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EDITOR'S PREFACE

The 2018 Japan Studies Association of Canada's Annual Meeting was held under the title, "Japan's World / the World's Japan: Images, Perceptions and Reactions." Its goal was to promote the analysis of the current global trend of resurgent nationalism in the face of accelerating globalization. Japan's interactions with the rest of world produce images, perceptions and reactions constantly. In the era in which much of critical decision-making processes and reactions depend on the mass production of images and perceptions, an analysis of their contents and mechanisms by which they are produced help identify challenges that Japan is facing and find solutions to them.

The selected papers in this volume have conceptualized this theme in their own ways, situating Japan in a global context. Three papers are included in the field of the Humanities. While Jay Goulding, Jacob Kovalio and Jane Traynor exhibit some similarity in their focus on the intersections and interactions between Western and Asian philosophies and cultures, they approached major Western thinkers in a different way. Goulding revealed very intriguing interactions between major Western and Japanese philosophers, revealing the existence of a transnational sphere that cannot be explained through the binary between the West and the East. Jane Traynor pushes the West-East boundary questions a bit further, analyzing translation in the performing arts. Focusing on the work of Samuel Beckett, her study also recognizes the space that emerges between two different languages and cultures in theatres—what she called "artistic liberties." Kovalio too analyzes the encounter between Western and Asian scholars but expresses concerns about the popularity and influence that Edward Said's *Orientalism* has had in the field of Asian studies. He stresses the fact that Western scholarly interaction with the study of Japan and the East has little to do with colonial power system and Western hegemony.

David Edgington and Brian K. MacLean examine the political economy of Japan from different angles, the former from international relations and the other from domestic economic politics. Focusing on the forty years of Japan-China relations, Edgington identifies several stages in the shifting Japanese perception of China as a trading partner. He refutes the static view of Japan-China relations that was established forty years ago, revealing that Japan has often changed its approach to China, as it increases its economic opportunities and competitiveness. MacLean's article shifts attention to Japan's internal economic politics, evaluating the first six years of Abenomics. While the assessment of its policy differs significantly among scholars and commentators, his analysis, focusing solely on the GDP and figures, points to a moderate success in economic recovery.

The essays by Tom Waldichuk et al. and by David Sulz and Daiyo Sawada are both written as reports of major projects that their teams have conducted for many years. Reviewing the stages by which the Edmonton Japanese Community Association collected personal documents and historic photos from community members and challenges that the process entailed, Sulz and Sawada present a unique analysis of the project. Revealing the gap between goals and reality, their essay offers a useful tool and insights to anyone who compiles community history projects. Similarly, Waldichuk et al. offers insightful analysis of one of the tourism routes, based on the field work. Interestingly, they reveal that the Bunkyo walking route is not necessarily designed

for foreign tourists and thus more international consideration is necessary to make it accessible, safe, and enjoyable for foreign tourists. All articles make valuable a contribution to the understanding of Japan's World and the World's Japan and bring Japan studies to a global audience. The editors hope that our dialogue will enrich future Japan studies in Canada.

Aya Fujiwara, Ph.D

Chair of the 2018 JSAC Annual Conference

1. JAPAN-WEST INTERCULTURE: TIME'S STEP BACK—DŌGEN, WATSUJI, KUKI AND HEIDEGGER

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ABSTRACT

As progenitors of world intercultural, Japanese scholars engage the phenomenologist Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) in Germany in the 1920s with discussions of literature, popular culture, language and philosophy. Yamanouchi Tokuryū (1890-1982) reads Husserl's *Logical Investigations* with Heidegger, later lecturing Greek philosophy at Kyoto University; Tanabe Hajime (1885-1962) shares Heidegger's love for art, culture, ontology and nothingness; Kuki Shūzō (1888-1941) engages Heidegger on the aesthetic of *iki* いき, publishing the first book on Heidegger: *The Philosophy of Heidegger (Haideggā no tetsugaku)*; Watsuji Tetsurō (1889-1960) brings existential philosophy to Japan, employing Heidegger's methodology in his classic work *Fūdo* (climate). This paper explores intercultural ideas amongst Kuki, Watsuji and Heidegger on cultural and philosophical intersections East and West. Comparative topics include the Japanese scholars' understanding of Zen monk Dōgen Zenji's (1200–1253) *uji* 有時 (sometimes, just for the time being), *Nikon* 而今 (just now), *kyōryaku* 經歷 (ranging, flowing) and *taiho* 退歩 (the step back), alongside Heidegger's *verweilen* (whiling time), *Augenblick* (right moment of vision), *Erstrecken* (to stretch time along) and *Schritt zurück* (the step back)—all directed toward a mutual discourse of Japan-West intercultural. Inspired by my initial encounter with the hermeneutic phenomenologist Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002) in the early 1970s at Hamilton's McMaster University, I launch a career of engagement with Heidegger scholars Richard Palmer (1933-2015), William Richardson (1920-2016), Hwa Yol Jung (1931-2017), Wu Kuang-ming (1933-) and Cheng Chung-ying (1935-), most of whom are experts in both East Asian and Western philosophies. From these interactions, I generate *four cornerstones* of East Asian thinking—primarily emanating from Japanese *Zen* and Chinese *Dao*—which manifest through one thinker in the contemporary Western world: Heidegger. The paper explicates these

cornerstones: 1) non-Cartesian subjectivity (there is no “I” but a person as temporally or dimensionally “in-between” [*renjian* 人間]); 2) non-Euclidean space (fractal geometry, Chinese chaos theory; no vanishing point); 3) non-Aristotelean time (reversibility of time; every moment an instance of a different time); 4) non-representational thinking (thing as itself, that which things a thing is not itself a thing), imbedded equally within Heidegger’s thought as within both Zen and Daoist cosmology. Remarkably, Heidegger arrives at these four cornerstones on his own—as counter-positions to traditional Western spatialized and materialized thinking, calling them respectively: 1) *Dasein* (*there-being*, non-Cartesian subjectivity as a collection of beings searching for primordial there); 2) *das Ding* (*the thing*, non-Euclidean space as four-dimensionality within essential spirit); 3) *Kehre* (*the turn*, non-Aristotelian time as a reversibility); 4) *Vernehmen* (*ap-prehension, proception, proception*) as an alternative to *Vorstellung* (representation). Finally, the paper contrasts the material West to the spiritual East through reversibilities including time and space. Western *binaries* such as centre and periphery, shape and shadow, interior and exterior, stillness and motion give way to East Asian *dipolarities* that do not culminate or overcome each other as in dialectical practices but are mutually conditioned linked opposites that are necessary for each other as co-constitutive, co-resonating and equiprimordial.

Keywords: Kuki Shūzō, Watsuji Tetsurō, Martin Heidegger, Dōgen, *uji* 有時, *taiho* 退歩, *Schritt zurück* (the step back), *Fukanzazengi* 普勸坐禪儀.

1. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of the essay is to (1) outline thumbnail sketches of interactions between Japanese philosophers Kuki Shūzō (1888-1941), Watsuji Tetsurō (1889-1960) and Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) on the way to (2) detailing what I call *the four cornerstones* of East Asian philosophy as reversibilities of Western thought. These act as provisional foundations for (3) a comparison of Zen monk Dōgen Zenji’s (1200–1253) *taiho* 退歩 and Heidegger’s *Schritt zurück*—both expressions rendered in English as *the step back*.

2. JAPANESE INTERLOCUTORS

In my review of Lin Ma’s exquisitely detailed source book of Heidegger’s interactions with East Asian philosophers,¹ I explain that over a five-decade period, the following occurs:

Yamanouchi Tokuryū reads Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* with Heidegger in the early 1920s, and later teaches Greek philosophy and phenomenology at Kyoto University (p. 11); Tanabe Hajime, a kingpin of the Kyoto School shares both Heidegger’s affinity for discourse on ontology and nothingness, and aversion to technology; Kuki Shūzō dialogues with Heidegger on the Japanese aesthetic of *iki* いき, and in 1933 publishes the first book on Heidegger, *The Philosophy of Heidegger* (*Haideggā no tetsugaku*); Watsuji Tetsurō is the “first to introduce existential philosophy to Japan” (p. 13); Nishitani Keiji engages in extensive

¹ Lin Ma, *Heidegger on East-West Dialogue: Anticipating the Event* (London: Routledge, 2008).

discussions in Germany from 1938 to 1940, and again in 1964 and 1972—primarily on comparisons of Buddhist emptiness and Heidegger’s nothingness as the “essential unfolding” of being (p. 179); Tezuka Tomio is the inspiration for Heidegger’s 1959 “A Dialogue on Language: Between a Japanese and an Inquirer” (pp. 19-23); Hisamatsu Shinichi, a Zen Buddhist monk, conducts a colloquium with Heidegger on “Art and Thinking” in 1958 (pp. 157-160); Tsujimura Koichi sees Heidegger as a “...signpost that can lead from Zen Buddhism to philosophy” (p.14); Xiong Wei studies with Heidegger in the 1930’s (p. 216), and might I add, supervises the translation of *Being and Time* (*cunzai yu shijian* 存在與時間) into Chinese in the 1980’s; Hsiao Shih-yi begins a translation of *Daodejing* with Heidegger in the 1940’s (pp. 153-156); and Chang Chung-yuan, a renowned philosopher from University of Hawaii, completes his own *Daodejing* translation with input from Heidegger in the 1970s (pp. 15-17).²

In May of 1928, Heidegger is preparing to return to Freiburg to accept a full-time teaching position; Kuki Shūzō is preparing for the Pontigny lectures in France; Watsuji is preparing to return to Japan—his trip cut short because of his father’s death. In 1931, Miyake Goichi (1895-1982), another celebrated scholar, studies with Husserl and Heidegger.³

I believe Kuki Shūzō (son of Baron Kuki Ryuichi [1850–1931]) to be the most sophisticated and refined of many Heidegger scholars in Japan. As a seminal philosopher in his own right, Kuki is courted by many thinkers but like Watsuji, maintains his own distinct thoughts and presentations. Watsuji might not have actually met Heidegger despite Lester Embree’s *Encyclopedia of Phenomenology*⁴ claiming that the encounter takes place at Husserl’s home as part of the Japanese Freiburg pilgrimage.

Although details of Watsuji’s travels in Europe are scanty, Yuasa Yasuo suggests that Watsuji’s intimate understanding of Heidegger could only come from a personal encounter.⁵ Watsuji wrote a substantial book in 1935 on climate and space (*Climate and Culture: A Philosophical Study* translated from *Fūdo* 風土)⁶ as a response to his close reading of Heidegger on time.

On the other hand, Inaga Shigemi informs us that Watsuji sends a letter from Florence to Tanabe Hajime on 26 March 1928, “excusing himself for not having made good use of the letter of introduction to Martin Heidegger prepared for him by Tanabe.”⁷ Since Watsuji and Kuki were longtime friends (meeting in Paris on April 6, 1927), it is possible that Watsuji might have made

² Jay Goulding, review of *Heidegger on East-West Dialogue: Anticipating the Event*, by Lin Ma, *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 36, no. 3 (September 2009): 484-487.

³ Dorion Cairns, *Conversation with Husserl and Fink*, edited by the Husserl-Archives in Louvain (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1976), 17-19, 29.

⁴ Lester Embree, ed., *Encyclopedia of Phenomenology* (Dordrecht: Springer Science and Business Media, 1997), 367.

⁵ Yasuo Yuasa, “Modern Japanese Philosophy and Heidegger,” in *Heidegger and Asian Thought*, ed. Graham Parkes (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 155-174.

⁶ Tetsurō Watsuji, *A Climate: A Philosophical Study*, trans. Geoffrey Bownas (from *Fūdo* 風土) (Tokyo: Printing Bureau, Japanese Government, 1961).

⁷ Shigemi Inaga, “Japanese Philosophers Go West: The Effect of Maritime Trips on Philosophy in Japan with Special Reference to the Case of Watsuji Tetsurō (1889-1960),” in *Japan Review* 25 (2013): 113-144.

a quick visit back to Germany in May to see Kuki and Heidegger before the long voyage home—especially since Watsuji would probably not visit Europe again.

In any case, taking inspiration from Heidegger, Watsuji introduces a fascinating argument on the essence of the person in-between (*Being and Time's in-zwischenheit*):

Man does not reach constantly into the future within individual consciousness alone; rather, it is the betweenness that reaches into the future. Temporality of the individual consciousness is a mere abstraction that is only rendered possible on the basis of historicity [*Geschichtlichkeit*] of betweenness. Third, transcendence also means standing out climatically. In other words, man-as-betweenness discovers itself in climate. From the standpoint of the individual, this becomes consciousness of the body, but in the context of the more concrete ground of human existence (*ningen sonzai* [人間存在]), it reveals itself in the forms of creating communities, and thus in the forms of constructing language, the forms of production, the styles of buildings, and so on. Transcendence, as the structure of human existence, must include all these aspects.⁸

Concerning this statement, Inaga Shigemi illustrates: “*Ningengaku* 人間学 is a neologism distancing Watsuji’s position from Western as well as (neo-) Confucian human-centered ethics: it means ‘the study of ningen,’ where ningen refers to the human, zooid as well as species, but its literal meaning is ‘inter-human,’ the relation in between, preceding the establishment of individuality and personality in the sense of ‘persona.’”⁹ As a crucial distinction, Watsuji employs a *spatialized* and sociologized idea of *ningen*, whereas Chinese philosophy (and Heidegger) have a *temporalized* view of the in-between as an interstitial dimension—something like the between of heaven and hell as in a classical Chinese cosmological understanding.

On the other hand, Kuki’s philosophical analysis begins with the surface of everyday experiences (Bergson’s existentialism) and then dives deeply (Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology). Of Kuki’s travels in France, Stephen Light writes:

The philosopher Yasumasa Oshima, in an article on Kuki, has recounted that when his elder colleague Yasutaro Awano was in Paris in 1934, Awano asked Emile Bréhier [Professor at the Sorbonne] if Bréhier could provide him with a partner for purposes of discussing French philosophy and thus employing his French. Bréhier, exclaiming, “that was just Kuki’s request!” introduced Awano to a young lycée professor, Maurice Merleau-Ponty! Oshima takes the remark as a sign that it was probably Bréhier who had earlier directed Kuki to Sartre [as *répétiteur*].¹⁰

⁸ Tetsuro Watsuji, *Climate*, 12.

⁹ Inaga, “Japanese Philosophers go West,” 119.

¹⁰ Light, Stephen. *Shūzō Kuki and Jean-Paul Sartre: Influence and Counter-influence in the Early History of Existential Phenomenology* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987), 26.

The renowned phenomenologist Hwa Yol Jung (1931-2017), student of Harvard's John Wild (1902-1972) who studies with Heidegger in Freiburg in 1931, suggests that when Kuki arrives in France from Germany, he places an advertisement for someone to teach him French in exchange for knowledge of both German language and existentialism; his first respondent is Jean-Paul Sartre (personal correspondence).

Elsewhere I have written of Kuki and Heidegger:

Phenomenology is the study of appearances in daily life from the position of a primordial *echein* (an originary holding ground or pure philosophy, see Heidegger and Fink 1979, 29) through an *epechein* (a withholding or suspension of personal prejudices) toward a *theorein* (a beholding or theorizing of a life-world). Embracing phenomenology, Kuki fleshes out a detailed sketch of Japan in his idea of *iki* as a 'refinement' of behaviours and attitudes stratified throughout language and culture. For Kuki, Tokugawa exemplifies both a 'horizontal' phenomenology of everyday experiences and a 'vertical' phenomenology of spiritual experiences. The *kanji* for phenomenology is important enough to explain. *Genshogaku* (現象学) is the study of that which manifests itself or represents appearance or presence. Husserl and Heidegger applied their respective phenomenologies to the study of time as a horizon of our experiences, hence a 'horizontal' phenomenology. An innovative aspect of the phenomenological method was the notion of 'bracketing' or suspending one's assumptions of the world in order to address alternative views. The world is composed of rings of perception or what Husserl calls the "*co-present margin*" (1962, 92). Philosophical, linguistic, cultural and psychological assumptions wind ring after ring of perceptions around our experiences and thereby create a horizon by which we judge the world. These rings are co-present—that is existing simultaneously. Heidegger refers to the matrix of these crossings of existential experience as *Dasein* or 'there-being' (1962). As a student of both thinkers, Kuki's contribution to the discussion was a 'vertical' phenomenology that incorporated the spiritual world in addition to the existential world of material things. For Kuki, the equilibrium of Japanese society finds a harmony in the crossings of language and culture through both their visibility (materiality) and invisibility (spirituality). Japan managed to balance daily experiences (materiality) with the harmonization of the three teachings of Confucianism, Buddhism and Shinto (spirituality). Not only was Japanese culture of the Edo Period [1603-1868] a blending of multicultural elements but also a harmonization of many teachings. Part of what gives Japan its global resilience today is this balance of materiality and spirituality. Not only the external appearance of balance but also the internal manifestation of harmony operated as twin generators of *iki*. Taking a cue from Heidegger, Kuki blends the methods of phenomenology with the quest for truth. 'Hermeneutics' was the art of interpretation by which scholars moved from mere appearances to essences of thought or to 'the things themselves.' Hermes, the messenger god, brought knowledge from the heavens to earth; hence, 'hermeneutics' is the study of interpretation of messages, both divine and

otherwise. Kuki links this hermeneutic quest for truth with the phenomenological project of displaying the layerings of social life, themselves stripped away like the peelings of an onion skin: linguistic, cultural, philosophical, political, social, psychological, religious, historical and cosmological. Husserl is famous for employing the image of the onion as “kugelschalenförmig” or “ringförmig.” The social world appears in “the shape of concentric peelings” or “the shape of a ring” (see Husserl 1973, 430).¹¹

Not only does Kuki contribute to the shaping of phenomenology at its inception (studying with Heidegger at the very moment that *Being and Time* is published) but applies his profound understanding to examples drawn from various periods of Japanese civilization:

In his Pontigny lectures of 1928, Kuki explains two levels of crossings. As mentioned above, one level is ‘horizontal’ phenomenology, the explication of everyday life in the *Lebenswelt*. The world is our horizon of being and time. ‘Ecstatic time,’ which stands outside of itself, seeks for a unity of present, past and future time (Heidegger 1962, 377-379). What Kuki adds is a second level, the notion of a ‘vertical’ phenomenology which is no longer simply an existential reality but a ‘mystical ecstasis’: “...each instant, each present, is an identical moment of different times... Each present has identical moments, in the future as well as in the past... time is in this sense reversible” (Kuki 1987a, 45-46). It flows back upon itself as a retrograde temporality or as a reversibility of time. Word (*kotoba* 言), event (*koto* 事) and meaning (*kokoro* 意) are synchronous; the ancient past folds into the now. We might think of Kuki’s concept of time as a *kairos*, a revelatory moment of eternal nows or what Heidegger calls *Augenblick*, the blink of an eye or an instance. Being and time are not separate but are linked, something like the Buddhist monk Dogen’s *uji* (有時) or ‘being-time’ (see Cleary 1986, 102-110). Perhaps it is like the Buddhist *ma* (間) or *aida* (間), an interval between life and death, between heaven and earth, between this and that. Perhaps it is like the pause of a *no* (能) theatre performer between movements.¹²

3. DIALOGUE ON LANGUAGE AND BACK TO PARIS

Thanks to Kuki’s encyclopedic expertise, the Edo Period idea of flirting with life—the peacetime *samurai* tasting the forbidden pleasures of the *ukiyo* and the wartime *samurai* testing his mettle with death (either in battle or in *seppuku*)—might intrigue Heidegger. The nearness of Nothing to Being and *Dasein*’s inability to embrace the immediacy of Being stand at the centre of Heidegger’s early work.

¹¹Jay Goulding, “Kuki Shūzō and Martin Heidegger: *Iki* 粋 and Hermeneutic Phenomenology,” in *Why Japan Matters!* 2, eds. Joseph F. Kess and Helen Lansdowne (Victoria: Centre for Asia-Pacific Initiatives, University of Victoria, 2005), 680-682.

¹² Ibid, 680-682.

The Japanese *sabi* 寂 or loneliness might catch Heidegger's eye. In this instance, the *haiku* poet Matsuo Bashō (1644–1694) and the profound German poet Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843) both wait for revelation which vanishes as its first brief appearance (*Augenblick*). This peek-a-boo reveal and conceal style attracts Heidegger:

That which is, the particular being, stands in Being. Through Being there passes a veiled destiny that is ordained between the godly and the counter godly... There is little that comes to be known. What is known remains inexact, what is mastered insecure. In the midst of beings as a whole an open place occurs. There is a clearing, a lighting [*die Lichtung*]. Thought of in reference to what is, to beings, this clearing is in a greater degree than are beings. This open center is therefore not surrounded by what is; rather, the lighting center itself encircles all that is, like the Nothing which we scarcely know.¹³

In the above 1959 quote from “A Dialogue of Language” in *On the Way to Language*, Heidegger reminisces his exchanges with Kuki from three decades prior.

Despite his engagement with a catalogue of top notch East Asian scholars, it is Kuki that Heidegger remembers the most. And it is Kuki that Heidegger writes about thirty years after their initial encounter.

In returning to France, Kuki delivers two seminar lectures at Pontigny (50 kilometers from Paris) in August of 1928. The first was called “The Notion of Time and Repetition in Oriental Time.”¹⁴

As I write of Kuki:

In this lecture, he ponders: “If one has the right to speak of ‘Oriental time,’ it seems it can be a question of nothing other than the time of transmigration. This time is a time that repeats itself, periodic time... Time is of the will. For a table, for a chair there is no time. If time exists for them, it is because consciousness, as will, has given them a time” (1987a, 43). This is a unique combination of Asian time as ‘transmigration,’ Bergson’s time as duration, and intentional phenomenological time as consciousness of something. Kuki goes on to praise Heidegger’s ‘anticipation’ of time as a future time (*sich-vorweg-sein*). Perhaps Kuki anticipates Merleau-Ponty (1964, 1968) when he says: “In the Orient, time is also considered as being, at bottom, of the will” (1987a: 43). Rather than being in time (Aristotle) we have time in being. What Kuki adds is the idea of will as a thickness of time and being. Quoting from Indian classics, he proclaims: “Of past, present, and future duration the root is ignorance; from ignorance come the dispositions of the will.” Thus, Kuki surmises that “from ignorance comes the will and from the will time” (1987a, 44). Hence, transmigration for Kuki is “indefinite

¹³ Heidegger, *On the Way to Language* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971b), 53.

¹⁴ Shūzō Kuki, “The Notion of Time and Repetition in Oriental Time,” in *Shūzō Kuki and Jean-Paul Sartre: Influence and Counter-influence in the Early History of Existential Phenomenology*, ed. Stephen Light (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987a), 43-50.

rebirth, the perpetual repetition of the will, the endless return of time” (1987a, 44). Classical Japanese Buddhist *nirvana* as ‘annihilation’ or ‘extinction’ is the renunciation of the will. Defeat desire and defeat both the will and the time that it creates. But is denying the will not itself the will? Is this not a tautological argument? Kuki responds with *bushido*, which is the shadow *nirvana*: “In Japan during the feudal period another moral ideal, *Bushido*—‘the way of the *bushi*’—was developed alongside Buddhism. Rectitude, Valiance, Honor, Charity: these are the cardinal virtues of *Bushido*” (1987a, 49). Again, Kuki gives a *raison d’être* to Lord Asano in *Chūshingura* who upholds his ‘*bushi*’ (武士) against the domesticated responses of Kira, even if it results in the misery and death of both himself and his loyal retainers. Kuki goes a long way to explaining the dipolarity of *bushido* and of Buddhism, of war and tranquility, of the will and its abolition, of the abolition and its will. In doing so, he destabilized the self from its apothecic pedestal and forces it to simultaneously face its own essence and annihilation. He takes it to the gates of the *torii*, to the slash between impurity and purity, reminding us that nothing is permanent. Everything perpetually moves forward and backward in the ebb and tide of being, as Heidegger might put it. Unlike ‘the eternal repose’ of Indian philosophers in ‘nontemporal deliverance,’ the *samurai* choose to ignore time “...in order to live, truly live, in the indefinite repetition of the arduous search for the true, the good, and the beautiful” (1987a, 50). This flowing into the experience of the life-world and meeting it half way, so to speak, is ‘the clearing’ that Kuki aesthetically names *iki*. It combines the horizontal ecstasies of Heidegger with the vertical ‘thickness’ of heaven and earth, of phenomenology with mysticism.¹⁵

Kuki complements the above lecture with “The Expression of the Infinite in Japanese Art.”¹⁶ In his analysis of nearness (stimulated by Heidegger), he recalls the Zen monk Hakuin’s (1686-1768) image of ‘standing in water yet searching for it.’

Art replaces the visible with the invisible. Japanese painting is a *synecdoche* where the part stands in for the whole: tree trunks for forests, a bridge’s buttresses for the bridge, a home’s roof for walls:

There is a reciprocal relationship between Kuki and Heidegger. While Heidegger was the first to discuss phenomenology with Kuki, Kuki was the first to gently direct the German philosopher toward poetics and beyond... *iki* develops between these two thinkers, one a philosopher and the other a poet. As Heidegger maintains: philosophers speak being; poets name the holy. Being/Nothingness resides within and between the two. On this account, Kuki states: “twice is art liberated from time: once in the artist who creates infinity, once in the spectators

¹⁵ Jay Goulding, “Kuki Shūzō and Martin Heidegger,” 688-689.

¹⁶ Shūzō Kuki, “The Expression of the Infinite in Japanese Art,” in *Shūzō Kuki and Jean-Paul Sartre: Influence and Counter-influence in the Early History of Existential Phenomenology*, ed. Stephen Light (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987b), 51-67.

who participate, as it were, in this creation by the contemplation of works of art” (1987b, 62-3). Kuki and Heidegger reach out from different phenomenological directions to ‘globalize’ the East/West dialogue and re-member (re-assemble) a communicative nexus, whose very existence attempts to create a ‘planetary thinking.’ These thinkers were at the centre of a whirlwind of social, philosophical and cultural change... At the forefront of this change, Kuki’s idea of *iki* helped preserve the backbone of a Japanese culture that collects up pieces of its heritage to help shape its future. Heidegger’s move to *Dichtung* (poetry) and subsequently to *Lichtung* (the clearing) is stimulated by Kuki.¹⁷

4. FOUR CORNERSTONES

Inspired by my initial encounter with the hermeneutic phenomenologist Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002) in the early 1970s at Hamilton’s McMaster University,¹⁸ I launch a career of engagement with leading Heidegger scholars Richard Palmer (1933-2015), William Richardson (1920-2016), Hwa Yol Jung (1931-2017), Wu Kuang-ming (1933-), and Cheng Chung-ying (1935-),¹⁹ most of whom are leading experts in both East Asian and Western philosophies.

From these interactions, I generate *four cornerstones* of East Asian thinking—primarily emanating from my understanding of Japanese *Zen* and Chinese *Dao*—which manifest through one thinker in the contemporary Western world: Heidegger. Those cornerstones I dub:

1. non-Cartesian subjectivity (there is no ‘I’ but a person as temporally/dimensionally ‘in-between’ [*renjian* 人間])
2. non -Euclidean space (fractal geometry, Chinese chaos theory; no vanishing point)
3. non-Aristotelean time (reversibility of time; every moment an instance of a different time²⁰)
4. non-representational thinking (thing as itself, that which things a thing is not itself a thing), imbedded equally within Heidegger’s thought as within both Zen and Daoist cosmology

Remarkably, Heidegger arrives at these four cornerstones on his own—as counter-positions to traditional Western spatialized and materialized thinking, calling them respectively:

1. *Dasein* (*there-being*, non-Cartesian subjectivity as a collection of beings searching for

¹⁷ Goulding, “Kuki Shūzō and Martin Heidegger,” 690.

¹⁸ “Atkinson philosopher heads up western ‘all-stars’ at Shanghai conference,” *Yfile*, Sept. 20, 2005, <http://yfile-archive.news.yorku.ca/2005/09/20/atkinson-philosopher-heads-up-western-all-stars-at-shanghai-conference/>.

¹⁹ Jay Goulding, ed., *China-West Interculture: Toward the Philosophy of World Integration: Essays on Wu Kuang-ming’s Thinking*, Association of Chinese Philosophers in America Series of Chinese and Comparative Philosophy (New York: Global Scholarly Publications, 2008).

²⁰ Shūzō Kuki, “The Notion of Time and Repetition in Oriental Time,” 45-46.

- primordial there)²¹
2. *Das Ding* (*the thing*, non-Euclidean space as four-dimensionality within essential spirit)²²
 3. *Kehre* (*the turn*, non-Aristotelian time as a reversibility)²³
 4. *Vernehmen* (*ap-prehension, approception, proception*) as an alternative to *Vorstellung* (representation)²⁴

The material West contrasts to the spiritual East through reversibilities including time and space. Western *binaries* such as centre and periphery, shape and shadow, interior and exterior, stillness and motion give way to East Asian *dipolarities* that do not culminate or overcome each other as in dialectical practices but are mutually conditioned linked opposites that are necessary for each other as co-constitutive, co-resonating and equiprimordial²⁵:

Table 1.1 Western Civilization and East Asian Civilization

Western Civilization	East Asian Civilization
Elements (ἔlementa)—material from Void (earth, air, fire, water)—never to return to it; Hesiod; Empedocles; replaced by Aristotle’s volume	Elements (<i>lún</i> 輪)—non-material re-inaugurated <i>through</i> Void and return: <i>generating interaction</i> (<i>xiāngshēng</i> 相生) and <i>overcoming interaction</i> (<i>xiāngshèng</i> 相勝) earth, air, fire, water, metal
Euclidean geometry —mountain as triangle; cloud as oval, lightning as slash; singular vanishing point (imaginary horizon where earth and sky meet)	Non-Euclidian geometry—fractal geometry, Chinese Chaos theory ; no vanishing point or multiple points as in scroll painting; Daoist ultimate polarity <i>taiji</i> 太極
Linear Time ; Aristotle’s time as a number of movements between before and after	Non-Linear Time , reversibility; “ orthogonal time ... everything that was, just as the grooves on an LP contain the part of the music that has already been played; they don't disappear after the stylus tracks them”; “That an orthogonal or right-angle time axis could exist, a lateral domain in

²¹ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 27, 46-58.

²² Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language and Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper Collins, 1971a), 163-187; Martin Heidegger, *On Time and Being* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 15.

²³ Martin Heidegger, *Concept of Time*, trans. William McNeill (London: Blackwell, 1992), 18E.

²⁴ Martin Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, trans. William Lovett (New York: Harper Collins, 1977), 15-19, 130-132.

²⁵ Jay Goulding, “New Ways Toward Sino-Western Philosophical Dialogues,” *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 34, no. 1 (February 2007): 100.

	which change takes place—processes occurring sideways in reality” ²⁶ ; “syntonic translimination” ²⁷
Cartesian Subjectivity , I and subject-object as a lightning flash of subjectivity rendering the object invisible	Non-Cartesian Subjectivity – the thing as stretching, flowing to and fro in and through itself; Heidegger’s <i>Dasein</i> as a collectivity of beings searching for their ‘there’ (<i>da</i>);
Representational Thinking —idea in head, one to one correspondence to object (thing as object); A=A, a thing is a thing; the object is absorbed by one’s subjectivity	Non-Representational Thinking — A≠A, thing as itself, object is not a thing; Zhuangzi “that which things a thing is not itself a thing (物物者非物)” ²⁸ ; cf. Heidegger’s “[Die] Dingheit des Dinges...kann selbst nicht wieder ein Ding sein” ²⁹
Connect the Traces (Dots) —add them up	Disappear within the trace —Heidegger’s <i>Schritt zurück</i> ³⁰ ; Zhuangzi’s <i>ji</i> 跡 (trace) where the Daoist sage disappears like cartoon character Bugs Bunny vanishing into a hole that he pulls from his pocket ³¹ ; apophantic trace (let the thing in itself be seen) as Guo Xiang’s footprint dimming down into nothing (<i>ming</i> 冥) ³²
Alterity as binary other outside	Di-Polarity as mutually conditioning linked opposites that are necessary for each other: co-constitutive, co-resonating, equiprimordial (<i>gleichursprünglich</i>); the Other within myself
Entropy —from something to nothing; from order to chaos	“Negentropic Vortex” —from nothing to something; from chaos to order to chaos ³³

²⁶ Philip K. Dick, *The Shifting Realities of Philip K. Dick: Selected Literary and Philosophical Writings*, ed. Lawrence Sutin (New York: First Vintage Books Edition, 1995), 216, 235.

²⁷ Philip K. Dick, *The Exegesis of Philip K. Dick*, eds. Pamela Jackson and Johnathan Lethem with Erik Davis annotations (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011), 31, 73.

²⁸ Zhuangzi, “Knowledge Rambling in the North,” Chapter 22 (*zhibeiyou* 知北遊), <http://ctext.org/zhuangzi/knowledge-rambling-in-the-north>.

²⁹ Martin Heidegger, *Die Frage nach dem Ding: Zu Kants Lehre von den Transzendentalen Grundsätzen* (Winter Semester 1935-36), in *Gesamtausgabe*, Herausgegeben von Petra Jaeger (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1984), 41: 8.

³⁰ Martin Heidegger, *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, Herausgegeben von Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann 2000), 7: 183

³¹ Jay Goulding, review of *Vanishing into Things: Knowledge in Chinese Tradition*, by Barry Allen. *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, 44, no. 1-2 (March–June 2017 [Dec. 2018]): 113-116.

³² Brook Ziporyn, *The Penumbra Unbound: The Neo-Taoist Philosophy of Guo Xiang* (New York: SUNY, 2003), 18, 66.

³³ Dick, *Exegesis*, 138, 373, 592.

The leader leads	The leader does not lead; fades away with time's passing, and vanishes into things
Subject sees the object as intended while moving linearly through the grid of now-time in Cartesian coordinates	The thing as “a rhythm or flow”³⁴ has no object while it sinks from three-dimensionality into multiple time lines— The Matrix , the Tesla Grid ³⁵

5. HEIDEGGER AND DŌGEN—THE STEP BACK

In September 1969 at Meßkirch in Germany, Tsujimura Koichi (1922-2010), an elite Kyoto scholar of both Zen and phenomenology, delivers the keynote address “Martin Heideggers Denken und die Japanische Philosophie” on the German philosopher’s 80th birthday. Tsujimura studies with Heidegger in Freiburg from 1956-1958, and in Japan with celebrated Heidegger *aficionados* Tanabe Hajime (1885-1962) and Nishitani Keiji (1900-1990). It is worth quoting Tsujimura’s outstanding speech at length:

It was in 1921 when for the first time a Japanese studied with our thinker, who was lecturing in Freiburg at the time. His name is T. Yamanouchi, who later founded the seminar on Greek philosophy at the University of Kyoto. One year later in 1922, my teacher H. Tanabe came to Freiburg. He was, as far as I can tell, the first to discover the importance of Heideggerian thinking—not only in Japan, but perhaps in the entire world as well. In his essay from 1924 *The New Turn in Phenomenology—Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Life*, one can already recognize a first version of *Being and Time*. Tanabe continued his thoughtful dialogue with Heidegger’s thinking up until his death in 1962 and has remained the leading thinker in Japan. He once said to me in his last years: “In my opinion, Heidegger is the *only* thinker since Hegel.” Then Baron Sh. Kuki came to see Heidegger in Marburg. To him we Japanese owe the first reliable elucidation of *Being and Time*. Unfortunately, he died too early—in 1941. Thus, in Japan, and particularly at the University of Kyoto, there has been an appropriation and tradition of Heideggerian thinking that has continued for almost half a century already.³⁶

Tsujimura goes on to say:

If, however, we understand by Japanese philosophy that thinking endeavor which does not arise from the place of Western-European philosophy, but rather springs from the ground source (*Quellgrund*) of our own spiritual tradition, then this philosophy is something very rare. In what follows, I understand Japanese

³⁴ Barry Allen, *Vanishing into Things: Knowledge in Chinese Tradition* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015), 34.

³⁵ *Ibid*, 292-294.

³⁶ Kōichi Tsujimura, “Martin Heidegger’s Thinking and Japanese Philosophy,” *Epoché* 5, no. 2 (Spring 2008): 349-357.

philosophy in the latter sense—and this philosophy finds itself in an essential want (*Not*). From the most ancient times, we Japanese have been close to nature in a specific sense. Namely: we do not have the will to dominate nature, but instead we want to live and die as far as possible in a way that is in accord with nature. On his death-bed, a simple Japanese said to those around him: “I am dying now, just as the leaves fall in the autumn.” And a Zen Buddhist master, who was, so to speak, the grandfather of my own Zen practice, refused an injection when he was dying and said: “What is the point of such a forcing and, thereby, of a prolonged life?” Instead of taking the medicine, he drank a sip of his favorite rice wine and died calmly. Rightly understood, here already is evident a stark contrast between the age-old Japanese spiritual tradition and a life determined by the European spiritual tradition and by European science and technology. In short, to live and die in accord with nature was, we may say, an ideal of the ancient Japanese wisdom of life... This conflict first of all remains veiled in an optimistic way, and yet visible all the same, in a slogan that appeared back then [1867], namely: “Japanese spirit with European ability” [*Wakon-yōsai* 和魂洋才].³⁷

Finally, Tsujimura states most profoundly:

What becomes worthy of questioning through his [Heidegger’s] thinking is what we always already are and so what is already somehow understood by us in a non-objective way, and thus is always overlooked in science and philosophy. It seems to me that the matter (*Sache*) of Heidegger’s thinking always preserves this character. For this reason, the matter of his thinking withdraws itself in its truth as soon as we simply want to represent, grasp, and know it. And, therefore, his thinking remains in principle inimitable. The ultimate matter of his thinking, which perhaps may be indicated by the ancient Greek word *Aletheia* (un-concealedness), could be understood in view of Western philosophy, and that means here metaphysics, as a ground that is concealed to metaphysics itself. Thus, the matter itself would have demanded from the thinker a transformation of thinking—namely, the transformation of philosophical thinking into “another thinking.” Only by this other thinking—and that means by “the step back from philosophy”—has what is “proper” to philosophical thinking—and that means here what is proper to the essence of the Western world and of its humanity—been “properly” glimpsed. That is an extraordinary appropriating event (*Ereignis*). In this sense, we Japanese see in Heidegger’s thinking a glimpsing-of-itself of what is “proper” to Western humanity and its world. In view of this thinking, we Japanese, too, necessarily had to be thrown back onto the forgotten ground of our own spiritual tradition. If I may offer something personal here: Right after my first encounter with *Being and Time* when I was still in secondary school, I sensed that at least for us Japanese the only possible access to a genuine understanding of this work of thinking is concealed in our tradition of Zen

³⁷ Ibid, 351-352.

Buddhism. And this is so because Zen Buddhism is nothing other than a seeing-through (*Durchblicken*) to what we ourselves are. For this seeing through, we first have to let go of all representing, producing, adjusting, altering, acting, making, and willing, in short, all consciousness and its activity, and then, following along such a way, to return to its ground source. As one of the greatest Japanese Zen masters, Dōgen, says as well: “You shall first learn the step back [*taiho* 退歩]” (Dōgen, *Fukanzazengi* [普勸坐禪儀]).³⁸

The very last expression is a breathtaking summary of fifty years of Heidegger’s project: “For this seeing through, we first have to let go of all representing (*Vorstellung*), producing, adjusting, altering, acting, making, and willing, in short, all consciousness and its activity, and then, following along such a way, to return to its ground source.” And then the ultimate punchline: “As one of the greatest Japanese Zen masters, Dōgen, says as well: ‘You shall first learn the step back [*taiho* 退歩]’” With this final comment, Tsujimura leaves generations of thinkers—East and West—with a spectacular hint on the connections between Dōgen and Heidegger: “the step back.” Tsujimura is the first scholar to see this coincidence of thought. It is to this connection that I now turn.

In the *Fukanzazengi* (*Universal Recommendation for Zazen*), written in the 13th century after his return from China, the monk Dōgen Zenji (1200–1253) expounds on “the step back” as a meditative practice. Step forward into thinking; step back into unthinking. In the original version (*Shinpitsu-bon*), written in classical Chinese, Dōgen states: “*o mochi-iyō ēko-henshō no taiho* 須迴光返照之退歩 (Take the step back of turning light around and illuminate inward).”³⁹ This is a very prophetic and difficult expression like many in Dōgen’s works—perhaps *the most important expression of all his writings*. Indeed, it can benefit from both Heidegger’s *hermeneutics* to unfold it and tear it down, and his *phenomenology* to compose it, and gather it together again. As much as Dōgen needs Heidegger, Heidegger needs Dōgen. As Tsujimura intimates, the key to understanding Heidegger is Zen, and the key to understanding Zen is Heidegger. A long-term key to understanding old Japanese Zen is China, and the key to understanding Chinese *Chan* 禪 is Dōgen’s Kamakura Japan (1185-1333).

Firstly, what is lost from Dōgen’s expression is the old Chinese connotation of *huí guāng fǎn zhào* 迴光返照: the last radiance of the setting sun, a momentary recovery before death, a sudden burst of energy prior to collapse or the medical image of a “terminal lucidity.”⁴⁰ It is an occasional rhetorical device meaning a last-ditch effort of a lost cause or something shining brightly before it disappears, the “last radiance of the setting sun.”⁴¹ It often has a mysterious or occult effect in its reaction from everyday speakers. A popular use today is a “get out of death card” (回光返照) that participants in role playing games employ to resuscitate their fictional characters just before they expire. In my era, it was simply *Monopoly*’s “get out of jail card;”

³⁸ Ibid, 351-352.

³⁹ Dōgen, “*Fukanzazengi*,” <https://tereless.hu/zen/dogen/Fukanzazengi.html#1>.

⁴⁰ “回光返照,” <https://baike.baidu.com>.

⁴¹ Xiaojing Cheng, “Chinese Metaphors in Political Discourse: How the Government of the People’s Republic of China Criticizes the Independence of Taiwan” (PhD. diss., Ball State, 2009), 223-24.

now both Western and East Asian animated versions of *Dungeons and Dragons* sword and sorcery combat simulations have “death resurrection cards.”⁴²

Alas, Dōgen intends a much deeper meaning than this—one that is quite apocalyptic and revelatory of his unique version of Zen. The sage fades in the midst of time’s passing as the world vanishing into nothing—certainly reminiscent of *wabi sabi* 侘寂 of samurai culture, both of life’s impermanence and unfilled goals (*sabi* 錆 as rust on a sword). Dōgen’s originary *taiho* 退歩 as a “step back” is a *dimensional shift*—the cultivation of energy gathered within oneself not only at the last breath of one’s *own* life but perhaps at the *last sunset ever* of humankind.

As a corollary, in respect to his time in China, especially at Shaolin, Dōgen is assuredly influenced by the Daoist imagery of the *first sunrise ever* such as in the variegated clouds soaking up the emerging fireball at dawn at Huang Shan (Yellow Mountain), captured in the classical Chinese graph *wén* 雯 described in dictionaries as “variegated clouds” of orange and red blending, technically named by the colour “Claudia,” and only seen at 5:30-6:01 in the morning in the mountains of Anhui Province. *Dao* 道 is the first sunrise coming into being; Dōgen’s Zen is the last sunset receding into nothing. The Chinese Chan monk Jianzhi Sengcan (529-613) is the first to record the imagery of *henshō* 返照 (Chinese *fǎn zhào*) in *Song of the Trusting Mind* (*xinxinming* 信心銘), translated by Richard B. Clarke, revised by Kokyo Henke:

歸根得旨 To return to the root is to find the meaning,
隨照失宗 but to pursue appearances is to miss the source.
須臾返照 At the moment of turning the light of awareness around,
勝卻前空 there is a going beyond appearance and emptiness.⁴³

Obviously, Dōgen’s Chinese excursions could bring him into contact with Jianzhi’s work.

In *Fukanzazengi*, perhaps the most crucial manual for practicing *zazen* that has ever been written, and the basis of Dōgen’s Sōtō school (*Sōtō-shū*), he states:

You should therefore cease from practice based on intellectual understanding, pursuing words and following after speech, and learn the backward step that turns your light inward to illuminate your self. Body and mind will drop away of themselves, and your original face will manifest itself. If you want to attain suchness, you should practice suchness without delay.⁴⁴

At this point, we turn and bend our light backward to Heidegger’s *Schritt zurück* to look at his version of the step back. Originally delivered as a lecture “Das Ding” in June 1950 at *Bayerischen Akademie der Schönen Künste*, Heidegger writes:

⁴² Ryan Erwin, “What’s the meaning of ‘回光返照’,” <https://www.quora.com>.

⁴³ Jianzhi Sengcan, “Xinxinming,” <https://www.scribd.com/document/252717188/Song-of-the-Trusting-Mind>.

⁴⁴ Norman Waddell, and Masao Abe, “Dōgen’s: ‘Fukanzazengi’ and ‘Shōbōgenzō zazengi,’” *The Eastern Buddhist*, New Series 6, no. 4 (October 1973): 122.

Wann und wie kommen Dinge als Dinge? Sie kommen nicht *durch* die Machenschaft des Menschen. Sie kommen aber auch nicht *ohne* die Wachsamkeit der Sterblichen. Der erste Schritt zu solcher Wachsamkeit ist der Schritt zurück aus dem nur vorstellenden, d.h. erklärenden Denken in das andenkende Denken. Der Schritt zurück von einem Denken in das andere ist freilich kein bloßer Wechsel der Einstellung. Dergleichen kann er schon deshalb nie sein, weil alle Einstellungen samt den Weisen ihres Wechseins in den Bezirk des vorstellenden Denkens verhaftet bleiben. Der Schritt zurück verläßt allerdings den Bezirk des bloßen Sicheinstellens. Der Schritt zurück nimmt seinen Aufenthalt in einem Entsprechen, das, im Weltwesen von diesem angesprochen, innerhalb seiner ihm antwortet. Für die Ankunft des Dinges als Ding vermag ein bloßer Wechsel der Einstellung nichts, wie denn auch all das, was jetzt als Gegenstand im Abstandlosen steht, sich niemals zu Dingen lediglich umstellen läßt.

When and in what way do things appear as things? They do not appear *by means of* human making. But neither do they appear without the vigilance of mortals. The first step toward such vigilance is the step back from the thinking that merely represents—that is, explains—to the thinking that responds and recalls. The step back from the one thinking to the other is no mere shift of attitude. It can never be any such thing for this reason alone: that all attitudes, including the ways in which they shift, remain committed to the precincts of representational thinking. The step back does, indeed, depart from the sphere of mere attitudes. The step back takes up its residence in a co-responding which, appealed to in the world's being by the world's being, answers within itself to that appeal. A mere shift of attitude is powerless to bring about the advent of the thing as thing, just as nothing that stands today as an object in the distanceless can ever be simply switched over into a thing.⁴⁵

And in 1957 in *Identität und Differenz (Identity and Difference)*, Heidegger explains:

Der Schritt zurück weist in den bisher übersprungenen Bereich, aus dem her das Wesen der Wahrheit allererst denkwürdig wird.

The step back points to the realm which until now has been skipped over, and from which the essence of truth becomes first of all worthy of thought.⁴⁶

Heidegger goes on to elaborate:

⁴⁵ Heidegger, *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, 183; Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language and Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper Collins, 1971a), 179.

⁴⁶ Martin Heidegger, *Identität und Differenz*, Herausgegeben von Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 2006), 11:58; Martin Heidegger, *Identity and Difference*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1969), 49.

Dies besagt: Wir wagen einen Versuch mit dem Schritt zurück. Der Titel »Schritt zurück« legt mehrfache Mißdeutungen nahe. »Schritt zurück« meint nicht einen vereinzelt Denkschritt, sondern die Art der Bewegung des Denkens und einen langen Weg. Insofern der Schritt zurück den Charakter unseres Gespräches mit der Geschichte des abendländischen Denkens bestimmt, führt er das Denken aus dem in der Philosophie bisher Gedachten in gewisser Weise heraus. Das Denken tritt vor seiner Sache, dem Sein, zurück und bringt so das Gedachte in ein Gegenüber, darin wir das Ganze dieser Geschichte erblicken und zwar hinsichtlich dessen, was die Quelle dieses ganzen Denkens ausmacht, indem sie ihm überhaupt den Bezirk seines Aufenthaltes bereitstellt. Dies ist im Unterschied zu Hegel nicht ein überkommenes, schon gestelltes Problem, sondern das durch diese Geschichte des Denkens hindurch überall Ungefragte. Wir benennen es vorläufig und unvermeidlich in der Sprache der Überlieferung. Wir sprechen von der *Differenz* zwischen dem Sein und dem Seienden. Der Schritt zurück geht vom Ungedachten, von der Differenz als solcher, in das zu-Denkende. Das ist die *Vergessenheit* der Differenz. Die hier zu denkende Vergessenheit ist die von der *Λήθη* (Verbergung) her gedachte Verhüllung der Differenz als solcher, welche Verhüllung ihrerseits sich anfänglich entzogen hat. Die Vergessenheit gehört zur Differenz, weil diese jener zugehört.

This means: we venture an attempt with the step back. The term “step back” suggests various misinterpretations. “Step back” does not mean an isolated step of thought, but rather means the manner in which thinking moves, and a long path. Since the step back determines the character of our conversation with the history of Western thinking, our thinking in a way leads us away from what has been thought so far in philosophy. Thinking recedes before its matter, Being, and thus brings what is thought into a confrontation in which we behold the whole of this history—behold it with respect to what constitutes the source of this entire thinking, because it alone establishes and prepares for this thinking the area of its abode. In contrast to Hegel, this is not a traditional problem, already posed, but what has always remained unasked throughout this history of thinking. We speak of it, tentatively and unavoidably, in the language of tradition. We speak of the *difference* between Being and beings. The step back goes from what is unthought, from the difference as such, into what gives us thought. That is the *oblivion* of the difference. The oblivion here to be thought is the veiling of the difference as such, thought in terms of *Λήθη* (concealment); this veiling has in turn withdrawn itself from the beginning. The oblivion belongs to the difference because the difference belongs to the oblivion.⁴⁷

Just as Heidegger in the 1920s contributes immensely to the return of Hegel scholarship in a predominantly neo-Kantian Europe, Watsuji Tetsurō nearly single handedly resurrects Dōgen in Japan. Written between 1919 and 1921, Watsuji’s *Shamon Dōgen (Dōgen the Adept)*

⁴⁷ Heidegger, *Identität und Differenz*, 58-60; Heidegger, *Identity and Difference*, 49-50.

changes the landscape for Zen studies in both Japan and the world.⁴⁸ Steve Bein, a student of Yuasa Yasuo (1925–2005), himself a close associate of Watsuji, writes in his introduction to the translation of *Shamon Dōgen*:

Dōgen was born in January 1200 to aristocratic but ill-fated parents. His father was probably a well-heeled member of the Koga family, and his mother was probably Fujiwara Motofusa. If so, then Dōgen was descended from noble stock. The Fujiwaras were a dominant power in Japan for centuries, and the Kogas were related to the Minamotos (another dominant family) and descended from Emperor Murakami [*Murakami-tennō* 924-967]. There is a general agreement that Dōgen's mother died when he was seven or eight years old. It is said that Dōgen first grasped the impermanence of all things as he watched smoke rise from the incense at her funeral. After her death, he was adopted by an uncle, Fujiwara Moroie [*Matsudono Moroie* 1172-1238], who was without a son and who therefore planned to groom Dōgen to be his heir. At the age of twelve or thirteen, Dōgen was faced with a choice: he could follow his uncle's wishes, undertaking a rite of passage into manhood and joining the aristocracy of the Fujiwara clan; or he could follow his mother's dying wish, which was for him to join a monastery. Dōgen chose the latter...⁴⁹

Just as Dōgen tries to create a pure Zen in his era, Watsuji tries to do the same in his. As Watsuji most astutely observes:

Dōgen crossed over to China before the Zen tradition had been established in Japan. Of all the Japanese that became truly absorbed in Zen thinking, it would be accurate to say he is the first. Nevertheless, he jumped into the midst of the closing years of a Chinese Zen tradition that had already existed for six or seven centuries, boldly claiming that in all that history *only* Rujing [Tiāntóng Rùjìng (1163-1228)] was correct. In other words, rather than choosing *the Zen sect*, he chose one man: Rujing.⁵⁰

In 1928, Heidegger is only beginning his journey of interconnections between East and West.

By the time of engagement with Tsujimura thirty years later in 1958, he would have had decades to think over personal and professional encounters with Japanese and Chinese interlocutors along the way.

As such, several uncanny resemblances emerge between Heidegger's ideas and those of Dōgen, the key one being "the step back."

⁴⁸ Steve Bein, *Purifying Zen: Watsuji Tetsurō's Shamon Dōgen*, trans. and with commentary (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011); James Takashi Kōdera, "The Buddha-nature in Dōgen's Shōbōgenzō" *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* 4, no. 4 (December 1977): 267-292.

⁴⁹ Bein, *Purifying Zen*, 10

⁵⁰ *Ibid*, 10.

6. SHŌBŌGENZŌ 正法眼藏

Although the Heidegger translator Joan Stambaugh (1932-2013) offers a more complete analysis of ideas revolving around *Schritt zurück* and Dōgen⁵¹, we can only highlight a few here. In *Shōbōgenzō* (*Treasury of the True Dharma Eye*), *uji* 有時 is a good example from which to draw. Below is a summary comparison of Heidegger and Dōgen:

Table 1.2 Summary Comparison of Heidegger and Dōgen

Heidegger	Dōgen
Schritt zurück (the step back)	taiho 退歩 (the step back)
verweilen (whiling time)	uji 有時 (just for the time being, sometimes)
Augenblick (Kairos, right moment of vision)	nikon 而今 (moment, just now)
erstrecken ⁵² (to stretch along; “stretched-out-ness of Dasein’s temporality”)	kyōryaku 經歷 (ranging, ⁵³ flowing in all directions)

Beginning in the 1920s and extending over a fifty-year period, Heidegger creates a new world of existential thinking. Rather than *being in time*, he moves to *being and time*, *time and being*, and eventually *time in being*. Hence, *verweilen* as whiling time (living in a moment), and *Augenblick* (as revelatory time) are crucial for reversing the Aristotelian view of time as a succession of now-times (*Jetztzeit*) pacing the modern material world of spatialized linear progression. In 1924, Heidegger writes:

Dasein is that entity which is characterized as *being-in-the-world*. Human life is not some subject that has to perform some trick in order to enter the world. Dasein as being-in-the-world means: being in the world in such a way that this Being means: dealing with the world; tarrying [*verweilen* as lingering, dwelling, sojourning] alongside it in the manner of performing, effecting and completing, but also contemplating, interrogating, and determining by way of contemplation and comparison. Being-in-the-world is characterized as *concern*.⁵⁴

And furthermore, time is reversible as a future’s past: “In being futural Dasein is its past; it comes back to it in the ‘how.’ The manner of its coming back is, among other things, conscience. Only the ‘how’ can be repeated. The past—experienced as authentic historicity—is anything but

⁵¹ Joan Stambaugh, *Impermanence is Buddha-Nature: Dogen’s Understanding of Temporality* (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press), 1990.

⁵² Graham Parkes, “Dōgen/Heidegger/Dōgen: A Review of ‘Dōgen Studies’ and ‘Existential and Ontological Dimensions of Time in Heidegger and Dōgen,’” *Philosophy East and West* 37, no. 4 (October 1987): 446.

⁵³ Thomas A. Kasulis, “The Zen Philosopher: A Review Article on Dōgen Scholarship in English,” *Philosophy East and West* 28, no. 3 (July 1978): 370.

⁵⁴ Heidegger, *The Concept of Time*, 7E.

what is past. It is something to which I can return again and again.”⁵⁵ Hence, the moment of vision (*Augenblick*) halts the everyday while yielding primordial insight:

Running ahead seizes the past as the authentic possibility of every moment of insight, as what is now certain. Being futural, as a possibility of Dasein as specific, gives time, because it *is* time itself. Thus it simultaneously becomes visible that the question of “how much” time, “how long” and “when”—to the extent that futurity is authentically time—that this question must remain inappropriate to time. Only if I say that time authentically has no time to calculate time is this an appropriate assertion.⁵⁶

Heidegger’s attempts at reversal try to make it “our time” rather than homogenous time, eternal time or clock time. Our *Anwesen* (presence) as a sojourn in the world is just for a while. It stretches from life to death in *Erstrecken*, a non-spatialized in-betweenness.

The step back from the technocratic world of moving forward or upward is the motivation of Heidegger’s reversal—a sinking down to the Friedrich Schelling (1775-1855) inspired “deepest grounds of being” (*tiefsten Grunde des Seyns*)⁵⁷—a primordial dip into the void. Similarly, Dōgen addresses three parallel ideas surrounding his *taiho*: *uji*, *nikon* and *kyōryaku*: *Uji* (just for the time being) is generally understood as simply meaning “sometimes” from its Chinese roots. Yet Dōgen interrogates the graphs of “being” and “time” separately, contemplating them side by side, “for the time being.”

In *Shōbōgenzō*, he writes:

古佛言、
有時高高峰頂立、
有時深深海底行。
有時三頭八臂、
有時丈六八尺。
有時拄杖拂子、
有時露柱燈籠。
有時張三李四、
有時大地虛空。⁵⁸

A former Buddha once said in verse

Standing atop a soaring mountain peak is for the time being
And plunging down to the floor of the Ocean’s abyss is for the time being;
Being triple-headed and eight-armed is for the time being

⁵⁵ Ibid, 20E.

⁵⁶ Ibid, 15E.

⁵⁷ Martin Heidegger, *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, in *Gesamtausgabe*, Herausgegeben von Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989), 65:100.

⁵⁸ Dōgen, *Shōbōgenzō*, <http://www.shomonji.or.jp/soroku/genzou.htm>.

And being a figure of a Buddha standing sixteen feet tall or sitting eight feet high is for the time being;
Being a monk's traveling staff or his ceremonial *hossu* is for the time being
And being a pillar supporting the temple or a stone lantern before the Meditation Hall is for the time being;
Being a next-door neighbor or a man in the street is for the time being
And being the whole of the great earth and boundless space is for the time being.⁵⁹

Likewise, Dōgen explains that *nikon* (just now) is not clock time but the time that can never slip away, perhaps an eternal time. *Taiho* (the step back) as a meditative dimensional shift reveals the natural deconstruction of *uji* into its component parts of time and being. The oscillating flux of being-time yields both (a) right now (*nikon*) and (b) continuous flowing (*kyōryaku*)—both stillness and motion in all directions.

Dōgen continues:

At the time when, proverbially, a mountain was being climbed and a river was being crossed, an I existed, and it was the time for that particular I [*uji no nikon* 有時の而今]. Since such an I existed, time could not abandon it. If time did not have the characteristic of “coming and going, being continually in flux”, then the time when this I was “climbing atop the mountain” would have remained forever, eternally comprised of that particular “time when.” But, since time retains the characteristic of “coming and going, being continually in flux,” there is a flow of ever-present “nows,” each comprised of a time when an I exists. And this is what is meant by the phrase “just for the time being.”⁶⁰

As well, Dōgen's expression *kyōryaku* as ranging, flowing and continuous passing in all directions finds its best reversible description as such:

Time has the virtue of continuity: it continuously flows [*kyōryaku*] from the today that we are talking about to a tomorrow, from a today to a yesterday, from a yesterday to a today. It flows from a today to a today and from a tomorrow to a tomorrow. Because continual, continuous flow is a function of time, past and present times do not pile atop each other nor do they form an accumulative line... Mountains are of time: oceans are of time. Were there no time, neither mountains nor oceans could be. Do not think that time does not exist for the mountains and oceans of the present moment. Were time to cease to exist, so would mountains and oceans cease to exist: if time does not become extinct, then mountains and oceans too will not become extinct... In such a manner, coming to

⁵⁹ Eihei Dōgen 2007, *Shōbōgenzō: The Treasure House of the Eye of the True Teaching. A Trainee's Translation of Great Master Dōgen's Spiritual Masterpiece*, trans. Rev. Hubert Nearman, O.B.C. (Mount Shasta California: Shasta Abbey Press, 2007), 108.

⁶⁰ Ibid, 110-11.

training, going on in training, training until you arrive, and training beyond arriving are, at all times, “just for the time being, just for a while.”⁶¹

Dōgen’s primordially eternal nows differ markedly from the “accumulative line” succession of Aristotle’s nows of before and after. The world-acclaimed Dōgen scholar Steven Heine comments: “*Nikon*, the ‘eternal now,’ is able to both encompass (‘chew up’) and to surpass (‘spit out’) the conventional misconception of time,” that is “time flies.”⁶² He articulates:

Kyōryaku (literally “undergo” or “passing through”) is one of the central notions in Dogen’s philosophy of time. Here, Dogen deals with the continuity of time in a way fundamentally distinct from the conventional view, which holds that fixed time-units are passing, flying or slipping away and flowing in irreversible succession toward some destination. *Kyōryaku*, on the other hand, refers to the process of a journey actively engaging the passenger and passage-way as well as the full context of their experiential reality. It is multi-dimensional, flexible and dynamic, moving in and through multiple directions simultaneously—a projection of man’s ontological understanding and enlightened experience of time into past, present and future, which are ultimately equalizable yet experientially differentiable dimensions of being-time. All tenses of time interpenetrate, reverberate through and influence one another... Because time is not linear, successive time-points do not accumulate.⁶³

In response to Heine, Graham Parkes suggests that *kyōryaku* as “ranging” (following Thomas Kasulis) might better serve a comparison to Heidegger’s *Erstrecken* as a stretching along of being:

In temporality, however, the constitutive totality of care has a possible basis for its unity. Accordingly, it is within the horizon of Dasein’s temporal constitution that we must approach the ontological clarification of the “connectedness of life”—that is to say, the stretching-along [*Erstrecken*] the movement, and the persistence which are specific for Dasein. The movement [*Bewegtheit*] of existence is not the motion [*Bewegung*] of something present-at-hand. It is definable in terms of the way Dasein stretches along. The specific movement in which Dasein is stretched along and stretches itself along, we call its “historizing”. The question of Dasein’s “connectedness” is the ontological problem of Dasein’s historizing. To lay bare the structure of historizing, and the existential-temporal conditions of its possibility, signifies that one has achieved an ontological understanding of historicity.⁶⁴

⁶¹ Ibid, 112, 116, 118

⁶² Steven Heine, *Existential and Ontological Dimensions of Time in Heidegger and Dōgen* (New York: SUNY, 1985), 180.

⁶³ Ibid, 181.

⁶⁴ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 427.

7. CONCLUSION: WALKERS OF THE BOUNDARY OF THE BOUNDLESS

It is clear that Heidegger is not Dōgen and Dōgen is not Heidegger. Both cross paths as Tsujimura attests through their various reversibilities—through Tsujimura himself in the 1950s but also through previous Japanese interlocutors such as Kuki or Watsuji. Despite their divergencies, we might ask, what lies underneath Dōgen and Heidegger? Dōgen studies *Dao* at Shaolin (Dōgen’s name: *Dao* 道 *yuán* 元 [original way]); Heidegger dabbles in Laozi and Zhuangzi over a fifty-year period. Heidegger⁶⁵ is familiar with a Zhuangzi text called *The True Book on the Southern Land of Blossoms*⁶⁶ translated by Richard Wilhelm. The book itself is a compilation of texts most likely drawn from the 1919 version of Zhuangzi entitled *Song Edition of the True Classic of Southern Florescence*⁶⁷ and annotated by Guo Xiang.

If Zen is the ceremony, *Dao* is the substance. Both Zhuangzi and Guo Xiang discuss the trace (*ji* 跡), a crucial idea resonating throughout Heidegger’s writings. According to Guo, the Daoist sage has “no deliberate mind or purpose of his own.”⁶⁸ Instead, he acts spontaneously. People who follow the actions or words of the sages are mistaken. What counts is the spontaneous action of the sage or “*ziran* [自然] as that which leaves the traces.”⁶⁹ Traces are places where the sage has left the world. For Heidegger, you find your own place to leave the world. What Heidegger calls the turn back or bend back (*Kehre*) as it relates to the trace (*Spur*) as “wending your way” (*wenden*) might be similar to Dōgen’s bending back the light. Both are turns in different planes of existence, hence stepping back. Dōgen and Heidegger are together “walkers of the boundary of the boundless” (*Grenzgänger des Grenzenlosen*).⁷⁰ Concerning this boundless boundary, Zhuangzi states in Chapter 22:

bù jì zhī jì jì zhī bù jì zhě yě
不 際 之 際， 際 之 不 際 者 也

The Border (Boundary, Limit) of the borderless (Boundless, Limitless) is (*yě* 也)
the Borderless (Boundless, Limitless) of the Border (Boundary, Limit).⁷¹

Likewise, the proper walker of Laozi’s *Daodejing* Poem 27 leaves no trace (tracks, wagon tracks, footprints)—*shàn xíng wú zhé jì* 善行無轍跡.⁷² Traces of the past as what has been, and

⁶⁵ Martin Heidegger, “Traditional Language and Technological Language,” *Journal of Philosophical Research* 22 (1998): 131, 143.

⁶⁶ Dschuang Dsi [Zhuangzi], *Das wahre Buch vom südlichen Blütenland: Nan Hua Dschen Ging*, trans. Richard Wilhelm (Jena: Eugen Diederichs, 1923).

⁶⁷ Zhuangzi, *Song Edition of the True Classic of Southern Florescence* (*Songke nanhua zhenjing* 宋刻南華真經), annotations by Guo Xiang in *Continuation of a Collection of Lost Ancient Writings* (*xu guyi congshu* 續古逸叢書) vol. 3, compiled by Zhang Yuanji (Nanjing: Jiangsu guji chubanshe, 1919), 81-227.

⁶⁸ Ziporyn, *Penumbra Unbound*, 47.

⁶⁹ *Ibid*, 19.

⁷⁰ Heidegger, *On the Way to Language* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971b), 41.

⁷¹ Zhuangzi “Knowledge Rambling in the North.”

⁷² Laozi, *Daodejing*, <https://ctext.org/dao-de-jing/ens?searchu=>.

traces of the future as not yet weigh on the dual meaning of *Spur*.⁷³ Parallel to Guo Xiang, Heidegger reflects in 1938-1939:

Das Da.

Eine Spur davon in der ἀλήθεια [un-concealment] der φύσις [emergent nature].
Aber längst ausgelöscht ist die Spur—nie einfach wieder zu be-treten, sondern aus
eigenem Gang zu finden.

The There [Da].

A trace of the There in the ἀλήθεια of φύσις.
But the trace has long since been extinguished—it can never simply be followed
again but must be found from one’s own trail.⁷⁴

All is reminiscent of Dōgen’s passing through (*kyōryaku*) of future to past and past to future by way of the step back.

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⁷³ Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language and Thought*, 91-92.

⁷⁴ Martin Heidegger, *Die Geschichte des Seyns* (1938-1940), Herausgegeben von Peter Trawny (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1998b), 69:9; Heidegger, *The History of Being*, trans. William McNeill and Jeffrey Powell (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015), 9.

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2. THE EJCA HISTORY PROJECT AND 2013 SURVEY: BACKGROUND, ACCESS AND SOME REFLECTIONS

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ABSTRACT

In 2013, the Edmonton Japanese Community Association (EJCA) ran a census-like survey of the broadly defined local Japanese community. The shorter, quantitative-type questions were modelled on long-form Canada Censuses (specifically the NHS in 2011) with the addition of longer, narrative-style prompts at the end. The roughly 290 responses were summarized in book form as “EJCA Community Survey 2013 Results and Individual Histories” both in hard-copy and ebook (see <http://ejca.org> or <http://era.library.ualberta.ca>). This paper outlines the history project generally and the census process and results more particularly through quantitative and narrative lenses. It then shifts philosophically to consider the roughly 92% of eligible people not captured by the survey and ruminates on how we might unhide these hidden blurs through eight metaphors: snapshot, census, energy/matter electromagnetic fields, entangled entanglement, Higgs fields, quantum and social fields for detecting community, nature sequencing through aesthetic predispositions and enlightened entanglement.

Keywords: Japanese-Canadian history, Japanese in Edmonton area, Edmonton Japanese Community Association, EJCA, Japanese-Canadian Edmonton Survey 2013, metaphors of community, enlightened entanglement, entangled enlightenment.

1. INTRODUCTION

In this short presentation, we introduce a project to collect the history of Japanese influence in the Edmonton region of Alberta, Canada undertaken by the Edmonton Japanese Community Association (EJCA) over the past number of years. In the first part, David Sulz will give an overview of the project—its origins and its products. In the second half, Daiyo Sawada will lead us on a deep philosophical exploration of what the project might and might not reveal. We hope it will inspire exploration of the materials we collected, created, and made available in various places.

The physical materials are mostly housed in the EJCA library but some items have been digitized. In addition, we created several documents and reports in both print and digital form to describe and summarize what was collected. The descriptive reports (and some digitized materials) are most easily available through the www.ejca.org website. However, in recognition of how websites are subject to constant change, physical copies were made and distributed to specific libraries and EJCA members. In addition, digital copies of the reports are housed in the University of Alberta's institutional repository called ERA. Specifically, the materials discussed in this presentation can be found here:

- EJCA History Project Data Collection Report June 2014. <https://doi.org/10.7939/R36M33K2W>
- EJCA History Project Appendix Compilation to Data Collection Report June 2014. <https://doi.org/10.7939/R3X34N737>
- EJCA Community Survey 2013 Results and Individual Histories (2016). <https://doi.org/10.7939/R3Q814R6X>
 - Note: this digital version contains the complete print version contents as well as the survey instrument in its various forms (i.e. English, Japanese, print, online).

In January 2010, the Edmonton Japanese Community Association (EJCA) board established a History Project Committee charged with gathering information about Japanese-Canadians in Edmonton. Actually, “Japanese-Canadian” is merely a convenient shorthand description because Japanese citizens who spent time in the area were also included. Six people have served on the history committee; four were involved across all three phases (Cathy Tennant, Sanae Ohki, Jim



Figure 2.1 The EJCA History Project and 2013 Survey




Figure 2.2 EJCA History Project

Hoyano, David Sulz) while Rick Hirata was involved for phase 1 until he moved away, and Daiyo Sawada joined for phases 2 and 3.

Early in the project, it was thought we would produce a book of some sort similar to other local history association projects. However, over time, a more generalized approach to collect materials that could be used in a variety of potential ways by different people in the present in the future was decided upon. We tried to think less of collecting material for “one time use” and more about issues of preservation and accessibility even if we were fully aware that we could never get all the way to archival standards of description and preservation nor meet current expectations of digital accessibility anywhere by anyone.

We came to refer to various parts of our project as “phases.” Phase 1 lasted about two years (2010-2012) and mostly involved conducting 19 oral interviews along with recordings and transcriptions thereof, in addition to a start on collecting documents, photos, books, and references. Due to the favourable reception of our progress by the EJCA board and continued enthusiasm of the committee members, we carried on for another two years of collecting, organizing, storing, and describing a variety of materials (i.e. phase 2). At the end of this second phase, a report was produced outlining the project, describing the materials, and sharing some interesting bits of what was collected. A digital copy Phase 1/2 report can be found on the EJCA website and in the University of Alberta’s ERA repository at <https://doi.org/10.7939/R36M33K2W>.

To give just a hint of what is contained in the Phase 1/2 report, there are ten sections and five appendices covering such things as:

- project outline
- interview process
- short descriptive histories of about 10 community groups in addition to internal EJCA clubs and committees
 - (e.g. Buddhist gatherings, Japan-Canada Businessmen’s Assoc., Metro Edmonton Japanese Community school, Tomo no kai, etc.)
- listing of materials collected by this project and stored at the EJCA (about 40 smaller collections)
- historic interviews with seniors from the EJCA newsletter
- copies of a few articles of particular interest
- transcriptions of interviews conducted during this project

“Phases 1 & 2”: Summary and Finding Aid

1) EJCA.org website



Figure 2.3 Phases 1&2: Summary and Finding Aid

Phase 1/2





Figure 2.4 Phase 1/2

At present, the materials collected during this project are stored in the EJCA library room in an organized filing cabinet that can be accessed during library room hours or by request. Of course, it would be ideal to also have digitally available copies of everything for wider accessibility but the realities of such an undertaking were beyond the scope of this project in terms of time, expertise and expense. Perhaps future users will be inspired to make and share digital copies now that much of the collecting and organising effort has been done.

One item of special note is the almost complete set of EJCA newsletters (*Moshi Moshi*) going back to 1977 which give an unparalleled glimpse back across time. Thanks to the particular interest and willingness of EJCA member Takashi Ohki, these are available both physically in the EJCA library and digitally on the ejca.org/moshi-moshi.html website. The intention is to make them more permanently available through the UAlberta ERA repository as well.

There were several realities that tempered our big dreams and expectations. Our modern digital world creates expectations not only of ease of access but also ease of production; there are endless examples of beautifully digitized materials available to anyone with a few clicks. The reality of creating such sites, however, is very different. Posting random photos on social media or uploading to a website are remarkably easy in the short term but the process of organizing large amounts of material in a logical way that will be findable by potential users with a variety of digital skills and making sure they will be available well into the future after multiple evolutions of formats and hardware devices is quite daunting in reality.

Our small group of volunteers, while enthusiastic overall, did experience its fair share of lulls in enthusiasm over the course of eight years and there are pieces of the project we look back on with some sense of wishing we had done a bit differently. One example, from the oral interviews, is the challenge in finding a balance between having a script of questions and allowing both interviewer and interviewee to follow items of particular interest and passion.

In the end, we believe we have created an interesting and relatively well-organised

Phases 1 & 2: Access




Figure 2.5 Phases 1&2: Access

Phases 1 & 2: newsletter Moshi Moshi



Figure 2.6 Phases 1&2: Newsletter *Moshi Moshi*

Phases 1 & 2: Insights and Challenges

- Big dreams and expectations but...
- internet standards (\$\$ and expertise)
 - small group of temporary volunteers
- Interviewing requires passion
- script + digressions
- Volunteer burn-out (or | enthusiasm)
- Still:
- Good, organized collection in safe place



Figure 2.7 Phases 1&2: Insights and Challenges

collection of valuable historical source materials in a safe place for future researchers to discover.

In the course of collecting materials for Phases 1&2, a few items were discovered that prompted the idea for an updated, census-like snapshot of the current Japanese / Japanese-Canadian community in the Edmonton area. These were the 1921 “Comprehensive list of Japanese Canadians” and the 1941 “Tairiku Nippo Japanese Name List” that had sections devoted to the Japanese community in Edmonton. While such lists including names, and often addresses, is not necessarily possible in our modern world of heightened privacy concerns, it was felt that something more akin to the Canadian national census might be feasible.

Such a survey, however, turned out to be a substantial effort and impossible to summarize in a short presentation. For this JSAC 2018 presentation, we have physical copies available for free if you would like your own copy (left over from our community distribution). In addition, a digital copy of the report is available through the <http://www.ejca.org/history-project.html> website as well as the UAlberta ERA repository at <https://doi.org/10.7939/R3Q814R6X>.

The digital copy has extra pages with all versions of the survey instruments that were not included in the physical copy for space reasons.

After much discussion about what sort of questions to include, four versions of the survey were created to reach a variety of audiences: English and Japanese language versions that could be completed either on paper or online through a Google form. The complete surveys and questions can be found on pages 236-284 of the electronic version. The survey was promoted in various ways including:

- newsletters (e.g. EJCA’s *Moshi Moshi* and Metro Edmonton Japanese Community School)

Phase 3: Survey

Inspiration:

- 1921: “The Comprehensive List of Japanese Canadians”
 - list of Japanese in Edmonton
 - biographies of some individuals
- 1941: Tairiku Nippo, Japanese Name List.

Goal: capture a census-like snapshot of present-day Japanese heritage in Edmonton




Figure 2.8 Phase 3: Survey

Phase 3 survey: Access

Preservation strategy:

- UAlberta Libraries Institutional Repository (ERA)
- Print copies in libraries and archives (and some homes).

notes:

- Electronic version has survey instruments included in the back
- Print version gives link to electronic
- Also a link on ejca.org website



Figure 2.9 Phase 3 Survey: Access

Survey details

Promotion

- newsletters (EJCA and Japanese school MEJCS)
- clubs and events
- restaurant posters
- EJCA community centre office display

4 versions

- English and Japanese
- Print and online (google forms)

Questionnaires on page 236- 284 of electronic version

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Figure 2.10 Survey Details

- various EJCA clubs and events
- posters in local Japanese restaurants
- bulletin board display at the EJCA centre.

The survey was presented in two parts: a quantitative section and a qualitative/narrative section. The quantitative section had 30 questions mostly of the multiple choice or very short answer type. Participants were not asked for any identifying information; responses were anonymized and presented in aggregate form. The qualitative/narrative section was as personal as respondents wished and was designed to elicit information similar to other local community histories which collected very specific and personal experiences, often by family. In addition to names, we prompted respondents to offer their year of birth, ancestral geography, reasons why they came to Edmonton, occupations, and how being Japanese may have influenced their lives.

To protect individual privacy related to questions in the first section, each respondent's survey was split into two parts and stored separately. As for translation, a decision was made to translate Japanese responses to English (and retain the original Japanese) but not to translate all the English responses to Japanese.

In the end, some 308 responses were received. About 2/3 were in Japanese and while 2/3 of respondents completed the whole survey, some answered only part 1 (quantitative) or part 2 (qualitative). It is difficult to say, however, how representative this is of the community considering the 2014 EJCA membership list shows 656 members (including children) and the 2001 Canadian Census indicated about 3650 people in the Edmonton area claiming some Japanese ancestry. Nevertheless, it does tell us something and the exercise in and of itself was a valuable undertaking.

As might be predicted, there was a wide variation in the extent of information provided in the voluntary narrative section. At one extreme, some responses preferred to remain anonymous and only offered up only where they came from (e.g., "Tokyo, Yokohama") and a very brief explanation of their reason for coming to Edmonton (e.g., "due to husband's work"). On the other hand, some responses were very extensive and involved great detail spanning several pages in the final book product.

Survey Sections:

- Part 1: quantitative
- 30 questions
 - No name required
 - (data later separated from part 2 which had names and personal information)
 - Page 7 - 33 of report
- Part 2: qualitative / narrative
- 10 questions, including
 - Name / Year of birth
 - Ancestral history
 - When and why came to Edmonton
 - Occupations
 - How has Japanese heritage influenced your life

11

Figure 2.11 Survey Sections

Survey Insights: narrative

From:


Anonymous (Surname / family name / 苗字 / 家族名)
 Anonymous (First name / given name / 名前)
 Ancestral History? 先代やあなたは日本のどこから来ましたか?
 東京、横浜 [Translation] Tokyo, Yokohama
 When and why did you or your family come to Edmonton? いつ、どうしてエドモントンへ来ましたか?
 主人の仕事のため [Translation] I came to Edmonton due to my husband's work.

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Figure 2.12 Survey Insights: Narrative

Survey Insights: narrative

To:



13

Figure 2.13 Survey Insights: Narrative

Although all Japanese responses were translated to English, the original Japanese text is also included; as noted above, however, it was decided not to translate all English responses to Japanese.

It is impossible in this short presentation to say much about the extensive quantitative section so it will have to suffice to say we created about 60 different graphs, charts, and tables from the 30 questions on the surveys. The original data is still available but, understandably, there are concerns about making it freely accessible to anyone.

Survey Insights: quantitative




Figure 2.14 Survey Insights: Quantitative

Survey Insights: quantitative




Figure 2.15 Survey Insights: Quantitative

2. REFLECTIONS AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS

Given the 2011 National Survey of Canada carried out by Statistics Canada found an estimated 3650 residents in the Edmonton area self-identified as having Japanese heritage but our 2013 survey garnered just over 300 responses, it seems that many residents in the Edmonton area with Japanese heritage remain “hidden.” In an effort to “unhide” them or consider what it means for them to be hidden, we present eight possible philosophical metaphors.

Reflections & Future

- Our sample of 290 is dominated by recent arrivals from Japan, mostly female.
- The rest of the 3400 JC residents in the Edmonton area remain “hidden”.
- Can we “unhide” them?
- 8 Metaphors to “unhide” the “hidden” Japanese Canadians.

Figure 2.16 Reflections & Future

2.1 Metaphor 1: A Snapshot

Our survey captured merely a “snapshot” of Japanese-Canadians living in the Edmonton area and a very uneven portrait of the actual number at that. In our snapshot, about 10% are in relatively clear focus with the rest maybe described as “dark, blurry blobs”—all we know is that they are out there somewhere. We could thus ask follow-up questions such as:

- What’s wrong with our “photographic technology”?
- Why is there so much blurry “darkness” almost everywhere?
- What can we do to improve, to “lighten up,” our “photo-sensitivity” to bring others into the picture?

Metaphor 1: A Snapshot

We got a snapshot of the 3400 Japanese Canadians living in the Edmonton area:

1. 290 (8% of the 3400) are in clear focus - our sample.
2. The rest (92% of the 3400) are just dark blurry blobs.
3. Why such huge blurry “darkness”?
4. Can we improve our “photo” technology?

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Figure 2.17 Metaphor 1: A Snapshot

2.2 Metaphor 2: Using the Canadian Census Snapshot

We might then examine the Statistics Canada methodology to come up with better ways to get “higher resolution” pictures of the Japanese-Canadian population residing in the Edmonton area and clarify some of those massive blurry “black holes.” However, the 2011 Canadian census project we had as an example had been changed from long-standing standards by the government of the day. The mandatory part of the census was restricted to the “short form” with minimal questions while the long-form questionnaire (the section with many of the more interesting questions) was made voluntary and renamed the National Household Survey. This resulted in dramatically higher **non-response** rates than previous years; for example, Alberta’s response rate was about 67% (i.e., 33% non-response) with Edmonton at about 30% non-response rate. Thus, even with the “best snapshot technology” and legislative backing, even Statistics Canada’s results have a massive blur. Is it possible for a tiny organization such as the Edmonton Japanese Community Association to do better than StatsCan? A huge challenge but possible? Should we consider some kind of return to fundamentals for our snapshot, or even a “paradigm shift” in how we analyze the community?

Metaphor 2: A Canadian Census Snapshot

- 2011 Canadian Census no longer mandatory,
- 30% - 40% “blackout” due to *non-response*
- Can we do better than StatsCan?
- *Change Metaphors?*

Back to BASICS

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Figure 2.18 Metaphor 2: A Canadian Census Snapshot

2.3 Metaphor 3: Back to Fundamentals: Energy/Matter

Apparently, energy/matter in the universe (as with other fundamentals such as coffee) comes in two “flavors”—regular and dark. According to physicists, **energy/matter** in the universe is distributed with 5% - 10% appearing as **Regular** and 90% - 95% as **Dark**. Interestingly, these percentages align with the distribution in our survey sample between respondents and apparent non-respondents (approximately 300 out of perhaps 3650).

Thus, our sampling dilemma can be rephrased as, How can we access the massive “**dark energy/matter**” that is so difficult to detect even for quantum physicists? We know the “dark energy/matter” is out there in the Edmonton area, StatsCan says so, but we don’t know how to “**enlighten**” it—render it **light** enough to be **detectable**. Currently this dark energy/matter, even though existing as “Japanese in the Edmonton area,” is **not** detectable as part of the Japanese **community** in the Edmonton area. Can we “enlighten” the dark stuff—render it sufficiently light/bright to be detectable?

Metaphor 3: Energy/Matter

- “Basic” enough?
- Energy/matter in the universe comes in 2 “flavors” *Regular* and *Dark*
- 5 - 10 % is *Regular* ; 90 - 95% is *Dark*
- Our sample of 290 is *Regular*: 8%
- Our “undetectable” is *Dark*: 92%?
- Can we “enlighten” the dark stuff -- make it light/bright enough to be detectable?

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Figure 2.19 Metaphor 3: Energy/Matter

2.4 Metaphor 4: Entangled Enlightenment—Our Dilemma and Our Opportunity?

Some followers of Buddhism, especially Zen Buddhism, suggest that **entanglement** is not only a fundamental property of quantum physics, it is also a fundamental property of Zen. Thus, is **Entangled Japanese-ness** out there but not aware of its own entanglement or, if aware, prefers to ignore it? Here then is our challenge: Can we use “enlightened entanglement” to help enlighten the dark Japanese stuff we know is “out there” but remains invisible to the Japanese-Canadian community?

Metaphor 4: Enlightened Entanglement: Our dilemma and our opportunity?

- Entanglement - a Fundamental property of *Quantum Physics*
- Can we use “enlightened entanglement” to help to enlighten the dark Japanese stuff?
- How to Enlighten?

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Figure 2.20 Metaphor 4: Enlightened Entanglement

2.5 Metaphor 5: There’s Magic in Fields

Even if we are not conversant with Maxwell’s field equations, we are all familiar with **electromagnetic fields** through photographs or displays of **individual** iron filings behaving as a “**community**” when they come under the influence of a magnetic field. Recently, a new field, the **Higgs Field**, was verified by physicists conducting experiments using the Hadron Collider. This discovery was a major “brick” in the verification of the so-called **Standard Model** of quantum physics.

Metaphor 5: “There’s Magic in them there Fields”

- Electromagnetic Fields - *Patterning* of particles: A “community” of particles. Now part of Physics 101.
- Higgs Field -- “cutting edge” field.
“The hunt for the source of dark matter is one of the most hotly anticipated searches of our time and the Higgs boson might be able to light the way to a possible dark matter discovery.”

<https://www.seeker.com/the-higgs-boson>

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Figure 2.21 Metaphor 5: “There’s Magic in Them There Fields”

“The hunt for the source of dark matter is one of the most hotly anticipated searches of our time and the Higgs boson might be able to **light the way** to a possible dark matter discovery.” [emphasis added] (www.seeker.com/the-higgs-boson)

This Higgs field pervades the entire universe and makes fundamental particles **detectable as mass**. Hypothetically, such **detection** applies to all kinds of entities whether regular or dark or even yellow. It provides support for the existence of other fields that “remain in the dark” such as undetectable Japanese-Canadians.

2.6 Metaphor 6: Social Fields (for Humans): From Quantum Fields to Social Fields in Order to Detect Community

The EJCA as a **Social Field** has the potential to **associate** individuals into a **Community**; this is what **social fields** do by their very nature. As with iron filings under the influence of a field, humans become aware that they are members of the larger community and that they themselves compose it just as it composes and recomposes them. Like a Higgs Field, however, can a social field render **social dark energy** detectable? Especially considering that about 92% of the **dark Japanese stuff** does NOT participate in a **Japanese-Canadian social field**. More explicitly, can the EJCA (or other Japanese Community Association) as a social field entice social dark stuff into a community by re-energizing **predispositions** existing latently but inactively in “dark Japanese Canadians”? This brings up two further questions:

1. Are “dark Japanese Canadians” at all **predisposed** to become Japanese community members?
2. How can we access/trigger/ignite/actualize predispositions latent in “dark Japanese” that, by virtue of being Japanese, are compatible with and supportive of a Japanese Community Field?

Metaphor 6: **Social Fields (for humans)**

- EJCA is a *social field* that *associates* individuals into a *community*.
- Can the *EJCA* as a *social field* entice social dark stuff into a *community* by actualizing *predispositions* latent in “dark Japanese Canadians”?



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Figure 2.22 Metaphor 6: Social Fields (for Humans)

2.7 Metaphor 7: Japanese “Aesthetic Predispositions” Already Sequenced in Nature

In the following, the verb “**sequenced**” should be read in the sense of genomic **sequencing**. There are several **Known predispositions** that are already **aesthetically sequenced** as indicating Japanese community: bonsai / Japanese garden / forest / Japanese community. In other words there is an aesthetic Japanese-ness that is already **organically sequenced** as Japanese community.

Metaphor 7: **Sequencing Japanese Predispositioning on Planet Earth**

“**Organically**” predisposed **Japanese aesthetic Sequencing**”

bonsai / garden / forest / Japan
 (“Japan” as an “organic/aesthetic” Community)

“**Socially**” predisposed **Jpn Canadian cultural Sequencing**”

Dark Japanese / EJCA / Social Field / Enlightened Entanglement
 (Japanese Canadians as a “socio/cultural” Community)



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Figure 2.23 Metaphor 7: Sequencing Japanese Predispositioning on Planet Earth

Is there, then, a sequence to convert **unknown** dark predispositions to be **socially sequenced** as Japanese community: e.g., dark Japanese / EJCA / Social Field / Japanese community. That is, can dark Japanese-ness be **socially sequenced** into Japanese community? In this case, our claim could be that these two sequences, the “organic-aesthetic” and the “socio-cultural,” are **equivalent** (\approx) even though the paths taken are different. Stated explicitly as equivalent sequences: this would render as
 [bonsai / garden / forest /Japan] \approx [dark Japanese / EJCA / Social Field / Japanese community]

2.8 Metaphor 8: Enlightened Entanglement

Can enlightened entanglement be actualized as “edited socio-cultural sequencing” and what might this entail? This question begs for a paradigm shift into “onto-epistemology” and suggests Magoroh Maruyama’s work on **Mindscaping** as a major component on an enlightened path into socio-aesthetic-cultural sequencing. Accessing such paths by “laying them down” as we walk depends mightily on how we walk, both as “me, myself, and I” and as a participant in “socio-aesthetic-cultural sequencing.” Riding on the shoulders of Maruyama and several others, one of us is attempting to write a book on “holonomic socio-aesthetic-cultural sequencing” as a way of walking here on planet earth or even in the uni- or multi-verse. Such a book might have a subtitle as grandiose as “A Journey into Consciousness”. It might even become one of thousands such books that fade into dark blurry blackness never to be detected. Nevertheless, could **such** a book be written in **such** a way so as to escape **such** a fate? Indeed, if “such suchness” is mentioned often enough it might foment a sequence! Said once more, are there paths ahead that “Japan” could lay down but thus far has not walked?

Thank you for your attention through two very distinct explorations into our project—the first half being very descriptive and the second very philosophical. We hope it has inspired you to dig into our collection and to look at the process through a deep philosophical lens. We are both more than willing to be contacted and share more with anyone so inclined.




Figure 2.24 Metaphor 8: Enlightened Entanglement

3. TRANSLATION WITHOUT WORDS: WHAT KYŌGEN CAN TELL US ABOUT SAMUEL BECKETT'S TOLERANCE FOR ADAPTATION

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ABSTRACT

Samuel Beckett (1906-1989) is known for his strict expectations for performers to heed to the specifications of his playtexts. However, he is also known for his work as a translator, a job which many would agree requires a nuanced understanding of the necessity of adaptation. Considering this, is it possible for one to discover at what point, for Beckett, necessary alterations become superfluous personal liberties? Particularly in cases of theatre, it is important to consider not only the linguistic translation of the written text, but also the adaptations of the performed text. In an attempt to address this question, this paper examines Noho Theater's adaptation of Samuel Beckett's *Act Without Words I* (1982). Through this case study, I investigate the boundary between translation and adaptation, and challenge the understanding of the text-stage relationship in the performing arts.

The paper begins with an examination of Beckett's style as a translator of his own works. In order to explore this concretely, I compare *Act Without Words I* and *Acte sans paroles I* (1957), to see the types of liberties Beckett took during the translation process. It also incorporates scholarship from experts in the field of Beckett's self-translation practices. It then investigates Noho Theater's adaptation, *Kotoba naki koi I*, and the challenges faced by the troupe in converting the work across cultures. Contrary to what might be expected of a radical adaptation of one of Beckett's works, Beckett was overall supportive and responded positively to Noho's works, so long as he found artistic liberties to be within reason. Finally, I propose a reading of Noho Theater's adaptations as an act of translation. Just as the written script was translated from English to Japanese, the actions on stage required a translation from one somatic language to another. This is particularly visible in the fixed physical style of classical Japanese theatres such as Kyogen. Through this, I propose that perhaps Beckett remained tolerant of adaptations of his works, provided that they were approached as cultural translations rather than reinvented for new purposes. I also suggest that this case study be considered preliminary research for what might

potentially be a larger investigation incorporating Noho Theater's entire canon of Beckett adaptations as well as a more in-depth analysis of their approach and process. Furthermore, I suggest an analysis of published reviews of their performances in order to see how the productions were received by both critics and popular audiences.

Keywords: Japanese premodern theatre, performance studies, kyogen, Beckett, translation, adaptation.

1. INTRODUCTION

Even from my earliest exposures to the Irish author and playwright Samuel Beckett (1906-1989), I was made painfully aware, usually from snide comments or passing remarks, that, while he was alive, he was notorious for having an iron-clad grasp on his works and even after his passing, his estate has carried on his wishes to have his texts strictly adhered to.¹ All stage directions must be followed and staging major discrepancies from the original text, for example, cross-gendered casting, will run you the risk of having the rights pulled and your run cancelled. But what does a (perhaps grumpy), strict, modern Irish playwright have to do with Japanese traditional theatre? According to Jonah Salz and Akira Shigeyama, the co-founders of Noho Theatre Group—everything.

Noho Theatre Group, a multicultural theatre troupe that specializes in *nōgaku* adaptations of western theatrical texts, among other transcultural theatre performances, found themselves particularly drawn to the works of Beckett over the years. One might postulate that the merging of two such contextually different genres might be artificial or forced, but dark humour and the follies of humans are themes explored regularly in both theatres. Therefore, *kyōgen* is a vessel already equipped to manage the overarching themes of Beckett's works and perhaps, as Shigeyama puts it, his view on life (*jinseikan*).² Their staging of various Beckett plays over the years included *Act Without Words I & II*, *Rockaby*, *Ohio Impromptu*, and *Quad I & II*. Of these interpretations, *Act Without Words I*, a short mime piece for a single actor, was the first play that Noho Theatre produced. While Salz indicated that this choice was dictated by his limited Japanese language ability at the time³—his Japanese was not yet at the level where he felt comfortable managing both a physical and linguistic translation on the stage simultaneously—this piece does make for an interesting “introduction piece” to transnational and transcultural adaptations of Beckett to Japanese audience. Salz had also hypothesized that as a piece without a verbal script, *Act Without Words I* (or *kotoba naki kōi I*, in Japanese), would be more accessible to international audiences.⁴ Furthermore, Salz has stated,

Beckett was aware of these productions and gave approval for them to be done only in Japan, or in Japanese when we went abroad... He understood our idea of translating culturally was a valid way to transmit his plays but he didn't want that to be the only version that people had in mind. And when I showed him some photos and wrote to him he was rather... understanding and sympathetic to what

¹ Personal observation, Classes at the University of Alberta (DRAMA 308 [Fall 2013] & DRAMA 409 [Winter 2014]).

² Akira Shigeyama, personal interview with author, July 23, 2018.

³ Jonah Salz, personal interview with author, September 18, 2018.

⁴ Jonah Salz, personal interview with author, September 18, 2018.

we were trying to do. Within limits.⁵

I will touch on the conditional approval contingent on these productions remaining Japanese exclusive in just a moment; however this depiction of Beckett by Salz paints the author as a relatively reasonable, perhaps even supporting playwright, rather contradictory from the image I had been primed to before. So what then made such adaptations acceptable to the man infamous for his scrupulous management of his works? I believe the answer is contained in Salz's key phrasing that he "understood [their] idea of translating culturally."⁶

It is important to note that Beckett's approval was by no means based solely on this understanding of and leniency towards cultural translation. As Salz explained, Beckett imposed the condition that the Noho performances of his works must either be in Japan, or when performed abroad, such as at the 1982 Edinburgh Fringe Festival, they were to be performed only in the Japanese language. Salz suggested that this was because he felt the reach of Japanese performances was not overly impactful to the distribution of his plays.⁷ Beckett still obviously wanted to maintain control over the Western language staging of his works. Nevertheless, he permitted these adaptations and in fact showed enough interest to meet with Salz on two separate occasions to discuss the productions. Additionally, it is feasible to consider that perhaps Beckett equated the Japanese language as a necessary part of the cultural translations in order to maintain their cultural integrity.

2. BECKETT AS A SELF-TRANSLATOR

Beckett, known far and wide for being inflexible in many ways, was himself a translator who, consequently, was acutely aware of the necessary creativity and concessions required for a successful translation. Successful translation, particularly when dealing with literary works, requires the translator to simultaneously maintain a thorough understanding of not just the linguistic elements of the source text, but its symbols, allegories, and over all affect, in addition to a thorough understanding of the target language and culture. In Raymond Federman's chapter "The Writer as Self-Translator" he states that complete analysis of Beckett's translations would require not simply a comparison of the "rhythmic and phonetic patterns of the two texts" but also what he classifies as "resonances and equivalences."⁸ According to Federman, by resonances and equivalences he means not only "how certain linguistic elements are transformed in the process of translation, but also how certain cultural, philosophical, and literary allusions, even quotations, are not simply translated but transposed into a French or English context to produce a totally different set of cultural, philosophical, or literary connotations."⁹

On the one hand, there is evidence that Beckett's particularity was sustained not just from the page to the stage, but from book to *livre*, or vice-versa. Translating all but one of his own

⁵ Jonah Salz, "Noho Theatre Group ACT WITHOUT WORDS 1," YouTube, April 25, 2010, accessed on October 3, 2018, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mFkrdBwhvMM> (Please note that the quote transcribed above omits fillers and instances where the speaker revises himself.)

⁶ Salz, "Noho Theatre Group ACT WITHOUT WORDS 1."

⁷ Jonah Salz, personal interview with author, September 18, 2018.

⁸ Raymond Federman, "The Writer as Self-Translator," in *Beckett Translating/Translating Beckett*, ed. Alan Warren Friedman, Charles Rossman, and Dina Sherzer (University Park and London: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1987), 13.

⁹ Federman, "The Writer as Self-Translator," 13.

works independently¹⁰ was obviously a deliberate choice to give himself the final say over the end result of his work. He was even said to have monitored the Italian and German translations closely,¹¹ drawing on his knowledge of those languages, which he acquired in his youth. On the other hand, as a self-translator, Beckett is known among bilingual readers as having a translative practice that is “extraordinary adaptive.”¹² For example, his translations have been known to take extreme liberties with literary references. Hokenson and Munson observe, “Voltaire becomes Berkeley in *Malone Dies*, [and] a line from Baudelaire becomes a line from Shakespeare in *Endgame*.”¹³ The overarching trend seems that Beckett’s earlier translations are closer in tone, syntax, etc. than later works,¹⁴ perhaps suggesting that his translation philosophy became more tolerant or even gained preference for major cultural or linguistic adaptations in order to successfully communicate his original intentions over time. Even in one of his most famous works, *Endgame*, there appears to be a “displacement of meaning” in the translation process which, according to Federman, might suggest a shift of moral attitude or temperament.”¹⁵ It is important to note, particularly in the case of self-translations, but perhaps potentially an attitude that may be applied towards external translation as well, that they should not be seen as “an approximation of the original, or a duplication, or a substitute, but a continuation of the work, or workings of the text.”¹⁶ Translations are often considered secondary to the original text; however in instances of self-translation, the authority given to the original author must be applied to both texts. One cannot arguably give one precedent as the “correct” version over the other.

Even in what may be the most “straightforward” translation, *Acte sans paroles I/Act Without Words I*, there are discrepancies. The idea may be that translating a short series of stage directions from French to English seems hardly a challenging or creative task, let alone one requiring major liberties to be taken in the translation process. In fact, a parallel reading of the English and French texts reveals that they are, for the most part, very literally translated. For example,

Acte sans paroles I (1957):

“Une petite carafe, munie d’une grande étiquette rigide portant l’inscription EAU, descend des cintres, s’immobilise à trois mètres du sol.”¹⁷

Act Without Words I (1958):

“A tiny carafe, to which is attached a huge label inscribed WATER, descends from flies, comes to rest some tree yards from the ground.”¹⁸

As one can see above, there are few minor discrepancies (for example, the converting of “meters” to “yards”) but overall, it remains quite consistent. The actions are announced in the

¹⁰ Jan Walsh Hokenson and Marcella Munson, ed., *The Bilingual Text: History and Theory of Literary Self-Translation* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 189.

¹¹ Walsh Hokenson, *The Bilingual Text*, 191.

¹² Walsh Hokenson, *The Bilingual Text*, 191.

¹³ Walsh Hokenson, *The Bilingual Text*, 196.

¹⁴ Federman, “The Writer as Self-Translator,” 15.

¹⁵ Federman, “The Writer as Self-Translator,” 10.

¹⁶ Federman, “The Writer as Self-Translator,” 14-15.

¹⁷ Samuel Beckett, *Fin de partie, suivi de Acte sans parole* (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1957), 119.

¹⁸ Samuel Beckett, *Endgame: a play in one act, followed by Act Without Words: a mime for one player* (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1958), 88.

same order, no action is missing or added in the English version, the carafe remains a carafe, and even the word “water” is capitalized in both versions. However, even *Act Without Words I* is not free from major omissions. In the original French, the set up to the scene is presented as followed (with English translation in brackets):¹⁹

PERSONNAGE (CHARACTER) :

Un homme. Geste familier : il plie et déplie son mouchoir. (A man. Familiar gesture: he folds and unfolds his handkerchief.)

SCÈNE (SCENE): Désert. Eclairage éblouissant. (Desert. Dazzling light.)

ACTION (ACTION):

Projeté à reculons de la coulisse droite, l’homme trébuche, tombe, se relève aussitôt, s’époussette, réfléchit. (Thrown backward from the right wing, the man trips, falls, stands up immediately, dusts himself, reflects.)²⁰

The first part of the English translation, released within a year of its French counterpart, begins:

Desert. Dazzling light.

The man is flung backwards on stage from right wing. He falls, gets up immediately, dusts himself, turns aside, reflects.²¹

Here we see a slight change of structure, but more importantly, two omissions and an addition between the two texts. Both the handkerchief and the man tripping are removed and the action “turns aside” is added before he reflects. These changes could be the result of a variety of reasons; cultural adaptation, linguistic adaptation, or even revisions after having seen this first run of the production brought to life on stage. However, the reasons for which these changes were made are of less interest to this paper than the fact that these changes exist at all, as they provide a concrete example of the concessions Beckett made himself on this work before we examine the translation process of Noho Theatre Group.

3. NOHO’S TRANSLATION AND BECKETT’S RESPONSE

It is clear from the very first point of contact with this piece, the title, that translating *Act Without Words I* into Japanese will without a doubt raise problems that are not observed when transitioning from French to English. In the Japanese version of the title *kotoba naki kōi I*, the pun on the word “act” (referring to both actions, as well as an act of a theatrical performance), which easily translates from French to English, is lost as the translator must drop one of the meanings in favour of the other. In this case, the importance was placed on the meaning of “actions” rather than the reference to an act of the theatre. More important, however, than the linguistic casualties for this piece are the physical alterations that were necessary to facilitate a smooth cultural translation. Especially translating between two vastly different cultures, there was bound to be some major alterations necessitated. After all, at the foundation of Saussure’s theory of semiotics, the signifier is arbitrarily linked to the object, concept or notion that it is

¹⁹ English translations in parentheses are translations by the author unless otherwise stated.

²⁰ Beckett, *Fin de partie*, 117.

²¹ Beckett, *Endgame*, 87.

signifying.²² One part of *Act Without Words I* that posed a problem for direct translation was:

He looks at his hands, looks around for the scissors, sees them, goes and picks them up, starts to trim his nails, stops, reflects, runs his finger along the blade of scissors, goes and lays them on the cube, turns aside, opens his collar, frees his neck and fingers it.

The small cube is pulled up and disappears in flies, carrying away rope and scissors.

He turns to take scissors, sees what has happened

He turns aside, reflects.²³

During the rehearsal process, Shigeyama noted that this gesture would not work in a Japanese, and particularly traditional Japanese, theatrical context as the image of suicide by cutting one's throat was deeply linked with the suicide of a samurai's wife. Since the character was a man, this action would have to be altered. They instead opted to use the scissors, already present on stage as a part of the previous actions, and have the man prepare to commit ritual suicide known as *hara-kiri*.²⁴

Though a seemingly drastic modification to the original texts, Beckett, when informed about this creative choice, was content with Noho Theatre Group's final staging. Beckett had been known to express his displeasure with Salz's creative decisions on other matters (the usage of a *nō* actor to represent a diseased wife) as well as lay down technical restrictions on performances (only the use of percussion instruments, in one instance); however, the double translation of slitting one's throat to *hara-kiri*, and then from that concept to its stylization for the *nō* stage, managed to satisfy Beckett's expectation for the work.²⁵ On the other hand, the harshest critique came from Japanese audiences who felt that *hara-kiri*, as a ritualized death linked with the samurai class, did not depict the everyday man that the protagonist of *Act Without Words I* is supposed to be representative of.²⁶

4. TEXTUAL TRANSLATION

I would also propose that while there were many acts of cultural translation importing *Act Without Words I* into *Kyōgen* as examined above, the process on the whole was also a type of linguistic translation. As I argue in my thesis "Treading in the Formaldehyde of Tradition: *Kata* as Somatic Text in the Japanese *Nō* and *Kyōgen* Theatres," the physical patterns (*kata*) which are performed on the *Nōgaku* (*nō* and *kyōgen* theatres) stage and preserved through direct teacher-student transmission can be read as a "somatic text:"

While traditional text is written through the medium of ink on paper, a somatic text is one that is written through the medium of movements through the body. The specific movements within *kata* can be likened to words, which, when strung together in a specific order, create a physical text and the transmission of this text is one that relies wholly on the learning, repetition, and transmission of these

²² Mark Fortier, *Theory/Theatre: An Introduction* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 20.

²³ Beckett, *Act Without Words I*, 90.

²⁴ Jonah Salz, personal interview with author, September 18, 2018.

²⁵ Jonah Salz, personal interview with author, September 18, 2018.

²⁶ Jonah Salz, personal interview with author, September 18, 2018.

movements by their practitioners.²⁷

From these texts develops of a sort of literacy in those that have been thoroughly trained in it, such as Shigeyama Akira, who would have been immersed in the genre from the time he was a child. It is with this literacy in *kyōgen kata* that Shigeyama was able to develop the appropriate gestures to facilitate the translation of Beckett to the stage.

As a purely stage directional piece, *Act Without Words I* always makes a transition from the linguistic to the physical; however, when, for lack of better term, a “standard”²⁸ adaptation is performed, the written text is being transferred into a corporeal blank slate. This blank slate which, if not pre-programmed to perform in a specific somatic language, is at minimum the type of body for whom the piece was written. A shift of dialect, rather than language, if you will. However, in the case of transition from text into *kyōgen*, the actions dictated by the script must be negotiated to fit the traditional language into which it is being transposed.

5. THE BIGGER PICTURE

This brings us to the question, “what can we take away from this?” Perhaps examining Noho Theatre Group’s translations of Beckett’s works, particularly *Act Without Words I*, can help reframe Beckett’s intentions for his works. Thinking in the contexts of the transmission of traditional texts, it is possible that we can shed new light on Beckett’s restrictions regarding his extra-textual instructions. Perhaps Beckett was attempting, in the only way he knew how, to preserve what he considered to be the crucial *kata* of his texts for future performances.

Taking things one step further, this may help us to re-evaluate the dialogue-stage direction and even text-performance hierarchies. Throughout my theatre education, I was taught to ignore or eliminate pre-designated stage direction from the script before pursuing a scene study. This led me to believe that this was the expectation and professional standard.²⁹ But if this were the case, why would playwrights bother to include direction in their writing at all? While understanding the post-modern instinct to reject the logocentric philosophies of the preceding generations, one might also question if rejecting linear text in performance entirely is simply flipping the hierarchy as opposed to abolishing it. However, rather than doing away with stage directions or entire texts, perhaps contemporary thespians could reimagine the purpose of these literary devices and rather than considering them restrictive elements preventing them from achieving their visions, they could instead consider them clues or hints as to the kind of piece the initial author intended them to have.

Perhaps, by seeing themselves as “translators” as opposed to “adaptors,” this could potentially even out the theatrical hierarchy. The director, by staging a text, enters a contract with the playwright, and for every ounce of authority given to the playwright, they are rewarded with a respect for their decisions that, in theory, are made in good faith and interpretation. Seeing the text not as the holder of the transcendental truth of any given piece, but rather as a gateway to the intentions of the playwright brings us back to the fundamentally collaborative nature of theatre. Though not necessarily “self-translation,” I believe that Federman’s notion that the “translation” of a work should not be seen as “an approximation of the original, or a duplication, or a

²⁷ Jane Traynor, “Treading in the Formaldehyde of Tradition: *Kata* as Somatic Text in the Japanese Nō and Kyōgen Theatres” (master’s thesis, University of Alberta, 2017), 4.

²⁸ By which I mean a performance aiming to stage the texts as is, not in what would be defined as “experimental,” “fusion” or “avant-garde.”

²⁹ Personal observation, Classes at the University of Alberta (DRAMA 150 [Fall 2011] & DRAMA 257 [Fall 2012]).

substitute, but a continuation of the work, or workings of the text”³⁰ can also be applied to theatrical pieces, for any play text is only a half-realized piece of art until it is brought to life on the stage.

6. CONCLUSIONS AND POINTS OF DEPARTURE

In summary, it is possible from the analysis included above to postulate that Beckett’s tolerance for “adaptation” seems to find its limits within what he considered reasonable acts of “translation.” From here, one might also consider a reframing of perspective towards Beckett’s works and perhaps even his artistic intentions. While this research investigation has proven to be an intriguing start to a research project wider than the scope of this paper, it ultimately remains quite preliminary and has opened my eyes to various other areas worth of investigation.

First and foremost, a more thorough investigation of Noho Theatre Group’s entire repertoire of Beckett works would perhaps produce a fuller understanding of the translation system that Shigeyama Akira took to his adaptations. Preferably this would be done through more interviews with the practitioners and detailed analysis of any remaining video footage and photographs. Ideally one of these interviews would be performed with both Salz and Shigeyama present in the presence of visual materials as memory triggers.

Furthermore, it would be worthwhile to consider the reception of Noho Theatre Group’s performances in further detail both in Japan and abroad. Reviews and critiques of performances would help shed light on the success or impact of the performances locally and the perceptions or misperceptions of Beckett scholars and fans from around the globe. No matter how big or small the overall impact these adaptations may or may not have had, they are now a part of the canon of Beckett reception and should be included in the critical discourse as such.

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³⁰ Federman, “The Writer as Self-Translator,” 14-15.

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4. FORTY YEARS AFTER THE CHINA-JAPAN TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP: REFLECTIONS ON CHANGING ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS

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ABSTRACT

The 40th anniversary of the 1978 China-Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 2018 provides an occasion to reflect on bilateral economic and commercial relations between these countries. Rather than applying universal and deterministic models of international trade relations, this analysis underscores the evolution of Japanese perceptions of, and reactions to, Chinese commercial opportunities and competition. Four distinct periods within the last 40 years or so can be recognized. In the first, Japanese images of its trade and commercial relationship with China were ingrained within traditional “core-periphery” notions. In the second period, Japan realigned its aims towards nurturing the modernization of China along the “flying-geese” model of Asia-Pacific development. The third period commenced after China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001 when it was seen as a growing economic and geo-political competitor. In 2018, perceptions of the economic and commercial relationship by the Japan side changed yet again. On the 40th anniversary of the 1978 Treaty there was anticipation that relations between the two countries were “back on track,” and that a new era of cooperation might emerge, reflecting the spirit and original intentions of the Treaty. The paper also points to the important role taken by Japan’s relationship with the USA during the past 40 years.

Keywords: Japan, China, 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, economic and commercial relations.

1. INTRODUCTION

Over 40 years ago the first post-War peace treaty was concluded between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Japan on August 12th, 1978. The China-Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship (*Nihonkoku to Chūka Jinmin Kyōwakoku to no aida no Heiwa Yūkō Jōyaku*) was signed in Beijing by Huang Hua (1913-2010), Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China (PRC), and Sunao Sonoda (1913-1984), Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan. The Treaty went into effect on October 23, 1978, with the state visit of Vice Premier of the PRC, Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997), to Japan, hosted by Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo (1905-1995). Lee¹ notes that the terms of the Treaty document were hammered out with a particular emphasis on China-Japan commercial relations, based on the political insights of the times by leaders from both sides. Today, the 1978 Treaty can be seen as a prominent event, not just in terms of bilateral ties but also regarding the political map of the Asia-Pacific region. Throughout the past 40 years or so the relationship between China and Japan has made remarkable progress despite some twists and turns and severe tests, including reversals of growth in trade and the falling off of direct foreign investment (DFI) as well as technology transfer. Indeed, prior to improvements that commenced in 2018, relations between the two countries had soured for years due to tense diplomatic disputes over the control of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea, as well as wartime issues, such as official Japanese history text books and visits to the Yasukuni shrine by the Japanese Prime Minister and politicians.² Nonetheless, as both countries prepared to mark the Treaty's 40th anniversary there was a growing momentum for improved ties between China and Japan. In the event, Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzō (in office, 2006-2007, and 2012 -) met with Chinese President Xi Jinping (assumed office in 2012) in Beijing during October 2018 to commemorate the occasion. This was the first full-scale Chinese-Japanese summit since 2011 and the emphasis was again largely on business ties.³

This essay reflects on the 40 years of Chinese-Japanese relations since the 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship with a particular emphasis on how economic and commercial relations have shifted in this period, primarily from the viewpoint of Japan. Reflecting the overall theme of the JSAC 2018 Conference: "Images, Perceptions and Reactions of Japan in the World/The World's Japan," I take an approach to interpreting this 40-year period with a framework that is historically contingent, one that depends on particular circumstances together with Japanese representations of the relationship, and how these have evolved over time. The analysis underscores that Japanese calculations of economic relations with China have never been set in

¹ Chae-Jin Lee, "The Making of the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty," *Pacific Affairs* 52 (1979): 420-445.

² Toshiya Hoshino and Haruko Satoh, "Through the Looking Glass? China's Rise as Seen From Japan," *Journal of Asian Public Policy* 5 (2012): 181-198.

³ Norihiko Shirouzu and Philip Wen, "China, Japan to Forge Closer Ties at 'Historic Turning Point,'" *Reuters*, October 25, 2018. Accessed March, 2019. <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-china-japan-ties/china-japan-to-forge-closer-ties-at-historic-turning-point-idUKKCN1N00B1>.

stone. They have shifted over time and can be marked by distinct stages.⁴ As Hilpert⁵ observed, traditional political and economic assessments of the China-Japan relationship are often unjustifiably pessimistic or unduly optimistic, as they miss the nuances of government responses to events and the roles of individual firms. For instance, a traditional (rationalist) political science view of the China-Japan relationship might conclude the differences between these country's national interests have been fundamentally irreconcilable.⁶ This is despite a cultural interpretation of the relationship that emphasizes ancient bonds and similarities—geographical proximity, shared customs, culture and religion as well as a history of bilateral exchanges stretching back to the Tang dynasty.⁷ Hilpert⁸ goes on to note that a traditional (neo-liberal) economist would likely come to alternative, more positive, but also over-simplistic interpretations of the relationship, based on an understanding of the complementary nature of resources endowments between the two countries. Thus, it is often noted that Japan possesses the technology and human skills for China's modernization and industrialization while China has abundant natural resources and cheap labor as well as a fast-growing market, signaling (potential) unlimited opportunities to enhance joint welfare by increasing bilateral trade and intensifying economic integration.⁹

By contrast to these deterministic models of international trade relations, I emphasize that Japanese perceptions of, and reactions to, Chinese commercial opportunities and competition changed markedly over the 40 years. This analysis draws from existing scholarship on China-Japan economic interactions by historians, economists and other social scientists, as well as press reports that covered the 40th-year anniversary of the 1978 Treaty during 2018. I argue that Japanese images of its trade and commercial relationship with China were rooted initially within traditional “core-periphery” notions, in part a legacy from the pre-World War II era. Yet, these evolved during the 1980s as Japan's motives shifted towards nurturing the modernization of China. Japan's basic stance towards China following the Treaty was based on a perceived mutually-beneficial “flying geese”-style pattern of increased trade, investment and technological assistance to China, and framed within broader Japanese goals of Asia-Pacific regional development.¹⁰ After the year 2000, however, China became the only East Asian country to emerge largely unscathed from the financial crisis of 1997-98, and was seen as a growing

⁴ Akio Takahara, “Forty-four Years of Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Relations Since Normalization,” in *China-Japan Relations in the 21st Century: Antagonism Despite Interdependency*, ed. Lam Peng Er. (London: Routledge, 2017), 25-65.

⁵ Hanns Günther Hilpert, “China and Japan: Conflict or Cooperation? What Does Trade Data Say?,” in *Japan and China: Cooperation, Competition and Conflict*, ed. Hanns Günther Hilpert and René Haak (Basingstoke, Hants: Palgrave: 2002), 32-51.

⁶ See, for example, Linus Hagström, *Japan's China Policy: A Relational Power Analysis* (Oxford: Routledge, 2005); Richard C. Bush, *The Perils of Proximity: China-Japan Security Relations* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute Press, 2010); and Yew Meng Lai, *Nationalism and Power Politics in Japan's Relations with China: A Neoclassical Realist Interpretation* (London: Routledge, 2014).

⁷ Akira Iriye, ed., *The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980).

⁸ Hilpert, “China and Japan.”

⁹ See, for example, C.H. Kwan, “The Rise of China as an Economic Power: Implications for Asia and Japan,” in *Japan and China*, 12-31.

¹⁰ T.J. Pempel, “Transpacific Torii: Japan and the Emerging Asian Regionalism,” in *Network Power: Japan and Asia*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein and Shiraishi Takashi (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 47-82; Walter F. Hatch, *Asia's Flying Geese: How Regionalization Shapes Japan* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010).

competitor to Japan in the region. This mounting rivalry between Japan and China led to diplomatic disruptions, worsening economic relations and a potential “decoupling” of bilateral trade and investment flows. In 2018, perceptions of the “China business” by the Japan side changed yet again. On the 40th anniversary of the 1978 Treaty there was anticipation that relations between the two countries were “back on track,” and that a new era of cooperation might emerge, reflecting the spirit and original intentions of the Treaty. The paper also points to the important role taken by Japan’s relationship with the USA during the past 40 years.

The remainder of this paper is divided into five sections. The following section covers the first 20 or so years after the signing of the 1978 Treaty, in which a number of Japanese mechanisms were used to support China’s modernization. It notes the importance of government official development assistance (ODA), loans and technology transfer, as well as private sector trade and foreign investment. The next section focuses on the “dangerous years” from around 2000 to 2017, a period when several political disputes came to the fore, and when China emerged as a formidable challenger to Japan in the Asia-Pacific region. Markers of this new era of competition included not only commercial rivalry between Japanese and Chinese corporations, but also enmity over economic influence in the wider region. The subsequent section then discusses the events and turnaround of economic relations 2018 and offers some speculative observations where China-Japan economic and commercial ties might develop in the future.

2. THE 1978 TREATY AND THE “GOLDEN YEARS”: 1978-2000

The events leading up to the 1978 Treaty commenced with an unprecedented visit to China by Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei (1918–1993) on Sept. 25, 1972, just seven months after U.S. President’s Richard Nixon’s week-long trip to China in February 1972.¹¹ Four days later, after meetings with Chinese leader Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai, the two governments issued a “Japan-China Joint Communique” restoring diplomatic relations after over 40 years of confrontation and ideological conflict left over from the 1937-45 War of Resistance between the two countries and as well as the Cold War.¹² This political declaration underscored “the ending of abnormal relations between Japan and China”, recognized the People’s Republic of China as the “sole government of China” and renounced any claims for World War II reparations. The communique also included Japan’s deep reflection on war responsibilities, and its firm adherence to the “One-China” policy recognizing Taiwan as part of China.¹³ After first attaining normalization of diplomatic ties in this way the principles of the bilateral joint statement were then embodied in the more comprehensive Treaty of Peace and Friendship, negotiations for which

¹¹ Chae-Jin Lee, *China and Japan; New Economic Diplomacy* (Stanford CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1984).

¹² Yoshihide Soeya, “Japan’s Relations with China,” in *The Golden Age of the U.S.-China-Japan Triangle*, ed. Ezra F. Vogel, Yuan Ming, and Akihiko Tanaka (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002), 210-228; Jesse Johnson, “Ahead of Abe’s Visit to Beijing a Look at Japan-China Ties Through the Years,” *The Japan Times*, October 21, 2018. Accessed March, 2019. <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/10/21/national/politics-diplomacy/ahead-abes-visit-beijing-look-japan-china-ties-years/#.XMSPMi0ZM-c>.

¹³ Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *1972 Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China*, no date. Accessed March, 2019. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/joint72.html>.

started in 1974 when a trade agreement between China and Japan was made.¹⁴ Many commentators at the time saw the 1978 Treaty as a long-term legal framework and policy to develop commercial arrangements in the future. The treaty summed up the history of bilateral ties, affirmed in legal form the principles of the China-Japan Joint Statement, made clear that the two countries should develop durable relations of peace and friendship, and laid a solid political and legal foundation for the sound and stable development of bilateral ties.¹⁵ Pressing political and territorial disputes at that time, such as over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands in the East China Sea, were shelved for future resolution.¹⁶

What sort of commercial arrangements existed at the start of 1978? Lee¹⁷ notes that post-war bilateral trade between China and Japan had already commenced following the Sino-Soviet break in 1956. Indeed, Japanese trading companies, such as Mitsui and Mitsubishi, were well aware of the potential of the Chinese market for sales of Japanese plant and machinery. Indeed, before the advent of the Cultural Revolution disrupted commerce in the mid-1960s, the amount of bilateral trade between Japan and mainland China exceeded that between Japan and Taiwan.¹⁸ Moreover, the two oil crises of the 1970s led to the Japanese side taking a strong interest in China's natural resources, especially its oil and coal resources, since Japan was keen to diversify its sources of energy imports.¹⁹ The 1978 Treaty was perceived as an important agreement that was expected to continue economic and commercial relations along a "traditional vertical international division of labor" or a "core-periphery" model, one based around the exchange of raw materials for advanced manufactured products.²⁰

According to this viewpoint, in order to fulfill its goals of rapid industrialization China would import modern technology, plants and construction materials, as well as other equipment from Japan, and it would pay Japan back with increased exports of natural energy resources in the form of oil and coal. In addition, Japanese financial capital was also expected to be used to fund an expansion of China's energy resource developments so that Japan's needs could be satisfied.²¹ In fact, patterns of trade at the start of the 1980s appeared to support the themes of the core-periphery model. For instance, at the time when China had just begun its economic reform program the larger portion of China's exports to Japan indeed consisted of raw materials, such as mineral fuels (54.9 percent), while manufactured goods accounted for only 22.6 percent (in 1980).²² Zhang²³ notes that the energy trade with Japan was facilitated by a Chinese government monopoly in coal and oil production and arbitrary low domestic energy prices at that time. By comparison, labor-

¹⁴ Lee, "Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty". See also Tomozo Morino, "China-Japan Trade and Investment Relations," *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science* 38 no. 2 (1991): 87-94.

¹⁵ Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship Between Japan and the People's Republic Of China*, no date. Accessed March, 2019. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/treaty78.html>; Ryo Kokubun, "The Shifting Nature of Japan-China Relations After the Cold War," in *Japan's Relations With China: Facing a Rising Power*, ed Lam Peng Er London: Routledge, 2006), 21-36.

¹⁶ Yun Zhang, *Sino-Japanese Relations in a Trilateral Context: Origins of Misperception* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).

¹⁷ Lee, *China and Japan*.

¹⁸ Takahara, "Forty-four Years."

¹⁹ R.A. Morse, *The Politics of Japan's Energy Strategy Resources—Diplomacy—Security*, Research Papers and Policy Studies No. 3, Institute of East Asian Studies (Berkeley: University of California, 1981).

²⁰ Lee, *China and Japan*.

²¹ Lee, "Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty."

²² Kwan, "The Rise of China as an Economic Power."

²³ Zhang, *Sino-Japanese Relations*.

intensive exports, for example in textiles and clothing, were constrained due to the Chinese government's overriding emphasis on heavy industry (e.g., steel and petrochemicals) as a means of modernization.

In the event, economic connections between the two countries grew dramatically following the Treaty, and the volume of two-way trade increased five-fold by the start of the 1990s.²⁴ Even more distinctive in the immediate post-Treaty era was the introduction of several government-to-government agreements on technology transfer, plant exports from Japan to China, scientific exchanges and financial cooperation to assist China's development. Such a high level of formal assistance from the Japan side was aimed at fostering China's economic capacity and stimulating industrial development beyond the mere exports of oil and agricultural products.²⁵ Theoretically, the new post-1978 perception of China by the Japanese side may be characterised through the lens of the so-called "flying geese" model of regional advancement, whereby Japan used its position as the most developed economy in East Asia to bring manufacturing expertise to other countries in the region in a staged "trickle-down" approach.²⁶ The flying geese model was promulgated in the writings of Japanese economist Akamatsu Kaname during the 1930s, initially to analyze pre-war Japan's relations with surrounding Asian countries and to show how an undeveloped country might become developed relatively quickly. Later, the model was re-cast in the post-war era as a policy prescription for development in Asia-Pacific, and to show how the region as a whole might catch up with the West.

In summary, the paradigm prescribed that the production of goods made uncompetitive in Japan due to rising wages and material costs should move from country to country in the Asia-Pacific region, through Japanese direct foreign investment (DFI) and other forms of technical assistance. This tactical relocation of industry would lead to a gradual upgrading of other countries' industrial ability—from labor-intensive production of clothes, such as T-shirts, to the assembly of consumer goods, such as televisions, and then to more technology-intensive production, such as semiconductors.²⁷ This Japanese-formulated flying geese theory, when applied to an analysis of international development in the Asia-Pacific region, offered a clear alternative to the (static) international vertical division of labor and core-periphery models of relations entrenched in 19th-century imperialism; also the horizontal division of labor of David Ricardo who argued that economies grew by exploiting their "natural" differences in competitive advantage. In the late 1970s and 1980s Japan was clearly the "head goose" among the flock of other countries in Asia-Pacific, and held largely a nurturing approach to China (and other countries in East Asia), in part (of course) due its need to sell its products into a growing regional market.

Admittedly, apart from the flying geese principle there were certainly many other political and economic factors at play in explaining Japan's keen interest at this time in "nurturing" China and preventing the country from slipping back into another Cultural Revolution.²⁸ For instance, the

²⁴ M. Seldon, "China, Japan and the Regional Political Economy of East Asia, 1945-1995," in *Network Power*, 306-340.

²⁵ Yoichi Yokoi, "Major Developments in Japan-China Economic Interdependence in 1990-1994," in *China and Japan: History, Trends, and Prospects*, ed. Christopher Howe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 147-154.

²⁶ Hatch, *Asia's Flying Geese*; Shigehisa Kasahara, *The Asian Developmental State and the Flying Geese Paradigm*, UNCTAD Discussion Papers, No. 213, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2013. Accessed March, 2019. https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/osgdp20133_en.pdf.

²⁷ Terutomo Ozawa, *Institutions, Industrial Upgrading, and Economic Performance in Japan: The "Flying Geese" Paradigm of Catch-up Growth* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2005).

²⁸ Takahara, "Forty-four Years".

fact that China had declined to receive any war reparations as part of the 1978 Treaty (estimated by Lee²⁹ at US\$50 billion) linked the compunction to atone for recent history (felt keenly by many leaders in Japan at this time) to a model of bilateral relations involving the transfer of equipment, materials, technology and capital for China's economic development. Another important element included Japan's search for a solution to the tension between its natural aspirations to improve relations with China and its prominent membership of the US-backed Cold War camp. Indeed, the Japanese were quite willing to transgress the Cold War ideological divide in East Asia during the early 1980s and to separate economics and politics (*seikei bunri*) so as to develop trade relations with China.³⁰ Let us now look at three important ways in which Japan nurtured China during this immediate post-Treaty period, and the impact on trade and commerce.

To begin, Japan began providing official development assistance (ODA) to China from the year following the year after the 1978 Treaty was signed. Initially, this was focused on the development of large-scale economic infrastructure, such as upgrading of harbors to facilitate shipping, power station construction and the installation of new railway lines connecting inland regions to coastal areas.³¹ Apart from such programs of direct economic assistance, China also used Japanese yen loans to build infrastructure projects as part of its economic reform drive.³² During the 1990s, the emphasis of both Japanese ODA and loans to China shifted in response to the country's rapid urbanization, including financing urban subways along with water and sewerage systems and the construction of international airports in both Beijing and Shanghai. Taube³³ notes that at its peak Japan was the largest contributor of bilateral ODA to China. On average, Japanese ODA in this period was nearly two times as high as that of the second-most generous provider, Germany, and nearly 10 times as high as that from the third-most generous, France. Moreover, China was Japan's top ODA destination from the 1980s.³⁴ Overall, with such a transfer of substantial amount of financial resources for over two decades up to the year 2000, Japan made an important contribution to Chinese economic development and its industrialization process.³⁵

A second area concerns direct foreign investment (DFI) and technology transfer by individual Japanese companies in factories producing goods either for export or for local consumption, as well as service sector investments, such as hotels and department stores.³⁶ At the outset, the reforms in China to allow foreign investment were highly experimental and designed to limit DFI to certain coastal special zones.³⁷ On top of this, the legal system governing foreign

²⁹ Lee, *China and Japan*.

³⁰ Akira Iriye, "Chinese-Japanese Relations, 1945-1990," in *China and Japan: History, Trends, and Prospects*, ed. Christopher Howe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 46-59.

³¹ Tsukasa Takamine, *Japan's Development Aid to China: The Long-Running Foreign Policy of Engagement* (London: Routledge, 2006).

³² Lee, *China and Japan*.

³³ Markus Taube, "Japan's Role in China's Industrialization," *Japan and China*, 103-120.

³⁴ Juichi Inada, "Japan's ODA: Its Impacts on China's Industrialization and Sino-Japanese Relations," *Japan and China*, 121-140.

³⁵ East Asia Analytical Unit, *Asia's Global Powers: China Japan Relations in the 21st Century* (Parks, ACT: Commonwealth of Australia, 1996); David Arase, "Japanese ODA Policy Toward China: The New Agenda," *Japan's Relations with China*, 92-106.

³⁶ Katsuji Nakagane, "Japanese Direct Investment in China: Its Effects on China's Economic Development," *Japan and China*, 52-71.

³⁷ Anthony Gar-on Yeh, "Foreign Investment and Urban Development in China," in *China's Regions, Polity and Economy: A Study of Spatial Transformation in the Post-Reform Era*, ed. Si-ming Li and Wing-shing Tang (Hong

investment and their local operations remained rudimentary.³⁸ Against this background, Japanese investment only trickled into the Chinese economy during the 1980s. It was rarely over 1 percent of Japan's total overseas investment, with a much larger percentage at that time going to the Asian NIES (newly industrializing economies) of Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea, as well as the ASEAN group of countries (Association of Southeast Nations).³⁹ But as conditions and regulations changed from the late 1980s, Japanese corporations invested more, largely in the manufacturing sector, and this increased steadily into the 1990s as a special investment protection agreement was hammered out between the two countries in 1988.⁴⁰

Within manufacturing, Japanese-controlled factories in China assembling labor-intensive textiles, electrical appliances, machinery, and transportation equipment experienced the fastest growth. Such an investment outflow was generally along the lines predicted by the flying geese model, leaving the production of sophisticated factory components and materials in Japan, such as the silicon chips (integrated circuits) that were imported and used in China's industrial production.⁴¹ More generally, direct foreign investment from many advanced European and North American countries, as well as Japan, contributed significantly to China's rapid industrialization and export growth during the 1990s.⁴² By 1994, China was Japan's second largest host country to global DFI, exceeded only by the United States.⁴³ While many Japanese factories in China comprised (at least initially) simple assembly operations, two examples can be given to show how Japanese companies contributed significantly to technology transfer during this period.

In 1977, Japan's Nippon Steel was awarded a Chinese government contract to construct the Baoshan Iron and Steel complex in Shanghai. Completed in 1985, this project was a near replica of Nippon Steel's Kimitsu Works located in Chiba prefecture and at that time Japan's (and likely the world's) most modern steel works. The final completion of the Baoshan steelworks was long delayed and not without controversy, mainly because Japanese contracts were suspended temporarily because of China's budget shortfall in 1981.⁴⁴ Indeed, the project was eventually implemented only after a 300 billion yen loan offered from Japan for its completion. However, Taube⁴⁵ argues that the fact the steelworks—then the largest in China—went into production at all was due to Nippon Steel's willingness to transfer its technological know-how, especially computerized control systems for steel production. In terms of the flying geese model, the project generally supported this paradigm of stimulating development. The technology employed by Baoshan was, at the time, not in line with the then perceived comparative advantage of China's economy, which would have demanded more labor- and less capital-intensive technology.

Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2000), 35-60; Chiwai Cheung and Kwan-yui Wong, "Japanese investment in China: A Glo-cal Perspective," in *China's Regions, Polity and Economy*, 97-132.

³⁸ Peter Howard Corne, *Foreign Investment in China: The Administrative Legal System* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1996).

³⁹ Shuichi Ono, *Sino-Japanese Economic Relationships: Trade, Direct Investment and Future Strategy*, World Bank Discussion Papers, China and Mongolia Department Series No. 146 (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1992); Pempel, "Transpacific Torii."

⁴⁰ East Asia Analytical Unit, *Asia's Global Powers*.

⁴¹ Christopher Howe, "Introduction; The Changing Political Economy of Sino-Japanese Relations: A Long Term View," *China and Japan: History, Trends, and Prospects*, 1-22.

⁴² Feng Li and Jing Li, *Foreign Investment in China* (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999).

⁴³ Yadong Luo, *Strategy, Structure, and Performance of MNCs in China* (Westport, CT.: Quorum, 2001).

⁴⁴ Lee, *China and Japan*.

⁴⁵ Taube, "Japan's Role in China's Industrialization."

Another case involves the role played in China by Matsushita Kōnosuke, the founder of the modern-day Panasonic Corporation, in the commencement of a modern electronic appliances industry. As part of Deng Xiaoping's visit to Japan in 1978 to sign the Peace and Friendship Treaty, a trip took place to inspect Matsushita's latest color TV factory in Ibaraki city, Osaka prefecture. Kawase⁴⁶ reports that Deng, impressed with Matsushita's approach to technology and management, asked him to help modernize China's electronics sector. Moved by this personal appeal for help, Matsushita, then 83 years, promised to do everything he could. He visited China the following year and found that local Chinese assembly factories were using technology largely from the 1940s. Matsushita then came up with a plan to establish a joint venture, the Japan-China Electronics Industries Federation, with the aim of promoting the modernization of China's electronics industry. While this institution never came to pass, Matsushita set an example to other Japanese companies by forging a pioneering partnership with the Chinese. Picture tubes, then the core component of color TVs and one that China needed to import, were chosen as the first factory set up by Matsushita in Beijing and this opened during 1987, ushering around four decades of the company's business in China.⁴⁷ Marukawa⁴⁸ comments more generally on the role taken by Japanese electronics firms in China. He notes that Japanese corporate presence in the country was unimportant in the end-production of consumer electronics, for instance TVs and radios, as well as in household equipment, such as air conditioners. Yet Japanese electronics firms, such as Matsushita and Toshiba, played a significant part in the local production of key components that required precision machining, such as cylinder heads and chassis for videocassette recorders, as well as compressors for refrigerators and air conditioners.

During this period, China's rapid growth and industrialization was accompanied by striking changes in the composition of goods traded with Japan, as predicted by the flying geese model. Thus, from the early 1990s nearly half of Japan's imports from China consisted mainly of machinery and other manufactured goods, rather than the emphasis during the 1970s largely on energy materials or agricultural products. For instance, the share of oil in Japan's imports from China dropped to 14 percent over the decade of the 1980s.⁴⁹ Conversely, iron and steel, which accounted for 53 percent of Japan's total exports to China in 1977, represented only 17 percent in 1989. The type of products imported from China also changed significantly, reflecting the growing sophistication of Chinese manufacturing together with the decline (and offshoring) of Japanese labor-intensive manufacturing, such as textiles and the simple assembly of consumer goods, including televisions and other audio-visual products.⁵⁰ Thus, in 1994, 32.7 percent of Japanese imports from China consisted of basic low-skilled labor-intensive manufactured goods, including

⁴⁶ Kenji Kawase, "China Praises Panasonic's Matsushita for Aiding Country's Reforms," *Nikkei Asian Review*. December 21, 2018. Accessed March, 2019. <https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Business-Insight/China-praises-Panasonic-s-Matsushita-for-aiding-country-s-reforms>.

⁴⁷ Roger Hayter and David William Edgington, *Multinational Corporations, Post-entry Frictions and Market Embeddedness in China: A Case Study of Panasonic*, unpublished manuscript, 2019.

⁴⁸ Tomoo Marukawa, "Japanese FDI and China's Industrial Development in the Automobile, Electronics and Textile Industries," *Japan and China*, 174-193.

⁴⁹ Ono, *Sino-Japanese Economic Relationships*, vii.

⁵⁰ Yoichi Yokoi, "Major Developments in Japan-China Economic Interdependence in 1990-1994," *China and Japan*, 147-154.

woven apparel, knitwear and footwear. By 2000 the share of these products declined, replaced by the growth of machinery and electrical equipment.⁵¹

In summary, even though the 1980s was marred by the Tiananmen Square protests (in 1989), the 1990s emerged as a “Golden Age” of China-Japan relations in which bilateral trade and foreign investment from Japan blossomed.⁵² By 2000 Shanghai was second only to Los Angeles in terms of the number of Japanese expatriates living there.⁵³ Offering theoretical endorsement to this success, Hayter and Edgington⁵⁴ showed that Japanese multinational corporations (MNCs) looked for cheap labour locations widely in Asia-Pacific countries, such as China, while developing economies in the region were themselves seeking out investment for their export industries. In other words, the motivations of the two sides were generally congruent and harmonious. The 1985 revaluation of the Japanese currency (*endaka*) led to further moves of production assembly from Japan to the Asia-Pacific region along flying geese lines, and to Japan topping the list of foreign investors in China.⁵⁵ Later, as China’s economy boomed, Japan saw the Chinese market as a way of revitalizing its own economy after the bursting of the Japanese “bubble economy” in the 1990s. Accordingly, bilateral trade between Japan and China ballooned, with China surpassing the United States as Japan's largest trading partner in the 2000s.⁵⁶

Overall, there was no perceived economic conflict in this “golden age” from the Japanese side, as Japan was still the number one economy in Asia. Importantly, the U.S. was supportive based on its shared geopolitical interests with both Japan and China during this time.⁵⁷ Indeed, in the 1970s and 1980s all three nations saw the Soviet Union as their chief threat during the final years of the Cold War era. There was only a virtuous cycle of investment and trade, and many imports from China came into Japan from Japanese firms’ factories in China, such as clothing and consumer electronics.⁵⁸

3. CHINA ENTERS THE WTO: “THE DANGEROUS YEARS” 2001-2017

At the beginning of the present millennium, China’s economic rise was marked by its entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) during 2001, signifying its deeper integration into the

⁵¹ Congressional Research Service, *Sino-Japanese Relations: Issues for U.S. Policy*. Washington, D.C., Congressional Research Service. Accessed March, 2019.

https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20081219_R40093_245010b5d91b727aa6f405e3c6fc703838f29a3b.pdf.

⁵² Nakagane, “Japanese Direct Investment in China.”

⁵³ Xiaojing Xing, “China Gradually Shifts from Factory for Japan to its Main Market, Economic Competitor,” *Global Times*. September 5, 2018. Accessed March, 2019. <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1118441.shtml>.

⁵⁴ Roger Hayter and David William Edgington, “Flying Geese in Asia: The Impacts of Japanese MNCs as a Source of Industrial Learning,” *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie* 95 (2004): 3-26.

⁵⁵ Richard F. Doner, “Japan in East Asia: Institutions and Regional Leadership,” *Network Power*, 197-233.

⁵⁶ Congressional Research Service, *Sino-Japanese Relations*.

⁵⁷ Ezra F. Y. Vogel, Yuan Ming, and Akihiko Tanaka, eds. *The Golden Age of the U.S.-China-Japan Triangle*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2002.

⁵⁸ East Asia Analytical Unit, *Asia’s Global Powers*; Greg Austin and Stuart Harris, *Japan and Greater China: Political Economy and Military Power in the Asian Century* (London: Hurst & Company, 2001); Hanns Günther Hilpert and Katsuji Nakagane, “Economic Relations: What Can We Learn From Trade and FDI?,” in *Chinese-Japanese Relations in the Twenty-first Century*, ed. Marie Söderburg (London: Routledge, 2002), 130-153; June Teufel Dreyer, *Middle Kingdom and Empire of the Rising Sun: Sino-Japanese Relations, Past and Present* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

global economy.⁵⁹ Japan very much supported China's entry into the WTO.⁶⁰ Indeed, Japanese firms expected that China-Japan economic relations would grow in more or less the same virtuous pattern as before and looked forward to China reducing its trade tariffs and engaging in open-market reforms.⁶¹ Following 2000, however, due to a trade dispute the growth of Japanese exports to China declined by 30.4 percent to just 2.2 percent.⁶² Thereafter, exports picked up to 28.2 percent growth in 2002 and reached a staggering 43.6 percent growth in 2003. By 2004, Japan's trade with China totaled US\$168 billion and for the first time in post-World War II history China surpassed the U.S. to become Japan's largest trading partner thereby deepening the dependence of Japan on the Chinese economy.⁶³ Of more consequence, Japanese (and other countries') foreign direct investment continued to pour into China, much of it in manufacturing. It became clear that, in the wake of the late-1990s Asian financial crisis and its entry into the WTO, China in the 2000s had become a "factory to the world" involving both domestic as well as overseas producers, much the same as Japan was in the 1960s and 1970s.⁶⁴

After this, Japanese perceptions of China changed. Alongside its supercharged growth during this period, it became apparent to the Japanese side that China had outgrown the flying geese model of staged development in Asia as it now was capable of making both rocket ships and T-shirts at the same time.⁶⁵ China had finally "stood up" as an economic peer of Japan. Accordingly, perceptions in Japan of China as an "aid recipient" country changed to one of a "formidable competitor."⁶⁶ Indeed, by 2010 China eventually surpassed Japan as the world's second largest economy following the U.S., with a GDP worth U.S.\$5.9 trillion in that year.⁶⁷ Although Japan's GDP per capita still exceeded (and continues to exceed) that of China, there was clearly a limit to the growth of Japan's economic power, in large part due to its aging population, and the difference in per capita GDP between China and Japan continued to shrink. This gave a sharp impression in Japan of a shift in the balance of power between the two countries.⁶⁸

Apart from shifting economic power relations, the 2000s and 2010s were also "dangerous years" for Japanese traders and investors. Political tension between China and Japan grew over visits by Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi to the Yasukuni Shrine, a new controversial Japanese

⁵⁹ Nicholas R. Lardy, *Integrating China into the Global Economy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2002).

⁶⁰ Frederick M Abbot, "China's Accession to the WTO," *Insights* (The American Society of International Law) 3 no. 1 (1998). Accessed March, 2019. <https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/3/issue/1/chinas-accession-wto>.

⁶¹ Hisashi Mino, "China's Accession to WTO and Japan-China Economic Relations: A New Stage of Bilateral Division of Labor," in *China Enters WTO: Pursuing Symbiosis with The Global Economy*, ed. Ippei Yamazawa and Ken-ichi Imai (Chiba: Institute of Developing Economics, Japan External Trade Organization, 2001), 110-131.

⁶² Takahara, "Forty-four Years."

⁶³ Dreyer, *Middle Kingdom*.

⁶⁴ Kevin Honglin Zhang, ed., *China as the World Factory* (London: Routledge, 2006).

⁶⁵ *The Economist*, "China's Economic Challenge to East Asia: A Panda Breaks the Formation." August 23, 2001. Accessed March, 2019. <https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2001/08/23/a-panda-breaks-the-formation>.

⁶⁶ Yun Zhang, *Sino-Japanese Relations in a Trilateral Context: Origins of Misperception* (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).

⁶⁷ *The Guardian*, "China Overtakes Japan as World's Second-largest Economy." February 14, 2011. Accessed March, 2019. <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2011/feb/14/china-second-largest-economy>.

⁶⁸ Ming Wan, *Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic, and Transformation* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006).

history textbook for schools and territorial conflict over islands in the East China Sea.⁶⁹ Combined, these led in 2012 to anti-Japanese demonstrations in Shanghai, and anti-Chinese protests in Tokyo (for major events between 2001 to 2017, see Table 4.1). The demonstrations in Chinese cities affected Japanese production, including the local facilities of Matsushita’s Panasonic Corporation even though the company was heralded as a benefactor of China’s modernization.⁷⁰ Thus, in September of that year Panasonic halted operations at three factories after angry protestors ransacked Japanese businesses. A Panasonic factory was also set on fire and the company suspended work at three plants for several days after factories in Qingdao and Suzhou were damaged by protestors. In addition, Panasonic also halted operations at a factory in Guangdong province as local employees staged a strike against Japan’s claims to the island chain called Diaoyu by China and Senkaku by Japan. Other Japanese companies affected by the unrest in China included Honda and Canon.⁷¹

Table 4.1 2001-2017: The Dangerous Years

Month/Year	Event
August 2001	Japan Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro, who took office in April, visits the Yasukuni Shrine, which is controversial as it enshrines Class A war criminals among the 2.5 million soldiers there. He angers China with this annual ritual, which he observes until he steps down in 2006.
April 2005	Anti-Japanese demonstrations in many Chinese cities due to a new, controversial Japanese history textbook.
October 2006	Abe Shinzō, in his first term as Japan’s Prime Minister, makes a fence-mending trip to Beijing, commencing a series of annual visits. These stop in 2011.
May 2008	Chinese President Hu Jintao visits Japan to sign a joint statement to advance relations based on “common strategic interests” (the 2008 Agreement).
2010	China overtakes Japan as the world’s second-largest economy.
September 2010	China-Japan ties deteriorate after a Chinese fishing trawler collides with two Japanese Coast Guard boats near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. The Chinese fishing boat captain is arrested. China temporarily halts the exports of rare earth materials to Japan.
December 2011	Japanese PM Noda Yoshihiko visits Beijing. No Japanese premier visits China, outside a multilateral gathering, until 2018.

⁶⁹ Nicklas Swanström and Ryosei Kokubun, eds., *Sino-Japanese Relations: The Need for Conflict Prevention and Management* (Newcastle Upon Tyne: Cambridge Press. 2008).

⁷⁰ Kevin Voigt, “Panasonic Closes China Plants after Violent Protests,” *CNN Business*. September 17, 2012. Accessed March, 2019. <https://www.cnn.com/2012/09/17/business/china-japan-panasonic/index.html>.

⁷¹ *The Guardian*, “Japanese Firms Close Offices in China as Islands Row Escalates.” September 17, 2012. Accessed March, 2019. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/17/japanese-firms-close-offices-china>.

September 2012	Sino-Japan ties plunge to an all-time low after Tokyo effectively nationalizes the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Large-scale anti-Japanese demonstrations breakout across China, with the Chinese calling for a boycott of Japanese products and setting ablaze factories and offices of Japanese companies in China. Anti-Chinese protests occur in Tokyo.
2013-2017	Both militaries dispatch jets over the disputed islands. Japan scrambles a record number of fighter jets in 2017, rising to an all-time high of 1,168 in the year to March 2017.

Sources: Congressional Research Service, *Sino-Japanese Relations: Issues for U.S. Policy*. Washington, D.C.:Congressional Research Service, 2008. Accessed March, 2019. https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20081219_R40093_245010b5d91b727aa6f405e3c6fc703838f29a3b.pdf; Toshiya Hoshino and Haruko Satoh, “Through the Looking Glass? China’s Rise as Seen From Japan,” *Journal of Asian Public Policy* 5 (2012); Jeffrey W. Hornung, “Japan’s Growing Hard Hedge Against China,” *Asian Security* 10 (2014): 97-122, 181-198; various news reports in *The Guardian* and *The Japan Times*.

Nonetheless, driven by the inertia of long-term trading contracts, Japanese exports to China held up well during 2013 and 2014. On the other hand, worsening political relations between the two countries eventually caught up and Japan’s commercial ties to China went on a sharp fall in 2015 and 2016.⁷² For instance, Japan was the biggest source of foreign investment in China during 2011 but the Chinese protests against Japan over island disputes led to steep declines in Japanese DFI in China during 2013 and 2014, with year-on-year investment dropping by 20 and 50 percent, respectively, and a further fall in 2015 by 25.2 percent.⁷³ By 2016 Japanese DFI in China had dropped to fifth place, accompanied by a corresponding increase in Japanese production investment in Southeast Asia, including in Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore.⁷⁴ Indeed, some observers predicted that the two economies might be even decoupling, thereby reducing the economic consequences of a prolonged bilateral conflict.⁷⁵

The long-standing territorial disputes, together with the shifting balance of economic power between Japan and China, also increased competitive tensions in other fields.⁷⁶ By way of illustration, China built up its own technology giants during the 2000s, such as Haier and Hisense (both are electronics and home appliances companies), Huawei (a telecommunications equipment company), and commercial giants such as the Alibaba Group, owner of the *South China Morning*

⁷² Michael Ivanovich, “Japan’s Trade with China is Booming, but Irreconcilable Differences Persist,” *CNBC News*. September 2, 2018. Accessed March, 2019.

<https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/03/china-japan-trade-booms-despite-irreconcilable-differences--commentary.html>.

⁷³ Norihiko Shirouzu and Kazunori Takada, “Two Years After Protests, ‘China Risk’ Still Haunts Japan Firms,” *Reuters*. September 12, 2014. Accessed March, 2019. <https://finance.yahoo.com/news/two-years-protests-china-risk-210021974.html>.

⁷⁴ *Financial Times*, “Donald Trump’s Tariffs Prompt Thaw in China-Japan Ties.” August 30, 2018. Accessed March, 2019. <https://www.ft.com/content/3c23bb06-ac48-11e8-94bd-cba20d67390c>.

⁷⁵ Gordon G. Chang, “The Chinese And Japanese Economies Are Delinking: Prelude To Conflict?,” *Forbes*. February 14, 2014. Accessed March, 2019. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/gordonchang/2014/02/16/the-chinese-and-japanese-economies-are-delinking-prelude-to-conflict/#26ce802c3291>.

⁷⁶ Jeffrey W. Hornung, “Japan’s Growing Hard Hedge Against China,” *Asian Security* 10 (2014): 97-122.

Post and a leader in Asian e-commerce, retail, Internet and AI technology.⁷⁷ Indeed, for the first time Chinese firms began to outcompete Japanese technology companies, not only in the Chinese market but also in the global arena.⁷⁸ Japanese firms operating in China also worried about Chinese violations of intellectual property rights and technology theft.⁷⁹ Other markers of the new competition between “giant” Chinese and Japanese companies included a spate of high-profile purchases of Japanese electronics firms by their Chinese competitors. These included China’s Haier Group Corporation’s acquisition of Japan’s Sanyo Corporation’s “white goods” business in 2011 (involving household equipment such as washing machines and refrigerators), and Hisense Co., Ltd’s purchase of Japanese Toshiba Corporation’s TV business in 2017.⁸⁰

Besides this kind of direct commercial rivalry, Japan-China competition spilled over into the adjoining Asia-Pacific region as China began to compete with Japanese infrastructure projects in Southeast Asia.⁸¹ In summary, Japan had begun its own program of large-scale investment in ASEAN nations during the 1970s when the Japanese government quickly became the dominant source of funds. By the 1990s Japan’s influence had escalated to where it had formulated an overriding vision for infrastructure connectivity across the region, involving new roads and rail lines.⁸² By contrast, China was a relatively recent newcomer to the ASEAN region and lagged behind Japan in overall influence. Nonetheless, Chinese investment in Asian construction projects backed by government loans grew dramatically in the years after 2001. During that time, large infrastructure projects in ASEAN nations began to be contested almost exclusively by Chinese and Japanese firms.⁸³

By way of illustration, the new competition in the area of infrastructure developments was visible in the way Chinese and Japanese companies bid for the same high-speed railway projects in Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia.⁸⁴ Government rivalry also accompanied these commercial investment bids, as Chinese infrastructure firms tended to be state-owned, while Japan’s received significant political support from their national government. In broad-scale, their competitive tenders reflected different industrial strengths: Japan typically offered more advanced technology,

⁷⁷ Mara Hvistendahl, “China’s Tech Giants Want to Go Global: Just One Thing Might Stand in Their Way,” *MIT Technology Review*. December 19, 2018. Accessed March, 2019.

<https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612598/chinas-tech-giants-want-to-go-global-just-one-thing-might-stand-in-their-way/>.

⁷⁸ Roger Cheng, “The Era of Japanese Consumer Electronics Giants is Dead,” *CNet*. November 9, 2012, accessed March, 2019. <https://www.cnet.com/news/the-era-of-japanese-consumer-electronics-giants-is-dead/>.

⁷⁹ *South China Morning Post*, “Japan ‘Wants to Join US in Complaining About Chinese Intellectual Property Laws to World Trade Organisation.’” April 6, 2018. Accessed March, 2019.

<https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/2140671/japan-seeks-join-world-trade-organization-complaint-us-against-china>.

⁸⁰ Chuanjiao Xie, “Toshiba Sells TV business to Hisense,” *China Daily*. November 15, 2017. Accessed March, 2019.

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017-11/15/content_34550381.htm.

⁸¹ Amelia Duggan, “Japan, China and the Contest for Influence in Contemporary Asia,” *Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada*. November 6, 2018. Accessed March, 2019. <https://www.asiapacific.ca/blog/japan-china-and-contest-influence-contemporary-asia>.

⁸² Takashi Shiraiishi, “Japan and Southeast Asia,” *Network Power*, 169-194.

⁸³ Hong Zhou, *Chinese and Japanese Infrastructure Investment in Southeast Asia: From Rivalry to Cooperation?*, IDE Discussion Paper No. 689 (Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, 2018).

⁸⁴ Hong Zhou, “Japan and China Crossing Tracks in Southeast Asia,” *East Asia Forum*. September 15, 2018. Accessed March, 2019. <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/09/15/japan-and-china-crossing-tracks-in-southeast-asia/>.

but China was seen as more cost-competitive. A key example of how this particular rivalry played out concerns the case of Indonesia, where the first major high-speed rail project opened for bidding was the 150 km link from Jakarta to the country's fourth largest city, Bandung, in 2009. After around five years of feasibility studies, Japanese officials and corporations felt close to securing the project in 2015. But as the window for final bidding drew to a close, China won the contract by undercutting Japanese companies, increasing the funding and lowering the specifications in order to reduce costs. In response, the Japanese side accused the Chinese consortium of offering unrealistic time scales and underestimating project expenses.⁸⁵ Both China and Japan became important sources of investment for ASEAN countries, who were seen by both countries as valuable markets and key trade partners. China is now ASEAN's largest single trading partner, eclipsing Japan in 2015.⁸⁶

More generally, China and Japan developed competing visions of how to develop the wider Asia-Pacific region.⁸⁷ Thus, since 2013 China promoted a "One Belt One Road" initiative together with a "21st-Century Maritime Silk Road" project (Figure 4.1). Together, they formed a major program of foreign-financed road, rail and harbor expenditure in Asia. Most "Belt and Road" projects have been built by Chinese state-owned companies and paid for with loans from government banks at commercial interest rates.⁸⁸ Japan, on the other hand, fostered its own "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" vision, along with the United States, which comprised an alternative project to provide connectivity across the Indian Ocean, one that emphasizes "high-quality" infrastructure and maritime law enforcement.⁸⁹ Thus, since its inception Japan has been wary of the China-proposed Belt and Road Initiative, and it launched its own competing version called the "Partnership for Quality Infrastructure."⁹⁰

In effect, the two countries became geopolitical and economic rivals, each trying to promote itself as the partner of choice for less powerful neighboring Asian nations. The two different visions for Asia-Pacific connections shown in Figure 4.1 were mirrored by two competing development banks, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), set up by China in 2014, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), which had supported economic and social

⁸⁵ Ravi Prasad, "The China-Japan Infrastructure Nexus: Competition or Collaboration?," *The Diplomat*. May 18, 2018. Accessed March, 2019.

[https://www.google.com/search?client=safari&rls=en&q=R.+Prasad+\(2018\)+The+China-Japan+Infrastructure+Nexus:+Competition+or+Collaboration%3F,+18+May,+The+Diplomat,+---&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8](https://www.google.com/search?client=safari&rls=en&q=R.+Prasad+(2018)+The+China-Japan+Infrastructure+Nexus:+Competition+or+Collaboration%3F,+18+May,+The+Diplomat,+---&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8).

⁸⁶ Zhou, "Japan and China Crossing Tracks."

⁸⁷ Mie Oba, "Sino-Japanese Competition Over Regional Institutions in Asia," in *Chinese-Japanese Competition and the East Asian Security Complex: Vying for Influence*, ed. Jeffrey Reeves, Jeffrey Hornung and Kerry Lynn Nankivell (London: Routledge, 2017), 53-70.

⁸⁸ Zheping Huang, "One Belt, One Road: Your Guide to Understanding OBOR, China's New Silk Road Plan," *Quartz*. May 15, 2017. Accessed March, 2019.

<https://qz.com/983460/obor-an-extremely-simple-guide-to-understanding-chinas-one-belt-one-road-forum-for-its-new-silk-road/>.

⁸⁹ Julian Richard Lasius, "Strategic Implications of Indo-Japanese Cooperation on the 'Asia and Africa Growth Corridor,'" *Observer Research Foundation*, Issue No. 223, January 15, 2018. Accessed March, 2019.

<https://www.orfonline.org/research/strategic-implications-of-indo-japanese-cooperation-on-the-asia-and-africa-growth-corridor/>.

⁹⁰ Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Quality Infrastructure Investment*, no date. Accessed March, 2019.

<https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000175945.pdf>.

development of the Asia-Pacific region since 1966 and was led by Japan and the U.S.⁹¹ The AIIB, together with a specific Silk Road Fund established in China, aimed at providing investment and financial support for trade and economic cooperation under the One Belt One Road framework. While many Western and Asian countries became founding members of the new AIIB, Japan and the U.S. decided to boycott the new bank citing their desire not to see it undermine the pre-existing ADB.⁹² This decision indicated not only Japan's skepticism about the AIIB's governance system, but also a serious concern over China's apparent ambition to replace the region's existing financial system of governance with one led by Japan.




Figure 4.1 China's Belt and Road Scheme and Japan's Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy

Source: adapted from a diagram in *Nikkei Asian Review*, "Japan Floats Business Aid Idea for China's Belt and Road Plan." December 31, 2017. Accessed March, 2019. <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Japan-floats-business-aid-idea-for-China-s-Belt-and-Road-plan2>.

A third major form of rivalry that emerged between China and Japan in the past 10 years or so concerns competing global trade blocs. In Japan's case it supported the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a comprehensive trade agreement championed by former U.S. president Obama in 2009 that was often framed as a U.S. tool to "contain" the expansion of China's power.⁹³ Conversely, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) set up in 2012 and

⁹¹ Ramon Pacheco Pardo, "China, Japan, and Economic Security Competition (and Cooperation) in the Asia-Pacific," *Chinese-Japanese Competition*, 71-85.

⁹² John Browne, "Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Challenges U.S. Supremacy," *Financial Post*. March 31, 2015. Accessed March, 2019. <https://business.financialpost.com/opinion/john-browne-chinese-bank-challenges-u-s-supremacy>.

⁹³ Daniel C.K. Chow, "How the United States Uses the Trans-Pacific Partnership to Contain China in International Trade," *Chicago Journal of International Law* 17 no. 2 (2016): 370-402.

supported by China was widely understood by Japan as China’s tool (together with the China-dominated AIIB) to counter U.S. intent to construct a new economic order by means of the TPP (see Figure 4.2).⁹⁴ From a geo-economics point of view, Japan has been a founding member of the RCEP from 2012, while Japan only joined TPP negotiations in 2013.⁹⁵ However, following the withdraw of the U.S. from TPP negotiations by President Donald Trump in 2017, Japan became the major economic partner and the finalizing of the TPP was spearheaded by Prime Minister Abe Shinzō in 2018. The TPP’s final approval by the remaining partner countries sent a clear political signal to the Asia-Pacific region that Japan no longer saw its own economic security through the lens of protecting its domestic economy from global competition, but through increasing interdependence, openness and mutual concessions. By contrast, a full-scale trade agreement under the RCEP has been delayed, due largely to India’s concerns about reductions in tariffs on its imports.⁹⁶




Figure 4.2. Competing Global Trade Blocs: TPP and RCEP (2015)

Source: World Bank data, adapted from a diagram in Mireya Solis, “The Case for Trade and the Trans-Pacific Partnership,” *Brookings*. October, 2016. Accessed March, 2019.

<https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-trans-pacific-partnership-the-politics-of-openness-and-leadership-in-the-asia-pacific/>.

⁹⁴ *The National Interest*, “TPP vs. RCEP: America and China Battle for Control of Pacific Trade.” October 6, 2015. Accessed March, 2019.

<https://nationalinterest.org/feature/tpp-vs-rcep-america-china-battle-control-pacific-trade-14021>.

⁹⁵ Jemma Kim, *Japan and East Asian Integration: Trade and Domestic Politics* (London: Routledge, 2018).

⁹⁶ Peter Petri and Michael Plummer, “The Case for RCEP as Asia’s Next Trade Agreement,” *East Asia Forum*. November 6, 2018. Accessed March, 2018.

<https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/11/06/rcep-evidence-of-asian-leadership-on-trade/>.

All in all, the years following 2000 saw an end of any “golden age” of China-Japan relations marked by a congruent flying geese formation in East Asia headed by Japan.⁹⁷ Besides commercial rivalry between Japanese and Chinese firms, Japan’s hopes to lever its economic ties with Asia-Pacific into broader political influence was derailed by China’s rise, evidenced by China’s Belt and Road program and its willingness to acquire influence through financing infrastructure undertakings. With China now being the largest trading partner for all Asian nations, it occupied a central position and became a formidable geo-economic rival.⁹⁸ The role of the U.S. in this period was largely one of Japan’s main ally and it seemed that China and the U.S. also appeared to be on a collision course.⁹⁹

4. BACK ON TRACK IN 2018?

The last two years or so have seen yet another shift in the Chinese-Japanese economic relationship—together with Japanese perceptions—one involving an unlikely warming up of ties in response to trade war measures against both countries by the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump.¹⁰⁰ It is not completely clear to what extent the new relationship was truly triggered by changed U.S. trade and security policies towards East Asia. Still, many commentators have pointed to the “trade wars” between the U.S. and China and Japan that commenced during 2017 as prompting President Xi to improve ties with Japan, and for Japan to welcome China’s overtures.¹⁰¹ The apparent thaw in what prior to 2018 was a frigid and at times hostile Japan-China relationship underscores the destabilizing impact of President Trump’s “America First” policies.¹⁰² In particular, both China and Japan have jointly opposed President Trump’s protectionist trade policy by Japan supporting the revised TPP (now called the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, or CPTPP), China further advocating completion of the RCEP, as well as both countries accelerating talks on a proposed China–Japan–South Korea free trade agreement.¹⁰³

For Japan, President Trump threatened a 25 percent tariff on Japanese automobiles imported to the U.S. in March 2018 in order to force Japan into trade negotiations designed to

⁹⁷ Peter J. Katzenstein, “East Asia—Beyond Japan,” *Beyond Japan*, 1-33; Lindsey Black, “Japan’s Aspirations for Regional Leadership—Is the Goose Finally Cooked?” *Japanese Studies* 37 (2017):151-170.

⁹⁸ Bill Emmot, *Rivals: How the Power Struggle Between China, India and Japan Will Shape Our Next Decade* (London Allen Lane, 2008); Zhang, *Sino-Japanese Relations*.

⁹⁹ Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, *The Coming Conflict with China* (New York: Vintage Books, 1998).

¹⁰⁰ *The Japan Times*, “Japan and China Agree to Bolster Economic Cooperation Amid Concerns Over Trade War with U.S.” August 30, 2018. Accessed March, 2019. <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/08/30/business/japan-china-confirm-agreement-trade-protectionism-benefits-no-nation/#.XMSgtY0ZOCU>.

¹⁰¹ Anthony Rowley, “Japan and China are Being Pushed Into Each Other’s Arms by Donald Trump’s Antics,” *South China Morning Post*. September 30, 2018. Accessed March, 2019. <https://www.scmp.com/business/article/2166214/japan-and-china-are-being-pushed-each-others-arms-donald-trumps-antics>.

¹⁰² Hal Brands and Peter Feaver, “Living in Trump’s World: The Global Reaction to ‘America First,’” *War on the Rocks*. March, 27, 2018. Accessed March, 2019. <https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/living-in-trumps-world-the-global-reaction-to-america-first/>.

¹⁰³ Rumi Aoyama, “Japan–China Ties are Tightening,” *East Asia Forum*. May 24, 2018. Accessed March, 2019. <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/05/24/japan-china-ties-are-tightening/>.

reverse what was seen as a structural balance of trade deficit in Japan's favor.¹⁰⁴ China also had trade issues with the U.S. In April 2018 President Trump threatened tariffs to halt imported Chinese products worth around US\$50 billion, claiming Chinese theft of U.S intellectual property. In the event, the United States imposed 25 percent duties covering \$50 billion of Chinese-made goods in July 2018, followed by a threatened second round of 10 percent tariffs covering another \$200 billion of Chinese exports, including vacuum cleaners and internet devices, the latter rate to jump to 25 percent at the end of that year. To pressure China over trade, Trump further warned of a third round of tariffs on \$267 billion of goods, which would bring all of China's exports to the United States into a new tariff regime.¹⁰⁵ China at first refused to negotiate, but eventually agreed to talks in late 2018.¹⁰⁶ In other words, compared to the previous decades, China and Japan now experienced a direct shared threat in the unlikely form of the U.S. Historically, such a common menace has been an effective reason for building alliances more widely for these two Asian countries. Accordingly, on the premise of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" (an ancient Asian proverb) President Xi of and Prime Minister Abe made overtures to each other to find commercial and trade opportunities.¹⁰⁷

Signs of a thaw in Japan-China relations first came in June 2017 when Prime Minister Abe expressed willingness to cooperate with China's Belt and Road Initiative, albeit with certain conditions.¹⁰⁸ This shift in Japanese foreign policy was instantly welcomed by the Chinese government, which happened to be considering re-orienting its own foreign policy to improve ties with Japan.¹⁰⁹ Thus, in December 2017 President Xi approved a Communist Party internal memo calling for improved relations with Japan following the U.S. National Security Strategy naming China as an official "competitor."¹¹⁰ The move towards closer bilateral relations then shifted into high gear during 2018 when there was a flurry of dialogue together with visits between dignitaries leading up to the 40th anniversary of the 1978 Treaty. These involved trips by Japanese politicians and business groups to Beijing, and vice versa, as well as important discussions of leaders at side meetings of international summits. Eventually, Prime Minister Abe visited China during 25th-27th

¹⁰⁴ Steve Holland and David Lawder, "Japan Dodges U.S. Auto Tariffs, For Now, as Trump and Abe Agree on Trade Talks," *Reuters*. September 16, 2018. Accessed March, 2019.

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-japan/japan-dodges-u-s-auto-tariffs-for-now-as-trump-and-abe-agree-on-trade-talks-idUSKCN1M62Q9>.

¹⁰⁵ Ju-min Park and Makiko Yamazaki, "Asian Firms Shuffle Production Around the Region as China Tariffs Hit," *Reuters*. 22 September, 2018. Accessed March, 2019. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china-production-focus/asian-firms-shuffle-production-around-the-region-as-china-tariffs-hit-idUSKCN1M305B>.

¹⁰⁶ *South China Morning Post*, "China May Reject New Trade Talks, Won't Negotiate 'With a Gun Pointed to its Head.'" 17 September, 2018. Accessed March, 2019.

<https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2164456/report-china-may-reject-new-trade-talks-wont-negotiate-gun>.

¹⁰⁷ Saki Hayashi, "Japan and China Pledge to Accelerate Free Trade Talks," *Nikkei Asian Review*. April 16, 2018. Accessed March, 2019. <https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Japan-and-China-pledge-to-accelerate-free-trade-talks>.

¹⁰⁸ Editors East Asia Forum, "Japan Opens the Way to Cooperation on China's Belt and Road Initiative" *East Asia Forum*. July 10, 2017. Accessed March, 2019. <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/07/10/japan-opens-the-way-to-cooperation-on-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative/>.

¹⁰⁹ Aoyama, "Japan-China Ties."

¹¹⁰ Michal Thim, "Why Trump's New Security Strategy on China and Taiwan means the Gloves are Off in Sino-US Rivalry," *South China Morning News*. December 20, 2017. Accessed March, 2019.

<https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2125047/why-trumps-new-security-strategy-china-and-taiwan-means>.

October 2018, which was the first visit to China by a Japanese prime minister since 2011 (see Table 4.2).

Table 4.2 Major Events and High-level Visits Leading up to the 40th Anniversary of the 1978 Treaty of Peace and Cooperation

Month/Year	Event	Major Outcomes
May 2017	Toshihiro Nikai, Secretary-General of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party, attends the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing.	Chinese President Xi welcomed Japan's endorsement of the initiative, explaining that The Belt and Road Initiative can be a new platform and an "experimental field" for China and Japan to achieve mutually beneficial cooperation and common development.
August 2017	PM Abe meets with President Xi on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Hamburg.	Xi told Abe the countries were important neighbors, and said the healthy development of relations was of importance to the rest of the world.
November 2017	PM Abe meets with President Xi at the annual Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Da Nang, Vietnam.	Both leaders agreed to make "a fresh start" and that "constructive steps" should be made to "appropriately manage and control disputes that exist between the two countries."
April 2017	Fourth High-Level Economic Dialogue between Japan and China convenes in Tokyo after an eight-year hiatus.	Both sides shared the view to continue to observe the principles enunciated in the four basic documents forming the foundations of China-Japan relations.
May 2018	Chinese Premier Li Keqiang visits Japan, the first Premier to do so in eight years.	A memorandum of understanding to set up a joint maritime and air liaison mechanism to manage possible crises in the East China Sea relaxed rules for Japanese financial institutions investing in yuan-denominated Chinese stocks and bonds; the creation of an entity to discuss the softening of China's regulations on importing Japanese food products.

August 2018	Japanese Finance Minister Aso Taro meets with his counterpart Lui Kun in Beijing. Around the same time, Nikai Toshiro, secretary-general of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), meets with China's Vice President Wang Qishan.	China was ready to work with Japan to inject more positive energy into bilateral relations. The two countries acknowledged the importance of bolstering financial cooperation, amid growing fears that an intensifying U.S.-China trade war would hurt the global economy. The two countries negotiated a currency swap arrangement: the original deal expired in 2013 and was not renewed amid sharp tensions over the territorial dispute between Tokyo and Beijing over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea.
August 2018	Japanese PM Abe and Chinese Premier Li exchange congratulatory messages to mark the 40 th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship. Japanese Foreign Minister Kono Taro exchanged similar messages with his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi.	PM Abe said in his message that he was "very pleased to have Japan-China relations return to a normal path."
August-September 2018	Leaders of Fujian and Sichuan provinces, as well as Beijing, visit Japan.	Pursuit of Japanese foreign investment.
September 2018	PM Abe holds a summit meeting with President Xi at the fourth Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, Russian Federation.	Discussions on the North Korean security issue.
September 2018	Nakanishi Hiroaki, the head of Japan's Keidanren (the Japan Business Federation), together with around 240 Japanese business leaders visit Beijing as part of the Japan-China Economic Association and meet with Premier Li and senior officials of the Chinese Commerce Ministry and National Development and Reform Commission.	Exchange of views on free trade, the digital economy and the proposed RCEP, together with a possible review of Chinese restrictions on food from Fukushima prefecture.

October 2018	14 th Beijing-Tokyo Forum takes place in Tokyo.	Discussion of joint cooperation in China's Belt and Road projects. China and Japan to deepen cooperation to achieve denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
October 2018	Japanese Defense Minister Iwaya Takeshi and his Chinese counterpart Wei Fenghe meet in Singapore.	Commenced exchange programs between each countries' defense authorities and troops.
October 2018	PM Abe visits President Xi in Beijing.	Agreements to boost bilateral economic cooperation and to promote free trade; to move ahead with around 50 infrastructure projects in third countries; to launch dialogue on cooperation in cutting-edge technologies and intellectual property rights protections; agreements relating to elder care, the securities market and a currency swap line in case of financial crisis. Broad agreement to lease a pair of Chinese pandas to a Japanese zoo.

Sources: Various news reports and commentary in *East Asia Forum*, *Mainichi Japan*, *Nikkei Asian Review*, *Reuters*, *South China Morning Post*, *The Asahi Shimbun*, *The Diplomat*, and *The Japan Times*.

What was achieved at this historic occasion marking the 40th anniversary of the 1978 Treaty? Apart from the customary diplomatic rhetoric between leaders, a series of compacts aimed at deepening economic and trade ties took place revolving around business cooperation, technical innovation, the finance sector and free trade agreements. At a press briefing in Beijing, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman remarked that the visit would “elevate our bilateral ties and put bilateral cooperation back on the right track.”¹¹¹ Prime Minister Abe also pledged to lift Tokyo's often-tense relations with Beijing into a “new dimension” in a “new era” of cooperation. And at a meeting held with President Xi, Prime Minister Abe proposed three principles: “switching from competition to cooperation; becoming partners instead of being threats to each other, and developing a free and fair trade system.”¹¹² This emphasis on improved economic and commercial

¹¹¹ Agence France-Press, “Shinzo Abe's Visit to China a Sign of Warming Relations Japan and China are Set to Thaw a Seven-year Cooling of Relations Amid Beijing's Worsening Trade War with the US,” *Aljazeera*, 12 October, 2018. Accessed March, 2019.

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/10/shinzo-abe-visit-china-visit-japan-pm-2011-181012090336310.html>

¹¹² Issaku Harada, Oki Nagai and Shunsuke Shigeta, “Xi and Abe Use Economy as Binding Force But Hold Back on Security: Collaboration To Replace Competition as Guiding Principle of Relations,” *Nikkei Asian Review*. October 27, 2018. Accessed March, 2019.

<https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Xi-and-Abe-use-economy-as-binding-force-but-hold-back-on-security>

relations was further underscored by a large number of private agreements exceeding \$8 billion dollars signed by various Chinese and Japanese corporations relating to business cooperation projects in “third countries.”¹¹³ Mr. Abe also remarked: “The horizon of cooperation is extending.”¹¹⁴ In turn, President Xi noted: “With efforts from both sides, the China-Japan relations have entered the right track and are facing an important opportunity for improvement.” So, what exactly might the new spirit of cooperation lead to and where might greater development opportunities lie?

The first opportunity, of course, is a possibility of increased in bilateral trade and investment between the two countries. In this regard China is already the number one export market for Japan where “the China business” remains a key lifeline for many export sectors of the economy, such as the automobile industry and industrial goods including integrated circuits, as well as the in-bound tourism sector. Table 4.3 indicates Japan’s main export partners in 2017, showing that China and Hong Kong together accounted for 24.1 percent of total Japanese exports compared to 19.3 percent for the U.S. For all of 2017, the Japanese export business to China flourished, soaring 20.5 percent after a 6.5 percent decline in 2016.¹¹⁵ Conversely, Japan is the third largest market for Chinese exports after the U.S. and Hong Kong, and Japan is the second largest source of imports into China.¹¹⁶ However, in terms of any growth in bilateral trade, Japan is likely unable to absorb substantially more imports from China, with which it already runs a trade deficit. Possibilities for growth in Japanese exports to China exist in food products, where China is potentially a big export market, as well as machinery for producing integrated circuits.¹¹⁷ Nonetheless, improving trade relationships in both agriculture and electronic machine sectors was overshadowed by the sanctioning of Chinese 5G internet systems and other electronic products on the Japanese market in 2018.¹¹⁸ Even so, Japan’s banks and brokerage firms agreed to set up a \$1.8 billion fund with China’s state-run investment group to help companies enhance trade between the nations.¹¹⁹

¹¹³ Rowley, “Japan and China are Being Pushed.”

¹¹⁴ Laura Zhou, “Shinzo Abe and Xi Jinping Pledge Japan and China Will Deepen Cooperation,” *South China Morning Post*, September 12, 2018. Accessed March, 2019.

<https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2163879/shinzo-abe-and-xi-jinping-pledge-japan-and-china-will-deepen>.

¹¹⁵ Ivanovich, “Japan's Trade with China.”

¹¹⁶ Hideo Kamata, Hideo, “China Seeks Investment From Japan,” *The Yomiuri Shimbun*. October 23, 2018. Accessed March, 2019.

<https://www.questia.com/newspaper/1P4-2124223930/china-seeks-investment-from-japan>.

¹¹⁷ *The Japan Times*, “China Intends to Ease Ban on Japanese Food Imports.” 17 October, 2018. Accessed March, 2019. <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/10/17/national/politics-diplomacy/china-intends-ease-ban-japanese-food-imports-sources/#.XMSg6C0ZOCU>; Nippon.Com, “Japan Data Baidu Survey Finds Why Chinese Tourists Visit Japan,” 11 May, 2018. accessed March, 2019. <https://www.nippon.com/en/features/h00191/baidu-survey-finds-why-chinese-tourists-visit-japan.html>.

¹¹⁸ Minoru Satake, “Japan's 4 carriers to Shun Chinese 5G Tech,” *Nikkei Asian Review*. December 10, 2018. accessed March, 2019. <https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Companies/Japan-s-4-carriers-to-shun-Chinese-5G-tech>.

¹¹⁹ Takashi Nakamichi, “Banks, China Investment to Set Up \$1.8 Billion Trade Fund,” *Bloomberg*, October 25, 2018. Accessed March, 2019. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-26/japan-banks-china-investment-to-set-up-1-8-billion-trade-fund>.

Table 4.3 Japan’s Major Export Markets in 2017

Trading Partner	Total US\$ Exports from Japan (% of total Japanese exports)
United States	\$135.1 billion (19.3%)
China	\$132.8 billion (19.0 %)
South Korea	\$53.3 billion (7.7 %)
Taiwan	\$40.6 billion (5.8%)
Hong Kong	\$35.4 billion (5.1%)
Thailand	\$29.4 billion (4.2 %)
Singapore	\$22.6 billion (5.1 %)
Germany	\$18.9 billion (2.7 %)
Australia	\$16.0 billion (2.3 %)
Vietnam	\$15.1 billion (2.2 %)
United Kingdom	\$13.8 billion (2.0 %)
Indonesia	\$13.4 billion (1.9 %)
Malaysia	\$12.8 billion (1.8 %)
Netherlands	\$12.4 billion (1.8 %)
Mexico	\$11.3 billion (1.6 %)

Note: Four-fifth (80.7 % by value) of Japanese exports in 2017 were delivered to the above 15 trade partners.

Source: based on data available in JETRO (Japan External Trade Organization), *Japanese Trade and Investment Statistics*, no date. Accessed December 2018. <https://www.jetro.go.jp/en/reports/statistics/>.

In terms of direct foreign investment the scope for Chinese investment in Japan and vice-versa also appears to be somewhat limited. In Japan’s case this is due to the relatively slow growth of its consumer and industrial markets, and in China’s case by existing overcapacity in its own export production sectors, such as electrical machinery and equipment, and the fact that President Trump’s tariffs on China’s imports to the U.S. have limited China’s attraction as an investment destination.¹²⁰ In addition, Japanese concerns over intellectual property theft still remain. Significantly, recent news reports on the future of Japanese investment in China behavior by various Japanese companies have been mixed. For instance, China is Japan’s number one automobile market. Consequently, Toyota, Honda and Nissan announced plans in 2018 to expand their car production in China.¹²¹ In contrast, many consumer electronic firms began to relocate products made in China back to Japan—in part due to recent falls in the value of the Japanese yen that made Japan-made export goods more competitive in overseas markets (see Table 4.3). At the

¹²⁰ Zhiqiang Tao and Mary Hui, “Why Donald Trump’s Trade War is Aimed at Foreign Direct Investment in China,” *South China Morning Post*. August 20, 2018. Accessed March, 2019. <https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/united-states/article/2160342/why-donald-trumps-trade-war-aimed-foreign>.

¹²¹ Nao Sano, Kae Inoue and Kevin Buckland, “Toyota to Target Tripling China Production Over Next Decade,” *Bloomberg*. August 28, 2018. Accessed March, 2019. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-28/toyota-said-to-target-tripling-china-production-over-next-decade>.

same time, rapid growth and development in China pushed up wages in recent years and increased local production costs, further dampening investment interest from Japan. Also, in 2018 a number of Japanese companies assessed the likelihood of U.S. tariffs impacting on their ability to export from China into U.S. markets and planned to relocate their operations from China to Japan or elsewhere.¹²² For instance, Mitsubishi Corporation decided to take some operations out of China to minimize the impact from the trade conflict with the U.S. (Table 4.3). Overall, Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) surveys indicate that Southeast Asian countries now rank above China as areas favorable for business expansion; especially Vietnam due to its high economic growth as well as its strengthening position as a production hub and large consumer market. In 2017, Japan was Vietnam’s largest foreign investor.¹²³

Table 4.4 Reports of Japanese Companies Leaving China

Japanese Corporation with operations in China	Recently announced relocation plans/country of relocation
Panasonic (home appliances exported the Japan market)	Back to Japan
Sharp (home appliances exported to the Japan market)	Back to Japan
Daikin (air conditioners exported to the Japan market)	Back Japan
TDK (electronic components for smartphones and autos exported to the Japanese market)	Back to Japan
Toshiba Machine Company (plastic moulding machinery exported to the U.S. auto market)	Back to Japan or to Thailand
Mitsubishi Electric Corporation (laser beam machines exported to the US)	Back to Japan
Komatsu Corporation (machinery parts exported to the US)	Back to Japan or to Mexico

Sources: S. Hakotani, Shinji, Dai Narusawa and Hisashi Naito, “Japanese Firms Shift Production from China to Avoid Trade War,” *The Asahi Shimbun*. 19 September, 2018. Accessed March, 2019. <http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201809190047.html>; Ju-min Park and Makiko Yamazaki, “Asian Firms Shuffle Production Around the Region as China Tariffs Hit,” *Reuters*. 22 September, 2018. Accessed March, 2019. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china-production-focus/asian-firms-shuffle-production-around-the-region-as-china-tariffs-hit-idUSKCN1M305B>.

¹²² Shinji Hakotani, Dai Narusawa and Hisashi Naito. “Japanese Firms Shift Production from China to Avoid Trade War,” *The Asahi Shimbun*, September 19, 2018. Accessed March, 2019. <http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201809190047.html>.

¹²³ Ngan Anh, “Vietnam Named 2nd Best Destination for Japanese Firms Wishing to Expand Abroad: Survey,” *VNExpress International*, March 11, 2018. Accessed March. 2019. <https://e.vnexpress.net/news/business/vietnam-named-2nd-best-destination-for-japanese-firms-wishing-to-expand-abroad-survey-3721277.html>.

ODA used to be a possible contender for Japanese business opportunities in infrastructure project contracts, but it has recently been shut down. As noted earlier, in previous years ODA was a significant conduit of Japanese commercial interests in China and since 1979 Japan provided a total of 3.65 trillion yen (about U.S. \$32.4 billion) in yen loans, grants and technological cooperation.¹²⁴ However, Japan's ODA to China in recent years focused less on economic infrastructure and more on projects such as school construction and measures to deal with infectious diseases.¹²⁵ From the year 2000 onward, effort was put into projects such as environmental protection, poverty reduction and human resource training.¹²⁶ Since 2007 no new yen loans were extended to Beijing, and in fiscal year 2016 Japan funneled just 500 million yen (around US\$ 4.5 million) to China in the form of ODA (Figure 4.3). Indeed, acknowledging the reality of China's increased economic stature, Prime Minister Abe announced an end to overseas development aid during his visit to Beijing, arguing that Japan had "completed its historical mission" over the past 40 years.¹²⁷




Figure 4.3. Japanese ODA to China, 1980 to 2016

Source: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development data, adapted from a diagram in Tamiyuki Kihara and Riyo Kiyomiya, "Japan to End ODA Funding to China, Now an Economic Titan," *The Asahi Shimbun*. October 23, 2018. Accessed March, 2019. <http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201810230031.html>.

¹²⁴ Lam Peng Er, "China–Japan Paradox: Antagonism Despite Interdependency," *China-Japan Relations in the 21st Century*, 1-22.

¹²⁵ The Asahi Shimbun, "Japan to End ODA Funding to China, Now an Economic Titan," October 23, 2018. Accessed March, 2019. <http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201810230031.html>.

¹²⁶ Marie Söderburg, "The Role of ODA in the Relationship," in *Chinese-Japanese Relations in the Twenty-first Century*, ed. Marie Söderburg (London: Routledge, 2002), 114-129; Mike M. Mochizuki, "China-Japan Relations: Downward Spiral or a New Equilibrium?," in *Power Shift: China and Asia's New Dynamics*, ed. David Shambaugh (Berkeley: University of California, 2005), 135-150; David Arase, "Japanese ODA Policy Toward China: The New Agenda," *Japan's Relations With China*, 92-106.

¹²⁷ Daniel Hurst, "Abe Wants 'New Era' in China-Japan Relations," *The Diplomat*. October 26, 2018. Accessed March, 2019. <https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/abe-wants-new-era-in-china-japan-relations/>; Tomohiro Ebuchi and Tsukasa Hadano, "Japan to End China Aid, and Proposes Joint Assistance for Others," *Nikkei Asian Review*, October 23. Accessed March, 2019. <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Japan-to-end-China-aid-and-proposes-joint-assistance-for-others>.

Beyond bilateral commerce, a more likely means to increase relations during this new era is in so-called “third-country” cooperation, which is undoubtedly a prospective multi-trillion dollar market in Asia during coming years.¹²⁸ While avoiding any direct endorsement of China’s controversial “Belt and Road” vision, discussions took place during 2018 indicating that the Japanese government would provide financial assistance for companies working in environmental and energy-conservation technology, as well as industrial development and improved distribution systems.¹²⁹ Indeed, 52 joint infrastructure projects worth more than \$18 billion were signed during Abe’s visit at the China-Japan Third-Market Cooperation Forum held in Beijing.¹³⁰ Financial support would be provided through the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, Nippon Export and Investment Insurance and other channels.¹³¹ A public-private committee was set up to select specific infrastructure projects for cooperation, but no concrete time frame to join the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank was made at the October 2018 Beijing summit. Prime Minister Abe first called for third-country cooperation at a summit with Xi in November 2017 (Shigeta and Nagasawa, 2018), and in Beijing the following year he restated that unless China met Japan’s conditions he would not offer any funding as Japan wanted to ensure joint projects with China were transparent, open, economically viable and fiscally sound for debtor countries.¹³² Going forward, a high-speed rail project in Thailand that aims to connect the country’s three main airports (Don Muang, Suvarabhumi and U-Tapao) was widely seen as a likely candidate for China and Japan’s first collaboration. This project is a central component of Thailand’s Eastern Economic Corridor development plan to assist its growing eastern provinces link with neighboring ones.¹³³

A third area likely to benefit from the October summit concerns future free trade agreements. As noted earlier, China and Japan will likely not only push for the completion of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), but also advocate further negotiations for a China-Japan-South Korea free trade area. While the warming of relations between China and Japan was expected to bring a conclusion to RCEP trade negotiations, no agreement was reached in 2018 because of India’s resistance to opening up its domestic market to international trade.¹³⁴

¹²⁸ Rowley, “Japan and China are Being Pushed.”

¹²⁹ Shiro Armstrong, “Japan Joins to Shape China’s Belt and Road,” *East Asia Forum*. October 28, 2018. Accessed March, 2019. <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/10/28/japan-joins-to-shape-chinas-belt-and-road/>.

¹³⁰ Nagai Harada and Shigeta, “Xi and Abe Use Economy.”

¹³¹ *Nikkei Asian Review*, “Japan Floats Business Aid Idea for China’s Belt and Road Plan.” December 31, 2018. Accessed March, 2019. <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Japan-floats-business-aid-idea-for-China-s-Belt-and-Road-plan2>.

¹³² *Reuters*, “Japan’s Abe Pursues China Thaw as U.S.-Beijing Ties in Deep Freeze.” October 12, 2018. Accessed March, 2019. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-china-thaw-analysis/japans-abe-pursues-china-thaw-as-u-s-beijing-ties-in-deep-freeze-idUSKCN1MM0XV>.

¹³³ Jeong-ho Lee, “Why Thailand Could be the Big Winner as China and Japan Start to Work Together,” *South China Morning Post*, October 26. Accessed March, 2019. <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2170391/why-thailand-could-be-big-winner-china-and-japan-start-work>.

¹³⁴ *SputnikNews*, “Chinese-Backed Regional Economic Partnership Talks Unlikely to Conclude in 2018.” September 5, 2018. Accessed March, 2019. <https://sputniknews.com/asia/201809051067770879-regional-economic-partnership/>.

Meanwhile, China was reported to have considered joining the new Japan-led CPTPP agreement.¹³⁵

Finally, there is the possibility that China and Japan could engage in cooperation in even wider projects, such as climate change, international peace keeping and the geopolitical governance of outer space.¹³⁶ In another sign of improving bilateral relations, Japan and China have agreed to pursue cooperation in developing advanced technologies in areas such as self-driving cars and artificial intelligence.¹³⁷

5. CONCLUSIONS

This paper has reviewed 40 years of China-Japan economic and commercial relations since the signing of the 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship. Rather than inferring any wide-ranging generalizations—either overly pessimistic or optimistic—I have emphasized the evolution of this engagement. Four broad stages were identified that shaped and altered (sometimes abruptly) Japanese changed perceptions of, and reactions to, the relationship. The core-periphery structure to bilateral trade identified at the outset of the study period soon led to a set of both government and private corporate interventions that fit with the flying-geese model of regional development during the 1980s and 1990s. Following China's entry into the WTO in 2001, patterns of commercial, technology and aid arrangements shifted again due to Japan's relative loss of economic power and increasing China-Japan competition and rivalry on a wide number of fronts. Be that as it may, the year 2018 appeared to mark the start of a new and more expansive phase of cooperation in China-Japan relations. These changes have occurred largely in line with China's rapid development as well as contextual factors, such as the role of the U.S. and its strategies toward China and the Asia-Pacific region. Clearly, this type of characterization underscores the need for more nuanced contextualizations of the bilateral relationship, involving the role played by politicians, bureaucrats and private corporations, together with a wide-range analysis that recognizes that bilateral relations do not exist in splendid isolation. The uneasy warming of Sino-Japanese relations in the last year or two is each other's insurance policy, a hedge against the uncertain nature of their trade relations with the U.S.

Perhaps the most decisive conclusion to emerge from this analysis is that the picture of China-Japan relations today is radically different from what it was 40 years ago. Today, not surprisingly, commentators such as Huang¹³⁸ have framed the contemporary bond as being “the best of frenemies”—a term that recognizes that while there might still be feelings of resentment

¹³⁵ Laura Zhou and Wendy Wu, “Beijing Looking Into Joining Trans-Pacific Trade Pact to Hedge Against US,” *South China Morning Post*, 11 October, 2018. Accessed March, 2019. <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2168147/beijing-looking-joining-trans-pacific-trade-pact-hedge-against>.

¹³⁶ Chris G. Pope, “China and Japan—An Unlikely Climate Partnership?,” *Asia Dialogue*. December 13, 2018. Accessed March, 2019. <http://theasiadialogue.com/2018/12/13/china-and-japan-an-unlikely-climate-partnership/>.

¹³⁷ *The Japan Times*, “Japan, China Plan to Launch ‘Innovation Dialogue’ with Focus on Self-driving Vehicles, AI.” September 23, 2018. Accessed March, 2019. <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/09/23/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-china-plan-launch-innovation-dialogue-focus-self-driving-vehicles-ai/#.XMSHIS0ZOCU>.

¹³⁸ Cary Huang, “China and Japan are Still Best of Frenemies, 40 years on From Treaty of Peace and Friendship,” *South China Morning Post*. September 23, 2018. Accessed March, 2019. <https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/2165253/china-and-japan-are-still-best-frenemies-40-years-treaty-peace-and--->.

and rivalry, China and Japan are permanent neighbors in Asia-Pacific whether relations are cold or warm.¹³⁹ In effect they are stuck both with each other and with surrounding nations, and each has an intense relationship with the United States. China is already Japan's largest trading partner with millions of personnel exchanges every year and, in a complicated global economy, if the U.S. closes its market to China, Japan will remain an even more crucial economic ally. Japan and China's economic interests are likely to deepen in the future, even as both look for alternative market and supply-chain opportunities, as well as to structure wider Asia-Pacific trade and economic relations in ways most beneficial to their own interests. Indeed, the basic method of "getting back on track" is seeking common ground while setting aside differences.

Over the years, major documents have been prepared to accommodate the changing relationship: the Japan-China Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1978, a Japan-China Joint Declaration of 1998,¹⁴⁰ and the Japan-China Joint Statement on Comprehensive Promotion of a "Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests," which was issued by the leaders of both countries in 2008.¹⁴¹ Together with the Japan-China Joint Statement of 1972, these constitute the so-called four basic documents of Sino-Japanese relations.¹⁴² Japan hopes Prime Minister Abe's trip in October 2018 will pave the way for a reciprocal visit by President Xi in 2019, which would be the first by a Chinese president since 2008. The Japan-side has also expressed hopes the two sides will sign a "fifth document" to add to the four existing diplomatic agreements. Indeed, a fifth document is needed to reconfirm the Peace and Friendship Treaty. In the fifth document, Japan should describe how to cooperate with China, now an international major power, on issues not only in the Asia-Pacific region, but also in the rest of the world, to bring about peace and stability.¹⁴³

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¹³⁹ Bush, *The Perils of Proximity*.

¹⁴⁰ Mochizuki, "China-Japan Relations."

¹⁴¹ Haikuan Gao, "The China-Japan Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests and East Asian Peace and Stability," *Asia-Pacific Review* 15 (2008): 36-51.

¹⁴² Shin Kawashima, "45 Years of Normalized Sino-Japanese Diplomacy," *The Diplomat*. September 11. Accessed March, 2019. <https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/45-years-of-normalized-sino-japanese-diplomacy/>.

¹⁴³ Shinichi Akiyama and Yoshitaka Koyama, "Japan, China Looking to New Stage of Relations 40 years on from Peace, Friendship Treaty," *Mainichi Japan*. October 23. Accessed March, 2019. <https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20181023/p2a/00m/0na/031000c>.

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5. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE FIRST SIX YEARS OF ABENOMICS¹

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ABSTRACT

In December 2012, at a time when the Japanese economy was seen by many as no longer capable of significant economic growth, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe came to power with an ambitious, Keynesian economic policy package consisting of three components: aggressive monetary policy, flexible fiscal policy and a growth strategy. The three components of the policy package were described as the “three arrows” of Abenomics.

Six years later, Prime Minister Abe was still in power, and although the economic policies of the government had evolved, Abenomics was still the term used to describe them. This essay provides an assessment of the first six years of Abenomics. The assessment differs from others in various aspects including that it is written for a general academic audience and makes use of Canadian data for comparative purposes. It has as its central aim to assess the degree to which Abenomics has achieved its core objective of overcoming economic stagnation.

The essay first outlines the general macroeconomic framework for the assessment, which is termed an output-gap framework. It then discusses two analytical issues of special importance for analyzing Japanese macroeconomic performance. These concern the appropriate indicators of economic growth and fiscal health. The essay then describes Japanese monetary and fiscal policies and growth strategies since early 2013, and examines indicators of Japanese economic performance. The conclusion is that although economic targets have not been fully realized, economic stagnation has been overcome. The economy has grown at a healthy pace and underutilization of capacity has been largely eliminated.

Keywords: Japanese economy, Abenomics, unconventional monetary policy, government debt burden, economic growth measurement, macroeconomic policy assessment, potential output estimation, labour market indicators, political economy.

¹ Helpful comments and questions were received at my presentation of an earlier version of this essay at the Japan Studies Association of Canada conference at the University of Alberta in October 2018. I am solely responsible for the contents of this essay.

1. INTRODUCTION

In December 2012, at a time when the Japanese economy was seen by many as weak and no longer capable of significant economic growth, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe came to power with an ambitious, growth-oriented economic policy package consisting of three components: aggressive monetary policy, flexible fiscal policy and a growth strategy. The policy package was developed in collaboration with advisers, notably the Keynesian economist Koichi Hamada, and it was Keynesian in its emphasis on the importance of aggregate demand growth.² The three components of the policy package were described as the “three arrows” of Abenomics. This was a reference, as explained by Pilling: “to Motonari Mori, a sixteenth-century daimyo lord who had told his three sons they would be stronger if they worked as a team. It was easy to break the shaft of one arrow, the daimyo had explained, but nearly impossible to snap three shafts bound together.”³

Six years later, Prime Minister Abe was still in power, and Abenomics was still the term used to describe the economic policies of his government. Given that the government could possibly stay in power until 2021, it may still be too early for a definitive assessment of the impact of Abenomics on Japanese economic performance. But we are over six years into this macroeconomic policy experiment, so there is plenty of evidence available to support a preliminary assessment.

Indeed, some lengthy assessments have recently been conducted.⁴ The current assessment differs from others in that it is written for a general academic audience, is focused on judging the success of Abenomics in terms of achieving its major objective of overcoming economic stagnation, emphasizes the framework for assessment and the relevant analytical issues and makes some use of Canadian data for comparative purposes.

The second section of this essay will outline the general macroeconomic framework for this assessment, and the third section will discuss two analytical issues of special importance for analyzing Japanese macroeconomic performance. The fourth section describes Japanese monetary and fiscal policies and growth strategies since early 2013. The fifth section examines indicators of Japanese economic performance. The sixth and final section of the essay is a conclusion.

2. A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE ASSESSMENT

An assessment of national macroeconomic performance demands a conceptual framework. One informal framework often applied by non-specialists has been to take the trend of Japanese real (inflation-adjusted) Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from the pre-1992 period and compare that trend to the much lower actual trend of real GDP since 1992 in order to claim that policy measures taken to boost economic growth since 1992 have failed miserably. We could represent this framework with Figure 5.1. The steeper the slope of a path of real GDP

² Since 2013, Hamada, Emeritus Professor of Yale University, has been writing columns, including ones on Abenomics, at Project Syndicate: <https://www.project-syndicate.org/columnist/koichi-hamada>

³ See David Pilling, *Bending Adversity: Japan and the Art of Survival* (New York: Penguin, 2014), 307.

⁴ See, for example, the 66-page *OECD Economic Survey of Japan* (Paris: OECD, 2017) and the 63-page *Japan: 2017 Article IV Consultation* (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 2017) in English, and many book-length studies in Japanese. A search of Abenomics (“abenomikusu” in katakana) on Amazon Japan (<http://amazon.co.jp/>) in late 2018 showed at least eight books devoted to Abenomics in just 2017 and 2018, and many more published in the 2013-2016 period.

shown in the figure, the higher the growth rate.⁵ The solid, steeply upward-sloping line represents the pre-1992 trend of sharply-rising GDP extrapolated into 1992 and later years, and the dashed, mildly upward-sloping line represents actual trend of slowly-rising GDP growth since 1992.




Figure 5.1 A Casual Framework for Assessing Japanese Economic Performance

The framework applied in this essay, like the informal framework illustrated with Figure 5.1, is concerned with real GDP trends, break points such as Figure 5.1 shows for 1992 and with judging macroeconomic policy effectiveness. Unlike the informal framework illustrated with Figure 5.1, the framework applied in this essay is one widely employed by macroeconomists.

The framework is based upon a distinction between actual output and potential output. Actual output is just another term for GDP as measured by the statistical authorities—say, by the Economics and Social Research Institute of the Cabinet Office in the case of Japan or by Statistics Canada in the Canadian case. The complicated part of this conceptual framework is not actual output but the other key component—that is, potential output. The general idea behind potential output is that at any point in time an economy has a capacity to produce output that is a function of the size and quality of its labour force, the amount of capital stock, the current state of technology, the quality of institutions and so on. And this capacity is not necessarily equal to actual output. In a recession, for example, actual output will fall short of potential output, the economy will be operating below capacity and the unemployment rate will be high. On the other hand, it is also possible that actual output could exceed potential output. The economy is then said to be “overheating” or in a “bubble” phase, and the unemployment rate will tend to be unusually low. When actual output will equal potential output the economy is said to be at full employment.

The difference between actual output and potential output is referred to as the output gap. It is generally expressed relative to potential output. When actual output falls short of potential

⁵ For the slope of a straight line to exactly represent a constant growth rate, the figure would have to show the natural logarithm of real GDP on the vertical axis.

output, there is a recessionary gap, and when actual output exceeds potential output there is an expansionary gap (sometimes called an inflationary gap). Figure 5.2 shows the output gap for Japan as a percentage of potential GDP as estimated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for the period 1984-2009. When the line is above the horizontal axis there is an expansionary gap by the IMF's calculations, and when the solid line is below the horizontal axis there is a recessionary gap. Notice, for example, the large expansionary gap during the bubble economy period of the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, and the extremely large recessionary gap during the global economic recession of 2008-2009.




Figure 5.2 Output Gap as a Percentage of Potential Output, IMF

Source: *IMF World Economic Outlook Database*, April 2018, and author's calculations.

The concepts of actual and potential output are static ones. They apply at particular points in time to levels of output. But they have dynamic counterparts that apply to economic growth rates. Corresponding to actual output, the dynamic counterpart is the actual GDP growth rate, and corresponding to potential output we have the potential GDP growth rate. The actual GDP growth rate is as measured by the relevant statistical agency. The potential GDP growth rate is estimated by economists, such as economists at the IMF, guided by theories about the factors determining the capacity of an economy to produce.

Thus, the framework to be applied later in this essay is one based on concepts of actual output, potential output, the output gap, the actual growth rate and the potential growth rate. For the rest of this essay, it will be called the output-gap framework.⁶

A relevant application of this output-gap framework is provided in an assessment of the Japanese economy published in 2011 by the U.S. economist and Japan specialist Edward Lincoln.⁷ He noted that for the “two decades (1990–2009), the average annual real (inflation-adjusted) growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) was only 1.1 per cent.” But for “the decade of the 1990s, the potential growth rate was probably on the order of 2.0 to 2.5 per cent, diminishing to no more than 2.0 per cent in the first decade of the new century.” Lincoln also notes that the Japanese economy was operating above capacity in the late 1980s into the beginning of the 1990s, and makes the case that Japan’s actual real GDP growth after 1990 would have been even lower with less aggressive macroeconomic policy than was applied by Japanese macroeconomic policy-makers.

Figure 5.3 provides a stylized illustration of these elements of Lincoln’s application of the output-gap framework for comparison with Figure 5.1 depicting the previously-mentioned informal framework. Figure 5.3 is “stylized” in that it leaves out business cycle ups and downs other than the 1992 downturn, and it also leaves out the small drop in the estimated potential growth rate from the 1990s to the 2000s.




Figure 5.3 A Stylized Representation of Edward Lincoln’s Output-Gap Framework

⁶ Further details about these concepts can be found in most macroeconomics textbooks—see, e.g., my co-authored macroeconomics textbook Robert Frank et al., *Principles of Macroeconomics*, 4th Canadian ed. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 2012), 159-64. The concepts are typically taught for use with specific economic models, and the term “output-gap framework” is not part of standard economics terminology.

⁷ See Edward Lincoln, “The Heisei Economy: Puzzles, Problems, Prospects,” *Journal of Japanese Studies* 37 no. 2 (2011): 351-75.

As compared to the casual framework represented by Figure 5.1, the relevant features of Figure 5.3 are:⁸ 1) the path of real GDP after 1992 is lower in part because the potential growth rate declined; 2) the steeper slope of potential GDP growth (shown by a solid line) than actual growth (shown by a dashed line) suggests that macroeconomy policy could in theory have done better than it did; and 3) the steeper slope of the actual growth path than the predicted growth path with less aggressive macroeconomic policy (shown by the dotted line) illustrates the idea that macroeconomic policy could also have done worse than it did.

There are two other important elements to this output-gap approach. One is that, based upon historical evidence, central banks such as the Bank of Japan tend to operate under the assumption that the inflation rate (the percentage change in the aggregate price level, typically measured by the Consumer Price Index or CPI) is strongly influenced by the output gap. If there is no output gap, the inflation rate will tend to stay the same, all else equal. If there is an expansionary gap with actual output above potential output, the inflation rate will tend to rise. And if there is a recessionary gap the inflation rate will tend to fall.

The other element relates to the three arrows of the original version of Abenomics. It is that monetary and fiscal policies, which together are referred to as stabilization policies, are thought to have their impact largely on the output gap (by changing actual output) but not on potential output. And the policies constituting the third arrow, the growth strategy, are thought to have their impact largely on potential output. Whether they have an impact on actual output depends on the particular type of policy and the state of the economy.⁹

This section has presented an output-gap framework that will inform the assessment of Japanese macroeconomic policy and performance from December 2012 to the end of 2018. It is worth noting that while the output-gap framework is neither beyond criticism nor completely objective, it does have broad acceptance among economists, being compatible with a variety of macroeconomic models, both orthodox and heterodox.¹⁰

3. TWO ANALYTICAL ISSUES OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE

For the task of analyzing Japanese performance later in this essay, this section will touch upon two analytical issues of special importance to the task: the indicator of economic growth and the measures of a government's debt burden. Without a proper appreciation of these issues, one can easily adopt an overly negative view of Japanese economic performance, either during the period of Abenomics or during the so-called two lost decades (approximately 1992 to 2012) that preceded the adoption of Abenomics.

⁸ To avoid making the graph overly complicated, I have refrained from showing actual output above potential output prior to the 1992 downturn.

⁹ For example, a policy under the growth strategy to increase the labour force participation of a particular demographic group might initially only result in more members of the group seeking work and not finding it (and thereby contributing to potential output but not to actual output) if the policy were implemented in the depth of a recession.

¹⁰ Two criticisms are worth mentioning. First, in a wide range of countries, changes in the inflation rate do not seem to be as sensitive to the output gap as was once thought. Second, there is growing evidence that the potential growth rate can be influenced by the actual growth rate. On the first criticism, see Lars Osberg, "Full Employment in Canada in the Early 21st Century," in *Aggregate Demand and Employment: International Perspectives*, ed. Brian K. MacLean, Hassan Bougrine, and Louis-Philippe Rochon (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2019 forthcoming), and on the second, see J.W. Mason, "Macroeconomic Lessons from the Past Decade," in *Aggregate Demand*.

3.1 The indicator of economic growth

A very common way to gauge the performance of an economy across time periods with other countries is to look at real GDP growth supplemented with other measures. Real GDP growth is a more meaningful indicator of economic performance than nominal GDP growth because nominal GDP can expand simply because prices on the whole are rising whereas real GDP growth is adjusted for inflation.

The practice of judging economic performance by real GDP growth goes back to the early years of official GDP measurement and it continues today.¹¹ It is a practice that is easily defended when comparing countries with similar population growth rates, but otherwise it gives what many economists regard as an unduly favourable impression of the economic performance of countries with high population growth rates and an unduly unfavourable impression of countries with low population growth rates.¹²

The growth of real GDP can be decomposed into two parts—the growth of population and the growth of real GDP per person. By focusing on the growth of real GDP per person directly instead of the growth of real GDP, analysts can focus on a macroeconomic indicator that is more directly related to improvements in living standards.

For example, the Japanese economy is frequently compared with the U.S. economy. Decades ago, when the population growth rates of the two countries were similar, it was reasonable to compare the countries according to their real GDP growth rates. It would not have made much difference whether one compared their growth rates in the 1960s, for example, in terms of real GDP growth rates or in terms of growth rates of real GDP per capita.¹³ But in the past decade or so, with Japanese population declining while the U.S. population continues to grow as a significant rate, it makes a big difference whether one compares the countries according to their real GDP growth rates or their growth rates of real GDP per capita. Japan, like other countries with low or negative population growth rates, consistently comes off as a poor performer when real GDP growth is used as the standard of evaluation.

In fact, some economists have suggested that focusing on growth of real GDP per capita rather than growth of real GDP does not go far enough because the growth of real GDP per capita still includes an arbitrary demographic element under the surface. More exactly, countries more affected by population aging will tend to be the laggards in international comparisons of growth of real GDP per capita. The reasoning is that growth of real GDP per capita depends on growth of output per employed person and growth in the employment to population ratio. But across the world, workers aged 65 and older are much less likely to be employed, so countries that have high ratios of elderly workers in their populations tend to have lower employment to population ratios than otherwise. And, of course, countries where the share of elderly workers in

¹¹ There is, of course, a large literature on alternative and supplementary measures of economic performance. See, for example, the discussion in Chapter 4 of my co-authored macroeconomics textbook, Frank et al., *Principles of Macroeconomics*.

¹² In Brian K. MacLean, “The Canadian Economy since the Lehman Shock—A Retrospective from 2015,” trans. into Japanese by Kenichi Haga, in *Keizai-gaku no zahyōjiku* (English title: *Economics in Three Dimensions*), ed. Sendai Economics Association (Tokyo: Shakai hyōron-sha, 2016b), 315-338, I discuss this issue in connection with international comparisons of Canadian economic growth performance.

¹³ Takakoshi Ito, *The Japanese Economy* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992), for example, compares Japanese and U.S. growth performance using only real output growth, not growth of output per capita. Actually, Ito, *Japanese Economy*, used real GNP (Gross National Product) growth rather than real GDP growth, probably reflecting the fact that the United States and Japan were later than other countries to switch from emphasizing GNP measurement to emphasizing GDP measurement.

the population is rising more rapidly than in other countries will find their employment to population ratios falling, all else equal. One proposal has been to compare economic performance in terms of growth of real GDP per person in the 15-64 age brackets.¹⁴

Later in this essay, when evaluating Japanese economic performance under Abenomics, the emphasis will be on growth of real GDP per capita. Incidentally, this is not to claim that growth of real GDP is a meaningless indicator. It is, for example, a meaningful indicator of growth of the national market and it determines changes in a country's share in world output.

3.2 The measure(s) of the government debt burden

A government debt-to-GDP ratio is typically considered an indicator of the burden of government debt in an economy. Some economists emphasize that high debt-to-GDP ratio combined with high interest rates on the debt imply a high share of government expenditure devoted to interest payments. They may also emphasize a high government debt-to-GDP ratio could indicate that a country is likely to have difficulty servicing its debt payments, and might then default on its debt. Default on government debt is not only problematic for bondholders, but more importantly can cause problems for the economy. The case of Greece since late 2009 provides an extreme example. Other economists caution against government debt hysteria and emphasize that one cannot generalize from the experience of an economy without its own currency to economies with their own currency such as Japan, the United States, Canada and many others.

In fact, there are two ways of measuring the government debt-to-GDP ratio—the gross government debt-to-GDP ratio and the net government debt-to-GDP ratio. The gross debt-to-GDP ratio measures all of the government's outstanding debt in its numerator whereas the net debt-to-GDP ratio subtracts the value of the government's financial assets from the value of its debt to arrive at its numerator. Journalists typically report the gross debt-to-GDP ratio—it is the larger one and can make for more dramatic news. Economists are more likely to use the net debt-to-GDP ratio for international comparisons.

For some economies, the government's holdings of financial assets are not particularly large, which means that the difference between the two debt-to-GDP ratios is not large either. But in the Japanese case, the choice of the government debt-to-GDP indicator makes a big difference. The gross debt-to-GDP ratio of Japan, the measure that gets cited so regularly in news stories, was estimated to be 238 per cent in 2017. The net debt-to-GDP ratio was estimated to be much lower—"only" 155 per cent.¹⁵

Moreover, under its program of quantitative easing the Bank of Japan has been purchasing a substantial portion of the government's debt. The Bank of Japan is owned by the government of Japan, which means that the government debt held by the Bank of Japan can be viewed as money that the government owes to itself, or debt that does not really count. The government bonds held by the Bank of Japan amount to 90 per cent of GDP and if they are

¹⁴ See Paul Krugman, "Japanese Relative Performance," *The New York Times*. February 9, 2013. <https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/09/japanese-relative-performance/>. Although the proposal is a logical extension of the practice of focusing on growth of real GDP per capita instead of real GDP growth, it has not caught on.

¹⁵ See *IMF World Economic Outlook Database, October 2018* (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 2018). For Canada, too, the difference between the two measures is large—28 per cent for the net debt-to-GDP ratio in 2017 but 90 per cent for the gross debt-to-GDP ratio. Italy is a case where the two measures do not differ greatly—118 for the net ratio and 132 for the gross ratio in 2017.

netted out like other government financial assets, then Japan's "consolidated" debt-to-GDP ratio is about 60 per cent of GDP.¹⁶

The U.S. policy economist Dean Baker has frequently noted the tendency of journalists and others to sensationalize Japan's high gross debt-to-GDP ratio and to ignore its surprisingly low government debt burden as measured by net government interest payments relative to GDP.¹⁷ Japan's general government net debt interest payments in 2017 were 0.4 per cent of GDP, the same as for Canada, and well below the 2.9 per cent of GDP for the United States and the 2.3 per cent of GDP for the United Kingdom.¹⁸

In concluding this section, it may be useful for me to mention an indicator of the financial health of governments recently promoted by the IMF. The IMF has recently made a case for the use of net government assets-to-GDP ratio as a supplementary measure of the government debt burden. Whereas the usual net debt-to-GDP ratio adjusts the gross debt-to-GDP ratio to account for financial assets held by the government, the net government assets-to-GDP ratio adjusts in addition for the value of the real assets (such as buildings) held by the government. By the IMF's recently proposed supplement measure of public sector balance sheets, Japan is not the extreme outlier as indicated by its gross government debt-to-GDP ratio but a rather normal, middle-of-the-road economy.¹⁹

4. ABENOMICS: THE POLICY RECORD²⁰

The previous two sections of this essay have outlined a conceptual framework and explained key analytical considerations for the assessment of Abenomics. This section will look at the implementation of the three arrows of the original version of Abenomics—monetary policy, fiscal policy and structural policy—beginning with monetary policy.²¹ The following section will evaluate economic performance during the period of their application.

¹⁶ The term "consolidated" debt-to-GDP ratio is employed in Mark T. Greenan and David E. Weinstein, "The Crisis that Wasn't: How Japan Has Avoided a Bond Market Panic," Center on Japanese Economy and Business Working Papers 361 (2017). The 60 per cent of GDP ratio has been calculated by Adair Turner, "Japan's Successful Economic Model," *Project Syndicate*. Sept. 20, 2018. <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/japan-successful-economic-model-by-adair-turner-2018-09>.

¹⁷ See, for example, Dean Baker, "Olivier Blanchard Is Worried about Inflation," *Beat the Press* blog, Center for Economic and Policy Research. April 13, 2016. <http://cepr.net/blogs/beat-the-press/olivier-blanchard-is-worried-about-inflation-in-japan>.

¹⁸ See *OECD Interim Economic Outlook* (Paris: OECD, 2018), Annex Table 35.

¹⁹ See Vitor Gaspar, Jason Harris and Alexander Tieman, "The Wealth of Nations: Governments Can Better Manage What They Own and Owe," *IMF Blog*. Oct. 10, 2018, <https://blogs.imf.org/2018/10/09/the-wealth-of-nations-governments-can-better-manage-what-they-own-and-owe/>; and Chris Giles, "IMF Urges Governments to Focus on State Assets," *Financial Times*. Oct. 10, 2018. <https://www.ft.com/content/730df5b4-cbba-11e8-b276-b9069bde0956>.

²⁰ For a year-by-year commentary on the Japanese economy under Abenomics, see the annual surveys by Hugh Patrick, the latest of which is Hugh Patrick, "Japan's Economy: Moving Along Its Modest Sustainable Growth Path," Center on Japanese Economy and Business Working Papers 78 (2018). <https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D81R86SR/download>.

²¹ In Brian K. MacLean, "Abenomics and the Japanese Labour Market," in *Aggregate Demand*, I discuss different stages in the evolution of what the Abe administration has called Abenomics.

4.1 Monetary policy²²

Although Bank of Japan (BoJ) Governor Masaaki Shirakawa was not scheduled to complete his term of office until April of 2013, already in January of 2013 the Abe government and the BoJ issued a joint statement about overcoming deflation (that is, negative inflation) and achieving sustained economic growth.²³ The statement indicated that monetary easing would aim to achieve a two per cent annual CPI inflation rate at the “earliest possible time.”

Then in February 2012 the government announced it would be nominating Asian Development Bank President Haruhiko Kuroda for the position of BoJ Governor. Kuroda had spent his career at Japan’s Ministry of Finance before becoming Asian Development Bank President in 2005. He was known as an advocate of highly expansionary monetary policy. Even before he was confirmed for the position of BoJ Governor he was quoted in the press as saying: “There is plenty of room for monetary easing.” This seems to have accelerated the depreciation of the yen that had started in mid-November of 2012 with the commencement of the election campaign that Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party seemed destined to win.²⁴

Next, in accordance with an announcement that had been made in early February 2013, BoJ Governor Shirakawa resigned a few weeks early from his post to allow Kuroda to commence his more expansionary monetary policies. Thus since March 20, 2013 Governor Kuroda has been the face of Japanese monetary policy. He was appointed at the same time as two new Deputy Governors, one of whom (Kikuo Iwata) was a professor at Gakushuin University known for advocating more expansionary monetary policy and reduced independence of the Bank of Japan from the government. In February 2018, the Prime Minister’s office played a central role in the reappointment of Governor Kuroda to a second five-year term of office, and also the appointment of two new deputy governors, including one (Masazumi Wakatabe) known for his support of aggressive monetary policy.²⁵

The monetary policy that Governor Kuroda was appointed to implement is known as unconventional monetary policy. In most high-income economies, the primary tool of monetary policy is the key policy rate of the central bank, which is typically a target for the overnight rate of interest for interbank lending. The most commonly stated goal of the central bank is to control inflation and the target inflation rate is usually 2 or 3 per cent CPI inflation, regardless of whether the inflation target is explicit or not. When the central bank expects that inflation will rise above the target inflation rate, it increases the key policy rate, and when the central bank expects that inflation will fall below the target inflation rate, it lowers the key policy rate. The central bank’s focus on inflation does not preclude a concern with economic recessions and booms because recessions tend to lower the inflation rate below the target and booms tend to

²² For a more comprehensive discussion of Japanese monetary policy under Abenomics, see Sayuri Shirai, *Mission Incomplete: Reflating Japan’s Economy* (Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute, 2017). The most relevant official documents can be found at: <https://www.boj.or.jp/en/mopo/outline/qge.htm/>.

²³ See Cabinet Office, Ministry of Finance and Bank of Japan, “Joint Statement of the Government and the Bank of Japan on Overcoming Deflation and Achieving Sustainable Economic Growth,” 2013. https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2013/k130122c.pdf.

²⁴ Toko Sekiguchi, “Tokyo Nominates Haruhiko Kuroda as BOJ Chief,” *MarketWatch*. Feb. 27, 2013. <https://www.marketwatch.com/story/tokyo-nominates-haruhiko-kuroda-as-boj-chief-2013-02-27>.

²⁵ See Jiji Press, “BOJ’s Independence Tested 20 Years after Legal Revision Curbed Government Influence,” *Japan Times*, April 1, 2018, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/04/01/business/bojs-independence-tested-20-years-legal-revision-curbed-government-influence>. Deputy Governor Wakatabe had been a Professor of Economics at Waseda University. His specialty is the history of economic thought, and one of his books was co-authored with Koichi Hamada, the noted economic advisor to Prime Minister Abe. From October 2014 to January 2018, Professor Wakatabe wrote 55 columns for Forbes magazine: <https://www.forbes.com/sites/mwakatabe/>.

boost the inflation rate above the target.²⁶ In the other words, using the terminology of the output-gap framework outlined in Section 2 of this essay, when actual output falls substantially below potential output, the inflation rate tends to fall and when actual output exceeds potential output, the inflation rate tends to rise.

The BoJ lowered its key policy rate almost to zero by the mid-1990s in response to the recession that followed the bursting of the so-called bubble economy, and since then conventional monetary policy has been of little consequence.²⁷ With the key policy rate already close to zero, there was little that the Bank of Japan could do with conventional monetary policy to counter the deflation that became a persistent feature of the Japanese economy in the latter half of the 1990s.

Under pressure to do something about a recession and persistent deflation, the BoJ resorted to unconventional monetary policy in March 2001 with a program of quantitative easing (QE). QE is sometimes referred to as the practice of the central bank cranking up the printing of money, which may suffice as a rough idea of what is involved. It is more accurately described as the practice of the central bank expanding its purchases of assets, typically government bonds held by commercial banks, to funnel reserves to the banking system. The expectation is that, operating through various channels (such as the boost to overall spending in the economy if the banks use the extra reserves to expand their lending), the expanded central bank asset purchases will boost overall spending in the economy and thereby boost economic growth and avoid deflation.²⁸

The BoJ's first experiment with QE continued until 2006 when the economy seemed to be on a solid growth path. A separate round of QE was initiated by the Bank of Japan in late 2010, around the time that a number of other central banks, including the U.S. Federal Reserve, implemented QE in response to the global recession of 2008-2009. The Bank of Japan's QE was judged to be rather cautious in comparison with the QE implemented by the U.S. Federal Reserve.

Early in April 2013, less than a month after Governor Kuroda had assumed his post, the BoJ announced that it would enter a new phase of monetary easing called "quantitative and qualitative monetary easing" or QQE. In this new phase the BoJ promised to achieve 2 per cent inflation within two years by doubling its holdings of Japanese government bonds (JGBs) and of exchange-traded funds (ETFs), and doubling the average residual maturity of JGB purchases.²⁹

The label QQE was apparently chosen to emphasize that monetary easing was not just about increasing the scale of asset purchases by the BoJ. The adjective "qualitative" in the label conveys the idea that quantitative easing purchases would be aimed at specific targets. One target was for government bonds of longer duration with a view to lowering long-term interest rates.

²⁶ For a detailed explanation of central banking and monetary policy, see Chapters 9 and 10 of my co-authored macroeconomics textbook, Frank et al., *Principles of Macroeconomics*.

²⁷ More precisely, with the key policy rate at or near zero, there was little to be done by cutting the rate to stimulate the economy because nominal interest rates cannot go much below zero. But there was still, of course, the possibility of raising the rate to restrain economic growth. A couple of times during the so-called two lost decades, the BoJ did hike interest rates, and the hikes were widely viewed in retrospect as having had negative consequences for economic growth.

²⁸ For an explanation of quantitative easing, see Brian K. MacLean, "Quantitative Easing," in *The Encyclopedia of Central Banking*, ed. L-P. Rochon and S. Rosso (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2015), 414-416. I emphasize the significance of channels other than that of increased bank reserves boosting bank lending.

²⁹ Increasing the average residual maturity of JGB purchases meant buying JGBs of longer duration (for example, bonds coming to maturity in five years or more as opposed to, say, coming to maturity in one year or less).

The introduction of QQE by the BoJ in April 2013 was the first of five significant stages in the evolution of Japanese monetary policy under Governor Kuroda. The second significant stage was entered at the end of October 2014 when the BoJ announced an expansion of QQE on the grounds that aggregate demand had weakened due to the consumption tax hike of April 2014 and also that lower crude oil prices were working against efforts to achieve the 2 per cent inflation target.

The third stage was marked by a January 2016 announcement by the BoJ that it would adopt a negative interest rate policy. Under this policy, a negative interest rate of -0.1 per cent would apply to current accounts held by financial institutions at the BoJ. More precisely, the negative interest rate would apply to one of three tiers of a financial institution's current account balance at the BoJ; on a second tier a zero interest rate would apply, and on the third tier a positive rate would apply.³⁰

The fourth stage came in September 2016. On the same day that the BoJ released a report assessing its experience with the frameworks of QQE (from April 2013 to January 2016) and QQE with a negative interest rate (from January 2016), the BoJ also announced a new framework with the label "Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing with Yield Curve Control."

Yield curve control had long been a concern of the BoJ.³¹ But by adding the term to the label for its monetary policy framework, the BoJ clearly hoped that the expansionary nature of its policy actions would be judged less by the scale of its asset purchases and more by their effects on interest rates, especially long-term interest rates.

The new framework also included an inflation-overshooting commitment. That is, the BoJ committed to keeping monetary policy expansionary at least until the inflation rate had exceeded its 2 per cent target level. The previous major policy announcements of the BoJ since April 2013 had all included the statement that the BoJ would continue with its framework "to achieve the price stability target of 2 per cent, as long as it is necessary for maintaining that target in a stable manner." The September 2016 announcement added the inflation-overshooting target as follows: "The Bank will continue expanding the monetary base until the year-on-year rate of increase in the observed CPI (all items less fresh food) exceeds the price stability target of 2 per cent and stays above the target in a stable manner."³²

At the time of writing, the fifth and latest state in the development of Japanese monetary policy under Governor Kuroda was announced in July of 2018. Offering the rationale that inflation remained below target relative to output and employment conditions, the BoJ declared that it would introduce forward guidance for policy rates.³³ Forward guidance occurs when the central bank commits to maintaining the interest rate or interest rates that it controls for a considerable but indefinite period of time (which is called qualitative forward guidance), for a

³⁰ See *The Economist*, "Don't Shed a Tier: How to Make Negative Rates Less Painful," *The Economist*, February 3, 2016, <https://www.economist.com/free-exchange/2016/02/03/how-to-make-negative-rates-less-painful> for an explanation of the BoJ's three-tier rate system of interest rates on the accounts held by banks at the BoJ.

³¹ A yield curve is a graph of the yields or interest rates on a particular type of bond (e.g., government bonds) with yields on the vertical axis and the duration to maturity of the bonds on the horizontal axis. Typically, bonds of longer duration to maturity have higher yields. Therefore, the yield curve typically slopes upward from left to right.

³² See Bank of Japan, "New Framework for Strengthening Monetary Easing: 'Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing with Yield Curve Control,'" Sept. 21, 2016, https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2016/k160921a.pdf.

³³ The inflation-overshooting commitment announced in September 2016 did not constitute forward guidance because it was a commitment about quantitative easing and was not directly a commitment regarding policy rates.

specific period of time (called time contingent forward guidance) or until some policy-relevant objective or target is achieved (call state contingent forward guidance).³⁴ In July of 2018, the BoJ's qualitative forward guidance was to maintain both short-term and long-term interest rates for an "extended" period.³⁵

One observation about monetary policy under Abenomics is that it has been expansionary not just due to a policy vision but also because of fortunate timing. Because the general election was held in December 2012, and the Bank of Japan Governor Shirakawa's term was due to end in April 2013, it was relatively straightforward for Abe's government to recruit and have appointed a Governor committed to highly expansionary monetary policy. But the general election did not have to be called in March 2013. The ruling party, the Democratic Party of Japan, had come to power in the lower house election of August 2009. It was only legally required to hold another election after four years. That is, the election could have been held as late as August 2013. In that case, the Governor of the Bank of Japan would have been a few months into a five-year term, and there would have been no opportunity to replace him or her during Abe's initial term of office, even if that term of office had lasted four years. In other words, given the special circumstances under which Abe came to power, with the term of the Governor soon to expire, the independence of the Bank of Japan as set out in the Bank of Japan Act did not constitute an obstacle to the implementation of the first arrow of Abenomics. But under more normal circumstances, the independence of the Bank of Japan would have been an obstacle. For example, if the Democratic Party of Japan had wished to engineer a dramatic shift of Bank of Japan policy when it came to power in 2009, it would have faced the problem that Governor Shirakawa had been appointed in 2008 and his term would continue until 2013.

4.2 Fiscal policy³⁶

Just as BoJ Governor Kuroda has been the consistent face of monetary policy under Abenomics, so has Finance Minister Aso been the consistent face of fiscal policy. Under Prime Minister Abe, he was appointed Minister of Finance (and also Deputy Prime Minister) in December 2012, and was reappointed in the cabinet shuffles of December 2014 and November 2017. He has served in the House of Representatives since 1979, and served a year as Prime Minister of Japan at the height of the global economic crisis of 2008-2009, at which time he played a significant role in the G20 agreement in November 2008 for member countries to administer fiscal stimulus.³⁷

³⁴ See Karyne Charbonneau and Lori Rennison, "Forward Guidance at the Effective Lower Bound: International Experience," Bank of Canada Staff Discussion Paper 15 (2015), <https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/dp2015-15.pdf>. In recent years it has sometimes been claimed that forward guidance is something new in the central banker's bag of tricks—see, e.g., Ryan Avent, "What 'Forward Guidance' Is, and How It (Theoretically) Works," *The Economist*, Feb. 11, 2014, <https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2014/02/11/what-forward-guidance-is-and-how-it-theoretically-works>, referring to the use of forward guidance by the U.S. Federal Reserve in December 2012. Charbonneau and Rennison, "Forward Guidance," however, note that forward guidance was pioneered by the BoJ in the April 1999-July 2000 period.

³⁵ See Bank of Japan, "Strengthening the Framework for Continuous Powerful Monetary Easing," July 31, 2018, https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2018/k180731a.pdf.

³⁶ The fiscal policy speeches of Japan's Minister of Finance constitute a primary source on fiscal policy under Abenomics, and are available at: https://www.mof.go.jp/english/public_relations/statement/fiscal_policy_speech/.

³⁷ See Ricard Koo, "Balance Sheet Recession Is the Reason for Secular Stagnation," in *Secular Stagnation: Facts, Causes and Cures*, ed. Coen Teulings and Richard Baldwin (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2014), 131-142.

The initial plan for fiscal policy under Abenomics was that it would be “expansionary” until the economy reached full employment. In the terminology of the output-gap framework outlined in Section 2 of this essay, it was to be expansionary until actual output of the Japanese economy rose to the level of the economy’s potential output, and hence the output gap was eliminated.³⁸ When the output gap was eliminated, fiscal policy would become contractionary in accordance with the primary objective of fiscal policy shifting from the now-achieved full employment to the objective of realizing “fiscal consolidation” (a reduction of the government budget deficit with a view to lowering the government debt-to-GDP ratio).³⁹

The initial expansionary phase of fiscal policy under Finance Minister Aso focused on government expenditure increases. There was 20.2 trillion yen (4.1 per cent of GDP) of extra spending for the emergency recovery program of January 2013 and another 18.6 trillion yen (3.7 per cent of GDP) of extra spending for the “Virtuous Cycle” program of December 2013.⁴⁰

But the plan was to move to fiscal consolidation as soon as possible. In his first budget speech, Finance Minister Aso announced that the government’s fiscal consolidation objectives were “to halve the primary balance deficit ratio to GDP of central and local governments by FY 2015 from that in FY 2010, and to achieve a primary balance surplus of central and local governments by FY 2020.”⁴¹ Central to the achievement of these fiscal consolidation objectives were planned hikes of the consumption tax from 5 to 8 per cent in April 2014 and then from 8 to 10 per cent in October 2015.

In April 2014 the government proceeded with the consumption tax hike as planned. The hike, however, was associated with a subsequent economic downturn, as some Keynesian economists had predicted. Consequently, the scheduled consumption tax increase from 8 to 10 per cent in October 2015 was postponed until April 2017 and then to October 2019.

There have been no further significant contractionary fiscal policy moves since the April 2014 consumption tax hike. There have, however, been expansionary spending measures. For example, there was a 28.1 trillion (5 per cent of GDP) spending boost in August 2016, and in December 2018 the government announced its plans for a budget that would increase spending by 3.8 per cent in comparison with the previous year’s budget.⁴²

Despite the expansionary spending measures, and the postponement of the consumption tax hike from 8 to 10 per cent originally scheduled for October 2015, the Ministry of Finance

³⁸ Because macroeconomic policies, including fiscal policy, generally operate with a time lag, it is common for macroeconomic policymakers to be forward-looking and to shift the direction of policy in advance of the achievement of an objective—e.g., before the output gap has been completely eliminated—to suit the situation expected at the time the policy will “kick in.”

³⁹ In general, expansionary fiscal policy involves government expenditure increases, tax cuts or some combination of the two, and contractionary fiscal policy is its opposite—government expenditure cuts and/or tax increases.

⁴⁰ Takatoshi Ito et al., “Did Abenomics Succeed?: Editors’ Overview,” *Asian Economic Policy Review* 13 no. 1 (2018): 2. My extra spending as a percentage of GDP calculations utilize the quarterly GDP numbers from the quarter in which the extra spending was announced (that is, the first quarter and the fourth quarter of 2013 respectively).

⁴¹ See Taro Aso, “Speech on Fiscal Policy by Minister of Finance Aso at the 183rd Session of the National Diet,” Feb. 28, 2013. https://www.mof.go.jp/english/public_relations/statement/fiscal_policy_speech/e20130228.htm. The primary government budget balance is the government budget balance net of interest payments on government debt. FY is an abbreviation for fiscal year. The Japanese fiscal year runs from April 1 of one year to March 31 of the following year.

⁴² See Ito et al, “Did Abenomics Succeed?”; and Emi Urabe and Yuko Takeo, “Japan’s FY2019 Budget to Top 100 Trillion Yen for First Time,” *Bloomberg*. Dec. 18, 2018. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-18/japan-s-fy2019-budget-to-top-100-trillion-yen-for-first-time>.

was slow to abandon its long-term objective for fiscal consolidation. As late as March 2018 Minister of Finance Aso committed to bringing the primary balance into surplus by fiscal year 2020, while recognizing the difficulty of doing so. But Prime Minister Abe formally announced in September 2017 that the government was working on revision of the fiscal consolidation plan and would release it by the following summer, and in June 2018, it was announced that the deadline for achieving primary balance was pushed forward to fiscal year 2025.⁴³

One observation about fiscal policy under Abenomics is that what is regarded as the major fiscal policy mistake—the hike of the consumption tax from 5 to 8 per cent in April 2014, which was followed by an economic downturn—was not just an economic policy misjudgement. Indeed, Koichi Hamada, the so-called godfather of Abenomics, warned against the consumption tax hike, and policy-makers were well aware that consumption tax hikes are contractionary by nature. But policy-makers felt that they had an obligation to meet their international commitments to engage in “fiscal consolidation.” When Finance Minister Aso announced the government’s fiscal consolidation objectives “to halve the primary balance deficit ratio to GDP of central and local governments by FY 2015 from that in FY 2010, and to achieve a primary balance surplus of central and local governments by FY 2020,” he was stating exactly the same objective that had been announced by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) Kan government in June 22, 2010, partly at the urging of the IMF. The Kan Cabinet decision to adopt a Fiscal Management Strategy with these fiscal consolidation objectives became a Japanese commitment in the G20 Toronto Summit Declaration of June 27, 2010. In addition, DPJ Minister of Finance Azumi had announced in his fiscal policy speech of January 2012 that the consumption tax rate would be increased to 8 per cent in April 2014 and to 10 per cent in October 2015 “on condition that the economic situation is improved.” This conditional plan for consumption tax increases was also maintained under the flexible fiscal policy of Abenomics until the negative economic consequences following from the April 2014 tax hike provided a satisfactory excuse to postpone the tax hike that had been scheduled to take place in October 2015.

4.3 Growth Strategy⁴⁴

Prime Minister Abe and his government termed the third arrow of the initial version of Abenomics as a “growth strategy.” Unlike the terms monetary policy and fiscal policy, however, the term growth strategy is not a precisely defined and widely used term in macroeconomics. In macroeconomics there is a tradition of dividing the major macroeconomic policies into three types: monetary policy, fiscal policy and structural policy. Monetary policy and fiscal policy fall under the umbrella of stabilization policy as they are concerned with the management of overall spending in the economy to combat recessions or to prevent “overheating” of the economy. In the terminology of the output-gap framework of Section 2, they impact actual output or its growth rate. By contrast, structural policy is said to be concerned with raising potential output or the longer-term growth potential of the economy.⁴⁵ Structural policy is the term that economists would use to describe the types of measures forming the third arrow of the initial version of Abenomics. Economists use the term structural policy rather than growth strategy because monetary and fiscal policies are also concerned with stimulating economic growth.

⁴³ See Robin Harding, “Japan Says It Will Run Budget Deficit until 2025,” *Financial Times*. June 15, 2018. <https://www.ft.com/content/a9e5fb10-7087-11e8-92d3-6c13e5c92914>.

⁴⁴ Growth strategy documents are provided by the Cabinet Office of Japan at: <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/keizaisaisei/kettei.html>.

⁴⁵ For further explanation of structural policy, see Frank et al, *Principles of Macroeconomics*, 90.

Details of the original growth strategy are presented in 98-page document titled “Japan Revitalization Strategy: Japan is Back.” Released in June 2013, it puts the growth strategy in context as follows:

Through the implementation of the three “arrows,” including this Growth Strategy, among other measures, Japan aims to achieve a vibrant economy that will register over 2% labor productivity improvement in the medium- to long-term, and around 3% nominal gross domestic product (GDP) growth and around 2% real GDP growth, on average, over the next ten years.⁴⁶

The paragraph mentions three targets: a target for the growth of labour productivity, one for the growth of nominal GDP and another for growth of real (or inflation-adjusted) GDP. By definition, the growth of real GDP equals the growth of labour productivity (GDP per employed person) plus the growth of employment. Also, by definition, the growth of nominal GDP equals the growth of real GDP plus the inflation rate (that is, the growth of the price level).⁴⁷ Of the three targets, the growth strategy would be most directly associated with labour productivity growth. But it would also be relevant for real and nominal GDP growth because real GDP growth depends on labour productivity growth and nominal GDP growth depends on real GDP growth.

The growth strategy document stated that economic growth would be ensured both through pursuit of macroeconomic targets and through achievement of targets for subcomponents of the growth strategy. Regulatory reforms, spending on new programs and projects, and changes to the system of taxation would support achievement of the targets, and the strategy would evolve from one year to the next. Among other things, regulatory reforms would extend to the electricity sector, agriculture and healthcare; corporate tax rates would be reduced; and corporate governance would be enhanced.

The growth strategies for 2014, 2015 and 2016 kept the same “Japan Revitalization Strategy” title as the 2013 edition but their subtitles changed from “Japan is Back” to “Japan's Challenge for the Future” to “Investment for the Future and the Productivity Revolution” to “Toward the Fourth Industrial Revolution,” respectively. Promoting a fourth industrial revolution based on the Internet of things (IoT), artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics was first raised as an issue in the 2014 growth strategy. The June 2015 edition of the growth strategy was presented as being central to a second stage of Abenomics in which, because of the substantial progress made in reducing the output gap, the growth strategy would become more important relative to monetary and fiscal policy. The 2016 edition emphasized the promotion of IoT, AI and robotics that had been introduced as an element of the 2014 growth strategy, and pointed to a new macroeconomic goal of realizing a nominal GDP of 600 trillion yen.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ See Cabinet Office et al., “Joint Statement,” 2.

⁴⁷ There are two main methods for measuring inflation. The most common method is in terms of growth of the price level as measured by the CPI. The method that is most relevant here, however, is in terms of the growth rate of the GDP deflator. The two inflation rates tend to move together, but, for Japan, the CPI inflation rate tends to show more inflation than the inflation rate based on growth of the GDP deflator.

⁴⁸ The government had first announced in the fall of 2015. To put the 600 trillion yen nominal GDP target in context, it helps to know that Japan’s nominal GDP in the third quarter of 2015 was about 533 trillion yen. The 600 trillion yen target was often mentioned without specification of any deadline for its achievement, but when a deadline was mentioned it was for fiscal year 2020.

The 2017 and 2018 editions of the growth strategy were both given the new title “Investment Strategy for the Future” with the subtitle for the 2017 edition being “A Revolution for the Realization of Society 5.0” and the subtitle for the 2018 edition being “A Shift to the Data-Driven Model of Society, Society 5.0.” Society 5.0 was presented as a new stage in socio-economic evolution that would improve people’s lives through the widespread diffusion of the technological breakthroughs emerging from the fourth industrial revolution. The role of growth strategy was to accelerate the transition to Society 5.0.

Many advocates of “structural reforms” to the Japanese economy treat the growth strategy of Abenomics as being synonymous with structural reforms. It is more accurate to describe the growth strategy as a structural policy that includes structural reforms but is not limited to them. Elements of the growth strategy such as the campaign to increase the annual number of tourist visits to Japan, measures to boost the employment of women through social program expenditures, efforts to raise educational attainment and industrial strategies to promote promising technologies for the realization of Society 5.0 are significant, and they would not normally be described as structural reforms.⁴⁹

Nevertheless, the main stated aim of the growth strategies of Abenomics has been to raise the labour productivity growth rate of the economy, and the Abe government has treated structural reforms as being critical to achieving this aim. One observation is that it is inherently difficult to raise the labour productivity growth rate of a high-income country, and structural reforms implemented with the stated aim of raising productivity growth can result primarily in a shift of income from labour to capital. With an output gap estimated by the IMF of 3.7 per cent of potential GDP when Abenomics began, there were easy growth gains to be had through expansionary fiscal and monetary policy until the output gap was eliminated. But Japan was not anything like, to give an extreme example, China waiting to be dramatically transformed by the implementation of Deng Xiaoping Theory following the death of Mao Zedong. Japan, as Japanese economy specialist Hugh Patrick has often stated, has a “well-educated, industrious labor force, high savings and investment rates, and good economic institutions.”⁵⁰ This has been true for decades, and it implies that raising Japan’s productivity growth rate by much is inherently difficult. Moreover, the experience of various countries shows that structural reforms implemented with the stated aim of raising labour productivity growth may instead primarily result in upward redistribution of income.⁵¹

5. ABENOMICS: PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

In 2012, pessimism about Japan's economic prospects was widespread, and not without reason. The two previous decades were widely described as the two “lost decades.” Nominal GDP in 2012 (at 495 trillion yen) was no higher than it had been in 1992. The economy was still

⁴⁹ The term structural reforms is usually used to describe financial liberalization measures, corporate governance reforms to make corporations more focused on returns to shareholders, large cuts to corporate tax rates, labour market reforms to increase “labour flexibility,” privatization of public corporations and publicly-provided services and so on. For further details, though with a developing country focus, see Dani Rodrik, “The Elusive Promise of Structural Reform,” *Milken Institute Review*, 2nd quarter (2016): 27-35.

⁵⁰ See Patrick, “Japan’s Economy,” 1.

⁵¹ In the political science literature, structural reforms are often viewed as a component of neo-liberalism. For the perspective that Abenomics has been a mixture of Keynesian and neo-liberal policies, see Saori Shibata, “Re-packaging Old Policies?” ‘Abenomics’ and the Lack of an Alternative Growth Model for Japan’s Political Economy,” *Japan Forum* 29 no. 3 (2017): 399-422.

experiencing deflation. The GDP deflator had declined from 103.7 in 2009 to 99.2 in 2012. The Tokyo Metro Area house price index had dropped below 77 for the first time since its inception in mid-1993. Japanese real GDP in 2012 was lower than it had been in 2007. Net export growth was challenged by a yen-dollar exchange rate that had appreciated from an average 118 yen per U.S. dollar in 2007 to 81 yen per dollar in November 2012. Total employment had declined continuously since 2009. The government budget deficit stood at -7.5 per cent of GDP. The Nikkei index of the stock market, which had peaked at about 39,000 at the end of 1990, stood at 8,500 in November 2012.⁵²

Such was Japan's economic situation when the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan returned to power by winning a majority in the Lower House election of December 2012 with an ambitious program to overcome deflation, boost Japanese economic growth and expand employment opportunities. The Abenomics program included targets for inflation (2 per cent), for fiscal policy consolidation (primary budget balance by fiscal year 2020), and for real GDP growth (2 per cent).

None of these targets have been met. The inflation rate, whether measured by percentage increase in the CPI or percentage increase in the GDP deflator, failed to average 2 per cent. Annual CPI inflation only reached 2 per cent in 2014, and has averaged slightly less than 1 per cent. The fiscal consolidation objective of primary budget balance by the target fiscal year 2020 has been abandoned in a favour of a target fiscal year of 2025, and the government gross debt-to-GDP ratio has continued to climb. Finally, annual real GDP growth only reached 2 per cent in 2013, and has averaged about 1.25 per cent.

But it would be extremely one-sided to note only that the targets have not been met. While 2 per cent inflation has not been reached and maintained, the economy has not fallen back into deflation. The GDP deflator that had declined each and every year from 114.1 in 1997 to 96.2 in 2013 has since risen to 100.⁵³

While the government budget deficit has not shrunk enough to meet the fiscal consolidation target, it has been cut in half, in good part thanks to increased revenue stemming from higher economic growth. Moreover, it should be noted that the usual rationale for slashing the government budget deficit is to bring down the gross government debt-to-GDP ratio. But, as discussed in Section 3, the gross government debt-to-GDP ratio that is typically employed to suggest that Japan is on the brink of fiscal disaster is not an ideal measure of Japan's fiscal health. Measures such as the "consolidated" debt-to-GDP ratio calculated by Greenan and Weinstein, the net government interest payments relative to GDP ratio emphasized by Baker and the net government assets-to-GDP ratio recently promoted by the IMF suggest that fiscal consolidation is probably less urgent than proponents of impending fiscal disaster suggest.

With respect to economic growth, as explained in Section 3 of this essay, growth of real GDP per capita is generally a more meaningful measure than growth of real GDP. The 1.5 per cent annual growth of GDP per capita for the 2013-2018 period compares favourably not just with the widely-praised 1.1 per cent annual growth during the years (2001-2006) of former Prime Minister Koizumi's government but even exceeds the growth rates of all other G7

⁵² The main source of data for this paragraph is the *IMF World Economic Outlook Database* (2018). Other sources are the Pacific Exchange Rate Service for the exchange rate, the Japan Real Estate Institute for the Tokyo Metro Area house price index and the FRED database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for the Nikkei index.

⁵³ See Federal Reserve Board of St. Louis, FRED Economic Data, GDP Implicit Price Deflator in Japan (JPNGDPDEFSAISMEI), <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/JPNGDPDEFSAISMEI>.

countries except for the United States (that is, Canada, France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom) during the 2013-2018 period.⁵⁴

One way to measure whether Abenomics has been successful in eliminating underutilized capacity in the Japanese economy is with estimates of change in the output gap. As with output gap estimates for other countries, those for Japan vary according to the source.

The IMF estimates point to the most slack in the Japanese economy. According to the IMF, Japan faced a recessionary gap of 3.7 per cent of GDP in 2012. The gap has fallen steadily, but the IMF estimated a recessionary gap of 0.8 per cent of GDP in 2017, and projected a recessionary gap of 0.3 per cent of GDP in 2018.⁵⁵

The OCED estimates are that Japan had a recessionary gap of 1.5 per cent in 2012. The gap fell substantially under Abenomics, and turned into a very small expansionary gap of 0.1 per cent in 2017. The OECD estimates a recessionary gap of 0.3 per cent for the Japanese economy in 2018.⁵⁶

According to the Cabinet Office of Japan, the Japanese economy had a recessionary gap of 1.7 per cent of GDP in the latter half of 2012, was operating just at capacity with no output gap in the first quarter of 2017, realized expansionary gaps of between 0.3 per cent and 0.8 per cent of GDP between the second quarters of 2017 and 2018.⁵⁷

According to the BoJ estimates, the Japanese economy had a recessionary gap of over 1 per cent of potential GDP at the time the Abe government took office, but had substantially reduced that output gap by the third quarter of 2013, and since the fourth quarter of 2016 the Japanese economy has been operating continuously with an expansionary gap, which reached 1.6 per cent of potential GDP in the second quarter of 2018.⁵⁸

The consensus among four official sources, then, is that there was a substantial recessionary gap before the implementation of Abenomics and that the recessionary gap has been either drastically reduced or transformed into an expansionary gap.

Another way to measure the success of Abenomics in eliminating underutilized capacity in the Japanese economy is with labour market statistics. A very wide range of statistics point to the fact that the Japanese employment has expanded to the point that labour market is “tight”—that is, close to full employment.⁵⁹ Although the population aged 15 and over declined by almost 100,000 from November 2012 to November 2018, the number of employed grew by 4 million over the same period, after having declined continuously from 2009 to 2012. On an annual basis employment reached 66.3 million in 2018, exceeding the previous peak reached in 1997.

The overall labour force participation rate rose by 2.8 percentage points over the November 2012 to November 2018 period. (For comparison, the U.S. labour force participation rate fell by 0.8 percentage points over approximately the same period and the Canadian one fell

⁵⁴ This paragraph makes use of data from the *IMF World Economic Outlook Database* (2018), with preliminary estimates for 2018.

⁵⁵ IMF output gap estimates can be found in the *IMF World Economic Outlook Database* (2018).

⁵⁶ The OECD estimates can be found at OECD. Stat: <https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?QueryId=51655>.

⁵⁷ The Cabinet Office estimated a small recessionary gap in the third quarter of 2018 that I presume would have been related to the impact of natural disasters that occurred in September 2018. Output gap calculations by the Cabinet Office are provided in a spreadsheet file on the Monthly Economic Report page of the Statistics site. At present, the direct link is: <https://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai3/getsurei/1842gap.xls>.

⁵⁸ Details about the Bank of Japan's output gap calculations can be found at: https://www.boj.or.jp/en/research/research_data/gap/index.htm/

⁵⁹ I present the relevant labour market statistics in much greater detail in MacLean, “Abenomics and the Japanese Labour Market.”

by 1.2 percentage points.)⁶⁰ The participation rate of Japanese women aged 25 to 54 now exceeds the corresponding rate for U.S. women in the same age bracket.⁶¹

The unemployment rate has reached its lowest level in decades. In May 2018 the unemployment rate fell to 2.4 per cent, the lowest level since 1992, and in September 2018 it fell further to 2.3 per cent.⁶² The unemployment rate of those in the aged 15 to 24 bracket has “declined to a level below that of the bubble period, and labour market conditions for new graduates have created more of a seller's market than ever before.”⁶³

In September 2018 the ratio of job offers to applicants reached a 44-year high. Moreover, the “active job openings-to-applications ratios recently have exceeded 1 in all prefectures, which was not observed even in the bubble period.”⁶⁴

In short, although targets for economic growth, inflation, and fiscal consolidation have not been met, the economy has grown at a healthy pace as measured as growth of real GDP per capita and employment growth. Moreover, Japanese labour markets are generally “tight” as measured by the extremely low unemployment rate, labour force participation rates and the extremely high rate of job offers per job applicant.

6. CONCLUSIONS

This essay has provided an assessment of Abenomics over the six years since its inception at the end of 2012. The central aim of the essay was to assess the degree to which Abenomics has achieved its core objective of overcoming economic stagnation. The assessment has been conducted with an output-gap framework and in light of analytical considerations such as the appropriate indicators of economic growth and fiscal health. The conclusion has been that although economic targets have not been fully realized, economic stagnation has been overcome. The economy has grown at a healthy pace and underutilization of capacity has been largely eliminated.

The assessment is obviously incomplete in that Abenomics will obviously continue beyond the period covered by the essay. Of particular interest for future assessments of Abenomics will be the economic impact of the consumption tax hike of 2 percentage points that is still planned for October 2019. The budget for fiscal year 2019-20 contains various counter-measures to offset the negative impact of overall spending of the consumption tax hike, but at the time of writing it remains to be seen whether they will suffice.

The assessment has also not delved into the evidence on the degree to which the improvement in economic performance under Abenomics has been the result of Abenomics or, say, simply due to the international economic environment during the Abenomics period.⁶⁵ I would argue that the improvement in economic performance under Abenomics is largely due to

⁶⁰ Japanese monthly data in this paragraph comes from the Labour Force Survey of Japan.

⁶¹ See Jay Shambaugh, Ryan Nunn and Becca Portman, “Lessons from the Rise of Women’s Labor Force Participation in Japan,” *The Hamilton Project/Brookings Institution* (2017). The paper gives the U.S. rate as 74.3 and the Japanese rate as 76.3 in 2016. Incidentally, the rate in Canada then was about 82 percent.

⁶² See Alice Woodhouse, “Japan September Unemployment Rate Falls to 2.3%,” *Financial Times*. Oct. 29, 2018. <https://www.ft.com/content/510aa27c-dbd3-11e8-9f04-38d397e6661c>.

⁶³ Masazumi Watakabe, “Japan’s Economy and Monetary Policy: Speech at a Meeting with Business Leaders in Nigeria,” Bank of Japan. Dec. 5, 2018. https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/press/koen_2018/ko181205a.htm/.

⁶⁴ Wakatabe, “Japan’s Economy and Monetary Policy.”

⁶⁵ In MacLean, “Abenomics and the Japanese Labour Market,” I have a brief discussion of the evidence on the extent to which economic performance under Abenomics is due to policy decisions.

expansionary monetary policy and to fiscal policy that has been mostly expansionary except for the consumption tax hike of April 2014.⁶⁶

The expansionary monetary policy has continued to lower interest rates, especially long-term rates.⁶⁷ Lower interest rates tend to weaken the exchange rate. A weaker exchange rate tends to stimulate export growth. Export growth and lower interest rates tend to boost stock prices. Low interest rates, export growth and rising stock prices tend to encourage private-sector investment. Export growth and private-sector investment growth produce growth of aggregate demand and real GDP growth, not just nominal GDP growth, in an economy with the underutilized capacity. Lower interest rates and rising stock prices also support consumption to some degree, which also supports real GDP growth. As well, expansionary fiscal policy contributes to real GDP growth directly—government purchases are a component of GDP—and indirectly by encouraging consumption and private-sector investment. Real GDP growth above the rate of labour productivity growth boosts demand for labour, which acts to raise employment rates and bring down employment rates.

The assessment is also incomplete in that it has focused on assessing how well Abenomics has achieved its initial objective of overcoming economic stagnation, and has described the key policies (fiscal, monetary and structural) related to this objective, but it has delved into later objectives of Abenomics. An example of a later objective is that, announced in fall of 2015, of raising the fertility rate to 1.8 births per woman as a means to reduce the pace of population decline. The fertility rate has risen almost continuously from a low of 1.25 in 2005 to about 1.45 more recently, and it is certainly an important question as to whether the rate can be raised to 1.8.⁶⁸

The assessment has not investigated the broader socio-economic impacts of Abenomics such as the availability of good jobs, the growth of wages, the distribution of income and the poverty rate.⁶⁹ Such an assessment would require another essay. In my concluding paragraphs, however, I would like to mention a socio-economic issue of considerable importance—the suicide rate.

Suicide rates have been cited frequently as an indirect indicator of the state of the economy ever since they jumped sharply after the financial crisis that began in 1997, and stayed at an elevated level for years after.⁷⁰ More precisely, in 1998 the number of suicides jumped 35 per cent from 24,391 to 32,863, and many of those who committed suicide left suicide notes mentioning financial problems. More than 30,000 deaths by suicide were recorded in each of 14 consecutive years to 2011, the highest number being 34,427 in 2003.⁷¹

Linking the number of suicides to economic factors is actually not straightforward. In their economic analysis of suicide prevention, Sawada et al. caution that “by examining

⁶⁶ In MacLean, “Abenomics and the Japanese Labour Market,” I argue that the key indicator that fiscal policy has been expansionary is that the budget deficit was still about 3.7 per cent of GDP in 2018 when the economy was very close to potential output and full employment by many indicators.

⁶⁷ To follow the reasoning of this paragraph, it helps to know that macroeconomics divide GDP into four broad categories of spending: consumption, private-sector investment, government purchases and net exports.

⁶⁸ Fertility rate data can be found at: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=JP>.

⁶⁹ In MacLean, “Abenomics and the Japanese Labour Market,” I briefly discuss the growth of wages and the availability of good jobs.

⁷⁰ I discuss this briefly in Brian K. MacLean, “Avoiding a Great Depression but Getting a Good Recession,” *International Journal of Political Economy* 35 (2006): 84-107.

⁷¹ Extremely detailed annual statistical reports on suicides in Japan are published online (in Japanese) by the National Policy Agency at: <http://www.npa.go.jp/publications/statistics/safetylife/jisatsu.html>.

individual-level data, the Suicide Investigation Team (2008) finds that people who killed themselves had typically suffered from multiple—four, on average—risk factors for suicide.”⁷² The National Police Agency gives health issues as the leading identifiable cause of suicide. Men are more than twice as likely as women to commit suicide, and those over age 65 are much more likely to commit suicide than those 64 and under. Suicide prevention policies have been a national priority since the Diet passed the Basic Act on Suicide Prevention in 2006.

Nevertheless, “financial problems” has been the number two motivating cause for suicides in Japan since the early 1990s, and given that the number of suicides was frequently cited as a dramatic indicator of the state of Japan's economy during the “lost decades,” it is worth mentioning that the number of suicides in Japan fell by 3.4 per cent in 2018 from the previous year, marking the ninth consecutive year of decline. The total number of suicides fell to 20,598 in 2018, down from 27,858 suicides in 2012, and marking a 37-year low. The number of suicides for women dropped to 6,473, setting a record low for the third consecutive year.

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⁷² See Yasuyuki Sawada, Michiko Ueda and Tetsuya Matsubayashi, *Economic Analysis of Suicide Prevention: Towards Evidence-Based Policy-Making* (Singapore: Spring, 2017), 34.

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6. FOUR DECADES SINCE THE PUBLICATION OF E.W. SAID'S *ORIENTALISM*: BRIEF COMMENTS ON ITS IDEOLOGICAL ROOTS AND IMPACT ON JAPAN AND JAPAN-RELATED SCHOLARSHIP

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ABSTRACT

2018 was the fortieth year since the publication of E.W. Said's anti-Orientalist (in fact anti-Western, anti-American, anti-Zionist [politically antisemitic]) *Orientalism*, a political “manifesto” masquerading as scholarly work. Notwithstanding countless factual errors (due to deliberate omission or plain ignorance), tendentious selectivity, shoddy, *victimist* (see below) corrupt and corrupting analysis, practically no academic, intellectual, communications and media, socio-economic, political, cultural and artistic realm, even in democratic societies—from the US, Canada and Europe to Japan and Israel—has escaped *Orientalism*'s deleterious impact. The history, culture and art of Japan—central to this piece—are no exception. This regrettable reality, as shown here, should be considered an expression *only* of the intellectual and socio-cultural malaise that has affected the democratic world in the past five decades that Said, the clever *political intellectual*, both profited from and exacerbated. This essay is indicating—for the *first time anywhere*—that *Orientalism* in particular, as well as Said's other political writings and militancy, drew heavily on the anti-Orientalist (thus anti-Western and antisemitic) writings and ideas of Egyptian thinker Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966, the leading ideologue of the global Islamist *Muslim Brotherhood* movement) especially his *Our War against the Jews*. In a gradual process that started in the late 1960s, universities, the media and politics in all democratic nations have come under systematic pressure of an anti-democratic thus totalitarian anti-Western, anti-American and anti-Zionist [politically antisemitic *cum* surrogate of convenience and facilitator

for the first two] activist “cabal” of sorts, composed of Islamists and Radical Leftists. E.W. Said—through *Orientalism* and other copious political writings and relentless activism—is the undisputed epistemological representative of *Islamist* (thus Rightist) anti-Westernism, anti-Americanism and anti-Zionism, positions fully shared and expressed on the *Radical Left* in the countless write-ups and militancy of fellow *political intellectual* and personal pal, A. Noam Chomsky. I am thus proposing the term *Saidskyism*—a neologism formed from the names of Said and Chomsky—as expressing concomitant Islamist/Leftist anti-Westernism, anti-Americanism and antisemitism. This short essay is the written version of a presentation by the same title, given at the annual conference of the *Japan Studies Association of Canada* (JSAC) at the University of Alberta (Edmonton) in October 2018. The essay contains three chapters: 1) *On Orientalism and orientalism*, 2) *EWS—intellectual jihadi to the end*, 3) *EWS’s lasting legacy at Columbia University*. The views expressed herein are the author’s alone.

Keywords: E.W. Said [EWS], A. Noam Chomsky (ANC), *Saidskyism*, *Orientalism*, *Orientalism*, orientalism, anti-Westernism/anti-Americanism/anti-Zionism, *International Congress of Orientalists*, *Muslim Brotherhood*, Sayyid Qutb, *Japan’s Orient*, *Embracing the East*, *Defending the West*, *Reading Orientalism*, 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US, World Social Forum Porto Alegre 2003, Columbia University, Hamid Dabashi.

Motto: “The sheer crassness of what is being quoted [in *Orientalism*] can override a critical caution about what has been left out... In terms of intellectual history [Said’s] interdisciplinary rigor borders on the mortis.”—Daniel M. Varisco, *Reading Orientalism*, 40-41.

Motto: “It is because the Japanese have tried to adapt themselves to the [sic] Western orientalism [that] Japan has become an orientalist State, that alienates itself from Asia.”—Yūzō Itagaki, *Dialogue Among Civilizations: A Japanese Viewpoint*, Bahrain Center for Studies and Research [BCSR], May, 2002.

Notes on style and terminology: **1)** Japanese names are rendered in traditional Japanese fashion, last names first. **2)** The name of Edward William Said—dapper, wealthy, aggressive “public [in fact Islamist political] intellectual,” self-anointed Middle-East expert though mostly ignorant of, and/or grossly prejudiced on all major issues—chiefly history—of the area of Asia at large, author of a slew of essentializing naked propaganda pontifications, *Orientalism* being the most notorious, all strongly inspired by and *stealthily* aimed at implementing the global agenda of the Muslim Brotherhood [hereafter MB] (see below), and influential with the anti-Western, anti-American, antisemitic academic, intellectual and media crowds in all non-democratic as well as in many democratic societies—is mentioned as EWS throughout. **3)** Eminent Orientalist Bernard Lewis who passed away in 2018 was the target of EWS’s mendacious racism and antisemitism in *Orientalism* and elsewhere, as were countless other eminent specialists who interfered with EWS’s politicized intellectual jihad. Rightist EWS’s sidekick on the Radical Nihilist Left, the equally shrill anti-Western, anti-American, antisemitic “political intellectual” A. Noam Chomsky [hereafter ANC] in March 2003, in an interview with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation TV, bashed Bernard Lewis as a “vulgar propagandist”—a baseless slur regarding Professor Lewis, but a perfectly accurate designation for both EWS and ANC for the anti-Westernism, anti-Americanism and anti-Zionism/Israelism [thus political antisemitism] underpinning their political oeuvres and activism. Given their common ideological turf (with antisemitism often

used as surrogate and/or facilitator for anti-Westernism and anti-Americanism) and the undeniable, though most regrettable, influence of their ideas (a symptom *not* of the acceptability of their views, but *only* of the scholarly and intellectual malaise affecting the academic, intellectual and political realms of democracies since 1968) I have coined the term *Saidskyism*—a portmanteau composed of the last names of EWS [Islamist] and ANC [Leftist] and expressing anti-Western, anti-American and antisemitic propaganda rolled into one. 4) EWS and EWS-inspired writing about the Middle-East and Asia is spelled “orientalism.”

1. ON ORIENTALISM AND ORIENTALISM

Following are brief remarks (stemming from a larger project) on what I consider to be the deleterious impact of EWS’s anti-Western, anti-American, antisemitic, anti-scholarly, agitprop polemic, *Orientalism*. This is an urgent need, in view of the popularity, as a potent ideological weapon wielded by an anti-Western, anti-American, antisemitic Islamist/Marxist, anti-democratic “cabal” (thus negatively affecting freedom of speech in society and on campuses) highly influential among many Western—including Israeli and Japanese—scholars, intellectuals and politicians, of EWS’s Islamism-inspired diatribe masquerading as scholarly work. Indeed, one is hard pressed to find any field in the humanities and social sciences which has not been afflicted by EWS’s arrogant, aggressive and intellectually corrupt orientalism—evidence *not* of the validity of his ruminations, but an unfortunate symptom of the contemporary intellectual and scholarly crisis affecting Western democracies, and which has allowed EWS to cause them incalculable damage.

The term “Orientalists, International Congress of,” at <https://www.encyclopedia.com>, is described as “a group... devoted to the spread of learning in oriental subjects” aiming at “the propagation of the knowledge of the History, Languages and Civilizations of Oriental people among Western Nations.” The suggested bibliography at the bottom of the short article includes but one item: *Orientalism* by EWS. Considering EWS’s highly politicized intellectual jihad against the Western scholarly, cultural and largely *apolitical* tradition of Oriental [Asian] Studies, which Orientalism embodies but which *Orientalism* has aimed to destroy, the very fact of the book being mentioned as a legitimate source for the field, indicates its continuing, and given its nature, deleterious impact. The passing in 2018 of the eminent Orientalist Bernard Lewis, often the target of EWS’s racist and overall poisonous pen and tongue, like many other leading historians and intellectuals who “dared” to criticize his “scholarship,” reinforces the relevance of renewed efforts to alert (at least) democratic societies to the destructive character of his extremely politicized intellectual output.

The year 2018 was the 40th anniversary of the publication of EWS’s *Orientalism*, a tome of unbridled anti-Westernism, anti-Americanism and anti-Zionism [political antisemitism] overflowing with shoddy scholarship, thus abundant displays of factual ignorance or distortion, and expressed in an arrogant, victimist and aggressive writing style. (EWS admirer and Asian supremacist writer Parag Khanna, author of *The Future is Asian*, has adequately called *Orientalism* a “manifesto.”) Nonetheless, it is undeniable that EWS’s assault on Western scholarship on the Muslim/Arab Orient and beyond has met with much popularity, EWS cleverly profiting from and bolstering rampant political correctness, cultural relativism, moral inversion and overblown multiculturalism which, in recent decades, have afflicted the institutions of higher learning as well as the intellectual and political life of all democracies, including Japan and Israel.

Traditional professional Orientalism is a field of scholarly (linguistic, cultural, historical, religious) intellectual and artistic endeavour encompassing all of Asia (itself a European designation) which emerged gradually in universities in Western Europe and Russia (where it was sponsored by the State) about 400 years ago. Scholarly, intellectual and linguistic curiosity as well as genuine fascination with Asian cultures animated European Orientalists from “Oriental” Jones, through Milescu Spătaru and Champollion to Bernard Lewis—rather than imperialism (an occasionally parallel but not complementary phenomenon) or sordid European plots to dominate Muslim lands and minds, as EWS and his followers insist. Excellent recent efforts—Urs App’s *The Beginnings of Orientalism* comes to mind—to redeem Orientalism and its history from *Saidskyite*, thus Islamist/Leftist politicized intellectual onslaught, while highly relevant, have had only a limited impact.

Even the briefest look at the way the study of Japan—and that of all other Asian cultures—by professional Orientalists, our assiduous, sincere, respectful, efforts to study and understand those traditions—should place EWS’s “orientalism” in the corner of shame it deserves, as the crude anti-intellectual campaign blaming the so-called West—for the self-induced, largely Islamism-related, problems plaguing his ancestral Arab-Muslim as well as African and some Asian cultures.

The *International Congress of Orientalists* [ICO] was launched in 1873 and Paris hosted the inaugural conference. The proceedings volume of the first conference includes a list of member nations and regional political entities (like the kingdom of Prussia). Japan’s membership included the Meiji Emperor, (mentioned by his given name, Mutsuhito) and other prominent personalities like intellectual modernizer, writer, educator and public opinion maker Fukuzawa Yukichi (a veritable “anti-EWS” given his pragmatic and constructive approach to modernization—selective learning from the West—as the most beneficial approach to Japan’s national interests and identity) was under the aegis of the foreign ministry, foreign minister Terashima Munenori, etc. The newly founded *Tōyō Gakkai* (Oriental Research Society), reflecting the ancient, often state-sponsored, Japanese tradition of historical writing, was underwritten by the foreign ministry. Since Japan was the central theme of the conference, the president of the Congress was the eminent French Japanologist Leon de Rosny—author, among many other titles, of the *History of the Civilization of Japan*. The Egyptian *khedive*, Ismail, was a member too. The ICO was an outgrowth of the Ethnographic Society (*Société d’Ethnographie*, founded in 1859). It is mentioned in the proceedings that “the importance of British colonies was behind the establishment of centres of linguistic and other training in [sic] India, China and Japan which became a hothouse [*pepinier*] of [bureaucratic] Orientalist specialists for Britain.” Newly united Germany had the largest number of Orientalists in Europe. The individual membership of the ICO stood at 909; 44 national academic societies, 17 libraries and an unspecified number of museums were affiliated with the organization.¹ The ICO continued to exist for a century; in 1973, it became the International Congress of Asian and North African Studies (ICANAS). Information about its activities and publications has always been readily available, eminently apolitical, yet have been by and large ignored due to the orientalist onslaught.

EWS in *Orientalism* mentioned French writers Anwar Abdel Malek and Michel Foucault, in particular, as having inspired him. My research, however, leads to the conclusion that the late (d.2003) Columbia University English Literature professor, *Palestinian-Egyptian*

¹ Congrès International des Orientalistes, *Compte rendu de la première session* (Lichtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1873 [1968]), x-xi.

and “talismanic” (EWS’s reference) American passport holder, nominal Christian, Palestine Liberation Organization [PLO] operative, and lifelong anti-Western, anti-American and anti-Zionist *political intellectual* was inspired in his long anti-Orientalist academic, intellectual, even artistic (as classical music reviewer) propaganda campaign (jihad) by the ideas of Sayyid Qutb—the top postwar ideologue of the MB—the world’s leading Islamist movement, founded in Egypt in 1928.

The MB has been very successful in penetrating Western universities (which given their traditional autonomy, constitute a political soft belly of democracies) through groups like the Muslim Students Association [MSA]. Former American President B. H. Obama—who throughout his political life interacted closely with EWS and especially with his fellow Columbia University orientalist and PLO-man Rashid Khalidi—has been a firm believer in the MB as a democratic movement (!!) and practically cut off relations with Egypt after its military overthrew president Muhammad Morsi—a leading MB member—in 2013. The movement has been banned as a terrorist entity in Egypt and much of Europe but not (yet) in the US.

EWS turned his highly politicized “scholarship”—a *Orientalism* being only the most notorious example—into a potent weapon of shrill propaganda aimed at the gradual undermining and eventual destruction of Western (especially American) democracy. His offensive anti-Western, anti-American and antisemitic write-ups and speeches—which he cleverly and, of course, falsely, advertised as “speaking truth to power”—in reality militated for nothing less than the unravelling of his host culture from within, a goal he shared with Qutb and the MB, as shown here:

QUTB: “The Jews have instilled [sic] men and regimes [in the Muslim world] in order to conspire against the Ummah [global Muslim nation]... Thousands of **Orientalists and students of Orientalists, a massive army of agents in the form of professors, philosophers and researchers... writers, poets and journalists**... all learned authorities intend to break the Creed of the Muslims..”²

QUTB: “[Our] divine program has to begin by **destroying... the power of the state [throughout the world] and** the social system and the conditions that surround it. We must not allow the campaigns of

EWS: “**Orientalism**... is a Western style [sic] for dominating, restructuring and having authority over the Orient... The study of a foreign region like the Orient is turned into a **program for control by divination**... Yet **such programs must have a liberal veneer and usually this is left to scholars, men of good will, enthusiasts to attend to.**”³

EWS: “**I think the Westphalian system, which ordered the state system of the world, has failed.** And I think it's failed **internally**. There's been a desire on the part of the right wing in the United States... to attack... **independent thought**... that

² Ronald Nettler, *Past Trials and Present Tribulations: A Muslim Fundamentalist's View of the Jews* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1987), 47. The Nettler book is a detailed analysis of Qutb’s *Our Struggle Against the Jews* published in 1955, which as seen above contains blunt and racist/antisemitic attacks on Orientalism, positions EWS fully shared.

³ Said, Edward, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 3.

Orientalists against the principle of Jihad to deceive or scare us.”⁴

appears to challenge the prevailing order, and **it increased after 9/11.**”⁵

EWS was a consistent supporter of Islamism—Sunni or Shi’ite, thus of Khumaynism. He used his harsh and offensive pen and tongue to bash writers of Arab origin like Fuad Ajami, Kanan Makiya and others who did not share his views on Islam and its relations with democratic societies.⁶

EWS’s orientalism and his equally fraudulent “post-colonial studies” (a version of the *Dependencista* theory—falsely accusing former Western colonial powers of continuing to dominate their past colonies by means of a supposedly skewed post-colonial economic and trade regime—a spurious theory invented by the late communist agitator Andre Gunder Frank and easily debunked by the examples of India, South Korea, Taiwan, and under its peculiar circumstances, China) found enthusiastic support among self-serving, racist and corrupt Arab, Muslim and African as well as more than a few Asian intellectuals and politicians only too happy to blame the lack of development of their newly independent nations not on the deleterious impact of their ancestral political cultures and incompetent leaders, but on their purported continuing domination by the defunct colonial powers.

EWS’s deleterious, intellectual and even political impact in Japan, Israel and other developed Asian nations is of course regrettable, though manageable, but downright devastating for Arab, Muslim and African societies in need of reform, simply because it bolsters the opposite attitude to the one they desperately need: *self-reflection as a precondition for their understanding of the inadequacies of their traditional political cultures, the resulting self-inflicted socio-cultural, economic and political wounds and the indispensable need for self-improvement.*

As mentioned earlier, all categories of traditional antisemitism and its contemporary variants of anti-Zionism and anti-Israelism (both forms of political antisemitism since their aim is Israel’s destruction) are indispensable political tools which, using Jews/Israel as surrogates for the unjustly maligned (in fact envied) democratic West, ultimately legitimize anti-Westernism and anti-Americanism.

The MB, in pursuing its global imperialist project (see below) employs the following tactics: *terrorism* (al-Qaida, Da’esh [ISIS]), *Da’wa* (religious conversion); *political infiltration* (of all societies) ; *propaganda* (*political*: anti-Western, anti-American antisemitic/anti-Zionist, conducted through *overt*—MSA chapters—and *covert* outfits especially in universities, the media and community organizations—like CAIR [Council on American-Islamic Relations]/ CAIR Canada etc. in democratic societies; *victimism*—the false accusation of Muslims/Arabs being subjected to wholesale discrimination in democratic societies). EWS was a relentless user of victimism, beginning with *Orientalism*:

The life of a Palestinian Arab... in the West, particularly in America, is disheartening. There exists here a... consensus that politically he does not exist... or only as a nuisance or as an Oriental. The web of racism, cultural stereotypes, political imperialism, dehumanizing ideology is astounding... No... *Orientalist*...

⁴ Nettler, *Past Trials*, 50.

⁵ EWS at the World Social Forum, Porto Alegre, 2003, online.

⁶ See, Zarnett, David, “Edward Said and the Iranian Revolution,” *Democratiya* 9 (2007): 43-53.

has ever in the US culturally and politically identified himself wholeheartedly with the *Arabs*... as has *liberal American* identification with *Zionism*.⁷ [emphasis added]

This is but patently false, racist, propaganda, when considering *facts*. Americans, unlike Arabs, do not distinguish among Arabs who do (especially based on vernacular dialect). In stark contrast to EWS's victimist rant, from national *politics*—James Aburezk, George Mitchell, Darell Issa, Ray LaHood, John Sununu, John E. Sununu, Donna Shalala, and recently Ilhan Omar and Rashida Tlaib, etc.—through the *military*—John Abizeid, *Nidal Hassan*—*business*—Steve Jobs, the Zogby media tycoons, etc.—to *entertainment*—K.C. Kassem, Paul Anka, Bill Maher, Michael Nouri, Hoda Kutb, George Nouri, Tony Shalhoub, Rima Fakih—and, above all *academe*, the United States, in the postwar era has been overwhelmingly fair and *open* to Arabs and Muslims. After all, the dandyish, supremely immoral, viciously anti-American EWS practically embodied that openness. The main element, however, proving the factual and intellectual fraudulence of EWS's statement is the continuing devastating impact of his views and those of his cohorts across the humanities and social sciences in the West—reinforced by the Radical Leftist rants of ANC, and their acolytes. As for Jewish/"Liberal" (in fact various nuances of Marxist) supporters for EWS's Arab cause, individuals like ANC, Joel Beinin, Judith Butler, Nira Yuval-Davis, Richard Falk are but the most notorious among EWS supporters as are universities from the UCal system and San Francisco State University to Concordia University in Montreal and Tel Aviv University. EWS practically took over the meek MLA (Modern Languages Association) and caused the implosion and splitting of the MESA (Middle-East Studies Association).

EWS's *Orientalism* is, by and large, a factually baseless, or distorting, plainly unjust, obscurantist tirade against the Western tradition of Middle Eastern in particular as well as Asian and area studies, a veritable *ode to ignorance*, when considering *pearls* like the bashing of Spain for publishing, in one year, more books than the entire Muslim world. Japan, routinely topping the global list of published books, would "deserve" the intellectual *commissar's* harshest tongue-lashing. EWS mangled Japan's history as part of his dogged anti-Western intellectual jihad: "Islam excepted, the Orient for Europe was *until the 19th century* a domain with a continuous history of unchallenged Western dominance. This is *patently true* of the British experience in India, the Portuguese experience in the East Indies, China and Japan, [except for] the occasional native intransigence to disturb the idyll, as when in 1638-39, *Japanese Christians threw the Portuguese out of the area*." [emphasis added] *All* of the assertions in the excerpt are factually false, the most egregious being the misrepresentation (on the altar of sorts of EWS's obsessive anti-Westernism) of the last stage of the genocide of Japanese-Christians by the Tokugawa shogunate.

EWS/*Orientalism* has had significant influence on Japan scholarship. On this side of the Pacific, Stefan Tanaka gave Japan's modern historiography the orientalist treatment in his 1993 award-winning *Japan's Orient: Rendering Pasts into History*. Professor Tanaka considers *Orientalism* "a fine study on the epistemological and ontological distinction between the Occident and the Orient." Fully accepting EWS's orientalist line, Tanaka writes:

Knowledge... claims authority over its object... In his study *Orientalism*... Said describes such a use of knowledge in the European discourse on the Orient,

⁷ Said, *Orientalism*, 27.

primarily the Middle East... how the French and British developed and defined a positional superiority; the Orient as the past was an object by which the progress of Europe could be measured... [Orientalism] developed into an institutional discipline, Europe used to create and manage the Orient.⁸

Tanaka then proceeds to orientalise Japan's modern historiographical practice:

[T]ōyōshi [Oriental history] evolved from a discussion of Japan's position in the world... to Japan's destiny in the world, particularly in Asia. The implication for power in this field of knowledge is clear... Japanese orientalists objectified tōyō in the same way that the European Orientalists objectified the Orient.⁹

Tanaka readily accepts EWS's political polemic at face value, and even as legitimate inspiration, apparently without considering the factual accuracy or the overall analytical validity of EWS's diatribe. Shiratori Kurakichi's supremacist analysis reflected the vibrant and successful modernization project of Meiji Japan vs. *self-destructing Shina* (mainly due to the lingering impact of the Taiping Rebellion and incompetent national leadership) is understandable in its own historical context, amply illustrated by cardinal events like China's inability to reform successfully and find stability in the century prior to 1949 vs. Japan's victories over China (a confrontation between two imperialist powers over Korea) and Russia and the self-confidence, even arrogance that they generated especially in the context of the Sino-Japanese civilizational relationship during the previous 1300 years. Thus, given modern Japan's intellectual and political history, the EWS-style orientalist interpretation is even anti-historical, unless one wants to partake in EWS's anti-Western intellectual jihad, *a la* Itagaki Yūzō as shown below. Qutb's Islamism followed by EWS is supremacist in nature and as such, *utterly averse to learning from other civilizations*. Japan is on the opposite end of the civilizational spectrum. The always pragmatic Shintoist/Buddhist civilization practised WAKON KANSAI in the pre-modern era, then switched to WAKON YŌSAI in the Meiji era—in both cases for its own benefit while fiercely guarding its distinct identity. A century ago, in his *Fifty Years of New Japan* then Japanese Prime Minister, Ōkuma Shigenobu, democrat, nationalistic statesman, educator and founder of Waseda University, confidently and historically accurately, observed: “Japan's general progress during the short space of half a century (since the Meiji Restoration of 1868) has been so swift that it presents a spectacle rare in the history of the world.” Nonetheless, and most importantly, “the susceptibility of the Japanese to the influences of foreign civilization [is coupled with] a strong retentive power which enables Japan to preserve and retain all that is good in and about herself. Moreover, for twenty centuries the nation has drunk freely from the civilizations of Korea, China and India. *The Japanese have then welcomed Occidental civilization while preserving their Oriental civilization.*”¹⁰ [emphasis added]

The failure of the “Arab spring” is but the most recent, major historical event, indicating the utter falseness of EWS's irresponsible and malign approach of blaming the West/America for the intrinsic failure of the Arab world to reform, again, mostly due to the lack of separation between Religion and State (*Din* and *Dawla*, respectively, in Arabic) characteristic of all Muslim entities. EWS's habit of blaming others for Arab failures renders him a ROLE (Racist of Low

⁸ Stefan Tanaka, *Japan's Orient: Rendering Pasts into History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 21.

⁹ Tanaka, *Japan's Orient*, 22.

¹⁰ Ōkuma Shigenobu, *Fifty Years of New Japan* (London: Smith & Elder, 1909), Introduction.

Expectations) as well. Japan represents the opposite reality—that of Religion traditionally serving the State with the drastically different and obvious consequences.

In *Embracing the East: White Women and American Orientalism*, Mari Yoshihara effusively praises “Said’s pivotal work on the European discourse about its colonial territories in the Middle East.”¹¹ Yoshihara seems to fully embrace EWS’s orientalism and racist anti-Americanism, ignoring the fact that the colonialism she mentions practically never existed, simply because 400 years of Muslim/Ottoman imperialism only ended in 1918 and Islam has been overwhelmingly dominant in the area for 1400 years. It is these two solid historical facts that account for the awful present political situation in the Arab/Muslim Middle East, where past Western *colonial* rule is but a distorted, propagandistic reference to the 30-year long British and French presence *not* as colonial masters but as Mandatory Powers for the League of Nations, that ended in 1948.

Yoshihara’s orientalist *Madame Butterfly* is “a classic trope symbolizing the politics of race, nation and gender in US-Asian relations... a melodramatic construction of Orientalism—Western ways of perceiving, understanding, and representing the ‘Orient’ that are founded on a material reality of unequal power relations between the West and the East... typically expressed in gendered terms: the powerful West... associated with virile masculinity and the subordinate East with passive femininity.” Impressively put, but only as an EWS-inspired remark. (EWS gave *Aida* the racist, anti-Western orientalist treatment, too). In reality, *Chōchō-san* is a very familiar case of a novel turned into an opera libretto, the result of a veritable international “conspiracy” (EWS would love it!) the main *plotters* being American novelist John Luther Long, French novelist Pierre Loti and two Italians, librettist Giuseppe Giacosa and composer Giacomo Puccini. Needless to say, *Madame Butterfly* as idea and as operatic masterpiece has nothing to do with racial or gender supremacist political ideas; it is a typical Italian opera set around a love story ending badly and told through beautiful—occasionally lachrymose—music. Most importantly, countless factual examples point in the opposite direction of Yoshihara’s gender-focused orientalist rendering of American-Japanese relations: Nitobe Inazō’s 1900 global best-seller *Bushido: The Soul of Japan*; the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902, facilitating a Japanese victory over Russia; the U.S. considering Japan’s military capability so challenging that the possibility of war against the upstart Asian power is seriously considered in 1907. Yoshihara further orientalist and *otherizes* Japan-U.S. relations in the late 19th century, by, in my view, [mis]representing the building of a full-size replica of the gorgeous *Hōōden* (Phoenix) Pavilion of the Heian era, at the 1893 World Columbian Exposition in Chicago, not as a display by a proud Meiji Japan of its ancient (Chinese-inspired) architectural tradition but as an episode of the U.S. “reassert[ing] the Orientalist vision of the Japanese as the peculiar Other... Americans... were also fascinated by the spectacle of the construction process.”¹² I cannot consider the act of Americans marvelling at the architectural masterpieces of another culture at an exhibition as an example of Western/American (White) supremacy.

Japan’s leading orientalist among the academic Left is professor Itagaki Yūzō, co-translator of *Orientalism* into Japanese, retired Tōdai professor of Middle East studies, former president of JAMES (Japan Association of Middle East Studies) and former advisor to then

¹¹ Yoshihara Mari, *Embracing the East: White Women and American Orientalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 7.

¹² Mari, *Embracing the East*, 20.

Lower House Speaker Kōno Yōhei. Sacrificing Japan’s history for the benefit of EWS’s Islamist scholarly agenda comes easy to Itagaki:

It is because the Japanese have tried to adapt themselves to the [sic] Western orientalism [that] Japan has become an orientalist State, that alienates itself from Asia... There are Japanese who feel spontaneous sympathy toward another orientalist state called Israel.¹³

Itagaki’s countless anti-American and antisemitic diatribes going back to the 1960s includes the book *Nihonjinyo, kakugo wa dekiteiruka?* (English title: *Have You Made Preparations?*) in which he urged his fellow Japanese to prepare for imminent suffering caused by the U.S., purportedly the result of Israeli “pressure” in reaction to Japan’s frequent pro-Arab policies aimed at ensuring a steady supply of oil since the first oil crisis of 1973. Itagaki’s dire predictions failed to materialize.¹⁴

Hirokawa Ryūichi, another Radical Leftist propagandist, masquerading as photographic journalist has been a fervent Palestinian-Arab victimism pusher, a Shylock promoter, as well as an EWS fan, thus vociferous antisemite for over 30 years. Indoctrinated in anti-Zionism in Israel by the late ‘Akiva Orr, a leader of the Israeli anarcho-nihilist terrorist outfit *Matzpen* who also trained Pakistani communist and fervent EWS follower Tariq ‘Ali, Hirokawa married and divorced Radical Leftist anti-Zionist Ruti Yoscovici, daughter of *Shoáh* survivors. In early 2019 Hirokawa was outed and may be tried as a sexual pervert and rapist.




Figure 6.1 Books Critiquing *Orientalism*

Orientalism has had its critics over the years. Malcolm Kerr was among the first to directly criticize EWS’s corrupt and highly politicized scholarship.¹⁵ Keith Windschuttle and many others have also taken EWS to task for his shoddy and corrupt scholarship, his abject

¹³ Yūzō Itagaki, *Dialogue Among Civilizations: A Japanese Viewpoint* (Bahrain Center for Studies and Research [BCSR], 2002).

¹⁴ Yūzō Itagaki, *Nihonjin yo, kakugo wa dekiteiru ka?* (Tokyo: KK Besto Serāzu, 1991).

¹⁵ Kerr H. Malcolm, “Review of *Orientalism*,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 12 (1980): 544-547.

victimist tactics,¹⁶ though not his *intellectual and political Qutb-style Jihadism I am introducing here*. The lack of more significant impact of two most important book-length critiques of *Orientalism* above, as well as that of countless critical articles, indicates the need for continuing scholarly and intellectual endeavours aiming to “talk truth to EWS’s lies” and based on solid historical facts. Ibn Waraq’s *Defending the West: A Critique of Edward Said’s Orientalism* is methodical and systematic. The title itself attests to the author’s perfect grasp of the *raison d’être* of EWS’s jihadi write-up. Daniel Martin Varisco’s *Reading Orientalism: the Said and the UnSaid* is very useful due to the author’s commitment to a *balanced* approach to orientalism—a major tradition in Orientalism and Western scholarship at large.

2. EWS—INTELLECTUAL JIHADI TO THE END

EWS’s unswerving support for Islamism, replete with his lifelong racist and antisemitic aggressiveness were in full display after the September 11, 2001, Jihadi terrorist attacks on the United States.

The day following the 9/11 attack, however, EWS was launching online the fraudulent *Israeli apartheid* movement: “In the American mind, analogies [between Palestinian-Arabs and] South Africa’s liberation struggle... most emphatically do not occur. We must make those analogies.”¹⁷ The baseless, grossly antisemitic Israeli *apartheid* jihad and its BDS (Boycott/Divest/Sanction) tactic was subsequently and quite successfully expanded by Omar Barghouti, a Qatari Islamist operative masquerading as a graduate student at *Tel-Aviv University (Israeli apartheid at work!!!)* a proponent of a “One-Arab-State” solution to the Arab-Israeli so-called conundrum, as well as by prominent Marxist activists like Canada’s Naomi Klein. EWS had used the apartheid slur against the Jewish State since the 1970s.

Among the leading supporters of the baseless and racist Israeli apartheid accusation have been major leaders of the iconic African National Congress (ANC) including Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu. By now, an “eternal” governing party, the ANC, after liberation, has proven a harsh disappointment for the nation’s long-suffering Black majority; it has become a cauldron of social injustice, corruption and unfathomable violence—especially in the form of sexual attacks against women—employing communist/Islamist antisemitism to prolong its rule. Israel, of course, has never been an apartheid state because as a genuine democracy, its Arab minority has always been fully represented in the Knesset (Parliament)—in Zionist parties as well as in Jihadi groups. Arab ministers, judges and Supreme Court Justices and diplomats, are routine. Separate roads for Israeli traffic in the West Bank were built in the early 21st century only for security reasons—to stem suicide-murder terrorism. It is, however, the Muslim world that has the oldest apartheid scheme—the 1400-year-old *Ahl Dhimma*. As well, the longest lasting (a millenium before the Atlantic African slave trade and 150 years after the latter ended in mid-19th century) the largest (in number of victims) and the harshest form of that awful tradition was dominated by Arab/Muslim traders (and their African collaborators) on the *eastern* coast of Africa (Zanzibar, etc.) as well as in North Africa where the victims were 1.5 million Europeans.

As for the September 11, 2001, Jihadi attacks on the United State, at first, after habitually rudely bashing another, Samuel Huntington (the author of a brilliant analysis of the civilizational nature of future international confrontations) as “a clumsy writer and an inelegant thinker,” EWS

¹⁶ Keith Windschuttle, “Edward Said’s Orientalism revisited,” *The New Criterion* 17, no. 5 (1999): online.

¹⁷ *Al Ahram Weekly Online*, September 12, 2001.

cleverly “elegantly,” and arrogantly, and, as expected, falsely, used the “trivialization card” in explaining away the incident: “Instead of seeing it for what it is, the capture of big ideas... by a tiny band of crazed fanatics for *criminal* purposes... international luminaries... have pontificated about Islam’s troubles... But why not instead see parallels... for... bin Laden and his followers in cults like the Branch Davidians, or the disciples of Reverend Jim Jones at Guyana or the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo?”¹⁸ In reality, as even the intellectually corrupt EWS knew (better than most but feigned ignorance out of loyalty to the Islamist cause) it is abundantly clear that the massive popular support for the “*Magnificent 19*” (bumper stickers in “Londonistan”) in the Muslim world (but not the Iranian people) indicate the global reach of Jihadi syndicates, from Al-Qaida to *Da’esh* (ISIS).

By late September, EWS adopted the Islamist/Leftist comeuppance theory, laced with historical falsehoods, plain antisemitism and clever victimist complaints against the anti-Arab “bias” of journalists (especially those with Jewish names), in order to turn the aggressor into “victim” and *justify* the attacks:

[I]n the Middle East and the Arab world, U.S. actions...—unconditional support for Israel, the sanctions against Iraq that have spared Saddam Hussein... the bombing of Sudan, the U.S. ‘green light’ for Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon (during which almost 20,000 civilians lost their lives, in addition to the massacres of Sabra and Shatila) the use of Saudi Arabia... as a private U.S. fiefdom, the support of repressive Arab and Islamic regimes—are deeply resented and, not incorrectly, are seen as being done in the name of the American people... In other words, *there is a dialectic between specific US actions... and consequent attitudes toward America... which has behaved with such callous obliviousness of lesser peoples. Surely also, many Arabs and Muslims are aware of the hold on US policy of the pro-Israeli lobby and the dreadful racism and fulminations of pro-Israeli publications like The New Republic or Commentary... or bloodthirsty columnists like Charles Krauthammer, William Safire, George Will, Norman Podhoretz and A.M. Rosenthal, whose columns regularly express hatred and hostility toward Arabs and Muslims.*¹⁹ [emphasis added]

ANC at MIT expressed his full support for the 9/11 attackers in a joyous tone, justifying the atrocity in a wild anti-American and anti-Western diatribe: “The United States, over the past 200 years... expelled or... exterminated the indigenous population (of America)... conquered half of Mexico, carried out depredations all over the region, Caribbean and Central America, conquered Hawaii and the Philippines... For hundreds of years, *Europe* has been casually slaughtering people all over the world. That’s how they conquered the world, not by handing out candies to babies... The main sport of Europe for hundreds of years was slaughtering one another... In Afghanistan, we are in the midst of trying to murder 3 or 4 million people, not Taliban of course, their victims.” [ANC, September 12, 2001, MIT]

In 1955, EWS’s *hidden* mentor, Sayyid Qutb, expressed most clearly the aims of the MB’s global Jihad mentioned on page 4. In 1962 the MB reached the United States with the MSA, the first among its many front outfits.

¹⁸ *Al Ahram Weekly Online*, September 17, 2001.

¹⁹ *Al Ahram Weekly Online*, September 27, 2001.

About three decades later, in 1991, the FBI—while investigating Jihadi finances and activism in Florida—uncovered an MB document originally drafted in Cairo in 1987 and titled *An Explanatory Memorandum for the General Strategic Goal for the [Muslim] Brotherhood in North America*, which spells out the movement’s goal of undermining America internally, through intellectual and political jihad:

The... ‘Civilization-Jihadi Process’... the *Ikhwan* [*al Muslimun*—the Muslim Brotherhood] undertakes in [North] America is a... grand Jihad in [sic] eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and sabotaging its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated and God’s religion [Islam] is... victorious over all other religions... It is a Muslim’s destiny to perform Jihad and work wherever he is and wherever he lands until the final hour comes, and there is no escape from that destiny.²⁰

In 2003, not long before his passing, EWS was expressing, in unmistakable Qutb-style, his militant jihadi convictions at the Marxist-Islamist *World Social Forum* in Porto Alegre, Brazil:

I... believe very strongly that it’s important for *those of us who are not part of this* [Westfalian-style nation] *state system* to be able to address what I call the ‘*other America*,’ because there are vast possibilities of mutual benefit... Porto Alegre is a terrific model for that. I think there are enough movements from below, whether *human rights movements, ecological movements, women’s movements, ethnic movements*, that favor, in America, *THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA which is very important*.²¹ [emphasis/capitals added]

ANC chimed in: “9/11 was due to Israel as the root cause for legitimate anti-U.S. Moslem and Third World fury.”²²

The slogans at the Leftist/Jihadi global anti-capitalist jamboree were “*Viva la Intifada Global!*” and “*Nazis, Yankees, Jews—No More Chosen Peoples!*” The slogans have not changed to this day, be it at WSF annual gatherings or at those of its newest affiliate—the *Antifa* Leftist fascist movement.

3. EWS’S LASTING LEGACY AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

EWS’s global anti-Western, anti-American, antisemitic legacy is particularly évident at his stomping grounds, relentlessly continued by at least three Islamist academic *militants*. American-born Rashid Khalidi, the E.W. Said Chair of Arab Studies is a former leading PLO operative, and now a “front” for HAMAS (founded by “the much regreted Ahmed Yassin”). In his scholarly work, Khalidi is the proponent of the idea of the existence of distinct Palestinian-Arab national patterns in the Ottoman era, a position championed for years by the likes of Radical Leftist Israeli sociologist Nira Yuval-Davis and Tel-Aviv University’s Radical-Leftist, avid promoter of the fictional Palestinian-Arab ancient nationhood, and avowed Jewish

²⁰ *The Investigative Project on Terrorism*, online.

²¹ Shimon Samuels, “With a Clenched Fist and an Outstretched Arm: Antisemitism, Globalization and the NGO Challenge in the International Arena,” *Jewish Political Science Review* 15 (Fall 2003): 3-4.

²² Samuels, “With a Clenched Fist.”

nationhood-denier, Shlomo Sand. Khalidi is the founder of the *American Arab Action Network* (AAAN) an MB-style advocacy outfit now headed by EWS acolyte, head of EWS-style Arab political advocacy *Washington Watch* and media magnate John Zogby. Islamist Joseph Massad uses extreme anti-Zionist hateful lies as legitimizing tools for the promotion of his hard gay-bashing, anti-Westernism, anti-Americanism and antisemitism. Islamist Hamid Dabashi (leading EWS acolyte and author of the orientalist *Post-Orientalism*) routinely uses antisemitic and anti-American tweets in a manner highly reminiscent of EWS’s tirades, and even worse:



Figure 6.2 Tweets by Hamid Dabashi

With such EWS-inspired teachers, no wonder that the Columbia University campus is becoming a cauldron of unbridled even violent, Islamist/Leftist anti-American and antisemitic activism, a *BirZeit on the Hudson*.



Figure 6.3 An Israeli Student Quoted in the Article

A recent episode—one of many—indicates the seriousness of the situation. An Israeli student (Figure 6.3) describes an incident she personally experienced: “A [Students for Justice in Palestine—an MB affiliate Islamist/Leftist propaganda outfit] member heard me [speak Hebrew]

and started screaming: ‘Stop killing Muslim babies!... You’re a murderer!’” she said. “Then she screamed, ‘Zionist, get out!’ A nearby public-safety administrator did nothing.”²³

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²³ <http://www.MEMRI.com>.

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7. THE TOURIST WALKING ROUTES OF BUNKYO WARD, TOKYO: FOREIGN PERCEPTIONS OF WALKABILITY

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ABSTRACT

Many cities have developed walking networks that are geared for international and domestic tourists. Students explored four tourist walking routes in Bunkyo Ward, Tokyo, depicted on a tourist map in May 2017, as part of a third-year geography field course. The main objective was to evaluate each route's walkability in terms of ease of walking, landscape variety, enjoyment, and safety. These criteria were from the walkability checklist on the website <http://ican.walk.ca> of Green Communities Canada. The students also critiqued the routes subjectively in terms of their suitability for foreign tourists walking them. The field work involved recording landscape observations, sketching and taking photographs. The overall results were that each route highlighted gardens, museums, temples and shrines according to themes about local literary culture that were assigned to each walking route on the tourist map. The enjoyment of each route varied according to the path taken between the points of interest noted on the map and the degree to which students were engaged in the landscape. Also, the routes took longer to walk than what was suggested on the map. The principal conclusions were that while the routes were generally safe for walkers, wayfinding was challenging, partly because most of the students did not read Japanese, and there were no route markers. Moreover, some students were disengaged as the themes of the routes were generally geared for local tourists who are familiar with Japanese literary culture.

Keywords: Japan, China, 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, economic and commercial relations.

1. INTRODUCTION

Tourist walking routes are common in large cities as walking has become more popular. There has been a drive to make cities more walkable. Some of these routes are geared for international tourists, but many are geared for domestic tourists and local residents.

Several walking routes exist in Tokyo. Some are indicated by signposts and maps affixed to markers or walls. Some of these routes were established by the metropolitan government and criss-cross the wards of Tokyo. They are often indicated by metal maps fixed to concrete markers at different locations along the routes (Figure 7.1). Some walking routes of Tokyo are published in paper and on the internet. Recently the Japan National Tourist Organization¹ published in English a set of walking routes for metropolitan Tokyo in a PDF map format. The Tokyo Metropolitan government also publishes a set of health walking routes on the internet.² Individual municipalities in Tokyo have created walking routes, e.g., the “Nippori and Yanaka Strolling Map” produced jointly by Arakawa City and Taito City.³ Some walking routes have also been created by individuals—often these are associated with blogs or personal websites.⁴ There are also guided walks. Some of these are free, and some are not. For example, guided walks are advertised on the internet for upwards of \$375—e.g., a day walk through places such as the University of Tokyo!



Figure 7.1 Ueno no Oyama Walk That Passes Through Bunkyo Ward

Source: Damei Li photo, May 17, 2017.

¹ “Tokyo and vicinity walking guide: Sixteen Selected Courses,” Japan National Tourist Organization, 2017 Accessed March 16, 2019. <https://partners-pamph.jnto.go.jp/simg/pamph/385.pdf>.

² “Tokyo Walking Map,” Tokyo Metropolitan Government, Bureau of Social Welfare and Public Health, 2016. <http://www.fukushihoken.metro.tokyo.jp/walkmap/en/tokyo-walk/index.html>.

³ “Nippori and Yanaka Strolling Map.” Tourism Promotion Section, Industry and Economy Division, Arakawa City Office, January, 2017. <http://www.city.arakawa.tokyo.jp>; Tourism Section, Cultural Industry and Tourism Division, Taito City Office, taitonavi.jp

⁴ Kaoru Sawahara, “Kakei Tanbou, Toukyou To Bunkyou Ku, Hongou, Kikusaka Kaiwai (Searching for a Beautiful View, Bunkyo Ward, Metropolitan Tokyo, Kiku Hill Neighbourhood),” 2007-2009, Accessed March 20, 2019. <http://www.natsuzora.com/dew/tokyo-east/hongo-kikuzaka.html>. This is an example of a personal website describing the Bunkyo Ward landscape in detail while one is walking back alleys and side streets.

This paper focuses on a case study of four walking routes in Bunkyo Ward in Tokyo. These walking routes are published in paper and online. The reason for choosing Bunkyo ward is one of practicality. The students and instructors in our third-year geography field course⁵ stay in Bunkyo Ward for about one week. In 2010, the students started to evaluate the walkability of these walking routes as part of their course assignment. This paper focuses on the work that 12 students did in May 2017. The students addressed the following questions: 1) How walkable is Bunkyo Ward based on foreign students' perceptions and reactions using a walkability checklist? and 2) How can the walking routes be improved for foreign tourists?

I write this report primarily in the first person from the point of view of the course instructor, but the students are authors too as it is their observations, perceptions, reflections and literature reviews that are the main content of the paper. I refer to the students by first name when citing their perceptions or comments. However, I generally do not distinguish which student used or cited which source. I will first give a brief background about Bunkyo Ward. Second, I will then go over the objectives and methods used in the study. Third, I will briefly describe the four tourist walking routes. Fourth, I will go over the walkability results. Fifth, I will discuss the results, make recommendations, and then summarize and conclude.

2. BACKGROUND TO BUNKYO WARD, TOKYO

Bunkyo Ward⁶ is located in the centre of Tokyo (Figure 7.2)—being surrounded by the Yamanote train line, which is the circular line around the centre of Tokyo. Bunkyo Ward is bordered by Ueno train station, Tokyo Dome, Shinjuku ward and Ikebukuro ward. It is a mixture of residential, commercial/retail and public space, including several well-known gardens, shrines and temples. Bunkyo Ward is the home to several universities, including Tokyo University and adjacent Bunkyo Gakuin University (Figures 7.3 and 7.4), where our field course students stay. The ward was created in 1947, and is an amalgamation of Hongo and Koishikawa wards.⁷ As of February 2019 it has a population of 221,606.⁸ The area is 11.29 km², and it is the fourth smallest of the 23 wards of Tokyo.⁹

⁵ This is a field course at Thompson Rivers University, Kamloops, BC. The course is open to students who have taken at least half a year of academic courses. Often students who are not majoring in geography—but have a strong interest in Japan—take the course. This was the case in 2017.

⁶ I will use the term Bunkyo Ward, a translation for Bunkyo Ku; however, Bunkyo Ku is also referred to as Bunkyo City

⁷ “Bunkyo Ku no Oitachi,” Bunkyo Ku, November 30, 2016.

<https://www.city.bunkyo.lg.jp/kusejoho/profile/three-minutes/upbinging.html>.

⁸ “Bunkyo-Ku Jinkou Toukei,” Bunkyo Ku, 2019. <http://www.city.bunkyo.lg.jp/kusejoho/toke/zinko.html>.

⁹ “Bunkyo Ku no Ichi to Chikei,” Bunkyo Ku, June 9, 2016.

<https://www.city.bunkyo.lg.jp/kusejoho/profile/three-minutes/location.html>.




Figure 7.2 Bunkyo Ward (Bunkyo-Ku) in Metropolitan Tokyo¹⁰



Figure 7.3 Bunkyo Ward Looking Northeast Toward Tokyo University from Bunkyo Ward Tower

Source: Nick Welychko photo, May 2017.

¹⁰ Shigenobu Aoki, “Bunkyo-Ku Map,” Akanemoto~commonswiki, July 4, 2006. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Map_Bunkyo-ku_en.png.



Figure 7.4 Bunkyo Ward from Bunkyo Gakuin University Looking Toward Shinjuku and Mt. Fuji.

Source: T. Waldichuk photo.

Bunkyo Ward consists of both uplands and lowlands. The uplands or *yamanote*¹¹ is part of the eastern edge of the Musashino Plateau.¹² During the Edo era, high ranking military, such as the *daimyo* or regional lords, had residences on the uplands,¹³ which elevated the status of the uplands—a landscape with mansions and park areas. There still exists a cultural difference between the lowlands (*shitamachi*) and the uplands, exemplified in terms of language and class.¹⁴ The ward is higher than the Asakusa area next to the Sumida River in adjacent Taito Ward, which is considered a traditional *shitamachi* or lower town. Jinnai gives a good description of some of the ridges and valleys in Bunkyo Ward. A lowland area stretches from Shinobazu Pond in Ueno Park—just east of Bunkyo Ward along Shinobazu Dori street, north to Nezu subway station and further north to Sendagi subway station in Bunkyo Ward. This is the valley of the former Aizome River.¹⁵ Other lowland places in Bunkyo Ward include the area near Tokyo Dome and the wide roads branching off from that area, e.g., Hakusan Dori,¹⁶ the area around the Kanda R. in the Otsuka and Mejiro districts of Bunkyo Ward next to Shinjuku Ward, and the area around Ochanomizu train station in the Yushima area. These lowland areas were characterized by small, high-density clusters of buildings, e.g., the *nagaya* building.¹⁷ Fujimori calls these present-day areas that are left-over residential landscapes, often found in back alleys, *shitamachi* islands.¹⁸ The sloped walking pathways (*sakamichi*) are a known characteristic of

¹¹ Terunobu Fujimori, “*Shitamachi*, in Tokyo’s left hand,” *Japan Quarterly* 34, no. 4 (Oct.1, 1987): 410.

<https://search.proquest.com/docview/1304282731?accountid=14314>.

¹² Hidenobu Jinnai, *Tokyo: A Spatial Anthropology*, trans. Kimiko Nishimura (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 11-12.

¹³ Fujimori, “*Shitamachi*,” 410, 412.

¹⁴ Robert J. Smith, “Pre-Industrial Urbanism in Japan: A Consideration of Multiple Traditions in a Feudal society,” *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 9, no. 1 (part 2) (Oct. 1960): 248. <https://doi.org/10.1086/449888>.

¹⁵ “Sendagi—The Landmarks of Edo in Color Woodblock Prints,” National Diet Library, Japan, Accessed February 26, 2019, <http://www.ndl.go.jp/landmarks/e/sights/sendagi/>.

¹⁶ Jinnai, *Tokyo: A Spatial Anthropology*, 12. One can see the Hakusan Dori (Street) area from the map on p.12.

¹⁷ Fujimori, “*Shitamachi*,” 412.

¹⁸ Fujimori, “*Shitamachi*,” 417.

Bunkyo Ward and are displayed on a poster produced by the Bunkyo Ward tourism association. Some slopes are more famous than others. For example, Kikusaka slope near Tokyo University was the home of author Ichiyo Higuchi.¹⁹ There are at least 113 slopes in Bunkyo-Ward.²⁰

Jinnai²¹ talks about the viewpoints in the uplands of Tokyo during the Edo period. Some of these views were from the uplands in Bunkyo Ward and adjacent areas. The views were of Mt. Fuji or Tokyo Bay. Tall buildings have blocked many of these views. For example, the view of Mt. Fuji from the uplands of Yanaka district (called Fujisaka [or Fuji slope]) of the Yanaka district from adjacent Taito Ward has been blocked by tall condominium buildings in Bunkyo Ward.

Some of Bunkyo Ward was fire-bombed during World War II. Karacas²² mentions that 51 per cent of Tokyo was destroyed at the end of the war. The Great Tokyo Air Raid of March 10, 1945 that burned the densely populated *shitamachi* area straddling the Sumida River and killed approximately 90,000 people.²³ Much of the destruction was in the *shitamachi* areas.²⁴ In Tokyo, in all the air raids more than 100,000 civilians were killed, injured, 2.9 million buildings were destructed, and 70 km² of land was bombed,²⁵ and 2,861,857 were made homeless.²⁶ If one looks at the historic composite map of the bombing, the areas north of Ochanomizu subway station, south of Komagome train station, and around Chinzanso Hotel near Edogawabashi subway station were bombed.²⁷ The section on the west side of the University of Tokyo toward the Bunkyo Ward Civic centre was spared.

To fully appreciate these sites and landscapes in Bunkyo ward, one should really have a background in Japanese history and more specifically historical geography. One must have an understanding of the Edo Era and Edo or old Tokyo itself. One also has to have a fundamental understanding of Japanese literature that starts well before the Edo era and continues through the Showa era. Many authors have—as I mentioned previously—written literary works that take place in Bunkyo Ward.

In summary, the uplands and lowlands play an important role in the cultural history of Bunkyo Ward. Whereas the ward is not an old administrative area, its amalgamated districts of Koishikawa and Hongo have a rich history dating back to the Edo period and earlier. As will be described in the following section, the areas described in the walking routes are the homes of famous writers and often the settings for their novels or poems. As well, the high society that lived in this highland area during the Edo period left a legacy of magnificent parks and

¹⁹ Kit Nagamura, “Booking Uphill in Bunkyo,” *Travel, Walking the Wards. Japan Times*. September 7, 2007, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/life/2007/09/07/travel/booking-uphill-in-bunkyo/#.XI1FJ6Is-fA>.

²⁰ Nagamura, “Booking.”

²¹ Jinnai, *Tokyo: A Spatial Anthropology*, 122.

²² Cary Karacas, “Place, Public Memory, and the Tokyo Air Raids,” *Geographical Review* 100, no.4 (2010): 522, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1931-0846.2010.00056.x>

²³ Gordon Daniels, “The Great Tokyo Air Raid, 9-10 March 1945,” in *Modern Japan: Aspects of History, Literature and Society*, ed. W.G. Beasley (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 129.

²⁴ Daniels, “The Great Tokyo Air Raid,” 125.

²⁵ Kenneth Hewitt, “Providing Grounds of Urbicide: Civil and Urban Perspectives on the Bombing of Capital Cities,” *Geography and Environmental Studies Faculty Publications* 14 (2009): 347, http://scholars.wlu.ca/geog_faculty/14. These numbers were based on multiple secondary sources.

²⁶ Hewitt, “Providing,” 357. These numbers were based on multiple secondary sources.

²⁷ David Fedman and Carey Karacas, “A Cartographic Fade to Black: Mapping the Destruction of Urban Japan During World War II,” *Journal of Historical Geography* 38 no.3 (July 2012): 323, figure 12. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhg.2012.02.004>.

architecture. At the same time the present *shitamachi* back alley landscape is a reminder of how life was in the Edo era for the common people. The newer landscape from the mid-1900s onwards often clashes with and dominates this landscape, leading to blocked views of Mt. Fuji and a functional but less interesting landscape.

3. OBJECTIVES AND METHODS

The objective of this project was to evaluate walking routes in terms of ease of mobility, safety, variety of landscapes and enjoyment²⁸ from the point of view of foreign tourists. We used the walkability checklist (described below, see Table 7.1) that used to be available from the website <https://icanwalk.ca>, which was connected with Canada Walks,²⁹ a part of Green Communities Canada.³⁰ The students also made landscape observations, sketched what they saw and took photographs as part of their assignment.³¹ Finally, they critiqued the routes in terms of their suitability for foreign tourists walking them, e.g., while visiting the 2020 Olympics. Thus, the students used this walkability information and their observations to write a report on a walking route. Most of these reports included recommendations to improve walkability along the walking course.

This paper draws its theoretical content from the perception literature, including that of Yi-Fu Tuan's 1974 book *Topophilia*,³² and John Urry's writings on "The Tourist Gaze,"^{33, 34} and also the walkability literature, e.g., Wunderlich.³⁵ Yi-Fu Tuan examines visitor perceptions: "The visitor's evaluation of environment is essentially aesthetic. It is an outsider's view."³⁶ It is also an evaluation based on sight.³⁷ We can relate these ideas to the foreign tourists' views toward walking route landscapes in Bunkyo Ward. "The visitor's viewpoint, being simple, is easily stated. Confrontation with novelty may also prompt him to express himself."³⁸ Tuan contrasts the visitor's viewpoint with the native resident: "The native, by contrast, has a complex attitude derived from his immersion in the totality of his environment."³⁹ Thus, such attitudes are more difficult to articulate. With effort and preparation one hopes that a tourist can see beyond the aesthetics and develop a feeling of what it is like to live in a place. "The outsider judges by

²⁸ This could have been done on any walking route. We actually do a "dry run" on a walk that I created with a colleague in Kamloops (I will talk about how we evaluate the walk for safety and enjoyment in the methods section).

²⁹ "About Us—iCANwalk," Accessed March 16, 2019: <http://www.icanwalk.ca/en/home/about-us>. Icanwalk.ca was partnered with Canada Walks.

"Canada Walks—A Leader in Canada's Walking Movement," A Department of Green Communities Canada, 2015, <http://canadawalks.ca/>.

³⁰ "We Make it Easier to Go Green," Green Communities Canada, Accessed March 16, 2019. <http://greencommunitiescanada.org/>. This organization promotes socially and environmentally sustainable communities.

³¹ And to help develop the students' field skills.

³² Yi-Fu Tuan, *Topophilia* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1974), especially "visitor and native," described on 63-66.

³³ John Urry, "The tourist gaze 'revisited,'" *American Behavioral Scientist* 36 no. 2 (November 1992): 173-184.

³⁴ John Urry and Jonas Larsen, *The Tourist Gaze 3.0* (Los Angeles: Sage, 2011), 2-3, 14-23.

³⁵ Filipa Matos Wunderlich, "Walking and Rhythmicity: Sensing Urban Space," *Journal of Urban Design* 13 no.1 (Feb. 8, 2008): 125-139. doi: 10.1080/13574800701803472.

³⁶ Tuan, *Topophilia*, 64.

³⁷ Tuan, *Topophilia*, 63.

³⁸ Tuan, *Topophilia*, 63.

³⁹ Tuan, *Topophilia*, 65.

appearance, by some formal canon of beauty. A special effort is required to empathize with the lives and values of the inhabitants.”⁴⁰

It is useful to have visitors evaluate walking routes. They can pick up on things that the local residents do not perceive. Tuan states “Obviously the visitor’s judgement is often valid. His main contribution is the fresh perspective.”⁴¹ “The visitor is often able to perceive merits and defects in an environment that are no longer visible to the resident.”⁴²

We can also relate the experience of travelling on the walking route to John Urry’s “tourist gaze.”⁴³ Urry mentions that many tourist gazes or viewpoints are unintentionally organized by, e.g., writers of tour guides. He also states that different gazes are authorized by different discourses, so one could apply this notion to the promotion of history and literary culture in Bunkyo Ward by the Bunkyo Ward tourism association in terms of the historic and literary themes of their walking maps.

One can also relate these thematic walking routes to “*kontentsu*” tourism. “Kontentsu tourism” is a Japanese-English term that refers to tourism with content or a theme,⁴⁴ e.g., the birthplace of a famous author. Japan markets kontentsu tourism both domestically and internationally.⁴⁵ The walking routes of Bunkyo Ward can be classified as “*kontentsu*” tourism as they are based on historical themes and linked with historical figures.

Finally, we make reference to the walkability literature. In particular, we refer to Wunderlich who talks about the different types of walking, e.g., purposeful walking,⁴⁶ and refers to the sense of place literature—authors such as Yi-Fu Tuan.⁴⁷ Thus, this paper examines the perceptions of foreign tourists walking between tourist spots in Bunkyo Ward, Tokyo. However, we do not delve deeply into the sense of place literature. Instead, we focus mostly on the evaluation of walking routes using a walkability checklist.

The walkability checklist that the students used, based on the website Icanwalk.ca, asked the following four questions (see Table 7.1).

- 1) How easy was your walk? (ease)
- 2) What people and places did you see? (variety)
- 3) Was your walk enjoyable? (enjoyment)
- 4) How safe did you feel? (safety)

These questions were asked at designated points along the walking route. The responses to each of these questions were broken down into pre-determined points or criteria, e.g., under “How easy was your walk?” one response was “nothing blocked the sidewalk.” If nothing blocked the sidewalks, then a checkmark was given for that location. If there were no sidewalks, then N/A (not applicable) was given for that location. Or under “How safe did you feel?” if crosswalks were well-marked, then a checkmark was given for that location. Some students

⁴⁰ Tuan, *Topophilia*, 64.

⁴¹ Tuan, *Topophilia*, 65.

⁴² Tuan, *Topophilia*, 65.

⁴³ Urry, “The tourist gaze,” 173.

⁴⁴ Kumi Kato and Yumiko Horita, “Tourism Research on Japan—Overview on Major Trends: Japanese and English-Language Materials,” *Tourism Planning & Development* 15 no.1 (May 19, 2017 online): 14, <https://doi.org/10.1080/21568316.2017.1325392>.

⁴⁵ Philip Seaton and Takayoshi Yamamura, “Japanese Popular Culture and Contents Tourism—Introduction,” *Japan Forum* 27 no.1 (Dec. 13, 2014, online): 2, DOI: 10.1080/09555803.2014.962564.

⁴⁶ Wunderlich, “Walking,” 126, 127, 131-133, 136, 137, 138.

⁴⁷ Wunderlich, “Walking,” 128.

modified the Icanwalk.ca checklist criteria or made up their own terms to evaluate the walking routes. These walkability criteria are part objective, focusing on practical considerations, e.g., accessibility by wheelchairs. But they are also subjective, focusing on, e.g., how enjoyable the walk was.

Table 7.1 Example of a Walkability Checklist with 23 Criteria Based on Icanwalk.ca

	Route Section						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
How easy was you walk?							
• I could use sidewalks, trails or paths	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
• There were sidewalks on both sides of the street			✓		✓		
• Nothing blocked the sidewalks	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
• The sidewalks were wide enough		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
• I could easily use the sidewalks if I was in a wheelchair or pushing a stroller		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
• The sidewalks were well maintained	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
What people and places did you see?							
• I saw a mix of homes, businesses, stores and schools	✓						
• I passed a mix of apartments, attached houses and single detached homes							
• I passed windows, not just walls or fences	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
• I met people on the street	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Was your walk enjoyable?							
• The route I took was pleasant and inviting	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
• I saw plants, trees and gardens	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
• There were benches if I needed to stop					✓		✓
• There were interesting things to see	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
• It was easy to get to shops and businesses	✓		✓				
• The shops and businesses were neat and tidy, worth a visit	✓		✓				
How safe did you feel?							
• It was clear where I could walk	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
• It was easy to read signs		✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
• Crosswalks were well marked	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
• I had enough time to cross the street	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
• Cars stopped at crosswalks and lights	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		
• Cars were driving at a safe speed	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
• At night, everything was well lit	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Adapted from icanwalk.ca, Assessments made by Brandon Turner - May 17, 2017

The scores on the checklists were then added up for each location to give an overall walkability score for that location of the walking route. The scores for multiple adjacent locations could then be added and averaged to give a walkability score for a section of a walking route. Thus, people used these criteria to evaluate walkability systematically (every so many

metres or block by block) along their chosen walking route (see Table 7.1). This checklist has been used in a study of the Niagara Region of Ontario.⁴⁸

We focus on one part of the orange walking route near Tokyo University as a case study using the walkability checklist. Not all students chose to evaluate their walking routes so systematically using a checklist—most of them critiqued their routes subjectively.

4. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FOUR TOURIST WALKING ROUTES




Figure 7.5 Four Bunkyo Ward Walking Routes: Purple, Green, Pink & Orange (with Most Stops Included)

Source: Source: Bunkyo City Tourism Association; Base map adapted from Pipping, April 7, 2016, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Today%27s_Tokyo.svg

As mentioned above, each walking route had a theme, and they were associated with famous scholars and nobility. But we differentiated each of the walking routes by colour for practical purposes. The students chose part of one walking route to evaluate—roughly 500m to 1km long.

The following is a brief description of the four walking routes. I refer mostly to a Bunkyo Ward walking map published in English, with the information as of Feb. 1, 2009 and 2016.⁴⁹ The same maps are published in Japanese, Chinese and Korean. In this paper we focus on the English

⁴⁸ Lisa Gallant, *Walkable Community Checklist Report—A Compilation of Data on Existing Supports for Walkable Communities in Niagara and Areas in Need of Improvement*, Prepared by Healthy Living Niagara as part of walkON, Niagara Region Public Health, May 2010, http://www.niagaraknowledgeexchange.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2014/05/Walkable_Community_Checklist_Report.pdf.

⁴⁹ “A Town of Culture—Bunkyo Tourist Guide Map,” Bunkyo City, Bunkyo City Office Tourism Section, Bunkyo City Tourism Association, August 2016, http://www.b-kanko.jp/Portals/0/map/osanpo_en/ebook/pdf/3.pdf.

and Japanese maps. The Japanese maps include short descriptive expressions above each of the stops along the walking routes, unlike the English version maps. The maps are free and are available at the Bunkyo Tourist Information centre. There are no routes drawn on the map between the numbered sites. According to the map information, all the routes are supposed to take between 1 hour and 1 hour and 40 minutes. Unless otherwise noted, the following descriptions and quotes are from the information included in the Bunkyo Ward walking map. I refer to the students in my course by first name when citing their comments.

An employee at the tourist information centre told me that older people, including seniors, often walk the routes, and they like the paper maps. Foreign tourists, other than those from China or Korea, use the English version of the map. In the future more sophisticated electronic maps may be produced, but because the current users are older, paper maps are more popular. In the future, she said there may be paper map booklets because it is difficult to keep the big map unfolded while walking.

4.1 Purple walking route (Otsuka and Mejirodai neighbourhoods) (Figure 7.5)

This is the “Art and Poetry Appreciation Course.” “Appreciate the arts and poets of the Edo era, as a renowned poet, Basho Matsuo, guides you through Otsuka and Mejirodai.”⁵⁰ It is located in the southwest part of the ward next to Shinjuku Ward.

The route consists of 10 scenic spots with a suggested walking time of 70 minutes. If one spends any time at these sites, the walk could take one or more days. Stops #3 to #8 are clustered together, whereas stop #1 is to the north, and stops #9 and #10 are to the east. An energetic-looking caricature of haiku poet Basho, holding a Bunkyo Ward flag, appears at the top of the list of 10 sightseeing points as if to lead the walkers on a quick trip through the area. The time span of the route goes from the Edo period to the 20th century, highlighting an Edo-era Buddhist temple (stop #1 near Gokuji subway station), Japan Women’s University, Shin-Edogawa Park near the Kanda River, a house dedicated to Basho, a museum where Edo Era nobility from Kumamoto (*daimyo*) had a house, a museum for the Kodansha publishing house, St. Mary’s Catholic Cathedral, the garden at the Four Seasons hotel, a hall dedicated to the family of former Prime Minister Hatoyama and a printing museum (Figure 7.6). Based on a multi-image map, much of this area was fire-bombed at the end of World War II.⁵¹ Thus, there are many post-World War II landscapes. Many of these lowland and upland stops are connected by “Heartbreak Hill,” a steep walking path from the Kanda River area to the Kodansha museum area. This is the probably the hilliest of the four walking courses (Figure 7.7). In sum, these stops focus on the history of literary culture, religion, politics, publishing and printing.

⁵⁰ “A Town of Culture—Bunkyo Tourist Guide Map.” Quotes from Bunkyo Ward walking map, 2009 and 2016 versions.

⁵¹ Fedman and Karacas, “A Cartographic Fade to Black,” 323.



Figure 7.6 The Landscape Around the Printing Museum (Right)

Source: Naomi Woolverton photo, May 2017.



Figure 7.7 Yureizaka Hill Walking Path

Source: Nick Welychko photo, May 2017.

4.2 Green walking route (Koishikawa neighbourhood) (Figure 7.5)

This is the “Relaxation and Tranquility” course. “Discover tranquility and relaxation as you stroll through beautiful Koshikawa area guided by the legendary Senhime, the daughter of the second Tokugawa Shogun Hidetada, Hidetada.”⁵²

⁵² “A Town of Culture—Bunkyo Tourist Guide Map.” Quote from the 2016 Bunkyo Ward walking map.

This walking course consists of seven stops with a suggested walking time of 1 hour and 2 minutes, and is dominated by two large botanical parks: Koishikawa Botanical Garden in the northwest near Myogodani subway station is at the beginning of the walk. Stop #2, Cherry Blossom Avenue, is of interest because it is an area rather than a building or park and is an example of post-World War II land readjustment that has been used in urban planning, in this case after the area was bombed during World War II. The walk then continues to a temple and shrine before arriving near the busy built-up area near the Bunkyo Ward civic centre, where the other large garden is found—Korakuen. The area covered by the walk can be divided into two sections: the residential area in the northwest near Koishikawa botanical gardens, and the more built-up commercial area in the southeast near the Bunkyo Ward civic centre and Tokyo Dome. The mapmakers try to make a connection among the parks, Cherry Blossom Ave., Dezuin temple, Kitano shrine, and Genkakuji temple, the Tokugawa Shogunate and the God of academic achievement Michizane Sugawara. One could say that the “relaxation and tranquility” theme refers mostly to the two large parks.

4.3 Pink walking route (Honkomagome neighbourhood) (Figure 7.5)

This is the “Course to discover the romance of the Edo-culture.” “This course will take you back in time. The renowned doctor and novelist, Ogai Mori will guide you through the Komagome area where you will get a glimpse of the Edo lifestyle.”⁵³

The pink walking route consists of eight stops with a suggested walking time of 1 hour, and highlights three shrines, three temples, a museum and a large garden. It includes a museum dedicated to a local medical doctor and fiction writer Mori Ogai. Literary romance along this walking route is illustrated with the love story associated with the tomb of Yaoya Oshichi at Enjoji temple (stop #4). Oshichi was a girl in love with a temple worker but was executed for starting a fire in her quest to meet up with him. The neighbourhoods around stop #3 Kogenji temple and stop #6 Kichijoji temple were fire-bombed during World War II, damaging these temples. The lack of old buildings in the area close to stop #7 (Fuji shrine) and Stop #8 (Rikugien Park) also indicate areas that were bombed. But looking at the multi-image air photograph of the area,⁵⁴ Rikugien park was spared during World War II bombings (Figure 7.8). Hakusan shrine (stop #5), Kichijoji temple (stop #6) and Fuji shrine (stop #7) have been moved over time. Hakusan shrine was moved to the general Hongo 1 chome area during the Tenryaku Period (947-957), and was moved again several times, lastly by the fifth Shogun Tsunayashi Tokugawa. Kichijoji temple was relocated from Suidobashi Bridge after being damaged in the 1657 Meireki fire. Fuji shrine (stop #7) moved from Suruga in Shizuoka Prefecture in 1573 to the Tokyo University campus area and then to its current location in 1628. Part of the shrine is an artificial hill, which resembles Mt. Fuji. Street stalls congregate around the shrine from late June to early July when Mt. Fuji opens.

⁵³ “A Town of Culture—Bunkyo Tourist Guide Map.” Quotes from the 2016 Bunkyo Ward walking map.

⁵⁴ Fedman and Karacas, “A Cartographic Fade to Black,” 323.



Figure 7.8 Rikugien Park at the End of the Pink Walking Route near Komagome Rail Station

Source: Damei Li photo, May 18, 2017.

4.4 Orange walking route (Yushima and Hongo) (Figure 7.5)

The orange walking route starts on lower land near Ochanomizu train station before climbing uphill to the elevation of Shinobazu pond in Ueno Park. The first three stops on the walk highlight famous temples and shrines with the first temple, Yushima Jingu, being noted for its Confucian history. Stops #4 and #5 highlight a more contemporary garden and museums from the 20th century. Tokyo University is the focus of stop #6, the red gate and the Sanshiro Pond (or Shinji Ike), which both date back to the Edo era, as does Stop #7, Kaneyasu store, which is south of the campus and marked the northern boundary of Tokyo during the Edo era.

The red gate was built in 1827 and is associated with the leader (*Daimyo*) of Kaga territory (or Kaga *han*) whose wife was the daughter of the eleventh Shogun. The gate became a national treasure before World War II.⁵⁵ The pond and surrounding garden were constructed in 1638 according to the wishes of the second *Daimyo* of Kaga territory and was considered the best garden among feudal lords residing in the area during the Edo period.⁵⁶ The pond became part of the set for Natsume Soseki's novel *Sanshiro*, which was the name of a character in the novel. Thus, Brandon argues that the pond ties in well with the walking route theme of literature and romance. Both the gate and Sanshiro Pond are the two best known historical sites on the University of Tokyo campus.⁵⁷

Stop #8, the Iseya pawnshop, which also dates back to the Edo period, is associated with the writer Higuchi Ichiyou, who patronized the shop during the early 20th century due to her lack of income. The neighbourhoods from the red gate (stop #6) to stops #7 and #8 contain old wooden buildings that date back to the Edo era. These areas survived fires from the Great Kanto earthquake of 1923 and the fire bombings of World War II. The last three stops, the museum,

⁵⁵ "Akamon Gate (Goshuden-mon of the Former Maeda Clan's Residence), "Why UTokyo? Explore Our Campuses," Hongo, University of Tokyo, Accessed March 16, 2019, https://www.u-tokyo.ac.jp/en/whyutokyo/hongo_hi_007.html.

⁵⁶ "Sanshiro Pond (Ikutokuen Shinji-ike)." Why UTokyo? Explore Our Campuses, Hongo, University of Tokyo, Accessed February 16, 2019, https://www.u-tokyo.ac.jp/en/whyutokyo/hongo_hi_006.html.

⁵⁷ "History of the Hongo Campus," Why UTokyo?, Explore our Campuses, Hongo, U. of Tokyo, University of Tokyo, Accessed March 18, 2019, https://www.u-tokyo.ac.jp/en/whyutokyo/hongo_history.html.

civic centre, and Tokyo Dome, are buildings from the second half of the 20th century, and are examples of the area's prosperity. Thus, we start with an old built landscape, with connections from China and the Edo era, and end the walk with new modern version of Tokyo.

5. WALKABILITY RESULTS OF THE ORANGE WALKING ROUTE

The twelve students evaluated the walkability of all four walking routes. However, in order to keep this paper concise, I am choosing the orange walking route to illustrate the walkability results. I refer to the walkability assessment of the other routes in the general discussion and recommendations. Not all students used a walkability checklist. Many students evaluated their walking routes subjectively. I focused on the four questions mentioned previously that are derived from the Icanwalk.ca walkability checklist.⁵⁸

The orange route was evaluated by Aly, Brandon, Geraldine, and Carley.

Aly's route: Stop#1, Yushima Seido temple to Stop#2, Reiunji Temple, to Stop#3, Yushima Tenman-Gu shrine:

Aly evaluated the route from Stop #1 Yushima Seido temple, to Stop#2 (Reiunji Temple) and finally Stop#3 Yushima Tenman-Gu shrine. Parts of Aly's walk are not accessible for disabled users. At stop #1 "Yushima Seido Temple has no wheelchair accessible ramps, and the stairs on the grounds do not have handrails for those who have difficulty walking, such as the elderly. The pathways are uneven and dark from the overhanging trees. The sidewalks are narrow and sometimes shared with cyclists. Further into the residential area, stop #2 Reiunji Temple is more accessible as the paths are even and connect with the parkade. But from stops #1 to #2 there are few streetlights and no crosswalks. Stop #3 Yushima Tenman-gu shrine is wheelchair accessible with large paths."

The walk is not well suited for tourists: it is hard to navigate the crisscrossed streets, which only have shops tucked away that locals know about—not an interesting landscape to walk for tourists. Aly found that the mixture of old and new buildings between the first and second stop detracted from the historic character of the walk. Near Stop #2 Reiunji temple, which is mostly residential and quiet, i.e., lack of variety in the landscape, Aly felt a sense of loneliness and unease. But there was more variety in the landscape near Stop #3 Yushima shrine: Yushima elementary school, children in a playground, more rooftop gardens and more green space in general. The presence of greenspace and children playing countered the sense of loneliness felt near stop #2. Aly commented that some sites seemed overcrowded, e.g., Yushima shrine, which detracted from its historic feeling. In general, Aly's route from stops #1 to #3 and the places on it need to address the needs of the elderly with mobility issues and the needs of tourists.

⁵⁸ 1. How easy was your walk? (ease)

2. What people and places did you see? (What did you see?) (variety)

3. Was your walk enjoyable? (enjoyment)

4. How safe did you feel? (safety)

Brandon’s route: Stop #4 Kyu-Iwasaki-tei garden, to Stop #5, Yayoi Museum, to Stop #6, Sanshiro Pond & the Red Gate

Brandon evaluated the walkability of the orange walking route from stop#4 Kyu-Iwasaki-tei garden to stop #6 the Sanshiro pond at Tokyo University. Brandon divided his section of the orange walking route into seven smaller sections (see Figure 7.9).




Figure 7.9 Walking Route Sections of Brandon’s Orange Route

Using his checklist (Table 7.1) Brandon concluded that his section 1 (in red on Figure 7.9) was accessible, reasonably safe and friendly.

Brandon’s section #2 (in dark blue on Figure 7.9), toward the hospital, on the way to the museums (near #4), was basically an alleyway through which he observed people hurrying, which prompted him to pick up his walking pace. He said this section had the least character and the lowest score on his checklist.

Brandon’s section #3 (in yellow on Figure 7.9) passes by the front of the university hospital. This section has more character than section #2 because one can see a planned university campus. The path is flat, unlike the beginning of his walking route, and one can smell a variety of scents from plants, a food truck and the hospital. One passes a façade with artwork at the entrance of the hospital. This was a pleasant place to walk; for example—with a tree-lined

boulevard and businesses such as street vendors to watch, but there was no place to stop and sit down.

Brandon commented “Without a clear path laid out on the tourist map it is quite easy to become confused and turned around.” Thus, Brandon was not sure where the Yayoi museum (point 4 on Figure 7.9) was—he was worried that it might be someone’s home as the area was residential. He found out that he was at the right place later on when checking the location using the online “Official Tokyo Travel Guide.” Referring to Brandon’s section #4 (in purple): “On the walkability checklist, this section failed (score = 16/23), as there were no sidewalks—they changed to a line separating the road from its shoulder near the museums, and it was difficult to read the signs, e.g., for the museum.

Brandon gave his section #5 (in green on Figure 7.9), the north end of Tokyo University campus where the engineering buildings are located, a high score (score = 19/23) due in part to the large number of rest spots. His main concern was the lack of or poor maintenance of green space.

Brandon analyzed section #6 (pink) and #7 (blue) together: section #6 goes from the “statue” to a building at the beginning of the Sanshiro pond on the Tokyo University campus. Section #7 goes around the pond (Figure 7.9). The entrance to the pond is difficult to find within the small clump of green space. The pathway down to the pond consists of cut stepping stones, and a small creek crosses it (Figure 7.10). There is a nice scent from the plants, and “It only takes a few steps in before it feels as if you are in a different world, transported from the relatively relaxed campus into a natural unburdened world.” The pond has fish, tortoises and visiting ducks. Brandon thought the pond was much newer and was constructed as a stormwater retention basin. One cannot see the surrounding buildings from the pond’s location—trees block the view. Unfortunately, the route to the pond is not accessible for handicapped persons; the stones can be slippery if wet, there are no railings to hold on to, and there are some drop-offs with no guard rails. Still, if one can visit the pond and garden, it is beautiful—even if one does not know its historical context. Brandon gave section #6 of the walking route—the approach to the pond—a score of 16 out of 23 and section #7 around the pond a score of 12 out of 23.



Figure 7.10 Stepping Stones Across Stream

Source: Brandon Turner photo, 2017.

In summary, Brandon gave a detailed description and impression of a counter-clockwise walk from Kyu-Iwasaki-Tei gardens near Shinobazu Pond in Ueno Park past the Tokyo University hospital, north to the Yayoi museum and Yayoi university gate, then south through the Tokyo University campus arriving at the red gate and Sandshiro Pond. He had trouble reading the signs near the Kyu-Iwasaki-Tei Gardens and near the Yayoi Museum. The route past the museum through the university was walkable, although the sidewalk changed to a line

marking off the shoulder of the road. His route continued to be walkable until he reached the pond, which although was beautiful, was not walkable for someone who needed assistance walking or a person in a wheelchair. He did not know the historical importance of the Sanshiro Pond or the red gate of the university.

Geraldine and Carley's route: Stop #6, University of Tokyo Red Gate to Stop #7, Kanayasu Store and Stop #8, Former Iseya Pawnshop

Geraldine and Carley, similar to Aly, did not formally incorporate a checklist into their walkability analyses. Geraldine focused on the aesthetics and history of her section of the orange walking route. She investigated back alleys between stop #6, Red Gate and stop #8, the Former Iseya Pawnshop. Between the Red Gate and stop #7 Kanayasu store she noted the old Edo landscapes around Kikusaka Dori (Street) with the common lamp designs, evoking a sense of enjoyment. Geraldine felt that Kikusaka hill had more historical “intrigue and significance” than the gate. She—like Brandon—also commented on the lack of English signage. She rated the walk between the Red Gate and Kanayasu store (stop #7) as very good, and the walk between Kanayasu store and the former Iseya Pawnshop (stop #8) as “good, but could do better.”

Carley evaluated the orange route from stop #9 Bunkyo Historical Museum to stop #10 Bunkyo Ward office to stop #11 Tokyo Dome (no one evaluated the section from the former Iseya Pawnshop to Bunkyo Museum)

In general, Carley found that the route she took between the museum and the ward office was walkable as there was a variety of pleasant, well-maintained, clean landscapes with abundant green space, and a perceived safe environment due to the lack of graffiti. In addition, there was a raised (tactile) yellow line following the length of one of the sidewalks for visually impaired pedestrians, and Carley noticed wheelchair accessible sidewalks and gardens along the way. She did find that large numbers of people around Tokyo Dome detracted from her walking experience. Also, some of the tiles near Tokyo Dome were broken, but they were being fixed, and there was a lack of English signage, especially on the museum building.

Orange Route Recommendations

The students had different recommendations depending upon their experiences walking the orange route. Aly mentioned that along the walking path people should learn about the local literary history of the area, perhaps through information sign boards. Brandon mentioned better signage (in English) for the Kyu-Iwasaki-tei gardens and the Yayoi museum. Geraldine said there could be better lighting and English signage in the old alleyway parallel to the road up Kikusaka hill, which is about halfway between stop #7 Kanayasu store and stop #8 the former Pawn Shop. Carley had a number of recommendations, but specific to the orange route, she said creating proper sidewalks near Bunkyo Historical Museum alley to prevent people from walking on the road. Also, the entire walking area needs a site where local people could spend more time, rather than just walking through the area.

Orange route Conclusion

In conclusion, the orange route was walkable and somewhat wheelchair accessible, except in places like the Sanshiro pond on the Tokyo University campus. The students felt safe on the walking route, and they experienced a variety of landscapes but Aly commented that the area around the middle of her route seemed quiet and lonely while some sites seemed

overcrowded, detracting from the tourist experience. The lack of signage, particularly in English, but even in Japanese spelled out in Roman letters, was a problem with all the students' routes. The historical context of the stops along the route was not always evident. The map descriptions gave some background, but often it was insufficient for people who have no background in Japanese literature and history.

6. GENERAL DISCUSSION

In general, all students focused on the utilitarian aspects of walking along their route and in Bunkyo Ward; however, there were variations in assessments and perceptions. Students examined, for example, accessibly, e.g., by people using wheelchairs, of the places along the walking route and the sections connecting them or the presence or need of sidewalks. Aly, on the other hand, also took a phenomenological-like approach to analyzing walkability—relying on her emotional reaction to each of the places along the walking route. Yi-Fu Tuan talks about this approach in his book *Topophilia*.⁵⁹ One can also relate Aly's feelings toward the places along her route back to Urry's "tourist gaze."⁶⁰ Also, in many cases the stops along the way were more interesting than the landscapes connecting them as the stops were highlighted on the maps, not the routes between them. Thus, some students did not evaluate the walkability of the sections of the route, but often evaluated the walkability of the stops, e.g., are museums wheelchair accessible? One student evaluated the walk in a reverse order along the purple route. Thus, her perceptions of the route were different, as she was walking downhill to the Kanda River, rather than walking the opposite way up from the river.

The students' perceptions of the walking routes sometimes differed from what the walkability scores would have us believe. One issue with the walkability checklist is that one may like the walking route, e.g., due to aesthetics, even though it is not walkable because of safety issues—for example, no sidewalks or crosswalks, or it may have a low assessment rating due to low scores in other categories, such as "How easy was your walk?" So the route may score poorly overall in terms of numbers, but the user may still like walking it.

Most students who investigated these four walking routes had a very basic knowledge of Japanese historical geography—they knew or should have known the significance of uplands and lowlands in Tokyo as they had to read an article on this topic. They also knew that Tokyo was called Edo. Some of the students were disengaged with landscapes on the routes due to lack of knowledge of literary culture; others were disengaged because of a lack of theoretical geographic knowledge, i.e., knowledge of Japanese urban geography or planning, e.g., the history of land use in the area.

Brandon talked about not understanding the history of the area that he was walking through. From stop #4 the Kyu-Iwasaki-Tei gardens to the Tokyo University hospital area he said "There was much to take in on this leg of the route but having little to no knowledge of the gardens and no connection to the neighborhood, [comma added] this felt like little more than a novel walk. There was no real sense of place for me along here". Brandon later said, "This goes back to the issue of being uninitiated... This sense of history should be evident while walking in the area, but perhaps some background reading for the person walking the route or signage is needed. Still, Brandon did find that even without the historical context, he could still enjoy his walking route, and appreciate the character of the different stops along the way. But he stated

⁵⁹ Tuan, *Topophilia*, 8-10.

⁶⁰ Urry, "The tourist gaze," 173.

that those people “with less passion for mundane details” will not be able to develop this sense of place without this historical context.

Brandon stated that he was able to appreciate the character of most of the stops on his route. Before embarking on the walks we did not review the literary history of the area, including the famous author Natsume Soseki, or the well-known haiku poet Basho—literary figures who were connected to the Bunkyo Ward area and are part of the walking routes on the map. As Brandon said, we did not know the context of why some of these places were important. Brandon further states that visitors would become more attracted to the sites and landmarks if they understood the historical context and how the stops on the routes are connected to the themes. Brandon, for example, did not know the significance of Akamon (red gate) at Tokyo University until he had done his initial walkability assessment.

These historic walking routes connect areas based on themes. These walks thus fall under the category of “*kontentsu* tourism,”⁶¹ as they are associated with these literary figures and sites. Brandon stated that the mapmakers have “created four walking routes which thematically tie many of these disjointed locations together.” I think the key point to remember is “disjointed.” It was interesting how—what we perceived as—unrelated sites were connected into a walking route, e.g., connecting shrines and temples with botanical gardens, but perhaps from a local, old-timer perspective these connections make sense. Thus, the routes seem to be designed more for domestic tourists with a background in local historical literary culture.

The students and I sometimes had difficulty connecting the walking route theme to the areas along one of the courses. For example, along the orange route the map has little information about the areas connecting the Iseya Pawn Shop, the Bunkyo Historical Museum, Bunkyo Ward Office or Tokyo Dome. There is information about the stops of interest, just not the areas connecting them. How do these interconnected areas relate to “Literature and Romance”—the theme of the orange route? Moreover, do all sites fit the theme of the route? How are the sites inter-related, and how are the areas in between them related?

Also, some tourists may interpret “romance” to mean the attraction between two people, rather than literary romance. Literary romance (*bungaku rouman*) is a genre of writing involving relations among several people, e.g., when focusing on someone’s life journey, sometimes in a historical context, but it does not always involve a love interest between people. Thus, some foreign tourists using the English walking map may interpret the “romantic” descriptions of the walking routes as interpersonal romance, and they may evaluate landscapes along the walking route in terms of wanting to revisit these places with a romantic partner, as some of my students in the past have done in their essays.⁶² These misperceptions can be corrected by studying the literary history of the area before walking the routes.

Other landscapes were perceived because of other foreign perceptions. In my 2017 class, there was a diversity of landscape perceptions because, in addition to Canadian students, there were two from Hong Kong and two from China. The two students from China noticed a monument built in honour of Chinese leader Sun Yat Sen at Hakusan shrine on the pink walking route (Sun Yat Sen had lived in the area). I would never have noticed this statue if it had not been for the two students.

⁶¹ Seaton and Yamamura, “Japanese Popular Culture,” 2.

⁶² A counterview: Kazuaki Nagata, “Tokyo’s Bunkyo Ward picked as most ‘Sensuous City’ in Japan,” *Japan Times* online, September 3, 2015, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/09/03/national/tokyos-bunkyo-ward-picked-sensuous-city-japan/#.XI0-UqIs-tB>. To the defense of these students, some in the media have portrayed Bunkyo Ward as truly romantic.

Moreover, the students were interested in everyday cultural landscapes, such as tofu stores and water pumps, which unfortunately were not highlighted along the walking route. Promoting these everyday landscapes on the map and on the ground would not require having an understanding of the area's literary history.

There is no suggested walking route between the sites on the map, which Brandon states makes it a challenge for people who do not know the area (such as foreign tourists) to navigate between the sites on the map—the city, including Bunkyo Ward, is not arranged in a grid, so one can easily become lost. For example, student Aly comments: “This residential area of Bunkyo-ward is not tourist friendly since the streets become nearly impossible to navigate even with a map, and there is a lack of signs.” Brandon states that perhaps the mapmaker's intent was for the tourist to explore the areas between the sites. Also, Brandon mentions that the order of the stops is the suggested order that the map maker wanted the tourist to take when visiting the sites.

One can definitely change the walking experience by taking different routes between two points of interest on the map. For example, two students first walked between two sites on the pink route along a major arterial roadway and then along a parallel back street—the experience was completely different as the arterial roadway was wide with much traffic, whereas the parallel older back street was narrow with few vehicles, all travelling slowly and passing houses, yards and small businesses.

Many of the students advocated for English signs where places were deemed important. Brandon was perplexed that what he believed to be lesser important places had English signage. “It was stunning to me that a location with some amount of importance was not marked in English when other more minor and most major landmarks have English signage,” referring to the fact that there was no English signage for the Yayoi museum. Geraldine used Google translate on her smart phone while walking on the orange route to read a note on the pawnshop that it was closed due to special spring hours. Carley referred to a book that describes the cultural and political challenges of adopting English as a global language in Japan.⁶³

In reality most tourists to Japan are from China and Korea. The number of native English-speaking tourists is much smaller. Perhaps what would be useful is to use more Roman letters when spelling out Japanese words or names, so everyone could read them, rather than using Japanese or Chinese characters.

To be better prepared for the walking the routes, one can develop an understanding of Bunkyo Ward by reading anime that is associated with the ward. For example, the setting for the Bungo Stray Dogs anime is Bunkyo Ward. One can collect electronic stamps related to the Stray Dogs at different spots in the ward.⁶⁴ This movement from place to place collecting stamps is known as a stamp rally (*sutamupu-rari*-). Information about the Bungo Stray Dogs and the stamp rally is found on the Bunkyo Ward website.⁶⁵ However, my interview with a Bunkyo Ward tourism office employee indicates that most people who currently walk the tourist routes are older and thus I think may not be interested in local anime.

⁶³ Philip Seargeant, *The idea of English in Japan: Ideology and the Evolution of a Global Language* (Bristol: Channel View Publications, 2009), 167. ProQuest Ebook Central.

⁶⁴ “Bunkyo-kunai 6kasho wo meguri, sutamupu wo atsumete keihin wo get!” (Tour the 6 spots in Bunkyo Ward to collect stamps and get a gift), Bunkyo ku, Accessed March 20, 2019, <http://www.city.bunkyo.lg.jp/var/rev0/0147/4684/chirashiura.jpg>.

⁶⁵ “Bungo Sutorei Doguzu (Bungo Stray Dogs),” Bunkyo Ku, Bunkyo Ku ~ Bungo no Kai-Bunkyo Ku Sutanpurari-& Irasuto Tenji ~, Accessed March 18, 2019, <https://www.city.bunkyo.lg.jp/bunka/kanko/event/bungostraydogs.html>.

The walking routes focus on history and literary culture, but why has so much of this historic landscape in Bunkyo Ward not been preserved? In the last one hundred years the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923 and the fire bombings of World War II have destroyed much of the built landscape. Also, there has not been a major effort to preserve these old remaining buildings. Uta Hohn⁶⁶ mentions that the preservation of the material aspect of a building is not of utmost importance because of the threat of fires and natural disasters, e.g., that wooden buildings are frequently destroyed by fire. Thus, people do not expect buildings to last long. However, Hohn does say that recently there has been a greater effort to preserve traditional architecture.

Observing a mixture of old and new buildings can be enjoyable. Enjoying the landscape is another aspect of walkability that is emphasized in the checklist from the Icanwalk.ca website. Along many of the walking routes there are still old buildings mixed in with new ones, which can be aesthetically appealing. On the purple route student Nick liked the combination of the old and new architectural landscape in Otsuka and Mejirodai. The mixing of new and old architecture makes this area desirable—Nick said it forms a palimpsest landscape, being able to see vestiges of the old landscape in the new one. This preference for the contrasting new and old landscapes is similar to Geraldine’s impressions of the orange walking route landscape. Geraldine refers to Yuriko Saito,⁶⁷ who says that Japanese aesthetics in design is related to juxtaposed “disparate, often contrasting, elements.” Thus, one can relate this to the old Edo era buildings mixed in with the newer buildings, even if the Edo era buildings are somewhat dilapidated or weathered. Conversely, Aly said that the mixing of old and new landscapes along her part of the orange route detracted from her appreciation of the historic landscape.

In areas of Bunkyo Ward where most of this older landscape has been burned or torn down, it is hard to appreciate what was once there. Brandon mentions that “while most can appreciate the significance of places such as an iconic building or renowned landform (such as Fujisan), the significance given to a landscape due to local history and culture doesn’t always translate, particularly when the landscape no longer clearly exhibits that history,” in other words, when much of that landscape has been removed.

Finally, the condition of green space had an impact on the walking experience in terms of enjoyment. Brandon was shocked by how the lawns at University of Tokyo are cared for—for example, using weed eaters instead of lawn mowers. “My sole concern when walking this path was the maintenance of the green space, which is not an issue limited to the University of Tokyo—across much of Japan I noticed a distinct lack of investment in maintaining green spaces (at least in the manner we do in Canada).” Overall, the presence of trees increased Brandon’s enjoyment of his walking route. Aly had a similar positive experience with trees near Yushima Seido temple at the south end of the orange walking route. Richmond positively remarked on the shade from trees while walking around Korakuen on the green route. Shade has been found to be

⁶⁶ Uta Hohn, “Townscape Preservation in Japanese Urban Planning,” *Town Planning Review* 68 no.2 (1997): 246, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40113818>.

⁶⁷ Yuriko Saito, “The Japanese Aesthetics of Imperfection and Insufficiency,” *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 55 no.4 (1997): 378. DOI: 10.2307/430925.

highly correlated with perceived walkability.⁶⁸ In a study from Oregon, a walking route with more and better organized green space was favoured over one with just basic green space.⁶⁹

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

The first ten recommendations suggest making changes to the walking landscape.

First, Brandon suggested managing pedestrian crossings better. Perhaps more crosswalks in high traffic areas can be added.

Second, in order to improve walking safety, in areas where there is no clear pedestrian pathway or sidewalk, Brandon states that one can convert a nearby narrow alley or street to pedestrian-only use (Yoshii⁷⁰ discusses this possibility).

Third, to make the walk easier use appropriate signage in different languages.

Fourth, to make the walks easier both Naomi and Aly suggested the construction of better pathways that could be wheelchair accessible.

Fifth, Naomi and Aly suggested wide benches for people to rest on. Brandon suggested that benches can be added regardless if one is a senior—he stated that benches are needed, so people can sit and reflect. Carley recommended installing benches at bus stops.

Sixth, Carley also suggested adding public art to walking routes, which together with benches would entice local residents to enjoy the area rather than just walking through it.

Seventh, Carley recommended installing garbage, compost and recycling bins.

Eighth, Naomi also mentioned that drinking water should be more available, such as public water fountains, especially after climbing steep hills as is common on the purple route.

Ninth, to improve the enjoyment of the walks, Carley advocated planting taller trees to provide shade and to deal with global warming, and she also mentioned displaying hanging flower baskets.

Tenth, to improve the aesthetic appeal (enjoyment) of the walking routes, Carley recommended burying electrical lines.

The following recommendations suggest making changes to the walking activity or to the map.

Eleventh, Naomi suggested organizing tours of the purple route area for more vulnerable international tourists, such as the elderly or physically challenged people, who are led by guides along the walking course at an easy pace and help people get up the steep hills safely. The guides could also translate any questions the users have about the area, such as directions. A guide system would help people become more active. (Bunkyo Ward does provide free guided walking tours; however, they are not targeted for vulnerable people.)

Twelfth, encourage walking the routes in different numbered orders for a different experience—one can, for example, walk from stop #2 to stop #1, then stop #3. One should

⁶⁸ Ganga N. Samarasekara, Kiyotaka Fukahori, and Yoichi Kubota, “Environmental Correlates that Provide Walkability cues for Tourists: An Analysis Based on Walking Decision Narrations,” *Environment and Behavior* 43 no.4 (2011): 517, doi: 10.1177/001391610379350.

⁶⁹ Arlie Adkins, Jennifer Dill, Gretchen Luhr and Margaret Neal, “Unpacking Walkability: Testing the Influence of Urban Design Features on Perceptions of Walking Environment Attractiveness,” *Journal of Urban Design* 17 no.4, (August 2012): 58, <https://doi.org/10.1086/690235>.

⁷⁰ Yu Yoshii, “Preserving Alleyways to Increase Walkability of Historical Japanese Cities,” *Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences* 216 (2016): 605-607, doi:10.1016/j.sbspro.2015.12.034

promote walking along the narrow, back streets, which are densely built up with flower pots, e.g., which Sorensen,⁷¹ talks about in adjacent Taito ward, rather than along the wider arterial routes.

Thirteenth, if there is a suggested route, Brandon suggested drawing lines on the map between points of interest, especially—I would add—if it is easy to get lost or if the mapmakers want to direct people to certain spots.

Fourteenth, for the benefit of international tourists, give more background information about the old scholars and famous people who lived in the local area. This could be in the form of additional information included on the walking route maps, QR codes on the maps that provide walkers with more information once accessed using a smart phone, or signs at the sites of interest that can provide more multilingual information displays.

Fifteenth, Richmond mentioned that local *anime* drama should be used to promote the routes to younger people, e.g., the Bungo Stray Dogs mentioned above.

Sixteenth, Brandon stated that community mapping can be promoted in Bunkyo Ward. People can be encouraged to create their own maps, which can be posted on the internet. Apps can be developed where people can create their own guided tours. This community mapping does exist: there were flyers from Tokyo University with information about community mapping at the Bunkyo Tourism Information Centre during our stay in May 2017.

The last recommendation focuses on how we can improve the evaluation of walkability.

Seventeenth, Carley states that in the future a more complex walkability index can be devised, which is a better gauge of walkability. There were some walks, as I pointed out earlier, that were enjoyable, but not safe. These discrepancies are not always reflected in the number of points a route receives when being evaluated.

8. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The students investigated the walkability of the four tourist walking routes in Bunkyo Ward. This paper only focuses on the walkability of what we called the orange walking route, or more correctly the Yushima and Hongo route. The four routes took longer to walk than what was suggested on the map. In general, the routes were safe but not completely barrier-free. It was hard to navigate the routes due to a lack of multi-lingual signs. On the orange route, Sanshiro pond on the Tokyo University campus was not accessible, some museums could not be located because of the lack of English signs, and other significantly historic sites and buildings were easy to pass by. It was helpful to know the historic context of the walking routes.

Brandon, who walked part of the orange route, stated

I felt a sense of place here, but not what the tourist map would have had me feeling. My sense of place was being constructed in the present, in the representation of what the University and its surroundings are in the here and now. For me, that was exciting. I relished the feeling of exploring the route, but as I said already, I am intrigued by what others might observe as mundane or inconsequential.

⁷¹ Andre Sorensen, "Neighborhood Streets as Meaningful Spaces: Claiming Rights to Shared Spaces in Tokyo," *City & Society* 21 no. 2 (2009): 217. doi:10.1111/j.1548-744X.2009.01022.x.

For many people in the class, perceptions of the landscape were different from those that the mapmakers wanted us to experience. Our perceptions were based on our observations around us while walking the routes. For some of us this was intriguing and in some cases exciting; for others, as Brandon points out, perhaps less so. The challenge is to engage more people in the landscape.

These mapped walking routes are a good introduction to Japanese culture for students in the geography field course at Thompson Rivers University. But a background in the geography and history of Japan, Tokyo and Bunkyo Ward is important to appreciate these landscapes. Knowledge of Japanese is helpful too. With little knowledge of Japanese urban geography and the Japanese language, students became disengaged with the landscape. They tended to pay attention to the museums and other sites along the way, rather than paying attention to the landscape in-between. The routes took a long time to walk, especially if one visited all the sites along the way. In the future, the creators of walking routes need to think about different user groups, e.g., the variety of international tourists visiting the area during the 2020 Olympics.

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