the two men’s lives and experiences, happened in this very building in which the JSAC meetings have been held in 2015, about 25 years earlier so just around the time JSAC was starting up (there is no necessary connection in that but I think that it is interesting that both JSAC and this building came into existence around the same time and have now passed that marker of 25 years and have also been brought together in this building) with the holding of an art exhibit of William Allister’s art in this Canadian embassy building as an architectural example of Raymond Moriyama’s work. Allister and his wife Mona, attended the opening, as did I.

4. Architecture, Building Identities, Citizenship, Dwelling and Being

It is time for further thoughts on architecture, identity, citizenship, and this Canadian Embassy in Tokyo, Japan as the Tree House. Anthropologists and other social scientists have long looked at the way architecture stages and shapes human being-ness, social relationships and personhood. Some follow a Marxian approach that material conditions do not just derive from consciousness but give rise to consciousness. Hence built forms as part of material conditions give rise to consciousness. Some follow Bourdieu (1977; 1990), who developed the idea of habitus initially in relation to houses and dwelling, showing that just as an initial task of infants and children in socialization and sociability is learning a language, it is also an initial task to learn the “grammar” of building and spatial expectations that derive from cultural forms of architecture, first experienced usually in the house or dwelling. Mary Douglas (1970, 116) in another context has asserted that: “What is being carried out in human flesh is an image of society.” Victor Buchli (2013), in attempting to establish An Anthropology of Architecture, echoes this for architecture. He writes:

It is the negotiation of these distinctions and the images of society that are sustained in bodily and architectonic form, which together are profoundly generative of the terms by which moral personhood and social life are understood in relation to each other. It is
analytically quite difficult to segregate one from the other in a meaningful way. This negotiation, however, is at the heart of cultural work, the never-ending terms by which life is made and sustained, requiring new understandings of embodied form in relation to built form and similarly novel forms of disembodiment within the same process... (Buchli 2013, 137-139, my emphasis)

Since anthropologists have a long tradition of assessing how built structures stage personhood and collective identity, a sense of belonging to the group (which includes “citizenship”) and a prompting towards expected forms of moral personhood in relation to “dwellings,” usually construed as “houses” as places where people dwell, I will discuss it in those terms, linking it to Moriyama’s assertion of this Embassy as both a Tree House, and also as a dwelling or type of “house” for an aspect of human dwelling.

Anthropological work as far back as Henry Morgan with *Houses and House-Life of the American Aborigines* (1965[1881]) suggests that architectural form both reflects and generates expectations of humans in relation with other humans, the environment, and the concept of the cosmos—it prompts forms of social and moral personhood. Pivotal, Morgan wrote that it was not the cessation or elimination of want that marked success in architectural form, but that, “Every institution of [humankind] which attained permanence will be found linked with a perpetual want” (Morgan 1965, xvi). This can be linked to Heidegger’s classic discussion of the pivotal nature of “dwelling” for human beings and how this is tied to architecture. Heidegger asserts that humans “most ever learn to dwell” (1993, 363), rendering this a never completed nor achieved process—but not in a hopeless way. For Heidegger (and Moriyama) the problem of dwelling is a perpetual problem involving a process of integration that never ceases. He writes (in a post WWII context of housing scarcity) in his essay “Building, Dwelling, Thinking”:

> However hard and bitter, however hampering and threatening the lack of houses remains, the proper plight of dwelling does not lie merely in the lack of houses. The proper plight of dwelling is indeed older than the world wars with their destruction, older also than the increase of the earth’s population and the condition of the industrial workers. The proper dwelling plight lies in this, that mortals ever search anew for the nature of dwelling, that they must ever learn to dwell. What if [humanity’s] homelessness consisted in this, that [humankind] still does not even think of the proper plight of dwelling as the plight? Yet as soon as [humanity] gives thought to [its] homelessness, it is a misery no longer. Rightly considered and kept well in mind, it is the sole summons that calls mortals into their dwelling (Heidegger 1993, 354).

Heidegger also writes: “Only if we are capable of dwelling, only then can we build.” He connects this to an awareness of nature and natural processes in understanding how to design architecturally—as Moriyama has considered and as he does design, specifically as displayed in this Embassy, conceptualized by Moriyama as needing to connect to an awareness of what he refers to as the LAW—land, air, and water. Another reason for Moriyama’s decision to build this Embassy as the Tree House was an awareness of what was in the surrounding environment including the trees of adjoining area.

Levi-Strauss has referred to architecture as providing the “illusory objectification” through which social and moral personhood is envisioned and prompted, again beginning
with dwellings. This does not mean it is an illusion in our usual sense of understanding that term, but an imaged projection. It is clear that in his construction of this Embassy as a Tree House, Moriyama also gave great thought to “dwelling” and to illusory objectification (whether or not he was thinking of it in those terms). This Canadian Embassy in Tokyo, as a/the Tree House projects the corresponding idioms of person, society, identity and citizenship it embraces. Moriyama has defined this building both as a Tree House, and as a “dwelling”. Here he contemplates not just the dwelling of the human body but also of the human soul and spirit (which I believe is also suggested by Heidegger’s assertion that mortals “must ever learn to dwell”). Moriyama states his purpose in designing this Embassy as a Tree House was prompted in part because a tree house is a magical place—and building such a magical place was part of his attempts through architecture to design \textit{spaces where the human spirit could dwell and soar} (in Peter Campbell, Director, \textit{The Art of Compassion}, 1995).

\textbf{5. Conclusions}

As a building, this Canadian Embassy in Tokyo, Japan, \textit{iterates and reiterates} a collective past, including a history of “wrongs” such as the Japanese Canadian internment. It projects a dwelling and a soaring of the human spirit and its ability to \textit{choose} and to aim at something other than set templates operative in the past, showing that it is not the case they are a given that cannot be gone beyond, but that patterns can be identified and broken, and new versions of society made possible; it projects a dwelling and soaring of the human spirit that can go beyond the past (neither deny it nor forget it, but go beyond it) to create or build new patterns of human behavior and interaction and new conceptions or pathways of identity and citizenship, aiming at inclusiveness in Canada’s now asserted multi-culturalism, and a greater sense of a just equality and citizenship or membership for all in a diverse society that acknowledges and remembers yet attempts to overcome past negative historical incidents.
References


10. On Collaborative Ainu Research Initiatives: Needs and Challenges

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Abstract

This article, which focuses on the situation of the Ainu Indigenous people, delineates the need for, and dilemmas of, a community-participatory research project centered on barriers to and catalysts toward Indigenous people accessing their own Indigenous knowledge. In other words, despite the seemingly promising development in 2008 of recognition by the Japanese Parliament of the Ainu people as an Indigenous people of Japan, the past seven years have seen extremely few concrete developments in actual Ainu policy. In the meantime, policy deliberations have remained vague and kept behind closed doors. Consequently, frustration amongst peripheral Ainu activist organizations has been snowballing. On the other hand, creation of solidarity necessary amongst the Ainu people to lobby for actualization of their Indigenous rights, including those revolving around Indigenous knowledge, has been hampered by the lack of financial and infrastructural support for gatherings which have as their objective anything other than cultural ends, creating a Catch-22 with regard to the advancement of said movement. Mainstream Japanese society stands to gain from a systematic and critical examination of the issues and solutions faced by the Ainu vis-à-vis progress in regards to the rights recovery movement. Such an investigation, however, had not yet taken place. Herein I describe a collaborative project on articulations of “Indigenous knowledge” in Hokkaido between Ainu cultural activists, foreign Indigenous scholars, and foreign and domestic (Japanese) academic researchers involved in research on Indigenous peoples, designed to identify the factors leading to the perceived “impasse” in Ainu policy implementation, particularly as it relates to Indigenous knowledge.

Keywords: Ainu people, Indigenous rights, Policy ambiguity, Collaborative research, Dilemmas faced by Indigenous minorities
1. Introduction

What are the needs and issues of an Indigenous people who have only been recently-recognized as such, and at that in a mediocre manner, living in one of the most multiculturally conservative industrial countries of the world? This is a question upon which this paper sheds light as it deals with the topic of needs for and challenges to collaborative university-community Ainu research initiatives in Hokkaido, Japan.

Starting eight years ago in 2007, the Japanese government in rapid succession voted for the approval of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP, 2007), passed an official parliamentary resolution calling for the acknowledgement of the Indigeneity of its Ainu people (2008), and, in the same year, established and implemented an Advisory Council on Future Ainu Policy (Hereafter, “Advisory Council”) to deliberate the applicability of the UNDRIP to Japan, the final report of which was produced in 2009. Despite these developments, nonetheless, recently inordinate amounts of time are still being spent by Ainu activists running around in circles waiting for pro-Ainu governmental policy to solidify, fighting battles against conservative and vindictive elected officials who would seek to have Ainu funding cut, and jostling against other Ainu individuals and communities for funding and other support available under the current Ainu policy system. Amidst such a stagnant situation, one question which should be at the front of the minds of academics involved in Ainu research is, what role can researchers play in contributing to improvement of conditions?

In this paper I take the stance that policy ambivalence is both a consequence of, and a contributing factor to, unclear research ethics and goals maintained on the part of Ainu researchers. Just as with First Nations peoples in Canada, ethical research principles dictate an Indigenously-centered collaborative research approach to issues affecting Indigenous stakeholders. Unlike many aboriginal groups in Canada, however, relations between the Ainu Indigenous people and the national government of Japan, including funding agencies responsible for providing funding for Ainu-related research, remain vague and uncodified. In order to begin to rectify such a situation, I submit that joint collaborative research by outsider researchers and the involved Indigenous communities needs to be conducted in order to clarify ambiguous factors associated with the perceived policy inertia.

Categorizing policy facets into political, socioeconomic, legal and cultural aspects, I point out that strengthening the former three amidst the current Ainu policy environment, which is geared only toward advancement of the latter, is problematic. I suggest joint collaborator research involving foreign Indigenous activist/scholars as a means of identifying differences between these categories and thus beginning to distinguish effective ways for promoting each.

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1 Following upon the example of the authors of Beyond Ainu Studies and the Oxford Guide to Canadian English Usage, I choose to capitalize the word Indigenous, as one would First Nations, Aboriginal, Native Americans, and so on.
The descriptive process necessary to explain these matters will involve first, an explanation of the current “Japan-specific” Indigenous policies, second, a general portrayal of the uneasiness being expressed by Ainu activists under such configurations, and third, descriptions of international Indigenous research standards as well as criticisms by academics espousing them in regard to Japan. Fourthly, I turn to a description of a collaborative research project proposed by the author, which attempts to deal with the quandaries presented above by being open to both the current policy envisioned by the Advisory Council as well as to priorities being espoused within the international Indigenous movement. Finally, I outline the research challenges that I foresee to be involved in beginning to implement such a research project amidst currently perceived restrictive conditions.

A full examination of the situation of the Indigenous Ainu people in terms of analysis of current policy’s degree of fulfillment of activists’ demands is beyond the scope of this paper. I present here only a cursory outline sufficient to argue the points presented herein. It is hoped that subsequently, the research project described below will serve to more systematically elucidate current problems and prospects.

All explanations in this paper are firmly grounded, as I expand upon below, in reflections from first-hand experience in fieldwork in Hokkaido, as well as in collaborative projects with Ainu educators and activists here spanning a period over the past 12 years. In this sense this essay comprises both position paper and research account.

Under current configurations in Hokkaido in which researchers are playing a central role in influencing how Ainu traditional knowledge subsequently may come to be accessed, collaborative projects between researchers and local Ainu communities may importantly serve the function of empowering the Ainu to become aware of how their own Indigenous knowledge is being used to empower or disempower them vis-a-vis inter-ethnic relations between themselves and the mainstream Japanese population. It is thus my hope that collaborative research approaches such as the one proposed by the author may begin to start to unravel the darkness surrounding current dissatisfaction of the Ainu activists.

2. Research Stance

The author is a scholar employed at the Hokkaido University Research Faculty of Media and Communication, with a teaching affiliation in the Hokkaido University Graduate School

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of Education. My main area of research is education for and regarding Japan's Indigenous people the Ainu, and I have been conducting ethnographic fieldwork on Ainu education, cultural transmission and the Ainu rights recovery movement, including participation in the Steering Committee of the 2008 Indigenous Peoples’ Summit in Ainu Mosir (2008, IPS) in Hokkaido, for approximately 12 years.

The perspective being put forth here is one of Indigenous Studies informed by the stance of an educational anthropologist. The main argument of Indigenous Studies is that Indigenous peoples should have the right, as enshrined in 2007 The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), to self-determination in all areas of their individual and collective lives, a perspective I feel ethically inclined to adopt as a graduate of the University of Alaska’s Masters Program in Cross-Cultural Studies, and as a member of the American Anthropological Association, an association of scholars many of whom whose mandate is to overturn the historical legacy of anthropology as a perpetrator within the global phenomena of colonialism. I should like to point out that while I receive the support and encouragement of other Ainu scholars at Hokkaido University, the views espoused here are completely my own and have not been endorsed by the University.

3. A Japan-Specific Indigenous Policy: The Political and Legal Situation of the Ainu in Japan

As noted above, the national government of Japan cast its vote in support of the UNDRIP in September, 2007, passed a Resolution to Recognize the Ainu people as an Indigenous people of Japan in June 2008, and formed the Expert’s Committee under the Cabinet Secretary to deliberate implementation of Indigenous Ainu policy in light of the UNDRIP in 2008. In this way, as the first significant advancement vis-a-vis Indigenous rights subsequent to the September, 2007 passing of the UNDRIP, great expectations rose amongst Ainu activists and the international Indigenous community regarding the publication of the report of the Advisory Council on future Ainu policy. However, these hopes were soon to be dashed when the proposed policy was unequivocally delimited to be “Japan-specific”, and its contents limited to the right of the Ainu to practice their “culture”.

More specifically, one of the members of the Advisory Council, Professor Teruki Tsunemoto of Hokkaido University (Tsunemoto, 2012) explains this reasoning by emphasizing the distinction that unlike countries in North America and Oceania, in Japan there exist no treaties nor clauses in the Constitution of Japan which would grant the Ainu collective “substantive rights”, as called for by the UNDRIP (Ibid., 43). As a “Japan-specific”

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3 The content of “culture” have been explicated as follows: “Culture intrinsically has a broad significance that embraces all aspects of people’s lives and lifestyles, such as technology, study, arts and morals in addition to food, clothing, and shelter” (Tsunemoto, 2012, 46).
approach, Tsunemoto calls instead for what the Advisory Council explains as a policy based on a “procedural concept of indigenous rights,” which acknowledges the Japanese government’s “grave responsibility to provide reparations” (Ibid., 46) for damage related to historical policies, but does so in a non-confrontational way by emphasizing that the government provide recompense by “making provisions” for the creation of environments “that enable the Ainu people to keep their ethnic identity” (Ibid., 47).

Herein, the key points are, firstly, that rather than the Ainu people themselves being responsible for taking the initiative in implementing measures relating to themselves or their own well-being, the measures are being advanced by Japanese bureaucrats (Uemura, 2012), and secondly, that the conceptions of policy are formulated in a manner which disregards political rights, largely bypasses legal rights, and for the most part disconnects socioeconomic improvement initiatives from the main pillar of policy support, that of revitalization of Ainu culture.

In moving forward toward policy implementation, emphasis during the six years since publication of the Advisory Council report has consistently been made on the establishment of a “hard” infrastructure, before beginning to deal with the “soft” aspects of Ainu involvement. In regard to political rights, the Advisory Council Final Report bypasses the issue, pointing out the unconstitutionality of such, and remarking that consideration of foreign cases “should be regarded as a middle- to long-term issue” (Advisory Council, 2009). Legal rights to enjoy benefits as an Ainu, in turn, are something which applies to Ainu individuals for social welfare purposes, but which do not maintain in the case of Ainu organizations nor communities, nor which apply to collective educational rights within the public education system. Ainu socioeconomic measures continue to be administered by a separate government section from those related to the revitalization of culture.

Presumably, one major factor for concern which would inevitably occur should substantive rights be suddenly and immediately granted in a Japan in which no such rights had existed prior to recognition of the Ainu as being Indigenous, is the phenomenon of backlash. A second is the lack of extant Ainu implementing bodies; Tsunemoto (2012, 46) specifically emphasizes that the Ainu have no “tribes or other autonomous bodies to possess or collectively exercise” the “right to political self-determination.”

As stands to reason, this approach firstly makes for ill bed-fellows with demands for sovereignty being put forth by Ainu activists, a point strongly argued by academic advocates of Indigenous rights, as noted in the next section. It secondly relies heavily upon extant Japanese bureaucratic structures for the implementation of public policy (Uemura, 2012), a tendency which, in addition to flying in the face of notions of self-determination as enshrined in the UNDRIP, seems to leave no room for consideration of already existing

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4 Tsunemoto (2012,43) explains that, “in Japan, where public understanding of the Ainu is still very limited, decisions based on self-recognition [of the right to enjoy special Indigenous rights] are hardly acceptable.”
Ainu efforts toward taking the initiative in matters related to their own issues. This is a point which is creating considerable frustration amongst some factions of the Ainu community\textsuperscript{5} who see no progress, nor mention of, considerations being made toward their unique Ainu aspirations, as I delineate in section 4.

Indeed, Ainu activists are decrying\textsuperscript{6} an apparent lack of efforts being made toward articulation, on the one hand, firstly, between Council proposals, representing a benign and comprehensive “Japan-specific” approach, and, on the other, toward actual community Ainu aspirations, as rooted in Ainu sentiment and the ideals of the international Indigenous movement. Secondly, they vocalize their doubts about the gap between concrete “central” government initiatives being advanced at the future site of the Symbolic Space for Ethnic Harmony in the town of Shiraoi, Hokkaido with the cultural praxis occurring in provincial Ainu communities\textsuperscript{7}.

Here, it was a desire to make a response to activists’ claims by shedding light on perceived discrepancies that inspired the author to instigate the ARAIKH Project, the conceptual details of which I explain in section 5. In short, the author’s concern is that the ambiguity arising from a lack of discussion regarding the adjustments necessary to articulate policy with reality, is serving no constructive function, and that it is the role of responsible researchers to disperse such ambiguity at the earliest possible juncture. However, this process, as I delineate in the last section of this paper, involves structural dynamics within Ainu society which are irrevocably interconnected to current policy issues, and any research project, which would seek to alleviate them, runs the risk of being associated with the causes of suffering rather than their solution.

4. Criticisms of a Culturally-Weighted Policy and the Argument for the Central Role of Indigenous People in Indigenous Research

As outlined above, Japan has qualified its Ainu policy as being Japan-specific, and limited the proposed direction of future Ainu policy to the right to praxis of culture “in the broad sense.” As a means of effecting such a policy, the Committee Members of the Advisory Council have called for a “procedural conception” of Indigenous rights.

Ultimately, it should be noted that the Advisory Council conceptualization leaves room open for a transformation of policy to one more substantively based, based upon the

\textsuperscript{5} Observations based upon ethnographic fieldwork by the author.

\textsuperscript{6} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{7} Explanation given by Curator Yahata Tomoe of the Ainu Museum at Shiraoi, lecture on “Reflections on the ‘Symbolic Space for Ethnic Harmony’” at Sapporo Freedom School, 24 July 2015.
premises of future public understanding of the Ainu, and the growth of Ainu capacity to handle their own fate, as evidenced by the following quote:

If Japan's first set of indigenous policies based on the procedural concept of indigenous people results in an increase in the number of Ainu who embrace their ethnic identity and the promotion of public understanding of the Ainu, the future generation of the Ainu and the majority of Japanese society will have the choice of choosing the next step of Ainu policy, which may include the substantive concept of indigenous peoples (Tsunemoto, 2012, 48, emphasis in original).

Yet despite such a caveat, or on the contrary exactly because of it, the fact that the proposed policy direction contains grave inconsistencies has been pointed out by many, scholar and non-scholar, Ainu and non-Ainu alike.

For example, the reason posited for current non-implementation of a substantive rights policy, that Ainu have no autonomous and representative tribe to judge identity directly contradicts the Expert Council’s conclusion that the Japanese government, “has a grave responsibility to provide reparations for related damage” (Tsunemoto, 2012, 46) when no reference is provided as to whom the reparations might be made. Granted, the issue of deciding who qualifies to be Ainu may be the greatest bottleneck preventing the smooth implementation of Ainu policy. Yet the UNDRIP calls for the self-determination of Indigenous peoples in all matters affecting the content and quality of their lives, cultures and societies. Academic critics (Uemura, 2012; Morris-Suzuki, 2014) have stridently maintained that Japan should more closely follow the standards of the international Indigenous rights movement by allowing the Ainu more rights on legal and political fronts, and more say in land and resource rights use. They point out that “culture” and “activism” cannot be so easily distinguished from one another (Morris-Suzuki, 2014), and question the legitimacy of an “Indigenous” policy directed toward promotion of public understanding.

Ainu activists, on the other hand, have also continued to question the legitimacy of a policy centered only on “culture”, discussing Ainu land rights in public forums8, criticizing “Japan-specific” conceptualizations based on a notion of the Ainu as not desiring more substantive rights9, demanding fuller systems of support for the Ainu language, and even calling for “Ainu sovereignty”10.

8 Inkarushipe Forum.
Meanwhile, Nomoto Masahiro, the current director of the Ainu Museum at Shiraoi, points out that the Ainu have created a network of cultural links, and states that the national and regional governments and the Ainu Association of Hokkaido (hereafter, AAH) “have a duty to help Ainu people become actively involved in policy development and be given the initiative in related endeavors.” (Nomoto, 2012, 63). Another crucially important element of Indigenous well-being hinted at by such statements is that of Indigenous involvement in research and education related to Indigenous matters. Forward-looking Indigenous scholars in the CANZAS countries and elsewhere have written entire books (for example, Smith, 1996) delineating the reasoning why Indigenous peoples should be in charge of their own research (Because Indigenous peoples know their own issues better than anyone else!), as well as creating guidelines for ethically-responsible research relating to Indigenous peoples (AFN 1993). Yet forums and debates regarding Ainu involvement in research are something of which we have yet to hear in Hokkaido.

Indeed, the Advisory Council’s seeming neglect of current Ainu activist organizations may be its largest shortcoming. As Tessa-Morris Suzuki (2014) and others have pointed out, activism is also a part of culture, and as the quote by Nomoto indicates, various cultural networks of Ainu exist, many members of whom have extremely strong opinions regarding the implementation of Ainu policy, which do not necessarily align with the policy proposals put forth by the Ainu Association of Hokkaido, yet which deserve to be heard, for many reasons. It was in response to these needs that the author conceived the ARAIKH Project.

5. The Need for Clarification of the Issues and Conception of the Research Project

5.1. The need for clarification of the issues

Presumably Ainu culture is something that is maintained by those who have experienced, and fought for, the maintenance or growth of Ainu society. Yet Advisory Council deliberations regarding Ainu policy originally included one Ainu member out of eight, Kato Tadashi, the Chairperson of the Ainu Association of Hokkaido. What’s more, deliberations of the Advisory Council, as well as its successor the Ainu Policy Promotion Council, have occurred behind closed doors, with no explanations being offered for the silencing of demands being submitted by alternative voices.

Amidst such a situation, the author has been in close communication with the majority of Ainu activists active outside of the AAH since the 2008 IPS, and has been able to witness their frustration and wavering motivation as possibilities for a substantive rights policy became replaced by a discourse of “procedural rights.” Yet these activists’ demands have not changed a bit, and in fact in some cases have become even more cogent in recent years. In fact, these activists have been the ones at the center of Ainu struggles in the face of apparent apathy by the Japanese and Hokkaido governments in terms of actions for the repatriation of Ainu burial remains housed at Japanese universities (litigation against Hokkaido University), efforts by Hokkaido politicians to rescind educational materials related to the Ainu (Citizens Group Against Recall of the Ainu Side Reader), and to disprove...
the existence of the Ainu people as a distinct ethnic group (individual efforts via the Internet against the Councilman Kaneko Yasuyuki). They have also sought to deliver the Ainu voice to the Japanese Diet via the formation of the Ainu Party.

That current Ainu policy makes no consideration of Ainu legal, social or political rights is something which has been pointed out by a number of scholars. That the hate speeches of vindictive politicians runs counter to the ideals espoused even in a policy limited only to the praxis of culture, seems self-evident. That these developments are creating tensions within the Ainu psyche, which have no way of being cognized nor healthily released, has been pointed out by no one. Is the silencing of diverse Ainu voices a healthy maneuver, and shouldn’t a counter-effort to listen to them as well as reflect upon their significance, be put into effect?

In regard to potential limitations of the current policy direction, one significant matter symbolically not being considered is the possibility that many of these very vocal Ainu stand to extend greater influence over Ainu society may have been nipped in the bud with the current financial insolvency of the Ainu Party. That such a possibility has not been seriously considered by policy experts seems to be a case in point of the potential demerits of current policy ambiguity. The prospect that the very Ainu culture which legislation is being designed to maintain may become very one-dimensional once these activist-culture-bearers have passed away may be a very real possibility. When we consider the fact that out of eight Party Officers of the Ainu Party, three are over 75 years old, it stands to reason in the light of promotion of Ainu activist culture, that we should not be waiting for their demise, but instead rather giving sincere consideration to these Ainu leaders’ voices.

One issue of a policy of waiting for Ainu capacity to reach maturity is that these Ainu, who already embrace their ethnic identity, are steadily losing their motivation to continue their struggle for Ainu rights as time passes and they are forced to wait for even the procedural concept to kick into effect. For example, already seven years have passed since the Resolution Seeking to Recognize the Ainu People as an Indigenous People, yet no concrete policy developments have since appeared. On the contrary, one result of the “procedural” development existing, that of plans for the creation of the Symbolic Space for Ethnic Harmony in Shiraoi, has apparently absorbed so much attention from policy makers that it leaves no room for the consideration of substantive rights, at least not until completion of the facility in 2020. For many Ainu activists, the loss of the dream of the substantive concept of Indigenous rights in such a manner is such an irony to bear that they can hardly maintain their motivation. Yet, with current developments for construction of a single symbolic cultural facility in Shiraoi heading in the direction of a “unidimensional Ainu policy”\textsuperscript{11}, how can the “motivation” which is the intrinsic impetus for the growth of culture, be maintained?

\textsuperscript{11} Phrase used by Ainu activist informant, age 48.
A second point is that many of the issues that these activists face in their activism are a condensed version of the stresses involved in education of the Japanese populace for an understanding of Indigenous rights. If their struggles are not recognized as such now and analyzed according to that premise, a proper conception of the issues involved in creating mainstream public understanding may never materialize. It is to these issues that the author has proposed a collaborative ARAIKH Ainu research project.

5.2. Conception of the research project

As a scholar, I am now involved in a three-year research initiative designed as a pilot project to develop a methodology whereby Ainu and non-Ainu, scholars and non-scholars can work in tandem in an action-research mode to analyze the articulations of Indigenous Ainu knowledge in Hokkaido and elsewhere. As the research project name, “Action-Research on articulations of Indigenous Knowledge in Hokkaido,” indicates, the keyword of the project is Indigenous knowledge, and my particular hope is that the outcomes might be used for the sake of developing a platform from which Indigenous education and research guidelines and best-praxis models might be created. In this sense, one potential outcome, that of self-determination in “education”, is one that I feel meshes well with the mandate of developing a policy supportive of Ainu praxis of “culture in the broad sense.”

I feel that this project is one which is open to re-exploration of the conditions for fulfillment of ethical guidelines for “outsider” (i.e. non-Indigenous) researcher in the support of Indigenous peoples in the countries in which they live and work, and at the same time could lead to commentary on and/or proposals regarding the direction in which Ainu policy is currently heading, thus potentially fulfilling one ethical role of the outsider researcher mandated by the standards of Indigenous Studies.

The project's purpose is as follows: For educators and researchers of Ainu, Wajin12 and foreign ethnicity involved in Ainu tertiary education to collaborate with Indigenous researchers of Indigenous descent to host action research workshop retreats in Ainu communities in which Indigenous scholars familiar with the successful processes of Indigenous revitalization serve as facilitators, and thereby, while learning discourses on and practices centered around Indigenous knowledge, to methodically and scholastically examine the means for overcoming impasses in Ainu knowledge construction, and to record and analyze these processes.

Here, Indigenous knowledge is conceived of as the sum of the embodied practical knowledge, skills and attitudes which characterizes and defines an Indigenous people’s social and physical relationship to one another, and to the natural environment which surrounds them. It includes moral and spiritual values, beliefs, and aspirations, and is consolidated in and most potently expressed in the Indigenous language. Action research

12 Ethnic Japanese.
refers to a method of research founded in the participant’s everyday praxis of their own knowledge and culture, in which analysis of the retreat session discussions is constantly refined and broadcast out to the Ainu community for feedback and further refinement.

Secondly, project implementation consists of four main pillars: 1) Participation in the World Indigenous People’s Conference on Education (“WIPC:E”, May, 2014, Honolulu, Hawai’i), 2) Implementation of an action research methodology on articulations of Indigenous knowledge centering around collective seminar retreats, attended by local Ainu, and facilitated by foreign Indigenous scholars, 3) Analysis and broadcast of the outcomes of the retreats, and 4) Feedback of the results into university education, especially in Sapporo.

The main concept of the project is to work toward a sociological explanation, centering around the voices of the Indigenous participants, regarding the status quo of their collective Indigenous knowledge, the barriers restricting access to such, and vice-versa, catalysts propelling growth toward such. The ultimate goals of the project are a holistic and cross-sectional analysis of the contemporary state of Indigenous knowledge, creation of a local platform and forum for discussing such, as well as development of a model for the processes’ application to higher education and Indigenous research. Through inclusion of the “alternative voices” of Ainu activists, the project seeks to fill the lacuna created by current policy implementation schemes.

6. Foreseen Challenges

6.1. Theoretical need for collaborative community-participatory Indigenous research in Japan

First, in order to contextualize the framework in which collaborative research projects involving Indigenous peoples might be advanced by indicating one gold standard benchmark for research projects involving Indigenous peoples, I would like to introduce the Alaska Federation of Natives (AFN) Guidelines for Ethical Research:

AFN conveys to all scientists and researchers who plan to conduct studies among Alaska Natives that they must comply with the following research principles:

- Advise Native people who are to be affected by the study of the purpose, goals and timeframe of the research, the data gathering techniques, the positive and negative implications and impacts of the research.

- Obtain informed consent of the appropriate governing body.

- Fund the support of a Native Research Committee appointed by the local community to assess and monitor the research project and ensure compliance with the expressed wishes of Native people.
- Protect the sacred knowledge and cultural/intellectual property of Native people.
- Hire and train Native people to assist in the study.
- Use Native languages whenever English is the second language.
- Guarantee confidentiality of surveys and sensitive material.
- Include Native viewpoints in the final study.
- Acknowledge the contributions of Native resource people.
- Inform the Native Research Committee in a summary and in nontechnical language of the major findings of the study.
- Provide copies of the study to the local people. (AFN, 1993)

As can be seen, the guidelines provide a framework for research which is based in the needs, aspirations and values of the concerned Indigenous community, and which contributes to community development.

6.2. Structural challenges to community-participatory Indigenous research in Ainu society

However, in the Ainu case in many senses it would seem that the successful implementation of such research is doomed before it even starts, due to the contemporary configurations of Ainu society in which, for all practical purposes, there exists no authoritative governing body to grant research permission, nor local community to serve as the agent of development.

Readers familiar with the history and current situation of the Ainu people will probably be familiar with the fact that assimilation into society was promoted via assimilatory education, forced agrarianism, and prohibition of Ainu traditional customs, and that currently Ainu suffer from lower educational attainment and higher rates of dependency upon welfare than Hokkaido residents in the same towns. They may not be familiar with the fact that the Ainu Association of Hokkaido, the largest representative body of the Ainu people, is a semi-organ of the Japanese government, that membership in the Association is not automatic and remains low, or that no representative Research Ethics Committee that could regulate the activities of outsider researchers has been established therein.

Readers familiar with Ainu policy developments will probably be familiar with the passage in 1997 of what is known as the “Ainu Cultural Promotion Act”, as well as the efforts of Ainu activists in getting this legislation passed. They may also be familiar with the passage of the 2008 Resolution Seeking to Recognize the Ainu People as an Indigenous People. They may not be familiar with the fact that remaining poverty, discrimination and
other factors cause many Ainu to be hesitant to come out as such and live as Ainu in all situations of everyday life, that funding for “cultural” activity has led to accusations of involvement in cultural praxis for financial gain and the internal criticism of “soulless” praxis, or that even amongst activists factionalism exists between hard-core activists and culturalists, with culturalists reluctant to voice criticism for fear of bashing or association with radical left-wing supporters, and hard-core activists expressing frustration toward culturalists for their lack of commitment to the issues. Nor may they be familiar with the difficulties in fostering autonomy, which would seem to be a prerequisite for participation in the praxis of an Indigenous-centered research; the lack of a self-regulating body (自治体) amongst Ainu society, or the difficulties of achieving pan-Ainu consensus when funding setups set municipalities with large Ainu population at odds with one another in competition against other towns and municipalities seeking to gain Hokkaido Prefectural or national funding.

In terms of governance, readers may be familiar with the Ainu Association of Hokkaido, but they may not be familiar with the distrust mentioned above in regard to the AAH’s participation in the Ainu Policy Promotion Council deliberations, when there has been no transparency regarding Policy Council statements (Uemura, 2012). These matters of distrust are compounded by issues of faith in Ainu leadership at upper government levels by Ainu outside of the AHH (Ibid.), as well as issues of faith in leadership at lower levels, in which in the past a mood of repressive censorship has tended to extend down even to informal organizations, with issues of ageism and sexism being claimed (Gayman, 2012; lewallen 2006).

On the other hand, on the research front, readers may be familiar with the existence of the Hokkaido University Center for Ainu and Indigenous Studies, but they may not be familiar with the praxis by scholars at Hokkaido University in the past of physical anthropology (Ueki, 2008), in which human Ainu remains acquired by dubious means were used as scientific specimens, nor the fact that the university was the site of a sit-in against discriminatory remarks by one of its professors, nor the fact that the university is currently being litigated against for repatriation of these remains. They may not be familiar with lingering distrust against Hokkaido University researchers13, or for that matter, researchers in general, nor the frustration of some Ainu activists regarding the role of HUCAIS, in which most, if not all, Japanese Ainu researchers refer to their research as research on Ainu “culture,” rather than on Ainu Indigenous rights. Nor may they be familiar with the fact that there have been only three Ainu graduate student enrollees in Hokkaido University in recent years who frequently have only furtively identified themselves as Ainu, nor that there are virtually no courses for undergraduate students to learn about the Ainu people or the Ainu people’s current rights situation.

13 As experienced by the author in his interactions with the Ainu since becoming employed at Hokkaido University.
6.3. Practical challenges for collaborative community-participatory Indigenous research in Japan

In this way, there are innumerable challenges lying in store for a collaborative university-community research project. Although the history of Indigenous research at such Hokkaido education and learning institutes such as Hokkaido University, where I am currently employed, begs for a more contributory form of research engagement, as outlined above, uncritical analyses of Ainu identity in university research remain conspicuous, and numerous issues revolving around the matter of self-determination in regard to even such innocuous issues as cultural transmission are being bypassed in research. Training of young Ainu scholars is desperately needed, and an accurate and comprehensive grasp of the diversity inherent in contemporary Ainu society is needed amongst non-Ainu students in order to promote understanding that might lead to advocacy for policy changes. And yet tensions and apprehensions against university researchers, including the author, still exist.

Within the Ainu community, re-evaluation of authority structures within Ainu society which are hindering furtherance of access to Ainu knowledge and motivation to engage in cultural transmission are critically necessary in order to ensure the cooperation of multiple generations in collaborative research, but these very structures themselves are complicating the formation of such groups. Meanwhile, at a time when pan-Ainu solidarity is necessary, community loyalties and inter-community feuds are similarly hindering collaborative research group formation.

On a logistical level, the absence of financial, administrative and moral support structures may be a major hindrance to systematic collaborative research efforts. Amidst a chronic low-income situation wherein many Ainu cultural practitioners are habitually overextended by the demands of their employment, heavy workloads and sheer geographical distances place insurmountable burdens on time and energy resources. In terms of group solidarity purposes, an absence of recognition of group rights results in a lack of infrastructure enabling processes of group decision; travel funds are not provided by Ainu funding agencies for “political” or “academic” events. As a result, amidst an absence of extant networks which might be capitalized on for collaborative group research purposes, the entire responsibility for and all energy required for selecting members of the research “group” may fall upon outsider researchers. Once collaborative group research has commenced, motivation of group members amidst the above-mentioned already trying life circumstances, can tend to become a full time job. In this way, unless support structures are drastically restructured, the logistical and motivational burden may prove too heavy, and the goal of “group” representation unachievable, for the average researcher.

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14 Uemura (2012) has referred to this as a zaisei (financing) problem.
15 One Ainu activist leader acquaintance has limited his “training” efforts to only two individuals.
Other conceptual and ethical dilemmas of Ainu Indigenous-based education/research which could surface might involve the articulation of concepts such as “collective”, or the extent in collaborative action research to which Ainu agency should be allowed at the expense of cohesiveness of the project at an academic level. For instance, must the agent be a group in order for “representation” to be claimable? Alternatively, culturally appropriate research demands respect for local values and communication styles, but to what extent to allow frivolity at the expense of scholastic excellence? Or to exercise leadership if team members don’t demonstrate initiative? In such cases if communication styles result in unnecessary expenses to the research project objective, should there be any limits to inter-cultural largesse? These and other lingering questions press large upon the project of Ainu collaborative research.

6.4. Possible ways forward

Amidst such challenges as the many listed above, experimentation with the following interpersonal measures that do not require any financial overhead may prove to be an effective way forward. Firstly, increased dialog between researchers and locals aimed at actualization of community-participatory research and the ideal of empowerment and increase in wellbeing will be indispensable, as the current policy-research nexus teaches us in the inverse. However, amidst such efforts, given traditional Ainu community factionalism, set-ups wherein the project leader working as the coordinator of small, loosely assembled units not necessarily in dialog with one another will probably prove necessary. Similarly, given the variety of Ainu communities existing, reconceptualization of categories and goals of collaborative research to include recognition of intra-Ainu diversity will be indispensable. In such a scenario, dialog might only presented as one ideal “option”, but not a mandatory goal.

On another front, in terms of the content of currently successful research projects, future tie-up of the ARAIKH Project with Ainu language revitalization work would have a good “image”, but possible demerits of narrowness of focus when language is only one aspect of Ainu Indigenous knowledge with which this research project purports to deal. In terms of ethical guidelines, one way to overcome the current absence of a pan-Ainu ethical governing board might be efforts toward the compilation of such at a local level amongst conservation societies, language classrooms and local Ainu Association branches. For the terms of the ARAIKH project of engaging foreign Indigenous expertise, a compact schedule in which foreign Indigenous researchers visit only during Japanese university vacations and tour several communities for dialog in one intensive trip, might be the most efficient way of scheduling time. In any event, evaluation of the needs amongst Ainu society should be undertaken in conjunction with a serious re-evaluation of the efficacy of the current Ainu policy deliberatory process and Ainu involvement therein (Uemura, 2012).

7. Conclusion

If the Japanese government is to uphold the commitment engendered by its recent official recognition of the Ainu as an Indigenous people, an undelayed clarification of the factors contributing to Ainu disempowerment is in order, and a systematic and clearly-
A clearly defined collaborative research initiative with the Ainu and other Indigenous peoples should go a long way toward such ends. The author commenced just such a collaborative research project with the Ainu people envisioned to provide such clarification in 2012; the purpose of this paper has been to elucidate, in light of the above situation, the background needs for such a research project, as well as the challenges posed at the juncture of commencement of such.

My objective has not been to unilaterally denounce the good progress that is currently being made, but rather to point out remaining inconsistencies which are being identified by Ainu and non-Ainu, scholars and non-scholars alike. I foresee continued negotiation between the national and prefectural governments and the Ainu people on issues of access to Ainu knowledge, and a clarification of the structural barriers limiting such is foreseen as a major catalyst to such mediation. On both a practical and theoretical level, much work remains to be done, and a great need for it exists. Hopefully, this essay has shed light on some factors which are jointly shared by First Nations communities and their academic supporters in Canada as well, and beyond that, within the globe at large.
References


11. Persistence of Traditional Subsistence Ideology in Nunavut Inuit Society: A Comparison of Modern Economic Activities Between Nunavut and Greenland

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Abstract

Subsistence patterns vary among the many regional Inuit groups of North America. Regional variations since colonization of the Arctic have been strongly influenced by the style of colonial rule, as well as geographic, economic, social and environmental configurations. Here I shall compare the situation of the Inuit of eastern Canadian Arctic—Nunavut, not including Nunavik (Quebec) and Nunatsiavut (Labrador)—with the Inuit (Kalaallit) of south Greenland. This choice of regions is based upon the contention that both experienced direct, concerted colonial subjugation in the late 18th century, later than other Arctic regions. However, notwithstanding this commonality, a significant difference may be noted between adaptations in subsistence activities. The Inuit (Kalaallit) of south Greenland have to a greater extent embraced sheep and vegetable farming, whereas the Inuit of Nunavut have shown no interest in livestock farming and continue to pursue more “traditional” subsistence activities. Through an examination of variation in elements of geography—contiguity to or distance from the national majority, economy (opportunity for modern economic development), society (a presence/absence of other ethnic groups), and environment (effects of climate change) of these two regions, I shall inquire into the historical and contemporary factors that have worked to manifest a striking difference in social and economic milieu of these two societies today.

Keywords: Nunavut, Kalaallit, colonial experience, subsistence, climate change

1. Introduction

In this essay, I briefly explore the historical, social and economic milieu behind the importance of subsistence ideology in the contemporary economic and political arena of Nunavut Territory, Canada. To illustrate this phenomenon, I make a comparison with the ideological role of subsistence activities of the south Greenland Inuit (Kalaallit).

Subsistence activities of the Nunavut Inuit have taken on a meaning beyond mere physical survival. I have noted in my research at Kugaaruk (Nunavut Territory) since 1975, that subsistence activities, particularly seal hunting on the sea ice, are also a potent symbol...
of ethnic identity (Stewart 1995). Hunting and other subsistence activities serve as an expression of self-representation of the Inuit as a distinctive culture and society, emphasizing the uniqueness of the Inuit as contrasted to contiguous indigenous groups and the Canadian majority society.

In this respect, subsistence activities in Nunavut Inuit society are not only a means of livelihood, but also take on importance as an ethnic marker in political negotiations with government agencies and contiguous indigenous groups.

In Greenland Inuit society, subsistence activities play a role in livelihood, but are seldom, if ever, employed as a political tool (Hayashi 2014), except in the case of international debate of climate change.

In spite of the fact that both groups derive from a common cultural and genetic background, the remarkable disparity in cognizance of indigeneity and ethnicity, and the divergent paths of economic development cannot be explained by environmental conditions alone.

I discuss the historical, social, political and economic factors that have contributed to a contrast between Nunavut and Greenland Inuit society concerning the importance attached to subsistence activities, with particular emphasis on developments since the 1950s.

2. The Problem

Inter-regional comparisons of Inuit (Eskimo) societies are few. Hughes (1965) presented a pan-Arctic review of cultural change in the mid-20th century. A comparison of Nunavut – Greenland by Loukacheva (2007) focused upon legal and political economy, but does not include observations on economic or subsistence activities.

I have chosen six factors influencing patterns of persistence in Nunavut subsistence activities and change in the economic activities of Greenland Inuit society. They are, 1) modality of colonial rule (benignity or harshness), 2) the geographic element (contiguity to or distance from the suzerain state and national majority), 3) the economic element (opportunity for modern economic/entrepreneurial development), 4) the social element (presence/absence of other contiguous ethnic groups), 5) the environmental element (consequences of climate change), and 6) political status. With these elements in mind, I inquire into the historical and contemporary factors that have worked to manifest a striking difference in change and persistence of subsistence and economic activities between these two societies today.

Canadian Inuit societies outside of Nunavut are not included in this study.

This choice of regions is based upon the contention that both groups share a common cultural ancestor (Thule, 1000-1500 CE), and have experienced colonial subjugation from the late 18th century. However, notwithstanding this commonality, a significant difference may be noted between adaptations in subsistence activities. The Inuit (Kalaallit) of south Greenland have to a greater extent embraced modern economic activities exceeding subsistence (as defined below) such as commercial fishing, whaling and agriculture.
including sheep and vegetable farming. Hayashi (2014) argues that sheep farming introduced into 20th century Greenland has become a traditional economic pursuit.

On the other hand, the Inuit of Nunavut have not engaged in livestock farming and attach greater importance to more “traditional” subsistence activities.

I use the term “subsistence” here in an extended sense. As Freeman notes (2000, xvi) subsistence is often defined as the bare minimum of survival using only simple tools. However, as Kuokkanen also argues, contemporary indigenous economies are mixed, including commodity production, wage labour and enterprise (2011, 221), and as such are not independent of the monetary economy (2011, 233). Subsistence activities in modern Inuit societies are grounded on cash income where cash income is a prerequisite to mechanization of subsistence activities in permanent settlements (Government of Greenland, 2012, 2; Stewart, 1995). I here define subsistence as culturally significant food-production and other life supporting activities, excluding activities based primarily upon wage employment (i.e. mine or government employment). Subsistence activities may include local monetary transactions, particularly in Greenland, but are not oriented to international markets.

3. Historical Background

As a background to this presentation, I briefly outline the histories of Nunavut and Greenland, with emphasis on the 19th to 21st century colonial experience.

3.1. Nunavut

Because this organization is of Canadian specialists, I present only an abbreviated version of Nunavut history (Table 11.1). The Nunavut area was settled at least 4000 years ago by the Palaeo-Eskimo, and about 1000 years ago came the Neo-Eskimo Thule people, the genetic and cultural ancestors of the modern Inuit (Dyke et al., 2011). Although Palaeo-Eskimo sites dated to 4600 BCE are known for northern Greenland, evidence of Palaeo-Eskimo occupation in Nunavut before 4000 BCE has yet to be discovered.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4000~2500 yBP</th>
<th>Palaeo-Eskimo (Pre-Dorset and Dorset cultures)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1000~500 yBP</td>
<td>Neo-Eskimo (Thule Culture)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500 CE~present</td>
<td>Inuit society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Nunavut Territory established</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* yBP = years before present

Effective colonial rule that began in the 19th century was preceded by large scale fur trade in the 18th century (Francis and Morantz, 1983) that contributed to the incorporation of Nunavut Inuit into the global economy. Effective colonial rule of Nunavut from the late
1800’s was much harsher than that of Greenland, including forced enrolment in English
curriculum residential schools far from home (Aboriginal Healing Foundation, 2003), de
facto control by the Northwest Mounted Police (later Royal Canadian Mounted Police) and
the Hudson’s Bay Company (Damas, 2002, 80, 127; Loukacheva, 2007, 88-89). These facts,
in addition to coercive relocation to permanent settlements (Tester and Kulchyski 1994, 6-
10) symbolize the harshness of colonial rule in the Canadian Arctic as compared to
Greenland.

The Nunavut Territorial Government was established in 1999, but is more limited in
authority than Greenland Home Rule. Nunavut Inuit society is homogenous in nature, and
subsistence activities, according to the game pursued, are generally similar. The population
is 37,000, of which about 31,000 persons are of Inuit ancestry (Nunavut Bureau of
Statistics).

3.2. Greenland

Human settlement in Greenland began about 4,600 years ago (Gronnow and Jensen,
2003; Sørensen, 2012, 189), including two, possibly three genetic populations—early
Palaeo-Eskimo, late Palaeo-Eskimo and the Thule population—not including the Medieval
Norse and modern Danish (Gilbert et al., 2008; Helgason et al., 2006) (see Table 11.2).

As opposed to the generally homogenous Nunavut Inuit society, the Inuit society
of Greenland may be characterized by three geographical units, the Inuhuit of the north, the
Ammassalik / Tunumiit of the east, and the Kalaallit of the south. In this paper, the south
refers to the area extending from Nuuk to the southern tip of the island.

“Kalaallit” is the official designation of all Inuit of Greenland, but historically this this
ethnonym referred primarily to the Inuit of south Greenland (Gad, 1984, 563; Gullov, 1997,
408-409; Kleivan, 1984a, 254; Kleivan, 1984b, 620; Stewart, 2014, 4-5). I have yet to find a
legal criterion for “Kalaallit” (Greenland Inuit), but in general terms, being born in
Greenland is an administratively registered proxy for Inuit (Hamilton and Rasmussen,
2010, 45). In this paper, in order to reflect the difference in the three geographical units, I
refer to the entirety of Inuit in Greenland as Greenland Inuit, and use the term Kalaallit in
reference to the south Greenland Inuit. The distinction is for the purpose of arguments
presented in this paper, and does imply a denial of the official designation of the entire
Greenland nation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4600~3000 yBP</td>
<td>Early Palaeo-Eskimo (Saqqaq, Independence I cultures)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3000~800 yBP</td>
<td>Late Palaeo-Eskimo (Independence II or Dorset culture)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1200~4-500 yBP</td>
<td>Neo-Eskimo (Thule culture)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000~600 CE</td>
<td>Norse from Iceland bring agriculture to south Greenland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1721~1952 CE</td>
<td>Kingdom of Denmark-Norway immigrants, colonial period</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The population of Greenland is approximately 57,000, of which about 50,000 persons are of Inuit ancestry (Statistics Greenland, 2014; Central Intelligence Agency, 2015). There exists a marked difference between subsistence activities of north and east Greenland and those of south Greenland Inuit (Kalaallit), as well as an almost diametrically opposed reaction to climate change (Nuttall, 2008). Such a regional variance is not conspicuous in Canada, but the reaction to climate change by the north Greenland Inuit is similar to that of the Nunavut Inuit.

Livelihood of the south Greenland Inuit is based largely upon government (8,000 employees) and service industry employment, agriculture and tourism, including whale watching, while the Inuit of north Greenland are primarily a hunting society. The economy of the Ammassalik/Tunumiit of east Greenland is a mix of hunting, commercial fishing and tourism.

4. Concise Overview of Greenland / Nunavut Economic Activities: A Comparison

For the sake of brevity, observations here are very general, often ignoring details. Also, here “tradition” refers not to a condition frozen in time, but a time slice of ever-changing cultural and social phenomena. In this essay, “tradition” refers mainly to subsistence activities rooted in history, and here is differentiated from recent entrepreneurial economic activities such as sheep farming, whaling, tourism, and so on.

4.1. Greenland

Colonial rule in Greenland until the mid-20th century basically fostered self-support in traditionally occupied small communities (Gad, 1984, 561). Colonial rule, although benign in nature, of course brought about many changes, but much of the traditional cultural fabric remained intact (Beukel, 2010, 13; Fleischer, 2003, 40-41; Thomsen, 1996, 266-267) (This point is disputed by Graugaard (2009), but generally accepted in the literature). In Greenland, the colonial law system distinguished between Danish law and customary law (Loukacheva, 2007, 88-89), a system that stands in stark contrast to 19th~early 20th century Canadian Arctic situation. Paternalistic isolation (Loukacheva, 2007, 21-22; Sorensen, 2007, 55) and education from the 18th century conducted primarily in Greenlandic (Kalaallisut) (Orvik, 1976, 68; Rink, 1974, 214-217) also contributed to the maintenance of traditional society.

However, modernization policy by the Denmark government enacted in the post-WWII era radically changed Inuit culture and society (Petersen, 1984). Briefly, modernization policy focused upon and promoted industrialization, such as commercial fishing, agriculture and industry in south and to some extent, east Greenland (Kleivan, 1984c, 701-
These policies resulted in a demographic shift turning Greenlanders from being primarily subsistence hunters into urbanized wage earners. Full-time hunters now number about 2000, that is, less than 3.5 percent of the total population (Government of Greenland, 2015, 5), a drop of 50% from 1993 (Sorensen, 2007,155). A full-time hunter may be defined as a person trying to survive out of fishing and hunting, as opposed to full-time wage earners and professional farmers and commercial fishermen (http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/june/tradoc_152604.pdf; Government of Greenland, 2012, 12).

Commercial fishing, accounting for 89% of total exports (Hendriksen et al., 2014, 258), including exports to Japan, is the major industry in east Greenland. Mining prospects are promising, but stalled by the current political situation. Deposits of petroleum may become accessible due to less and thinner sea ice. Development of these resources could contribute to economic independence for Greenland (Greenland Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum, 2012), which in turn may form the economic base for an independent Greenland nation (Nuttall, 2008). Numerous deposits of rare earth also hold promise for economic development (Hendriksen et al., 2014).

Agriculture in south Greenland is still in its initial stage, but 130 tonnes (2012) of potatoes are harvested and more than 25,000 sheep are sent yearly to a local meat processing facility. This may not appear to be a large production, but is a substantial contribution to food self-sufficiency for a population of only 56,000 persons. In addition to home gardens found in all south Greenland homes, 48 full-time farmers and several experimental stations produce cabbage, beans, turnips, cucumbers, and tomatoes for domestic consumption (Tietge, 2010; Røen et al., 2010).

Agriculture is not an alternative in east Greenland; but amelioration of sea ice conditions and ocean current change have contributed to increased production of fishing fleets. More than 5000 Greenland Inuit are employed in fishing and other associated industries.

Recent sea ice conditions also make Arctic cruise season longer and safer. Cruise ships that put in mostly to east and south Greenland bring more than 30,000 persons, in addition to the 30,000 tourists arriving by air, more than the population of Greenland (Stromberg, 2011).

These economic activities are all a product of, or furthered by recent climate change. Aside from the sentiments of north Greenland Inuit, the Government generally views climate change (warming) positively and considers it a factor for new economic opportunity (Nuttall, 2008, 46).

Greenland Home Rule is essentially semi-autonomous and the capital Nuuk is separated from Denmark by 3500 kilometres of ocean. Moreover, Inuit are the only indigenous people and the Danish government has historically considered Greenland “the land of the Inuit”. Because of these and other factors, there is little need to emphasize or symbolize indigeneity, a potential political tool often mobilized by Nunavut Inuit and other indigenous peoples. Indigeneity seldom enters into Greenland politics.
4.2. Nunavut

Nunavut, in contrast to Greenland, a territory with limited autonomy is geographically contiguous to the national majority. The Nunavut Legislative Assembly has only circumcised authority (Loukacheva, 2007, 56, 60; Nunavut Acts Designation Policy) when compared to the parliament of Greenland, which has judicial, financial, legal authority and even some authority in foreign policy that does not contravene international law or compromise Danish defense and security policy (Statsministeriet).

Economic possibilities exist also in Nunavut, such as natural resource development and tourism. However, petroleum deposits, known mainly for the north-east section, will be difficult to develop because sea ice is chocked-in by many small islands, making marine transport difficult or impossible. Tourism is an important element also in Nunavut, but here also sea ice conditions limit tourists to only 14,000 a year, 1/4 the number or tourists that visit Greenland (Stewart et al., 2007).

I have not found statistics concerning number of full-time hunters in Nunavut, but my observations there over the past 30 years lead me to believe that a sizable percentage of the population may be classified as full-time hunters according to the criteria noted above. However, in Nunavut I observed no monetary transaction in the distribution of country food among the Inuit. In contrast, country food is sold locally in markets and shops, even by street vendors in Greenland.

5. Discussion: Change and Persistence

Naotaka Hayashi, in his research of Greenland sheep farming, points up a difference in the role of indigeneity and ethnic identity between Nunavut and Greenland Inuit societies (Hayashi, 2014). Hayashi states that the Nunavut Inuit tend to be more concerned with tradition, rather than exploring new avenues of development (2014,155). His argument is valid in many respects, but here I shall re-appraise his judgment on the role of traditional subsistence ideology and indigeneity, and how these relate to persistence of subsistence activities in Nunavut.

Hayashi says (Nunavut) Inuit tend to be preoccupied with past tradition, rather than innovation of tradition. This stands in contrast to Greenland Inuit, who embrace outside elements to innovate tradition (Hayashi, 2014,155). He goes on to say that this attitude tends to reproduce an emasculated manifestation of tradition in Nunavut (2014, 156).

This argument suggests that “innovation” typifies Greenland, while “persistence” and “stasis” is characteristic of the Nunavut Inuit. Hayashi’s argument highlights one aspect of Nunavut Inuit society, but we are left with the impression that Nunavut is tradition-bound and backward-looking.

The emphasis upon traditional subsistence in Nunavut Inuit society should be interpreted against historical, political, social and environmental conditions unique to Nunavut as compared to Greenland (see Table 11.3). I propose that traditional subsistence ideology in Nunavut is future-oriented, and an effective adaptation to present environmental and political circumstances.
Table 11.3. Factors Influencing Contrasting Economic Pursuits in Nunavut and Greenland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modality of historical colonial rule</th>
<th>Greenland</th>
<th>Nunavut</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benign (laissez-faire): few conflicts</td>
<td>Harsh: forced residential schooling etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographical relation to ruling state</th>
<th>Greenland</th>
<th>Nunavut</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geographically separate: less intervention by Danish gov’t.</td>
<td>Contiguous: constant necessity for negotiation with Federal gov’t.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic development potential</th>
<th>Greenland</th>
<th>Nunavut</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large mineral and petroleum reserves, agriculture possible in the south</td>
<td>Few mineral reserves, petroleum reserve development difficult due to sea ice conditions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relations with other Indigenous groups</th>
<th>Greenland</th>
<th>Nunavut</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greenland Inuit only Indigenous group</td>
<td>Contiguous borders with numerable other Indigenous groups: conflict of interest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change in physical environment</th>
<th>Greenland</th>
<th>Nunavut</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less sea ice, glacier retreat and climate warming conducive to economic development</td>
<td>Early spring sea ice melt, late ice formation detrimental to subsistence activities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political status</th>
<th>Greenland</th>
<th>Nunavut</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong ethnic self-government with theoretical possibility of independence</td>
<td>Subordinate territorial status, little possibility of increased autonomy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indigeneity in politics</th>
<th>Greenland</th>
<th>Nunavut</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not important</td>
<td>Important in gov’t and inter-indigenous negotiation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Importance of traditional indigenous knowledge</th>
<th>Greenland</th>
<th>Nunavut</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scant importance to modern industries such a sheep farming and commercial fishing</td>
<td>Essential to ethnic identity and cohesion, and a lever in land claim and other political negotiations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Greenland, traditional subsistence activities are pursued to a certain extent, but as Hayashi indicates, are seldom employed as a political tool (2014, 155-157), except in the case of international debate over climate change. The relatively benign colonial regime in Greenland, as well as the mono-ethnic composition of the population, has fostered a social atmosphere where an active representation of ethnicity and indigeneity is not a political priority. The highly autonomous contemporary Greenland government, representing a single indigenous people, has the opportunity to pursue autonomously various avenues of economic development. Indigeneity, symbolized by hunting and other traditional subsistence activities, although conspicuous in popular media, does not play an eminent role in domestic politics (Hayashi, 2014, 156). As an important economic and cultural activity, full-time hunting is largely limited to small scattered communities and plays only a minor role in the south Greenland society, where more than 85% of the population is concentrated. Rather, capitalistic economic pursuits are hailed in the government slogan of Greenland as a “The Pioneering Nation” (Nuttall, 2012, 118).
The interaction of several factors has been decisive in recent economic development in Greenland, particularly in the south. South Greenland was, and is, where Danes settled. This constituent led naturally to European influence on the Kalaallit (southern Greenland Inuit) society and culture. The benignity of colonial rule created a social atmosphere wherein Kalaallit assimilated Danish economic ideology with little resistance. As many researchers point out, modern entrepreneurial economic undertakings were primarily proposed or introduced by Danes (e.g. Rasmussen 2000). For example, Jens Chemnitz, who first introduced sheep farming, was the son of a Danish cooper (Langgard, 1998, 94). The historical legacy of small-scale horticulture and husbandry of the Norse in the 11th-15th centuries probably was not a decisive factor in the establishment of sheep farming in the early 20th century. The environmental potential for sheep farming existed since at least the past two centuries (Rasmussen, 2000, 128), but it was not until the Danish government began a programme promoting modernization the 20th century that sheep farming took hold.

Modernisation policy introduced in the early 20th century was followed by concerted programmes of modernisation in the 1950s and industrialisation in the 1960s that accelerated economic innovation (Kleivan, 1984c).

The absence of inter-ethnic competition and the commingling of Danes into Kalaallit society have created an atmosphere conducive to cultural and economic innovation possible in a relatively mild marine and terrestrial physical environment.

In contrast to the social and political environment of Greenland, a rather oppressive colonial history, coupled with geographical contiguity to numerous other minority indigenous groups and the Euro-Canadian majority, put Nunavut Inuit in the position that necessitates ethnic representation and repeated demonstration of indigeneity. As a territory, many decisions concerning development and resource co-management in Nunavut necessitate endorsement of the Federal Government (Nunavut Acts Designation Policy).

Economically, harsh environmental conditions preclude the possibility of agriculture and off-shore fishing, as well as making it difficult to ship out mineral and petroleum resources. The possibility of economic diversification in Nunavut is limited by environmental factors. Under these circumstances Nunavut Inuit leaders have chosen to emphasize traditionalism as a means to survive culturally, socially and politically in the Arctic. Traditional subsistence ideology is an effective agent to realize such goals. Also, traditional subsistence ideology plays a role in conflict of inter-ethnic interests, and is a political base for negotiation with the Federal Government. Distinctive ethnicity and indigenenity, symbolized by traditional subsistence activities, are indispensable political tools to the Nunavut Inuit.

Inuit ethnicity is epitomized in Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit (IQ). In the broad sense, IQ encompasses various systems of knowledge, wisdom, practice, and belief gained through experience and culturally transmitted among members and generations (Huntington and Fox, 2005, 64). IQ is specifically a code of ethnic (Inuit) ethics and an emblem of ethnicity evincing the uniqueness of the Inuit of Nunavut, contrasting that of contiguous indigenous
peoples and the majority Canadian society. As such, it functions as a potent political lever in inter-ethnic and Canadian government negations.

IQ also serves as a vehicle to promote social cohesion and pride in a society that has few alternatives for economic development. In this respect, IQ is a future-oriented ideology, particularly Nunavut Inuit youth who do not have the option to pursue entrepreneurial occupations available to the Kalaallit.

6. Conclusion

Nunavut Inuit and the Kalaallit of Greenland share common cultural roots, and were very similar in subsistence regimes until the early 20th century. In spite of the commonality, the two groups evidence divergent paths of economic development, and as a result, there is a marked contrast in the importance attached to traditional subsistence ideology and Traditional Indigenous Knowledge (TIK) as embodied in IQ.

In Nunavut, IQ is specifically a code of ethnic (Inuit) ethics and an emblem of ethnicity evincing the uniqueness of the Inuit of Nunavut, contrasting that of contiguous indigenous peoples and the majority Canadian society. As such, it functions as a potent political lever in intra-ethnic and Canadian government negations (Loukacheva, 2007, 63). It is noteworthy that in Greenland, where Home Rule was achieved in 2009, there are no co-management projects so well-known in Canada, because Greenland government has the authority to make its own domestic decisions.

TIK plays little importance in the livelihood of south Greenland Kalaallit. Here, local knowledge concerning recently introduced agriculture and offshore fishing, and the related global economic fluctuation is of foremost importance. In contrast, traditional subsistence activities form the basis of ethnic maintenance in the Nunavut Inuit society. This is the platform for negotiations with neighbouring ethnic groups and the Federal government.

Environment is the common denominator in both groups, but the numerator differs between them. In south Greenland, climate amelioration makes husbandry and agriculture a viable economic pursuit, as well as permitting development and shipping of petroleum and mineral deposits. On the other hand, climatic change in Nunavut does not yet result in an environment conducive to agriculture nor ameliorate sea ice conditions enough to allow development and shipping of natural resources, nor allow cruise ships in the number of those landing in Greenland.

In this essay, I argue that traditional subsistence activities in Nunavut are not only a means of livelihood, but also take on importance in inter-ethnic social relations and political negotiations, both on domestic and international stages. Subsistence ideology in Nunavut is a future-oriented strategy to cope with the present environmental, social and political situation of Nunavut today.

In closing, I express my appreciation for the constructive comments to the draft of this essay by Nobuhiro Kishigami of the National Museum of Ethnology.
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12. Part of the Moose: Maintaining Continuity Between the Kaska and Animals Through Hunting Activity

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Abstract

North American indigenous people are known as the people that have maintained a relationship with animals through hunting. In this paper I examine the continuity between the indigenous Kaska people of northwestern Canada and the animals of the region, through their hunting activities. Specifically, first of all, I will analyze Kaska hunting by classifying their knowledge, rituals and norms of hunting. I will suggest that rituals for game animals are not necessarily required for all species. This reveals the fact that the presence or absence of rituals depends on whether the animal will be eaten, suggesting that hunting for eating is more important than hunting for profit or fur.

Secondly, I will examine my field data of moose hunting focused on ritual and cognition. The moose is the most important food of the Kaska and their relationship with the moose is at the core of Kaska society. Also my field data shows that Kaska people recognize that their hunts succeed because their relationship with the moose has been maintained.

The background of this idea is the recognition that the Kaska view of animals is composed of two general concepts. One is the reciprocity between human beings and animals; the other is “original oneness.” Also performing rituals for animals is an expression of the Kaska people’s desire to maintain a close and ongoing relationship with the animals.

Keywords: Canada First Nation, Hunter-gatherer culture, Ritual and activity, Yukon Territory

1. Introduction

In this paper I examine the continuity between the indigenous Kaska people of western Canada and the animals of the region through their hunting activities. My first thesis centers on an analysis of Kaska hunting practices and uses an animal classification scheme based on the hunting method employed, the way in which the hunted animal will be used, and the accompanying hunting ritual. It suggests that rituals for game animals are not
necessarily required for all species. It reveals the fact that the presence or absence of rituals depends on whether the animal will be eaten and establishes that hunting for eating is more important than hunting for profit or fur. A second thesis considers the reasons that the Kaska people perform hunting rituals for animals that do not eat other animals, based on moose-hunting field data which focus on ritual and cognition. The moose is the most important food of the Kaska and their relationship with the moose is at the core of Kaska society. As an indicator of this, my field data show that the Kaska people recognize that their hunts succeed because their relationship with the moose has been maintained.

This study is based on empirical observational ecology in which I attempt to demonstrate the interplay between observational ecology and religion by discussing the behavioral strategy of northern hunter-gathers (Irimoto, 1994).

2. Objectives and Method

The traditional territory of the Kaska First Nation encompasses over 240,000km² of boreal forest area in Northeast British Columbia and Southeast Yukon (Figure 12.1). The Kaska language is classified as a Northern Athapaskan, Thaltan-Kaska-Tagish language of the Na-dene family. Further, the Kaska are classified into the Northern Athapaskan cultural sphere. However, Kaska culture has been deeply influenced by the First Nations peoples of the Northwest Coast, including elaborate social systems such as the clan system, because the Kaska are located on the border (Moore, 2002).

My field research, which forms the basis of this paper, was intermittently executed from September of 2005 to March of 2014 under a license (License Number 06-07&SE, 07-85&SE, 09-010&SE) issued by the Yukon Territory. During this period, I lived with the Kaska people and learned hunting, trapping and gathering in the bush, and collected primary source materials by experiential empirical observation. Many of my informants were Kaska elders (65 years or older). I also did complementary research by fact-finding on the spot and collecting literature.

3. Kaska Subsistence Today

Traditionally, Kaska subsistence has been based on hunting and gathering. Much of Kaska hunting depend on land mammals like moose and caribou for the greater part of life’s necessities, especially in regions lacking large salmon stocks. It is estimated that the first contact between “white people” and the Kaska occurred in the Halket trading post on the Liard River that the Hudson’s Bay Company managed in the 1820’s (Honigmann, 1981). People from outside the region began immigrating to prospect for gold in the early 1870’s and a large number of Euro-Canadians passed along this route in the Kaska territory on the way to the Klondike gold rush of 1897 to 1898. At the same time, Euro-Canadian trappers were trapping in this region until the end of the 19th century. Protestant and Roman Catholic missionaries visited the Kaska people prior to 1926, the year that the Catholic fathers established a mission at MacDame Creek on Kaska land (Honigmann, 1981). At that time, Euro-Canadians brought many new technologies. Later, trading posts, stores and
churches were erected in the Kaska territory. As a result, people gathered in the town and settled.

Figure 12.1. Kaska Traditional Territory
However, the Kaska people believe that the most significant changes in their lives were caused by the construction of the airport and the highway, followed in the 1940s by the immigration of Euro-Canadians. The influence of Euro-Canadian society increased rapidly with the appearance of a stable traffic road. It accelerated the growth of "micro-urban villages" (Smith, 1978). Shifts to the money economy and the occupation economy rolled in Canadian administration and the community system, ultimately contributing to changes in beliefs and language. For instance, when the field-work of anthropologist Honigmann, carried out between 1944 and 1945, was surveyed, an investigation in English was possible (Honigmann, 1981).

Thus, it is understood that contact between Kaska and a Euro-Canadian (society and/or culture) came about in two stages, the former being a gradual introduction of technology and goods in the early immigration of Euro-Canadians and the latter coming as a great social change after the stand of the 1940s. Today, the town has amusement facilities such as hotels, restaurants, and golf courses, as well as welfare facilities such as high schools, hospitals, and libraries. Almost everyone lives in houses with modern equipment such as electricity, water service and TV, and many of them own cars.

Even with such different value systems, the Kaska people seem to have accepted much of European culture. In town, the Kaska lifestyle is almost identical to that of the “white man.” However, this does not mean that the Kaska are losing their ethnic culture. Such changes, especially the transformation of their culture by their quickly and adaptively taking up new tools and technology, are a common trait of many indigenous societies that survived in a severe environment (Yamaguchi, 2011).

Traditionally the Kaska community was not a closed society. Its members were active participants in trading, marriage, and war with neighboring First Nations. The Kaska people tend to embrace convenience tools and accept new ways with a positive attitude. Henry Sharp, who conducted anthropological research on a Chipewyan, Athapaskan family, described the Chipewyan people as follows: “They are great survivors with an almost uncanny ability to reinvent themselves in the face of changing circumstances. Their history is a history of repeated adaptation and transformation to the changing context of their life” (Sharp, 2004, 139-140). As with many other Canada First Nations, hybridity is a characteristic of the Kaska culture, and the Kaska people survive by positively receiving new elements from other cultures, while maintaining the core of their own culture. In this way, the Kaska have accepted a money economy but bush food remains an essential part of the Kaska diet. In other words, the Kaska have adopted a “mixed economy” (Omagari, 2004). Under such a mixed economy, the people retain their hunting-gathering culture in the contemporary world (Berkes and Berkes, 1999).

4. Kaska Utilization and Method of Munting Animals as Natural Resources

During my field-work, I witnessed the Kaska people, especially the elders of the community, using natural resources year-round (Table 12.1).
Table 12.1. Year-round Hunting-gathering Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>Trapping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>Trapping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>Tanning hide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ice fishing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>Beaver and muskrat hunting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tanning hide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>Beaver and muskrat hunting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tanning hide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gathering birch water and edible wild plants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>Tanning hide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gathering medicine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>Drying medicine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gathering berries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>Gathering berries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hunting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fishing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Making dry fish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>Hunting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Making toboggan and snowshoe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>Making toboggan and snowshoe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintaining trail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>Trapping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>Trapping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ice fishing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to my field data on the utilization of natural resources, a high percentage of this usage involves animals (Yamaguchi 2012, 2014). Therefore, my analysis here focuses on animal resources. As described in the introduction, it reveals that for the Kaska people, the appropriate classification scheme should be based on animal species, hunting method and the utilization by the hunter of the hunted animals (Table 12.2).

Table 12.2. Kaska Utilization and Method of Hunting Animals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Hunting method</th>
<th>Utilization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kaska classification</td>
<td>Hunting method</td>
<td>Utilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order</td>
<td>Rifle hunting</td>
<td>trapping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Species</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animals that do not eat other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>animals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leporidae</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Snowshoe hare</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rodentia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red squirrel</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>△</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal Type</td>
<td>Uses</td>
<td>Sale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Least chipmunk</td>
<td>Δ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern flying squirrel</td>
<td>Δ</td>
<td>Δ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoary marmot</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woodchuck</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North American porcupine</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American beaver</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muskrat</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mule deer</td>
<td>Δ</td>
<td>Δ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-tailed deer</td>
<td>Δ</td>
<td>Δ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elk</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moose</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribou</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountain goat</td>
<td>Δ</td>
<td>Δ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dall’ s sheep</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 12.2 shows that the largest frame of the Kaska classification scheme is “animals that eat other animals” and “animals that do not eat other animals.” The Kaska people believe that “animals that eat other animals” are not good for food and that only “animals that do not eat other animals” are suitable for eating. There are, however, exceptions. The Kaska people will sometimes eat “animals that eat other animals,” including, for example, the lynx. In such cases, they will offer an excuse. “Because the lynx eats only grouse,” they will remark, “it means they really don't eat meat.” It appears that the Kaska people are quite conscious of an animal's categorization within this scheme.

The members of the Kaska community use animals killed in hunting not just as food but also as material that serves a variety of other purposes. The most important of these materials is the skin. The Kaska tan the skin to make clothes and tools. Traditionally they

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Animals that eat other animals</th>
<th>Carnivora</th>
<th>Least weasel (Ermine?)</th>
<th></th>
<th>Fur for sale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>American Mink</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fur for sale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>American marten</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fur for sale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Northern river otter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fur for sale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wolverine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fur for sale and use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Canadian lynx</td>
<td></td>
<td>△</td>
<td>Fur for sale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Black bear</td>
<td>△</td>
<td>△</td>
<td>△</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grizzly bear</td>
<td>△</td>
<td></td>
<td>△</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gray wolf</td>
<td>△</td>
<td></td>
<td>Fur for sale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coyote</td>
<td>△</td>
<td>△</td>
<td>△</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Red fox</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fur for sale</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
have also tanned the fur for use in sewing, but now many of them sell the fur to earn money.

As indicated in Table 12.2, the Kaska hunt animals in two ways: hunting with a rifle and trapping. Taken together with the two classification factors described earlier, this produces the three-way classification scheme described in the table. Focusing first on method and utilization, three main groups emerge: (1) animals hunted (with a rifle) for food and other uses in the community, as in the case of moose; (2) animals trapped in order to sell the animal's fur, as in the case of martins; and (3) animals sometimes hunted (with a rifle) for food and sometimes trapped in order to sell their fur, as in the case of beavers. I then analyzed the connection between these three groups and the performance of rituals. It was clear that the Kaska people perform rituals for some, but not all, animals. I learned that rituals are performed for a moose or beaver—when the beaver meat is eaten—in order to promote the rebirth of their animal spirit, whereas no rituals are performed when the beaver is trapped solely for the sale of its fur.

5. The Meaning of the Ritual

To find the reasons for the rituals, I examined various hypotheses related to animal resource utilization. The first possibility is that the Kaska people want to apologize to the animal for its killing. Just as is true for many Japanese (and others) who have grown up in the contemporary world, I become highly emotional whenever I witness an instance of killing and often feel a powerful sense of remorse. To express this remorse, ancient Japanese rituals such as "Kuyou" for slaughtered animals are meant to apologize for the killing and to provide a funeral for the dead animal’s soul. However, if this sort of apology-driven motivation were behind Kaska rituals, one would have to believe that it would apply for all animals that the Kaska killed, or at least for all animals killed directly by means of a rifle. But, as already observed, the Kaska people don't perform rituals for all animals. And while, at first glance, performing a ritual seems to be connected to animals killed by rifle, the fact is that even if a beaver is trapped, a ritual may sometimes be performed.

The second possibility is that the Kaska people perform their rituals in order to avoid revenge from the animal's spirit. The Kaska view of world is based on animism and shamanism (Honigmann, 1981; Yamaguchi, 2014). According to this traditional view, animals have personality and are able to talk with the Kaska people. Many Kaska hunters believe they have a “medicine animal,” similar to a guardian angel. This "medicine animal" has a spiritual power that can be used to help people. According to the Kaska, each animal species has a different power and ability. At the same time, the Kaska people regard the power of some animals as dangerous. Honigmann (1981, 108-109) described these magical powers and dangers as follows:

Upper Liard Kaska. In pre-contact time the Indians of the Cassiar recognized, several species of animals as magically dangerous. Holding first place in this category which among other Mackenzie drainage people is reserved for the wolf. Like mink, the otter could drive persons insane, subject them to fainting, nosebleed, and produce more serious illness such as “twisting up”. Both animals were avoided as food. A mink inadvertently caught in a deadfall had its carcass...
thrown into the fire and covered with feathers. This “put them (i.e., mink) in good
mind”. To take live mink from a trap was particularly dangerous. An otter taken in
a beaver deadfall was returned to the stream or lake with instructions to one’s
children not to drink water near the place. Dreaming of the otter made people
fearful and such dreams were regarded as originating with the animal itself. Otter
possessed power to transform themselves into human beings. Attitudes of
profound respect and avoidance were not lacking for the wolf. A hunter who
wounded this animal always let it go free with the expectation that the creature
would again present itself to the hunter. Should it then be killed, a depletion of
game would follow within two or three years. …Contemporary informants still
categorize the mink, otter, and wolf as “devil’s helpers”. Also allied with Gusliina
are the snake, toad, elephant, wolverine, flying squirrel, and grizzly bear.”

In this sense, the performance of rituals seems to correlate with the way the Kaska
classify animals as those that eat other animals and those that do not. Based on my field-
work, the Kaska people perform a ritual almost exclusively for animals that do not eat
other animals. However, even though it is very rare, rituals can be performed for an animal
that eats other animals. To illustrate, one of the Kaska elders recounted a story describing a
hardship that she and her mother had endured: “(At) that time, we (the elder and her
mom) suffer from starvation. Then black bear come close our camp. Mom shot the bear.
Usually we take eye out before cooking head means after skinning. But that time, mom took
eyes at first. During skinning bear, mom keep talk with that bear very carefully. She told
him that, we so starve... no moose even no rabbit... we need food. And after skinning, first
place mom put bear’s head on the tree and made prayer. That’s first time to eat bear meat
and I never eat after. It was good though. Also I remember next morning yang moose come
to our camp and we get it.”

This narrative suggests that bear meat can serve as an emergency food, even though a
bear is an animal that eats other animals. It may also be true that since a black bear’s diet is
mostly plants, this is the reason that some members of the community may sometimes eat
bear meat. But the bear is also considered by the Kaska to be a brother with strong power.
It may be for this reason that the elder’s mother treated the bear’s remains very carefully
and performed the ritual— to avoid the bear’s revenge.

This case further suggests that the performance of a ritual correlates to the Kaska
classification scheme. Animals in the category of "animals that don’t eat animals," may
warrant a ritual. Correctly, people perform a ritual if they want to eat the meat of the
animal. In this sense, we can understand why even the killing of an "animal that eats other
animals," such as the bear, sometimes requires a ritual.

6. The Ritual of Moose Hunting

In the case of animals used specifically for food, then, the necessity of a ritual has been
suggested. In this section, I consider why the Kaska people perform a ritual for animals that
don’t eat other animals through my field data dealing with moose hunting, with a focus on
ritual and cognition.
The moose is the most important game for the Kaska people. According Table 13, the Kaska hunt moose intensively in August and September. The rifle is the main hunting implement. The Kaska use motorboats, cars, and small planes for transportation while hunting. It is certainly true that hunting is the most important of the bush activities, and is considered central to the Kaska way of life. The motives for hunting are simple: it serves as a primary source of food and provides numerous body parts that can be used for multiple purposes.

During a hunt, the Kaska pay close attention to animal signs and observe the Kaska norm (code). The hunting practice of one of my informants showed this pattern quite well. He was always attentive to messages he received from the animals, especially in deciding when to go hunting and which animals to seek. He received messages both directly from animals in the bush and through his dreams. He told me that as people develop their own sixth sense, the voice from the animals becomes clearer and clearer. Moreover, according to the Kaska norm, he intentionally avoided shooting female moose accompanied by their calves.

After succeeding at the moose hunt and dissecting the moose's body, my informant always performed a ritual that would include hanging the moose's windpipe on a tree. I wondered why and asked him. He answered, “This will allow the moose's spirit to breathe again. And then the moose's spirit will return with meat in the future.” After harvesting the moose, he carefully followed the Kaska norms and taboos in cutting the meat; he separated all the sinew, bone, and internal organ portions for human consumption and for the dogs. The hide and brain were saved for tanning, and the hind leg bone was kept for a scraper. Generally he shared the moose’s remains with his relatives and friends after hunting. When he ate dinner at his sister’s home, his sister usually cooked moose meat from the moose he had hunted. She would always take out the moose eyes before skinning the moose head for cooking because it was believed that all moose were watching people through the eyes of every moose. She did not want the moose to see her cutting. The Kaska people care very much about what the animals think of them and make a point of showing respect to the animals.

It is important to understand the nature of hunting as both a physical and spiritual process for the Kaska. It begins by making contact with the animals (physically and spiritually), seeking and following them, killing the prey in the bush, cutting the animal carcass, leaving some parts as part of a ritual, taking home as many other parts as possible, and eating them or using them up completely. Hunting thus appears to exist as an endless loop based on the Kaska view of reciprocal relationships between humans and animals. In this sense, bush resources, as represented by the meat of the moose, play an important role in maintaining the Kaska culture by creating continuity between the Kaska people and nature.

7. Conclusion

In conclusion, for animals that do not eat other animals, specifically when those animals are hunted for food, a ritual is always required. For animals that eat other animals, especially for those that are killed in order to sell their fur, no ritual is needed. The Kaska
people perform their rituals to maintain their reciprocal relationship with the animals, but not for every animal. The Kaska people, for example, perform rituals for beaver if they eat the meat, but typically don’t perform the ritual if they simply sell the fur. There is a strong correlation between the utilization of the animal (that is, the purpose of the kill) and the performance of a ritual.

People use various animals for various purposes. There are some correlations between the performance of rituals and species, method, and utilization. The Kaska perform rituals to maintain continuity with the animals by showing respect and promoting the rebirth of the animal’s spirit. But not for all animals. They perform rituals almost exclusively for animals that don’t eat other animals and that they themselves consume as food.

As background, it might be this way because “selling” is a relatively new phenomenon for the Kaska. The modern monetary economy may well have influenced community norms. If the Kaska people do not cut into the body of an animal that has been killed for its fur, that is, if they do not put a knife into the body of the animal, and do not use the animal’s remains for themselves, but rather sell to others, the implication is that the relationship between the animal and the people is not direct.

Hunting for food, however, is still conducted according to traditional Kaska norms and the Kaska people’s relationships with animals. Hunting for food is governed by these norms even today. The Kaska people want to maintain their connection with the animals around them and the land they inhabit. Through the traditional practice of hunting and eating the animals they hunt, they feel an endless, unbroken connection, similar to the how wolves eat moose, moose eat willows, and willows draw water from the land.

The Kaska view of animals is composed of two general concepts. One is the reciprocity between human beings and animals; the other is “original oneness.” Many of the indigenous peoples of North America believe in this reciprocity with animals (Nadasdy, 2007; Sharp, 1994; Ridington, 1994; Irimoto, 1991). Under this concept, animals give their bodies to people. Anthropologist Nadasdy, who studied the Kluane First Nation describes this phenomenon as “The Gift in the Animal” (2007). Sharp names this “inverted sacrifice” and explains it as follows:

Inverted sacrifice occurs wherever and whenever a Chipewyan male who is prepared to take the life of an animal encounters an animal that is willing to die for him (Sharp 1994).

Such reciprocity between man and animal is based on the idea that animals have personality. The Kaska people also perceive animals as targets with whom negotiation is possible. I consider the concept of “original oneness” as enabling people to negotiate with animals and to form a reciprocity between them. Irimoto (1994, 336-337) described it as follows:

The concept of “original oneness” as defined here means the human explanation for the contradictory conceptions of dualism and oneness. “Dualism” is a result of categorization, but “oneness” results from non-categorization. Thus, the “original oneness” is a mythological settlement between “dualism” and “oneness,”
in which the dual opposites present in the world now are assumed to have been originally one.

Irimoto also suggests that:

The concept of “original oneness” represents a fusion of these different perceptions of the world. It justifies both the oneness and the dual opposition of man and nature. Myth or ritual is the expression of the “original oneness.” However, even though modern northern hunter-gathers continue to adhere to the concept of original oneness, it does not represent a mere synthesis which reconciles the problem of contradiction, either by the logic of mythology or the logic of reciprocity. Rather, the concept of oneness and dualism continue to coexist. Thus, despite the use of dual classification and the various explanations and justification of the man-game relationship, man constantly experiences a different perception of the world in everyday hunting life. The discrepancy between oneness and dualism will continue to be subject for reconciliation, which will make for unique worldviews among northern hunter-gathers, as long as human beings must remain human being.

Performing rituals for animals that do not eat other animals is an expression of the Kaska people’s desire to maintain a close and ongoing relationship with the animals. I believe that the activity of hunting and the full use of the animals they hunt build a strong feeling of continuity. In his well-known book about Yukon First Nations, McClellan (1987) described the old people he found there as “part of the land, part of the water.” Quoting these words, my informant always told me that:

For us, we are part of the animals. You should only go hunting when you need moose for food. Don’t hunt any animals for just fun or trophy. If you do so, the animals will recognize your behavior and change your luck, sometimes for weeks. You have to pay respect and listen to the animal’s voice.

I do not doubt his statement. When we see a moose’s stomach full with willow, we know that thick willow trees grow in the place we hunt the moose, and the willows stand on the land near the water. From this perspective, it is easy to understand that human beings are not special; they are just part of the moose, part of the cycle of nature.
References


